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introduction
The real in the real economy
Federico Neiburg and Jane I. Guyer
The shIFTING meaNINGs oF real
“economic reality ignores political expectations,” writes one of the Brazil’s main 
newspapers on the ongoing national crisis.1 “all will depend on the behavior of 
the real economy,” claimed an expert on CNN, talking about the future of the 
United states after Donald Trump’s election.2 “evidence is mounting that the 
real economy is suffering from Brexit,” writes the Economist.3 over the last few 
decades, and especially after the 2008 financial crisis and the following period of 
turbulence and uncertainty that affected the biggest democracies and strongest 
national economies, “the real economy” has been transformed into one of the 
most important concepts shaping public debates about the present and future 
of our collective existence.
1. “realidade econômica ignora a retórica política,” Folha de São Paulo, July 17, 
2016. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/laura-carvalho/2016/11/1832883-
realidade-economica-ignora-a-retorica-politica.shtml.
2. “money,” CNN, may 14, 2016.
3. “straws in the wind,” Economist, July 16, 2016. https://www.economist.com/
britain/2016/07/16/straws-in-the-wind.
2 The Real economy
In this introduction, we wish to trace the shifting referents of the real from 
its first use as a term in economics in the sixteenth century to its formalization 
in the early twentieth century. We will also trace the concept, via its more recent 
historical connotations, to the present, when “real life” for global populations 
as well as for sectors of the “formal economy” has become sufficiently turbu-
lent to make daily practice a frontier for anthropological understanding. as 
we emphasize later, it is here that anthropologists can simultaneously mediate 
official terms through the details involved in their implementation, and attempt 
to comprehend people’s own concepts and practices, their “realities”, desires, and 
expectations, as they come to terms with them.
In the chapters that comprise this volume, we also draw attention to the fact 
that—in addition to its technical referent—the word real has moved beyond 
the technical economic domain into many new vernacular modes within public 
arenas. “really!” and “Get real!” are exhortations made in everyday exchanges. 
In most places, it is people who see themselves as the custodians of the referent 
of “the really real” and engage in public discussion with this conviction. only 
close ethnography can capture this range of referents in different contexts and 
languages, while paying close attention to its formal existence as a device of 
knowledge and government. This reflects the elasticity of the concept of “the 
public” itself, from the population in general through their legal representatives 
in governance and experts.
The real economy, as an official concept of economic governance, was initially 
created to track the relationship between money and commodities over time. It 
is still a key concept in the organization of the contemporary world, circulating 
among experts and ordinary people, through scientific and vernacular spaces, 
in multiple contexts, with shifting meanings. It is something that “real persons” 
can feel in their pockets, like the value of money, economic growth, or recession. 
People’s sense of the real economy is linked to its realization in experiential 
life. In technical terms, we can measure and visualize it, as in the case of index 
numbers for prices, GDPs, interest, or risk rates, organized in the form of tables 
and graphics. In the terms used by Fabian muniesa, “reality is really real when it 
is provoked, and hence realized” (2014: 17).
The reality of the real economy evokes something that endures, as indicated 
by its latin etymology res (a thing), and thus also evokes a set of opposites: 
virtual, fictitious, black, or false economies. as we discuss later, in some con-
texts “real” is employed to analyze monetary valuations that may fluctuate for 
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several different reasons. Discussions of slogans such as “Wall street versus main 
street,” widely deployed in the popular press, also enact these oppositions. some 
social movements denounce the dominance of a spurious financial economy, 
arguing that people are losing the real value of their wages and their currencies.
These assemblages of vernacular and scientific realizations and enactments 
of the real economy are linked to ideas of truth and moral values: the realization 
of the real economy is also a moral judgment—like the index numbers them-
selves, those devices designed to know and govern turbulent realities, such as 
hyperinflations and recessions. as Jane I. Guyer argues in an article that served 
as the cornerstone of our project, “the concept of the ‘real economy’ is in itself 
real, in the sense that it has endured, as a large umbrella concept for centuries, 
adaptable in many contexts, a source of precise devices as well as vague allu-
sions, but always indexing, in some direct or indirect way, as a counterpoint to, 
or mode of dealing with, turbulence and its mitigation” (2016a: 252).
By examining the formal concepts and actions in action, the essays included 
in this book apply a classic ethnographic methodology toward understanding 
how people grapple with the indeterminacies of time and meaning within the 
formal sector and at its interfaces. our main aim in this collection is to launch 
a new program of research on the anthropology of economy/economics that 
combines intensive ethnographic reserach with contributions from economic 
history, taking a long-term and broad view of both national and international 
dynamics of change. our focus is on the pragmatics of the real: we wish to 
scrutinize the real as a technical meaning in the international standardization of 
terms, yet at the same time, having varied philosophical and vernacular usages 
and meanings, link it to the “common sense-ism” of pragmatism—as proposed 
by Charles s. Peirce (1905) or even Thomas reid ([1785] 1997), as suggested 
by Guyer (2016a: 259ff.)—with the kind of ethnographic theory proposed by 
Bronisław malinowski (1935: 5ff.), where language and concepts are taken to be 
tools, documents, and “cultural realities.”
QUesTIoNING The real
What are the shifting meanings of the “real”? In which situations and processes 
is it enacted and realized? how do these meanings form part of assemblages 
of vernacular and expert experiences, enactments, and realizations of the real 
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economy? What processes are responsible for generating the “self-evidence” of 
the real? What practices, materialities, ideas, and devices are used to experience, 
live in, and live with real economies in diverse ethnographic settings? What 
kinds of persons and relations does the real economy enact and realize? Do we 
find both translational nuancing in local languages and cultures and also active 
policy interventions designed to redefine old meanings and modify their ap-
plication as the global economy moves through different phases and changes? 
Do the philosophical interrogations of “the real” add yet another voice to our 
attempts to grapple with the dilemmas of contemporary life? how do we realize 
these experiences and realizations ethnographically?
here we wish to distinguish our approach from the subdisciplinary field of 
“economic anthropology,” born in the mid-twentieth century through classic 
ethnographies such as Paul Bohannan’s work on the Tiv of Central Nigeria, 
including his analyses of production in Tiv farm and settlement (1954), distri-
bution within spheres of exchange (1955), and eventually linked to the am-
bivalent and ambiguous (like all moral domains) realities of “development.” 
economic anthropology, we argue, has always dealt laterally with the real 
economy, never explicitly focusing on it as either its main subject of inquiry or 
analytic concept. The debate between formalists and substantivists was just the 
most developed instance of a more general problem raised by economic theory: 
What do we describe as the “economic” and how do we describe it in any given 
“real” situation? What is this reality composed of ? Is it constituted by behaviors 
or by institutions? Is it an aspect of individuals or of collectives? Is it a term that 
people use descriptively or performatively? and in what contexts do they use 
it? That is, do they use it in their own languages, drawing on their own cultural 
archive of concepts, proverbs, sayings, inherited poetics, or (perhaps) religious 
invocations?
In a number of recent anthropological studies (see, for example, Neiburg et 
al. 2014; Narotzky and Besnier 2014), these questions have begun to be posed 
from a fresh angle that finally problematizes an earlier issue: Why and how 
does the “economy” or the “economic” appear as something taken for granted, 
by both actors and analysts, a given and objectified reality that limits and allows 
for different possibilities for human life? In this sense, Keith hart was a pio-
neer in exploring radically different viewpoints on monetized economies in his 
trailblazing article “heads or tails? Two sides of the coin” (1986), the two sides 
being the state (top-down) and the markets and social life (bottom-up). how, 
then, are these realities realized and recognized as such?
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FoCUsING oN The CoNCePT oF The real
To be “real,” the economy (it appears) needs to be adjectivized: micro, macro, na-
tional, global, popular, grassroots, financial, informal economy(ies). But the use 
of the adjective real implies some singular inflections, a very particular political 
epistemology linked to the two latin roots of the term real: realis, res, “some-
thing that exists, truly and effectively,” and regalis, “something that belonged or 
is related to the king or to royalty.” as a development of this latter sense, “real” 
also turned into a substantive thing, associated with the king, and became the 
name for a small spanish silver coin. over time, it also came to denote various 
coins in different countries under spanish and Portuguese colonization. Real 
has likewise been the denomination used for the Brazilian currency since 1994 
(Neiburg 2006). In countries like Venezuela, Nicaragua, and el salvador, the 
word real is used as a synonym for money.
The use of the adjective real to depict the economy is also linked to the socio-
genesis of the term economy itself, associated with the world of the house and the 
family, as in the well-known ancient Greek definition elaborated by aristotle: 
the oikos as the natural space of real persons to govern and administrate the 
house, as opposed to the chrematistic, the multiplication of money or the ac-
cumulation of wealth in the form of money. as Guyer has also shown (2016a: 
246), it is time to examine the contemporary inflexions of the real economy, 
where the house is linked to the housing market (as “real estate”) and debts, 
with an aim to develop a much deeper understanding of contemporary forms of 
relating the real to life: not only in the baskets of goods that serve to measure 
the value of money and inflation but also in the body itself, or parts of it, in the 
DNa or the global climate, all of them, among many other commercialized 
“goods,” distant from a world in which the real referred, paradoxically perhaps, 
to the Polanyian “fictitious commodities”: land, labor, and money.
The concept of the real in economic thought is centuries old, dating back 
to early european thinking on the quantity theory of money. Tracing its his-
torical, social, and geographical mutations can provide to us a creative inroad, 
therefore, to understanding the present postcrisis, turbulent, economic world. 
luigi einaudi ([1936] 1953) showed how the wide use of imaginary monies 
in medieval europe (that is, pure units of account, without any physical exist-
ence as coins or notes) gave traders a fixed point from which to think of “real 
values,” generating confidence between traders in a world full of monies and 
material media. Fictional monies were, in this sense, more real for the traders 
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than physical coins, since their value endured over time. This idea was developed 
to some extent by marc Bloch (1954), who contributed to our comprehension 
of the multiplicity and articulation of units of account and means of payment in 
premodern europe, which underpinned the calculative dimension of money as 
a device for the commensuration of “reality.” akinobu Kuroda (2008a, 2008b) 
developed these ideas in the context of Chinese history, providing valuable ele-
ments for other inquiries into the reality and realization of contemporary imagi-
nary monies in africa (Guyer 2012, 2016a) and the Caribbean (Neiburg 2016b).
Real tends to imply stability, something to be relied upon. as an analytic 
term, the concept of the real was first put forward by Copernicus in 1517 as part 
of his argument for vigilance over the quality and quantity of currency issued by 
the governing powers, so that the currency would always operate in a sufficiently 
stable way, and so that prices would reflect the real values for the people. Coper-
nicus saw the relative stability of prices and confidence in the money issued by 
the government as vital components of the nationhoods developing in europe 
during his era. In this sense, real reflected the shared values of a people.
The concept of the real exchange economy, based on a theory of the value 
of a measurable, stable component of the economy such as the classical labor 
theory of value of the nineteenth century, declined in the twentieth century 
with the rise of marginalist thought and the rise of capital as the key component 
of the triad: land, labor, and capital. The concept of the real became specifi-
cally applied to the purchasing power of money with respect to the same goods 
over time (producing “real prices”) and the corresponding purchasing power of 
money wages (“real wages”), with the implementation of the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as indices for tracking 
economic life in the twentieth century, after World War II. Inflation, the decline 
in the purchasing power of money, would depress real wages and raise the cost 
of living. Under an updated quantity theory of money, and in the expanding 
colonial economies, the concept of the real thereby became the formal measure 
of inflation.
These numbers form part of the modern economic cosmology: they became 
central concepts in the making of a “cosmoeconomics” of different conceptions 
of prosperity and the radical uncertainty of their sources (da Col 2012), linked to 
new modulations of the real. They form an object of belief; they have won public 
trust; they seem to have always existed, like a natural fact with immanent force, 
but they nonetheless have a singular history. according to some authors (for ex-
ample, Kendall 1969; Kula 1986: chap. 8; Poovey 1998: chap. 2; mirowski 1991; 
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Crosby 1996), the first registers of price variation date back to fifteenth-century 
europe. They were linked to the attempt to calculate and control fluctuations in 
the monetary value of certain products (like bread) and money in the context 
of rises in prices and monetary plurality (einaudi [1936] 1953; Bloch 1954; 
Bompaire 2006; Bompaire and Dumas 2000; Fisher 1922: chap. 1; Kendall 
1969; Diewert and Nakamura 1993; Balk 2008: chap. 1; allen [1975] 2008).
From the eighteenth century on, more abstract numbers began to be calcu-
lated, whose content was no longer directly linked to specific products but to 
nondirectly observable agglomerates of goods and services making up “baskets,” 
which serve to realize the reality of the people’s economies. The index numbers 
were directly associated with the idea of the cost of living. In 1822, Joseph 
lowe wrote on the troubles caused by the Napoleonic Wars, in which he argues: 
“What would be the practical application of this knowledge? The correction of 
a long list of anomalies in the real economy, in regards to rent, salaries, wages, 
etc., arising out of the unfortunate fluctuation of our currency” (lowe 1822, 
quoted in Kendall 1969: 6). however, it would be necessary to wait until the 
end of the nineteenth century when, in the context of the marginalist revolu-
tion, the concept of index numbers was formulated. The first Consumer Price 
Index was created in Britain in 1913, and “a formalized monitoring of the cor-
respondence, from year to year, between money prices and standardized ‘basket 
of goods’ to measure the cost of living within national economies, was installed 
as a technique of governance at the time of the Great War” (Guyer 2016a: 5). 
Irving Fisher produced the first national price index in the United states some 
years later (Fisher 1921; see also Neiburg 2010).
so, between the First World War and the end of the second World War—
during the Great Depression and the european hyperinflations of the 1920s—
the price index became widespread as a standardized instrument of knowledge 
and action with respect to the real economy (in this sense, something measur-
able and dependable; “The economy,” in the terms set by Tim mitchell [2002]). 
Index numbers, like the Consumer Price Index, are produced through abstrac-
tions of aggregates of price variations for “real” goods, expressed in a singular 
form of numbers: percentages.4 These are used “to measure the change in some 
quantity which we cannot observe directly, which we know to have a definite 
influence on many other quantities which we can so observe, tending to increase 
4. see Guyer (2014) on percentages—those particular figures linked to a sense of 
totality (and reality).
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all, or diminish all, while this influence is concealed by the action of many causes 
affecting the separate quantities in various ways” (Bowley 1926: 196, quoted in 
allen [1975] 2008: 2). according to Irving Fisher (1922: 3–4), “they express 
proportions represented by percentages and changes of magnitude between two 
points in time.”
later in the century, after World War II and the foundation of the In-
ternational Financial Institutions, the GDP and CPI became key variables in 
international monitoring and mediation, commercial contracts, national social 
payment policies, and eligibility for international investment. all of these have 
an implicit or explicit temporal horizon, meaning that they project value into 
the future based on configurations of “the real” from the past. at the same time, 
index numbers became a privileged field of battle and controversy about the 
real: technically, there are different ways to measure the value of money, and 
such divergences could transform into conflicts between agents and agencies 
(governments, number laboratories, trade unions), each trying to impose their 
own figures to govern the real economy (Neiburg 2011). since the mid-twen-
tieth century, the Bretton Woods institutions (the ImF and the World Bank) 
have overseen and examined how countries make these calculations, submitting 
them for assessment in the broad policy contexts where these institutions play 
an important role.
In recent economic writing, the real appears to refer largely to these mac-
roeconomic measurements (Cochrane 2005), at precisely the same time that 
popular and critical economics is seeking terms to analyze the experience of 
populations living in soft currency economies, where many factors affect the 
stability of the purchasing power of their money, given that financial capital 
is increasingly—and worldwide—held in hard currencies and real estate assets 
(see Piketty 2014 on the rising proportion of total capital held in housing). 
Both the concept and the analysis of the real is thus becoming complex and 
even contradictory. economic historians massimo amato and luca Fantacci 
(2014) have made the critical point that the increasing identification of capital-
ism with financial capitalism, and the real with purchasing power means that 
local-regional markets are very largely neglected as sources of livelihood—in 
this sense echoing some of the critics of contemporary mainstream economics 
for its supposed lack of attention to the real, instead privileging financial or fic-
titious economies. During the 2008 crisis and after, the press searched for terms 
to apply to people’s values and experiences and came up with expressions such 
as “Wall street versus main street” (as mentioned earlier). Internationally, there 
9The real IN The real eCoNomy
was also a powerful sense that the world’s financial elite were strengthening a 
huge rift between the investment economy and the economy of those dispos-
sessed by it (hammar 2014).
The money economy and the real economy, the latter in the mundane sense 
of “making” a stable and predictable living (to “make a living”), have apparently 
been parting ways. The privatization and financialization of land and urban real 
estate, along with the expansion of extractive industries, have led to a migration 
of a sense of the real both in and out of the popular economic world. In official 
circles such as the International monetary Fund, the real, in the sense of the pur-
chasing power of money and the value of incomes, is still central to the calcula-
tion of the Consumer Price Index. Indeed, the CPI and risk rates have become 
two of the most important indices, informing a broad spectrum of policies.
a particular challenge arises from the increased sense that the conditions of 
the present economic and political world produce high levels of indeterminacy 
and turbulence in the “real lives” of ordinary people. The real and the turbulent 
are converging. But how is this being experienced and managed vis-à-vis peo-
ple’s individual search for some kind of temporal reach into their own futures, 
while at the same time an overarching technical and political locus is devoted 
to what is conceived as a “world order”? how do these realities and temporali-
ties entangle with people’s search for better lives, linking the real and the real 
economy to the stabilization and destabilization of collectives and persons?
It is here that anthropologists can both mediate the official terms—through 
the details of governmental policy implementation—and attempt to compre-
hend people’s own concepts and practices, desires, and expectations as they 
come to terms with them. The recent works of Jane I. Guyer and Federico 
Neiburg on the “emergent” and “economic emergencies” provide ideal fields to 
further develop our theoretical framework.5 Both concepts have the same ety-
mology, the latin emergere, which simultaneously means a process of coming 
forth (or becoming) and an unforeseen occurrence requiring immediate atten-
tion. The first sense (emergent) underlies the process of coming into being or 
becoming prominent; the second sense (emergency) accentuates the need to act. 
We will address emergency first.
5. here we incorporate some of the ideas from the papers presented by the two 
authors at the rio de Janeiro workshop: Jane I. Guyer, “The real economy: Past, 
present, and emergent” (2016b) and Federico Neiburg, “economic emergencies and 
the real economy: some ethnographic threads of thought” (2016a).
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TUrBUleNT TImes: eCoNomIC emerGeNCIes
The real economy seems to be traversed by the actuality of crisis and the need for 
its prevention. The concept of crisis is closely linked to the concept of emergency. 
Whether seeking to avoid or cure it, economic reality must be diagnosed and 
fixed. Idioms of medicine and warfare are prevalent in the realization of the real 
economy—going back to the connections established by Nicolas oresme in his 
De moneta (c. 1360) between the rapid fall in the real value of money and the 
Black Plague (Kaye 1988). Crisis is also linked to truth and lies, to the accuracy or 
falsity of numbers, as we have recently seen in countries like Greece or Portugal, 
because of the lack of reliable “real” risk rates and “real” national deficit figures.
some authors have shown how the crisis today is a kind of narrative, a struc-
turing idiom and an existential device (mbembe and roitman 1995), a language 
of exceptionalism (riles 2011), an omnipresent sign in almost all forms of nar-
rative, which is mobilized as a defining category of historical situations, past and 
present, a term that seems to be self-explanatory, relating to a “moment of truth” 
(roitman 2014).6 like the latin emergere, the ancient Greek krisis denotes a 
mixture of revelation and truth, a power to distinguish, a capacity or a demand 
to choose and to diagnose. Both involve moral judgments and imperatives to 
act, providing a remedy without delay, urgently.
In the contemporary world, this entanglement of moral judgment and imper-
atives to act is performed in the concept of a “state of economic emergency,” an ex-
ceptional yet nonetheless extremely frequently used way to suspend constitutional 
rights and the rule of law during times of crisis. It also alerts citizens to change 
their supposed normal behavior and orders government agencies to implement 
emergency plans. states of economic emergency are linked to states of excep-
tion, as studied by Giorgio agamben (2005). elaborations in the juridical field 
concerning “states of economic emergency” (see, for example, scheuerman 2000a, 
2000b) base themselves on agamben’s reading of Carl schmitt, underlining the 
role of economic crisis (as well as war) in the construction of states of exception.
The theory and practice of the states of economic emergency were linked 
to World War I and its effects: european hyperinflations and the Great 
6. Claudio lomnitz (2003) has explored the concept of “times of crisis,” referring to 
wars, natural catastrophes, or major economic breakdowns, in order to stress the 
temporal character of crisis in two senses: a duration and a perception linked to the 
notion of a “saturation of the present” (as proposed by reinhardt Koselleck [1972] 
2006).
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Depression. In his classic study of German inflation, Gerald Feldman describes 
the establishment of states of emergency (Notstand) to ensure the food supply 
and, especially, to issue “emergency currencies” (named as such by law) to meet 
the demands of the real economy for paper money, first to finance the war, later 
to deal with inflation. all sorts of emergency money were issued in Germany by 
firms, municipalities, the states, and other public and private agencies (Feldman 
1997: 785). The relations between monetary instability, emergency money, and 
the war economy were, as we know, the topic of intense debates (see, for in-
stance, mendershausen 1943; meyler 2007; Keynes 1940; and the responses to 
the latter by hayek [1982] 1998: 124–26).7
In Britain, the British emergency Powers act of 1920 is especially illu-
minating. With the memory of wartime emergency provisions still fresh in 
people’s minds, lloyd George’s postwar cabinet succeeded in pushing through 
regulations granting it substantial exceptional powers to limit strike activity that 
might interfere with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, 
or with the means of locomotion (scheuerman 2000b: 1877). In the United 
states, President Franklin D. roosevelt demanded and acquired unprecedented 
wide-ranging executive powers to wage an economic war against the emergency. 
Taken as a whole, the dozen or so important statutes enacted at the time con-
stitute the single largest instance of delegated power in Us history. although 
the supreme Court soon declared parts of this original New Deal legislation 
unconstitutional, some of the laws survived the New Deal itself (scheuerman 
2000b: 1875n5). Despite legal and institutional variations (for example, anglo-
american models of martial law versus French-inspired conceptions of a state 
of siege), virtually all twentieth-century liberal democratic polities have been 
willing to declare economic emergencies before delegating generous (and often 
poorly defined) discretionary authority to the executive for the sake of tackling 
problems in the real economy.8 The core of the argument is located in the two 
7. Discussing German hyperinflation, andré orléan (2007: 205) asks, “what is real about 
currencies in war time” when the element of trust is radically thrown into question 
due to the absence of guarantees of victory or defeat? In response, he proposes the 
concept of a “self-referential currency” for those currencies imbued with uncertainties 
about the very future existence of the community within which they circulate.
8. Friedrich hayek’s responses to Carl schmitt are well known: although the austrian 
author was quick to recognize the need for states of emergency during wartime, he 
was always a staunch defender of the rule of law as a defense against despotism (e.g. 
hayek [1945] 2001: 63–96).
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world wars, in the interwar period (pervaded by hyperinflation and by eco-
nomic depression), and in the postwar period, with its series of food supply 
crises (Guyer 2016a: chap. 2), monetary rearrangements (the end of the gold 
standard and the order that emerged from Bretton Woods), and injunctions for 
reconstruction—notably, through the launch of the marshall Plan.9
over recent years, various countries have decreed economic emergency 
devices. In the United states, the most relevant was perhaps the emergency 
economic stabilization act signed by President George W. Bush in october 
2008—a law enacted in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, authorizing 
the United states secretary of the Treasury to spend up to Us$700 billion to 
purchase distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed securities, and supply 
cash directly to banks. one year later, the Icelandic legislature passed an emer-
gency law that enabled the Financial supervisory authority to assume control 
of financial institutions and made domestic bank deposits priority claims. In the 
following days, Iceland’s Prime minister Geir haarde announced: “The crisis in 
the real economy struck so violently that it turned into a concept of internation-
al law applied to countries at war or experiencing systematic crises. It is precisely 
what happened here [in Iceland].”10 similar examples in recent history can be 
mentioned apropos of Greece, Portugal, spain, France, and Venezuela, among 
others. a curious case comes from argentina: in December 2015, the new Pres-
ident mauricio macri declared a “state of national statistical emergency,” the 
intervention of the National Institute of statistics and Censuses (INDeC), and 
the freezing of any publication of the “main index numbers of the real economy.” 
The president claimed, “up to now the state has lied systematically, blurring 
the boundary between reality and fantasy,” and his economic minister added, 
“we want to stop lying and start telling the truth, to give back transparency 
and credibility, to know the real numbers of the argentinean economy.”11 In 
9. on the relationship between inflation and economic emergencies, see also 
mcCormack (2015).
10. “Financial crisis: Full statement by Iceland’s prime minister Geir haarde,” The 
Telegraph, october 6, 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
iceland/3147806/Financial-crisis-Full-statement-by-Icelands-prime-minister-
Geir-haarde.html.
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economic emergencies, the real economy becomes a public concern and a field 
of government, an issue for experts and for ordinary people, too, who need to 
“make a living” in extremely uncertain conditions.
ChaNGING realITIes: eCoNomIC emerGeNCes
The concept of emergence has itself “emerged” in recent years as a means to 
capture the relative imprecision surrounding prediction in a world where defini-
tive historical developments are no longer anticipated in precise step-by-step 
fashion, projected from now into the future, or according to clearly defined 
plans. We see this implicit—although perhaps exemplary—indeterminacy in 
such popular publications as alec ross’s Industries of the future (2016), where 
he observes several of these future industries, such as digital money, developing 
fastest in africa. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (2011) suggest that new 
forms of labor organization are being tested out in the Global south for sub-
sequent application elsewhere. The concept of emergence itself comes from the 
science of complex systems, which are composed through the ongoing dynamic 
interactions between smaller and simpler entities.
The two macroeconomic indices in which “emergence” is a concept, and where 
the CPI figures in some of its “real economy” referents, are the emerging markets 
Index (which ranks the “65 most influential cities”) and eaGles (emergent 
and Growth leading economies), which now includes thirteen countries whose 
GDP growth rates (also dependent on normalization through the inflation rate 
and the CPI) are comparable with the G6 (wealthiest) countries. strangely, mem-
bership of this category overlaps with the BrICs group, but then this latter acro-
nym is formed from the names of the countries themselves (Brazil, russia, India, 
China, south africa, which were the first to “emerge” into the global economy, 
post-1989), probably selected due to their size and industrial dynamism rather 
than being defined by a comprehensive inventory of all their qualities. Brazil, 
russia, India, and China are still eaGles. results of the national CPIs are 
applied to define inflation, largely for investment purposes. For comparison, we 
can note that inflation for the so-called hard currencies was, until the British 
vote on Brexit, recently less than 1 percent. hence, emergence can be treated as 
a methodological concept through which an ethnographic approach can explore 
surprise and indeterminacy as temporal processes in economic life rather than as 
a completely formalized concept to slot cases into international indices.
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here we could also briefly evoke an earlier engagement with the concept of 
emergence in anthropology, where Bill maurer writes of “ethnographic emer-
gences” precisely as a way to enable “a rethinking of ethnography as a method 
and a retooling of the theoretical apparatus of the discipline” (2005: 1). he advo-
cates new interfaces with other disciplines. In a world where interconnectedness 
is pervasive, the grasping of “the enmeshment of the observer and the observed, 
together with their mutually reinforcing, yet oftentimes incongruent, knowledge 
formations,” which infuses anthropology’s method, should “go along for the ride, 
in mutual, open-ended, and yet limited entanglements” (maurer 2005: 4). “en-
tanglement” is an old concept in Western history, as stanley edgar hyman (1962) 
pointed out in his book The tangled bank (a phrase taken from Charles Darwin) 
on great thinkers, including the early anthropologist James Frazer. We even learn 
from the press coverage of unexpected happenings, such as—to cite a recent case 
from Nigeria that adds further detail to the situation described by Guyer for the 
Nigerian CPI (Guyer 2016b)—the discovery that some shipments of rice im-
ported from China were adulterated with plastic, a symptom of the price lurches 
in the local markets and the profits to be gained by importers. a 50 kg bag now 
sells for around 20,000 naira (Us$63), more than double the price fetched in 
December 2016. Nigeria’s inflation rate stood at 18.5 percent at the end of that 
year its thirteenth consecutive monthly rise, driven by higher food prices.12
such surprising and indeterminate dynamics, involving many participants, 
relate to the real in several ways: What exactly is “real” rice? What can the rap-
idly inflating Nigerian currency actually buy, especially for those consumers who 
earn their incomes in unpredictable ways? We can ask, then, how the force of 
the concept of the real economy is created and combines in multiples realities, 
mobilizing concepts in ways that only in-depth ethnographically based research 
and mutual engagement can illuminate—as many of the essays in this book seek 
to demonstrate.
emergence is not a state but a flow, something that springs into being, en-
tangled in global assemblages and personal, experiential, and subjective lives. But 
there is nothing teleological in emergence: real economies can both emerge and 
submerge. Crisis is always a possibility, as shown by the current decline in some 
of the largest national “emergent economies” (such as the Brazilian economy, 
12. “Fake plastic rice seized in Nigeria amid rocketing food prices,” Guardian, December 
22, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/22/fake-plastic-rice-
seized-in-nigeria-amid-rocketing-food-prices.
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for example). Personal and collective lives need to come to terms with these 
variations, seen by specialists as cycles of economic expansion and contraction. 
as the chapters in this volume show, this is an extremely fertile field of research 
when it comes to formulating an ethnographic theory of the real economy: the 
experiential and the subjective, struggling to come to terms with the emergent 
and its opposite, allow us to ethnographically reframe the aspirations created by 
the massive absorption of populations into the contemporary market economy, 
through the expansion of indebtedness and financial devices, and their con-
trary: stagflation, the impossibility of paying, the dramatic change in personal 
and collective expectations, the transformation of uncertainty into some kind of 
normalcy that must be navigated through, lived with, and used to fashion lives.
ToWarD aN eThNoGraPhIC Theory oF The real 
eCoNomy
The study of the mutation of words and terms over time, space, and social context 
is itself an inspiration in ethnographically based theory. During Guyer’s reading 
on the “emergent,” she found the concept in the title of poet-cleric John Donne’s 
meditations on life in general, written during his own illness and his sense of im-
pending death: Devotions upon emergent occasions ([1624] 2014). The 27th medi-
tation contains terms that became part of the literary and conceptual life of the 
twentieth century: “No man is an island,” and “ask not for whom the bell tolls. 
It tolls for thee.” all of us live in both the certainty and uncertainty of life, in 
Donne’s poetic and religious register. In the twenty-first century, we stand poised 
to think deeply about emergence in a secular and pragmatic register, and to be 
attentive, through use of the classic ethnographic method, to people’s own words, 
sayings, proverbs, and invocation of sources from their shared religious, philo-
sophical, and performative archives, in their own languages. For example, what 
did Confucius write about reality and economy, or the dynamics of indetermi-
nate emergence? Is it still quoted in China, and if so, in what contexts, by whom, 
and with what consequences? ethnographic theory’s great strength resides in its 
inquisitive receptivity to people’s own lives and thoughts, expressed in their own 
terms, which in this case includes domains of formal expertise and everyday life, 
in their own discursive modes, social contexts, and temporal frames.
The question of realism is pervasive in Western philosophy: the idea that 
there is some kind of real world independent of our thoughts is intrinsically 
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linked to the idea of truth and to moral values. as we know, Émile Durkheim’s 
“social realism” was a singular instantiation of this concept: society (simultane-
ously immanent and transcendent to the individual) is truly real and its reali-
zation by the sociologist is, at the same time, an imperative to act upon it (see 
Durkheim [1895] 2013; Jones 1999). In a different register, much more recently, 
John searle (1995) proposed that there are two kinds of realities: the raw and the 
institutional. The latter, as in the case of money mentioned by searle himself, de-
pends on people’s trust and on institutional assemblages. Both kinds are “speech 
acts”—concepts that allow us to realize the reality of the real. This explains why 
reality is also a key issue for actor Network Theory, especially for its critique of 
constructivism, which tries to build what is seen to be a realistic account of real-
ity, proposing instead an inquiry into the effects and the “effectuation” made by 
human and nonhuman actants (see, for example, muniesa 2014). luc Boltanski 
has argued that the very concept of the real is linked to a sense of totality also ex-
pressed in the imagination of some kind of stable “world.” In his words, the “re-
ality of the reality,” despite its viscosity and seriality ever present in the devices of 
realization deployed to tame uncertainty, suffers from “a sort of weakness which 
must incessantly be reinforced in order to endure” (Boltanski 2011: 36–37).13
here, though, we have moved far away from research into the ontology of 
the real (or more modestly, the real economy). as João de Pina-Cabral (2017: 
11) proposes apropos the similarly self-evident concept of world, we argue the 
need to abandon “the established dichotomy between rather crude forms of re-
alism and equally crude forms of semiotic idealism,” proposing an ethnographic 
rather than philosophical question about the real. at the same time, following 
Tom Boellstorff ’s (2016) recent work on the “ontological turn” and the “digital 
real,” we propose to problematize the diverse ontologies of the real, showing, at 
the same time, similarities and differences, the multiple realities of the virtual, 
and the multiple virtualities of the real.
The PolITICs oF The real eCoNomy
In the first volume of his well-known series Spheres, German philosopher Peter 
sloterdijk (2011) links the modern concept of the real to the spherical form 
of the material coin and its opposite, the aerial concept of the bubble. since 
13. see also Boltanski’s (2011: chap. 2) differentiation between world, real, and reality.
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ancient rome, the sphere has contained the reality of money, its real value, 
minted to avoid the deleterious and unrealistic economy of lies associated with 
airiness and fictitiousness (see also marsh 2019). The concepts of reality and the 
real economy are linked, then, to the utopias of collective well-being—blended 
by circular coins of real monies and good economies—and with the dystopias 
of bubbles and balloons in which people’s lives “crash” with the reality of their 
economies, from the famous Dutch Tulip bubble of 1636 to the 2008 mortgage 
credit crisis, and today. as we proposed at the outset of this Introduction, when 
the real economy is provoked—that is, realized mostly in monies, numbers, and 
graphics, or even in the “reality Test” made by macroeconomic forecasters (see 
Pilmis 2018)—it reveals its constitutive links with concepts of force and weak-
ness (hard and soft monies, strong and fragile economies), with moral values 
and with the value of truth. To adopt michael Jackson’s terminology (2009: xiv), 
provoking the real leads us to navigate the turbulent and challenging waters of 
“juxtapositions, analogies, poetic images, epiphanies and anecdotes” that allow 
us to experience at close range and realize reality; that is, to quote William 
James (quoted in Jackson 2009: 4), the place “where things happen,” or as we 
have suggested, where something exists and must be governed.
These themes are found at the core of the chapters of this volume. They 
explore our proposal for an ethnographic theory of the real economy, offer-
ing insightful perspectives on singular assemblages of vernacular and scientific 
realizations and enactments of the real economy, along with their links to ideas 
of truth and to moralities. They show how these multiple and shifting realities 
become present and entangled with historically situated lives, the different ways 
through which the experiential lives of ordinary people engage with the formal 
realizations of the real in the governance of the economy (or economies).
Fabian muniesa and horacio ortiz focus on business in education and 
practice. muniesa shows how people teach and learn about the real economy 
in a leading business school, where a culture of realization of the economy is 
lived and cultivated, linked to a type of anxiety to deal with reality through the 
subjective and experiential lives of the business students themselves. muniesa 
offers an ethnography in which the vernaculars of the business world are entan-
gled, revealing the different perceptions of business reality and the reality of the 
economy nurtured by the subjective excitement of its realization. ortiz analyzes 
different concepts of economic reality put into play by cross-border financial 
consultants, located between shanghai and europe. Based on long-term field-
work in a shanghai consultancy company, his article shows that the analytic 
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claim of a “real economy,” against which financial practices are to be gauged, 
misses the multiple meanings through which these practices make sense for 
those who carry them out.
Deborah James and maxim Bolt explore the relations between reality and 
formalization and how the formal sector is made real. Bolt focuses on Zimba-
bwean labor on south african border farms in order to explore the relations be-
tween reality and formalization and the process of making workers real through 
real documents. his ethnography reveals how “spotlights” and “stepping-stones” 
are found at the points where formal regulation and livelihood plans mutually 
constitute each another, establishing the shared ground for negotiating the “re-
ality” of a wage economy in the process. James focuses on dealing with debts and 
indebtedness from the official viewpoint and from the viewpoint of the debtor, 
showing their multiple articulations and disjunctures. Proposing a deep ethnog-
raphy of the links between the formal “deductions” and “counter-deductions” of 
debts and the current explosion in south african “unsecure lending” by profit-
able big retailers and new microlenders, she reveals how financialization, in its 
multiple dimensions, has become a privileged field for an ethnographical ap-
praisal of the real economy.
Caitlin Zaloom goes to the heart of the concept of the real economy, dis-
cussing the temporality of the oikos, household planning and the operation 
of calculative devices to project family futures. Under financial capitalism, 
Zaloom argues, the future, even the distant future, becomes a “central category 
for citizens’ household operations.” To plan a child’s future education is “a 
hallmark of middle-class and aspiring Us parenthood.” ordinary people thus 
craft and live regimes of foresight and projective fictions as a means to deal 
with financial policies and make financial plans in changing and uncertain 
times. at stake are moral ideals and concepts of (good) parenthood and fam-
ily life—simultaneously rejecting finance, as opposed to the real and genuine 
family life, and incorporating finance and dealing with debts to make good 
lives.
mariana luzzi and ariel Wilkis explore the contingent properties of money, 
its temporality, and its relationality. Contemporary argentina offers the authors 
an extraordinary field in which to examine the changing meanings of the real 
economy and real monies through the dynamics of monetary pluralism. en-
tangled in the long cultural history of the use of Us dollars in argentinean 
daily life, luzzi and Wilkis examine new units of account and stores of value 
(soybeans and bricks) that provide insights into the changing reality of money 
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and economic lives. as the authors show, the creation and use of new currencies 
relies on, and reveals, changing concepts of the real.
eugênia motta scrutinizes the relations between Brazilian favelas and num-
bers. how is this unquantifiable and unstable reality measured and stabilized? 
how do numbers circulate and how are they reinterpreted by the favela inhabit-
ants themselves? how do alternative figures emerge and compete with state sta-
tistics? motta focuses on the statistical concept of the “subnormal agglomerate” 
used by state experts to realize the favela’s reality, stabilizing and spatializing ur-
ban poverty, while also exploring resistance to this concept from favela residents 
(through self-counting) and local organizations (through alternative censuses). 
she then shows us how reality is also disputed and resisted.
Inquiring ethnographically into the concept of legal personhood in anti-
trust policy (which aims to regulate mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures), 
Gustavo onto discusses what a real economic agent is. Companies, individuals, 
and networks reveal and mask three key economic concepts: economic agency, 
markets, and competition. how do regulators realize economic agency and in-
dividualize real economic actants, identify “relevant markets” and distinguish 
between good and bad competition? how do they cultivate the knowledge (and 
sensibility) needed to regulate real markets and true competition and to realize 
economic realities?
What is a real or fictitious transaction? This is the main question scrutinized 
by Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra in his chapter. In a deep ethnography of high-
frequency financial trading and infrastructure, he focuses on the “realism” of 
electronic, automated stock markets, looking specifically at those transactions 
conceptualized as “spoofing”—“performances of reality” that constitute true 
trades and markets. Through this field, Pardo-Guerra addresses a key question 
for this project that articulates regimes of truth and the morality of exchanges 
regarding the real economy.
Fernando rabossi’s chapter sheds light on the dark sides of the real econo-
my, on the difficulties of realizing “hidden” economic realities, black economies, 
smuggling, and piracy. Taking as his starting point fieldwork carried out on the 
border between Brazil and Paraguay, he asks who defines what it is legal and vis-
ible or illegal and invisible, how these boundaries are made and how the contro-
versies over the real make the (un)real and the (un)realizable. (Un)quantifiable 
realities, rabossi shows, are political.
The volume ends with Bill maurer’s afterword. Inspired by Constantin 
stanislavski, maurer explores the affinity and disjuncture between playing 
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theater and doing ethnography: it is necessary to put oneself in other people’s 
shoes in order to experience and realize others’ realities. It has nothing to do 
with a metaphysics of the real but rather with the concrete lives of persons and 
the very nature of the ethnographic project. It is also about enabling bridges, 
pluralities, and what maurer calls the intentional ethnography that links the real 
economy to the ethnographic reality, being “radically empirical without being 
irreducibly empiricist.” and it is also, as always . . . about politics.
Political struggles are found at the core of the pragmatics of the real and 
the real economy we propose in this project. as the argentinean filmmaker 
lucrecia martel pointed out in speaking about fiction, to discuss and question 
the legitimacy of the real is itself a political act and a political fight.14 This is 
true even more so in contemporary times, when the political battles over the 
real (and the real economy) are gaining new forms in public space through the 
concepts of “fake” and “fake news.”
In a passage of the Philosophical investigations, ludwig Wittgenstein stated 
that the question “Is a sum [or a calculation] in the head less real than a sum 
[or a calculation] on paper?” is less philosophical than practical (Wittgenstein 
[1953] 1986: §366ff.). This is also valid for the debate between those who de-
nounce the supposed incapacity of mainstream economics to provide an ac-
count of reality (as proposed by Keynesians and the so-called critical econo-
mists, such as lawson 1997) and those preoccupied with the ways through 
which economics perform social reality (Callon 1998). The theoretical, political, 
and moral dimensions at stake in these debates are part of the research pro-
gram on the real economy that we propose in this volume. as the articles show, 
the real is a shifting and pluri-scalar concept, which involves multiple agencies, 
agents, engagements, and enactments, claims of truth and claims of justice, col-
lective and personal lives, emergent and submergent personhoods, experiences, 
and feelings. The singular power of contemporary ethnography and ethnog-
raphers to navigate between worlds, realms of experience, scientific and ver-
nacular scenarios, global assemblages, and the “imponderables of everyday lives” 
(to cite malinowski on focal points of method) of ordinary people, reinforced 
by the collective nature of this project (which enhances the heuristic power of 
ethnography), can serve as an invitation to further develop the ethnographic 
(pragmatic, comparative, historical) theory of the real economy that we propose 
in this book.
14. http://revistacinetica.com.br/home/entrevista-com-lucrecia-martel/.
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The live act of business and the culture 
of realization
Fabian Muniesa
Notions of reality significantly permeate the contemporary business curricu-
lum. A prominent requirement of business schools today is to provide students 
with a realistic sense of managerial, entrepreneurial, and financial operations, a 
requirement that is often expressed as a critical response to purely abstract, the-
oretical, or academic approaches to the conduct of economic business. Experi-
ential educational techniques, such as the case method of instruction in business 
administration, are now pervasive in business schools worldwide. They typically 
rely on participatory deliberation, focusing on the discussion of pedagogical 
materials consisting in the presentation of real or realistic practical cases, of-
ten involving several forms of staging and role-playing. Mainstream theories of 
business leadership tend to indicate that the felicitous attainment of a directori-
al disposition involves a transformation of the self, which requires the empirical 
exercising of the reality of the act of business decision. Promotional materials 
abound in which the semantic field of the real is put to work in a way that is 
not without relation to the exigency of adventurousness and courage in the face 
of reality that characterized the early ideological programs of institutions such 
as the Harvard Business School (Fraser 1931; McNair 1954; Copeland 1958; 
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Christensen, Garvin, and Sweet 1981; Cruikshank 1987; Barnes, Christensen, 
and Hansen 1994; Snook, Nohria, and Khurana 2012).
Specifying the meaning and function of the cluster of notions and intuitions 
that converge into this culture of the business real is a complicated venture. One 
can ask how this repertoire of the real relates to other common ideas widespread 
in economic critique, such as that of monetary gain as the ultimate reality test, 
or that of a materially tangible, genuine underlying ground that shall distinguish 
from spurious, artificial, fictitious, or unreal representations (cf. Guyer 2016). 
The difficulty augments with the evidence of ethnographic appraisal, since the 
examination of the actual practices that correspond to the discourse of the real 
in business education provides evidence of an ostensible level of contrivance 
and artifice, which may suggest the presence of a problematic concept of reality.
In the present study, I develop a characterization of the problem of the 
business real while drawing from ethnographic investigation. The first section 
provides a description of three situations observed in three different fieldwork 
sites in which the vernaculars of the business real are articulated. The first one 
is a course on the use of the case method, attended by business instructors at a 
business school established in Europe (2008–9, Winter Term). The second one 
is a case teaching session in the MBA program offered by a prominent busi-
ness school established in North America (2011–12, Spring Term). The third 
one is an international case-solving competition for business school students 
in a business school established in Europe (2009–10, Winter Term).1 I selected 
these situations from fieldwork records both because they are representative of 
the ordinary process of case-based business pedagogy and because they express 
most saliently the ordinary tensions produced by the problem of the business 
real. I do not venture here into a comparative analysis of specific cultural con-
texts but rather into a broad interpretation of these tensions. How can they be 
made sense of, then?
In the second section, I proceed to an examination of the concept of reality 
implied in these materials. For that task, I draw partly on Hans Blumenberg 
1. I spent three days in the instructional workshop, one month in the North American 
business school, and one week at the case competition, having had in all cases the 
opportunity to talk to organizers, instructors, and students. These ethnographic 
experiences were part of a wider, multisited research project carried out from 
2008 to 2015 that involved multiple qualitative methodologies (archival research, 
qualitative interviews, and ethnographic observations) in various business education 
establishments in Europe, North America, and Asia.
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(1979). Known primarily for his philosophical contribution to the intellectual 
history of the categories of modern thought, for his discussion of secularization, 
and for his study of metaphors, Blumenberg offers in his essay on the concept 
of reality a helpful resource for the examination of the tensions these materials 
offer. Four concepts of reality are discussed in that essay. The reality of instan-
taneous evidence found in ancient philosophy, Blumenberg writes, can be con-
trasted with the request for a guarantee of objective truth present in medieval 
and modern thought and, further, with a more contemporary idea of reality as 
intersubjective, experiential realization, that in turn may finally evolve into an 
idea of reality as what resists such realization. I locate in the notion of realiza-
tion, as articulated in these two last concepts of reality, the crux of an anthro-
pological understanding of the business real, as manifest in the ethnographic 
materials. I then observe the paradox that the culture of realization constitutes, 
with the ideal of the business real being caught between the excitements of an 
intersubjective provocation of reality, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
the contained, almost fetishistic quality of the vehicle of realization.
THE CASE METHOd IN BuSINESS EduCATION
Instruction workshop2
The three-day course offers two workshops, one on successful case teaching 
and one on how to write effective cases. We are in a small room located on the 
premises of a business school that hosts this event offered by an organization 
that specializes in the commercialization of cases. There are six participants in 
the course, all instructors working in different business schools. I am among 
them, having enrolled in the course as a regular participant (I introduce myself 
as a social science instructor in an engineering school). The first workshop is led 
by a professor of strategy and international management. She opens the work-
shop with a general introduction to the case method. She refers to the method’s 
origins and development at the Harvard Business School. She insists on busi-
ness education being “practical,” centered on participants being confronted with 
“complex situations” that require a “project-solving” methodology.3 She refers to 
2. description from fieldwork notes: workshop for case instructors.
3. I use quotation marks henceforth for verbatim expressions (my translation to 
English when required).
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instructors as “facilitators” and to students as “participants.” She situates the case 
method in a scale of increasing interactivity and pedagogical accommodation, 
from one-way action from facilitator to participant at the bottom, to higher 
interaction among participants at the top. “The more the case is lived by the 
participant,” she indicates, “the more it is understood,” adding: “You’ve got to 
get it just like that,” snapping her fingers expressively, pointing to her head and 
raising her eyebrows. The case, she says, might be real or fictional: a real case 
might be more effective, but what ought to be real in any case is the “setting of 
the situation.” The workshop involves practical work with actual examples of 
case teaching.
The facilitator, the workshop tutor demonstrates, needs to “manage” carefully 
a learning process: constructing it, but without obstructing its participatory and 
experiential dynamics. The “scenario” is the central ingredient: the situation is 
to be presented as realistically as possible, “as a real decision-maker confronts it 
in real life”—that is, most distinctively, “without all necessary information.” The 
method, she explains, is “cooperative” (as opposed to individualistic), “dynamic” 
(as opposed to passive), and “democratic” (as opposed to magisterial). Students 
need first to read the case individually. Then they typically have to meet in small 
groups in order to confront interpretations and prepare for discussion. They 
finally attend a plenary session in which viewpoints are debated collectively. The 
workshop tutor insists on “decision”: “Participants have to position themselves; 
the situation demands resolution.” She insists on the fact that there is no “one 
best solution” to the “problem” featured in a case.
The bulk of the workshop revolves around the idea of the “scenario.” This re-
fers to the narratives that ought to be employed in order to convey to participants 
a clear comprehension of the particular state of affairs they need to maneuver 
in and of the particular agencies at play: where are “we,” what happens, what is 
the problem, and who ought to make a decision. The “discussion” is also central 
in case teaching know-how. Practical aspects such as how and when to start and 
close a discussion need to be dealt with, also how to “make disagreement sali-
ent” or, conversely, how to “make consensus emerge,” how to gratify participants, 
how to pick up claims as they come and write them down on the blackboard, 
how to avoid a professorial attitude, and how to value positively the production 
of “well-argued decisions.” In order to further illustrate these points, a short 
video is screened that presents the views of experienced case instructors on the 
method’s philosophy (“maieutics,” “dialectics”) and a few staged examples—
some openly parodic—that illustrate common errors. The workshop concludes 
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with a discussion on the crucial importance of using suggestive—“sexy”—cases 
and of entertaining a recreational—“game”—atmosphere.
The second workshop is led by a marketing professor. He embarks on a criti-
cal commentary on the historical import of the case method from the Harvard 
Business School, emphasizing a few paradoxes that other business schools en-
counter in the emulation of the model, such as “the lack of means.” He is ada-
mant in signaling that the method ought to focus on the communication of 
“concepts” and “fundamentals” in order not to become a spurious “salon conver-
sation.” The workshop tackles specifically the case-writing process. The tutor de-
velops the topic of case “sources.” The most usual one would be “students”—that 
is, a student’s report on a company or an essay following a visit or an internship. 
The student’s name ought to be mentioned in the acknowledgements. “Friends” 
in the corporate world do also serve well the purpose of acquiring “sources.” The 
key justification of authorship does not rely on a sense of case investigation but 
on the writing process proper—that is, on the composition of the case narrative 
and also, most specifically, on the writing of the “teaching note.” The teaching 
note is the document that the facilitator, having purchased the case, will use as 
a source of inspiration for the setting of the teaching. The content (and even 
existence) of that note, we are told, should be concealed from participants. A 
point is explicitly made about the confidential character of the teaching note. 
Anonymization of case company may be necessary in some cases but most com-
panies, the tutor says, are “very happy” with being featured in cases: “Of course, 
not when the case is critical, but cases shouldn’t be critical.”
The workshop is almost entirely devoted to the “opening pages” of the case: 
that is, to the introductory narrative that sets the scene and introduces the prob-
lem. The writing of the actual documentation of the case (i.e., the presentation 
of empirical elements) is not considered as a central topic. The importance of 
the introductory narrative is illustrated with a case that includes some video 
material—that is, a short documentary film that presents the case company 
facing a competitive situation. Participants are asked to write down a list of 
keywords and suggest topics for development that could be made explicit in 
an accompanying teaching note. We also take part in a most amusing exercise, 
which consists in writing down a short dialogue that could serve as an introduc-
tory narrative for a human resources case, and then performing it theatrically. 
The workshop concludes with a complaint by the tutor about people not always 
paying the fees for the purchase and use of cases. The method’s commercial sys-
tem requires that an instructor purchase from the case repository as many copies 
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as students in a case-teaching session, and complies with the rules concerning 
the confidentiality of the teaching note. A conversation arises about how case 
authoring and teaching connect to faculty evaluation and, more generally, to 
business school rankings. A few participants comment on how they felt pressure 
from their employers to enroll in this kind of instructional course.
Amphitheater discussion4
The case session lasts eighty minutes. The classroom—a large amphitheater—is 
fully packed with about a hundred students from the MBA program. Members 
of the staff carefully clean the several chalkboard panels from the previous ses-
sion. The instructor arrives and introduces a few guest visitors, including me 
(I am presented as a sociologist from France researching teaching practices 
in business schools). The case featured this day is a finance case. The topic is 
the use of stock options as employee incentives. Students have already had 
the opportunity to read the case and discuss it in small groups, which they 
did the previous day. Specific sections from a corporate finance textbook were 
also given as required reading. The case recounts the story of a company facing 
the challenge of repricing its employee stock options (i.e., an “option exchange 
program”) as a response to a dramatic decrease of the stock’s price in the midst 
of the stock market crisis of 2008. The case is documented extensively. Students 
are asked to decide what to do, and explain their reasons, first putting them-
selves in the position of a shareholder (“Would you vote for or against the pro-
posed option exchange program?”) and then of an employee owning company 
options (“Would you participate in the option exchange program?”). The case 
refers with an actual name—“Nancy”—to the imagined employee featured in 
the situation.
The instructor introduces the case, setting up the scene and writing down 
the two questions on the blackboard. He mentions that at least two students had 
the experience of participating in comparable exchange programs, and points at 
them. “What is going on?” is the question he uses in order to initiate the partici-
patory dynamics. Hands are in the air; he picks one, then another. As students 
comment on the main characteristics of the situation and of the corresponding 
challenges, the instructor writes down condensed versions of the claims on the 
blackboard, in an organized manner. He seeks to sharpen the terms in which the 
4. description from fieldwork notes: case teaching session at a business school.
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problems are expressed: “How is the stock doing? . . . Is it a disaster? . . . Yes, it is! 
. . . How is the company doing? . . . Is it a disaster? . . . No! . . . See why we are 
doing the exchange program?” Hence dramatized, the rationale for the option 
exchange program is then complemented by a characterization of the situation 
employees holding options are put in: constraints, risks, but also a “culture of 
stock options” in which “you want employees acting as shareholders.” He asks 
how many students had stock options in previous jobs, and about twenty stu-
dents raise their hands. The atmosphere is quite cheerful, and gently amusing 
comments are made about the culture of risk-taking and the recurrence of the 
experience of failure in business life.
The instructor calls for a vote. He roughly estimates the number of hands 
raised and writes the following in the blackboard: “Shareholders approve plan: 
Yes 90%, No 10%.” And then: “Employees participate: Yes 50%, No 50%.” He 
emphasizes excitement about the scale of the disagreement: “Fifty-fifty! That’s 
what we like in case teaching!” He then orients the discussion toward how the 
price of these options is calculated—that is, the use of the Black-Scholes model.5 
Another student asks the two students that had participated in that company’s 
option exchange program how they proceeded with the calculation, to which 
they respond that they really did not calculate anything. The instructor makes 
a point about how these decisions are usually taken without expert knowledge. 
He also tells the classroom: “Next year you’ll get stock options, so now you will 
know how to make decisions.” He draws a valuation table on the blackboard, 
comparing the old price with the new price. He raises concerns, such as the 
number of options in the plan or the conditions of execution. When he men-
tions that one should consider the value of the option but also how many op-
tions one gets, he always refers to a student who actually raised the issue (“That 
was your point, right?”). He then opens from the classroom computer desktop, 
projected onto a screen, a spreadsheet that contains a Black-Scholes options 
valuation calculator. One student makes a point about the psychological, behav-
ioral aspect of financial decisions: people in the actual case did not make these 
calculations. The instructor acknowledges, pointing at the guest “economic soci-
ologist” (me), explaining that for psychologists these phenomena are individual 
5. The Black-Scholes model is a standard mathematical model widely used in the 
financial industry for the theoretical estimation of the price of financial derivative 
contracts such as options, which confer to their holder the right to buy or sell an 
underlying asset (e.g., a stock) at a predefined price and at a predefined date.
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and for sociologists they are collective. “But let’s focus on Nancy,” he says refer-
ring to the imagined employee actually featured in the case. He plays with the 
stock price value in the spreadsheet calculator to see how both the old and the 
new option price evolve.
A student asks a question to which the instructor responds: “Who are you 
talking about when you say ‘you’? Nancy? Or the shareholders?” He then indi-
cates that the student had spotted a major issue: these are two possibly conflict-
ing views. Another student intervenes, further developing the behavioral aspects 
of the problem. The instructor acts as if the student had actually revealed the 
nitty-gritty of the case. “If you got what she just said, then you got the thing en-
tirely,” he says, rubbing fingers in a gesture that connotes an idea of fine-grained 
intellectual perception.
The case session does not constitute a rebuttal of a purely formal, calcula-
tive approach to decision-making. “We couldn’t have had this discussion before 
last week,” says the instructor, in reference to an introduction to option pricing 
that was given previously in lecture form and that had introduced a shift in the 
students’ capacity to “discuss hot topics.” That said, the bulk of the session is 
oriented to a sense of pragmatic realism, with emphasis put on the behavioral, 
psychological dimension and on the fact that “it all depends on expectations 
on the evolution of the stock price.” A final vote on the decision to participate 
in the option exchange program gives a result more favorable to participation. 
The instructor closes the session with a nicely spectacular video animation of 
the evolution of the stock price as it actually happened in reality, with the price 
going below the two option limits (old and new) then up one and then up the 
second one, too.
At the end of the class, a couple of students take pictures of the blackboard 
with their smartphones. The instructor himself takes a picture. In a private de-
brief with me after class, he says he had also recorded the session, as this was 
the first time he was teaching that case. He also explains the depth of the pre-
paratory work, which includes rehearsing and, most prominently, studying and 
memorizing the profile of students: their experience, the companies they have 
worked for, and so forth. A preselection of the students that can offer better 
performances for the felicitous conduct of the session is necessary. He tells 
me straight-out (without me asking) and with visible relief that he wanted 
to use the student who asked the final question, because “she has a medical 
background,” which seems to imply something about her capacity to think 
differently.
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Real competition6
The case competition takes a full week, with a program packed with a number 
of events. Presented in communicational materials as a “real life case,” the com-
petition is announced copiously on the campus of the business school. A dozen 
teams representing business schools from around the world and each composed 
of four students are to compete in their capacity to provide strategic guidance 
to a real company. They are expected to give their views on “what are the most 
important challenges” of the company and on “how they should be solved” to a 
jury panel, which includes executives from the company. The nature and identity 
of the “case company” is not revealed until day four. until then, participants 
mostly engage in social activities, visits, conferences, and “team-building” events. 
They also have some time to interact with the coach assigned to their team by 
their home business school. Once the identity of the case company is “revealed” 
and the case documentation distributed, teams engage in “case solving,” a task 
they have thirty-two continuous hours to perform, which potentially involves 
overnight work. Each team has a room provided with computer connectivity; 
organizers provide snacks and assistance. The coaches are removed from the 
premises and prevented from interacting with their teams. At the end of that 
period, each team hands in an “executive summary” and a “presentation.” The 
next day, a preliminary round of presentations takes place in small rooms. Four 
finalist teams are selected, which then perform again in the main amphitheater 
on campus in front of a vast audience. Following these “finals,” the winner is 
announced at an “award banquet.”
I attend the competition as an academic guest of the institution hosting the 
event. The organizing team has been instructed to take me around and allow 
me to mingle with staff, participants, and coaches for the full week (I intro-
duce myself to informants as a social scientist studying the practice of the case 
method). during the days preceding the actual “case solving,” my informants 
insist on the importance of “creating a friendly, social atmosphere,” “prevent-
ing the formation of a too competitive atmosphere and a situation in which 
groups won’t talk to each other.” For example, each team is asked to present 
itself in a jovial manner, with each team engaging in cheerful stereotypes or 
“fun facts” about their national cultures. The organizing team is actually com-
posed of students from the host business school. They resolutely value the task 
6. description from fieldwork notes: international case competition hosted by a 
business school.
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of organizing the case competition: this is for them “an actual business experi-
ence,” which involves taking responsibilities, being creative, and interacting in 
a professional fashion with executives of the case company. It also satisfies a 
“need for concrete reality.”
A series of team-building exercises take place in the form of several kinds 
of “games.” Game teams do not correspond to actual case competition teams, 
thus making participants mingle together. One exercise involves blindfolded 
participants, going around in a room while making the sound of an animal that 
has been assigned to their team, with the task of recognizing team members 
through this noise, then crowding together, and then removing the blindfolds 
to discover who is on their team. Again blindfolded, they have to play at “war” 
in the following manner: each group forms a “train,” with the last member, not 
blindfolded, having to give the instruction “move forward” by tapping into the 
next person’s shoulder. Each “train” is in fact a “torpedo” that has to break up the 
other “torpedoes.” Each “torpedo” holds a banner with the image of their animal 
and sings its motto occasionally (“Go, Tigers!”). A number of several compa-
rable exercises follow. An organizer later indicates to me that these exercises 
follow the methodologies developed by a consultancy firm that specializes in 
the design and facilitation of team-building games. When I ask about the fact 
that these games are about competition, he insists that the games are “all about 
having fun” and “building great networks.”
In a dinner conversation with organizers and team coaches, the issue of 
how to select team participants is discussed. One coach talks about a group 
that “was very good at analysis, very deep,” but that “failed” because “they were 
not capable of making a clear-cut decision and defend it.” This is about “busi-
ness reality,” he claims, adding: “You won’t find the best solution, but you need 
to find one.” More importantly, he indicates, “you need to defend it, you need 
to be convincing, showing that you are yourself convinced; you need to show 
that you love your solution” (with emphasis on “love”). He explains that when 
he examines potential team members from his business school, he very much 
cares about how they perform “on stage” and that he also favors students “that 
do well in sports.” An organizer who contributed to the writing of the compe-
tition case recalls the performance of a winning team in a past edition of the 
case competition, and criticizes it because, although “the pitch was excellent, 
very convincing,” their proposal did not look “real enough,” in the sense of not 
likely to be effectively implemented by the case company. She adds that, in 
order to test the realism of the case in the present edition, the text was shown 
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to consultants from a top management-consulting firm “who provided very 
valuable feedback.”
On the morning of day four, the identity of the case company is revealed 
in a plenary presentation. The name appears on the screen after a moment of 
suspense, followed by a video projection and a talk by the company’s CEO. A 
copy of the case is handed to participants, coaches, and visitors. Participants are 
taken to a separate room in order to read it, and then taken on a “surprise” visit 
to the headquarters of the company, which is located in the same city. The “case 
solving” thirty-two-hour period has started. Coaches are kept busy with social 
activities and visits during that time. An organizer tells me that they have to be 
kept under surveillance and prevented from “cheating”—for example, passing 
along some tips to the students by email or text message. I observe the anxiety of 
coaches: failure of their team means a serious burden on the reputation of their 
employers, and even possibly a threat to their own career.
The fact that the case ought to be “solved” in thirty-two hours is meant to 
simulate the pace and constraints of “real” business life. I am told the next morn-
ing that most teams opted for a shuttle ride back to the hotel for a short sleep, 
but some teams decided to spend the entire night working in the room that 
had been assigned to them. One coach tells me with some sense of pride that 
she is sure that her team did not go to sleep: “They have taken blankets to the 
room.” The interior of the rooms is partially visible through transparent doors. 
I observe that some participants have obstructed the view—for example, with 
a flag of their business school. Some can be seen in casual wear, gesticulating, 
eating snacks, taking naps, working on their laptops. They have access to coffee 
and energy drinks. I talk to one organizing staff member about her views on all 
this: she is a student at the host business school, and she volunteered because 
she was “pissed off ” with the “abstract” aspect of more professorial approaches to 
business learning. “You have to think in terms of reality,” she says with a rebel-
lious, transgressive tone. She is concerned that missing study time will affect her 
grading. She says, with emotion, that she has “learned much more” with the case 
competition. Late afternoon on day five, teams hand in a uSB drive containing 
two files: an “executive summary” in the form of a PdF file and the “presenta-
tion,” the PowerPoint slideshow document that they will use the next day in 
front of the jury. There is an atmosphere of excitement; it’s almost party-like.
On day six, each team delivers a presentation in front of a jury. Participants 
dress smartly—that is, in compliance with conventional business dress code. 
Many teams play the game of impersonating a team from a consulting firm 
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(some have even designed a mock company logo), sometimes an executive team 
within the case company (“We as a company”). Slideshows generally comply 
with the semiotic requirements of management consulting, with synthetic for-
mulations and formalistic concepts augmented with acronyms and embedded in 
schematic shapes. One “key message” would, for example, read “Augment Core 
Business” (dubbed “ACE”); another would be “Optimize Existing Portfolio.” 
Assessment of the company’s situation is recurrently provided in the form of 
“SWOT analysis”—that is, a matrix in which “Strengths,” “Weaknesses,” “Op-
portunities,” and “Threats” are listed. Pictures are used abundantly in order to 
illustrate marketing ideas (e.g., brand partnering, expansion of consumer base, 
new facility). Numeric information for “financials” (e.g., “dCF” for “discounted 
Cash Flows”) is usually provided in the last part of the presentation, eventu-
ally backed with the visualization of an Excel spreadsheet. “Q&A” follows each 
presentation. The guest executives from the case company take the lead. The 
emphasis on realism is palpable. At some point, a jury member addresses the 
question of the “communication” of the project just presented, a comment that 
team members misinterpret as being about the “marketing” dimension: the jury 
member then reframes the question in terms of “acceptance by stakeholders.” 
The reaction of the team proves disappointing. The four teams that have made it 
to the “finals” perform again the same presentation in front of a larger audience, 
in the main amphitheater.
BuSINESS EduCATION ANd THE CONCEPT OF rEALITY
Symbolic realization
In his 1949 essay on the therapeutic efficacy of shamanistic incantation for 
the management of childbirth, “L’efficacité symbolique,” Claude Lévi-Strauss 
expressed emphatically the fine impression he had of the results obtained by 
Marguerite Sechehaye with the psychoanalytic psychotherapeutic method 
she had developed for the treatment of schizophrenia (Lévi-Strauss 1963: 
186–205). In her attempt at going beyond the barriers of narrative operation, 
Lévi-Strauss wrote, Sechehaye had discovered the effectiveness of engaging the 
patient through acts that symbolize a fundamental element of the problematic 
situation. In order to confront a weaning complex, for example, the psycho-
analyst would enact a maternal setting by actually drawing the patient’s cheek 
to her own breast. Lévi-Strauss did even conjecture that the parallel between 
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shamanism and psychoanalysis could be further confirmed by advances in phys-
iology and biochemistry, suggesting that an organic transformation could be 
indeed induced through the manipulation of symbols. The only relevant differ-
ence between shamanism and psychoanalysis would reside in the location of the 
scenario—or myth—that ought to be enacted: in one case, the healer provides 
the myth and the patient performs the operations and, in the other, it is the 
medic who performs the operations whereas the patient produces her myth 
(Lévi-Strauss 1963: 200–204).
The name that Sechehaye had given to her method in the psychotherapy 
case monograph published in 1947—“symbolic realization” (“réalisation sym-
bolique”)—seemed quite appropriate and became an important reference in the 
field of the psychoanalytic psychotherapy of psychoses (Sechehaye 1951). The 
name suited well a method in which the patient ought to acquire the conscience 
of things through her involvement in the actual manipulation of symbols. But 
the name was also perhaps quite meaningful from the standpoint of the gen-
eral conceptual culture the psychoanalytic movement was part of. The notion of 
realization obviously communicates with the German vernaculars of psychoa-
nalysis, and most distinctively with the vocabulary of fulfillment (Erfüllung, 
with Wunscherfüllung for the Freudian notion of wish fulfillment). Psychoanaly-
sis aside, the notion of realization (Realisierung, also Verwirklichung) has been 
aptly signaled by Blumenberg as a salient marker of the concept of reality that 
characterizes the epoch (Blumenberg 1979). An attempt at demarcating differ-
ent historical concepts of reality, Blumenberg writes in his 1964 essay, neces-
sarily stumbles upon a contrast between the reality of instantaneous evidence 
prevalent in ancient philosophy and the request for a godly guarantee of reality 
elaborated in medieval and modern thought (cf. Blumenberg 1983, 1987). But 
it also has to identify another contrast between the latter and a contemporary 
concept of reality understood as the outcome of realization: that is, of reality as 
the establishment of a context that is confirmed in intersubjective experience.
Blumenberg’s instructive diagnosis, originally located in a critical examina-
tion of the problem of fiction, is clearly of use for situating a concept of reality 
that has come to characterize heavily the social sciences and the humanities, and 
which is perhaps best exemplified by the vast influence of The social construction 
of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966; cf. Muralt 1974). It may be even pos-
sible to argue that the idea that what is real to someone may not be to someone 
else—and that reality depends on how it is realized—is now a defining part of 
popular culture. Presented in many guises, it is also a feature of the concept of 
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reality that is articulated in the experiential movement in business education. 
Quite strikingly, the concept of the real that is explicitly advocated for in the 
philosophical meditations of early inceptors of the case method of instruction 
in business administration at the Harvard Business School, quite influenced 
by vitalism and pragmatism (such as Arthur Stone dewing), is fundamentally 
about realization in that sense (dewing 1910, cf. 1931).
There are numerous ways in which the culture of the business real exempli-
fied in the preceding ethnographic accounts connects to this concept of reality. 
The realization of the business insight is formulated as a psychological event 
that is characterized by its dramaturgical unfolding and by an experience of 
intersubjective excitement. A therapeutic element is sometimes openly pre-
sent, with realization understood as the elicitation of the will to decide. rather 
than being concealed, the scenic contraptions that facilitate this event (and 
that constitute the bulk of the pedagogical apparatus) are celebrated in their 
capacity to produce a felicitous simulacrum. The demonstration of the love of 
decision, and hence the transmission of an ideal of reality as provoked real-
ity, appears to be quite more salient than any notion of scientific inquiry. The 
disregard for empirical adequacy and the emphasis on the vagaries of human 
expectations in the real world is consistent with a constructivist, existential 
conception of reality. The prevalence of an individual self that affirms a con-
text in an orchestrated social interaction stands as the prime vehicle for the 
acquisition of a business disposition, best understood as a process of symbolic 
realization.
True, the web of economic activities and power relations business schools 
are part of is not controlled by this concept of reality only. A vast portion of the 
notions of truth and order that characterize dominant approaches to economic 
value in contemporary business life draw, for example, from a tradition of liberal 
political philosophy and economic science that is by far closer to the scholastic, 
modern concept of reality (dumont 1977; Ingrao and Israel 1990). And the no-
tions of financial valuation present in the mainstream pedagogical narrative (e.g., 
dCF, Black-Scholes) certainly require the establishment of a deeply natural-
ized sense of value creation that revolves around the idea of considering things 
(including oneself, as a successful businessperson) in their capacity to maximize 
a return on investment (Ortiz 2013, 2014; Muniesa 2016; Muniesa et al. 2017). 
But the breadth of the experiential movement in business education and of the 
distinctive concept of the business real that it conveys should not be disregarded. 
As the preceding ethnographic accounts show, the medium of business education 
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exemplifies a concept of reality as an ideal—even epic—conquest based on the 
confirmation of the experience of a context (Blumenberg 1979: 32–33).
The lack of reality
In his essay, Blumenberg discerns yet another distinctive concept of reality—a 
fourth one—that would be based, rather, on the experience of resistance: that 
is, a concept of reality as what the self does not—or cannot—hold, master, ma-
nipulate, or even make available for consideration (Blumenberg 1979: 34). This 
concept is expressed, most typically, in the form of a paradox. Often articulated 
in relation to the threat of the unreal that marks the projection of desire, and 
surely recognizable in psychoanalytic theory too, this concept does also perme-
ate the constructivist enigmas of particle physics and the epistemology of sur-
realism. Stretching the idea further, one could even claim that the real stands 
now for what cannot be realized, if not in a delirious or hallucinatory manner 
(Lacan 1993).
It is possible to claim that the ideal of the business real that emerged in 
early justifications of the experiential curriculum partially wears the traits of 
this concept of reality too. Frequent reference to adventure, disorder, uncer-
tainty, and courage suggests, indeed, that the existential flow business reality 
arguably consists of cannot be made explicit in full and can be approached only 
as a fantasized limit (dewing 1931). The ethnographic accounts offered in this 
study do also, in part, support this view. The emphasis that is put on deliberation 
and cooperation is presented as an attempt at reproducing faithfully the real-
ity of an actual business setting but constitutes also, paradoxically, a normative 
approach that may conflict heavily with the mundane experience of arbitrary 
power in the conduct of business. The business student attempts to experience 
a fulfilling encounter with an ideal medium of executive deliberation but is also 
exposed, simultaneously, to the fact that actual reality might be systematically 
located elsewhere. Strong insistence on promptness and nerve in decision-mak-
ing places the business student in a position that possesses the qualities of the 
acting out, with all that this implies in terms of a materialization of anxiety. 
The acts of moral exercising conducted in small groups that often accompany 
these pedagogical vehicles can be infantile, if not openly surreal (Lezaun and 
Muniesa 2017). The therapeutic component can shift indeed, implicitly, from an 
emancipatory ideal of self-realization to a recreational happening in which the 
phantasm of the business real can be safely played with.
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Within this perspective, the experiential apparatus in business education 
can in part be considered in the light of the psychoanalytic notion of the fet-
ish—a shield against the painful awareness of reality—albeit augmented with 
the elements of suspense, contract, and disavowal that have been identified in 
the problem of masochism (deleuze 1971). One conclusion that can be fairly 
drawn from the ethnographic materials presented above is that the creation of 
the experience of the business real inside the business school consists indeed 
most essentially in the elaboration of a shield (Lezaun and Muniesa 2017). It is 
certainly a paradox that the exacerbation of a taste for reality in contemporary 
experiential business education does not translate, simply, in the affirmation of 
the superiority of apprenticeship programs or internship jobs—that is, of the 
access to the business real from outside the business school, directly. Instead, an 
immense educational apparatus is required in order to provide a medium propi-
tious for the simulation of the business act or, more exactly, for the maintenance 
of the simulation as the only approachable notion of the business real.
CONCLuSION
The vast network of meanings that characterize the global industry of business 
education in the present time is certainly marked by multiple concepts of reality, 
often poorly connected to each other, connected in contradictory manners, or 
not connected at all. The philosophical history of the concept of reality sketched 
out by Blumenberg (1979) proves nonetheless useful for an attempt at charac-
terizing the parts of that industry in which the praise for the real is advertised 
the most: namely, in the experiential tradition in business pedagogy and, more 
particularly, in the widely institutionalized practice of the case method of in-
struction in business education, famously developed at the Harvard Business 
School. An examination of the philosophical sources that may have informed 
or accompanied the origins of the method—for example, through the pivotal 
contribution of Arthur Stone dewing, philosopher, investor, finance professor, 
and notable case method instructor and advocate (dewing 1903, 1910, 1920, 
1931)—can unquestionably provide evidence of the importance of a vitalist, 
existential, constructivist, almost epic ideal of business reality as the outcome 
of a courageous process of realization. This ideal is vividly present, in variable 
forms, in the ways in which the case method is presented, practiced, and made 
sense of in the global business curriculum today. An ethnographic investigation 
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in a number of paradigmatic sites indeed demonstrates the extent to which 
the notions of the business real that are articulated there correspond to what 
Blumenberg characterized, under the rubric of realization, as the intersubjective 
confirmation of the performance of a context.
But ethnographic inquiry also reveals a critical tension between this concept 
of reality and an interpretation of the business real as what cannot be realized. 
The conceptual repertoire of the real in psychoanalysis provides an appropriate 
analytical correlate to this conception, as the latter typically precipitates the 
possibility of anxiety. In the three fieldwork sites I referred to above, I observed 
instantiations of anxiety in relation to the articulation of the problem of real-
ity, in both instructors and students (cf. Anteby 2013). These were found, for 
example, in expressions of excitement about the radical, revelatory effect of the 
case method, expressions that would nonetheless refer to the ineffable character 
of the reality hence revealed. The case method was also often conceived of by 
students as a technique for coming to terms with a sense of personal insecurity 
in the task of acquiring a leadership disposition, but sometimes with the im-
pression that this could mean coming to terms with one’s own self, which can be 
thought of as an illusory (or dangerous) task. The crucial notion of decision—of 
the need to emit a decision and display assurance in doing so—was also op-
erational in creating this troubling sense of the real. In an interview after class 
with a student enrolled in the MBA program described in the second situation 
above (the amphitheater discussion), the topic of anxiety was brought up spon-
taneously. After a fervent vindication of the sense of realism the case method 
brings to business education, the student characterized as a necessary form of 
psychotherapeutic counseling the career coaching services the MBA program 
offered. These were helpful in coping with the tensions prompted by a climate 
of permanent decision, which prevented students such as her from taking the 
necessary time to think. She illustrated emotionally the idea of decision with 
reference to Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments—a reference that had 
been introduced to her in a program course as a way to illustrate the human 
challenges of decision-making, and that is known for its deeply traumatic form 
and content (Lezaun, Muniesa, and Vikkelsø 2013).
What conclusions can be drawn from these analyses for an anthropologi-
cal appraisal of the cluster of meanings of reality that control the conduct of 
mainstream economic business? Limited as these results may be, they suggest 
that the subject matter cannot be dealt with satisfactorily only through a criti-
cal examination of the empiricist epistemology the notion of economic datum 
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depends on. It cannot simply revert to a moral denunciation of the lack of re-
alism that would be implied in economic policies or financial conduct. What 
this task requires, once the location of different notions of reality in contrast-
ing conceptual assemblages has been acknowledged, is an exploration of the 
paradoxes these notions entail for an anthropological critique of the business 
real. At the center of such paradoxes lies the fact that an openly constructivist, 
performative, therapeutic—and perhaps even properly anthropological—ideal 
of symbolic realization becomes a cultural engine of business reality as we know 
it. Add to this the fact that such an ideal comes accompanied by the trouble of 
its own negation, in the form of a recurring reference to realization’s exhausting 
impossibility. The possibility of an anthropological critique of the business real 
(that is, a critique of the business real as a condition of being human) remains 
nonetheless available, but only insofar we consider the part these paradoxes play 
in anthropology’s own problems (rabinow 2002).
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chapter two
Deductions and counter-deductions 
in South Africa
Deborah James
In 2015 and 2016, reports in the South African press gave the newest episodes 
in a long-running saga. There was the story of a washing machine sold to a 
gardener on installment plan (known locally as “hire purchase”) that cost three 
times the normal price; the company in question was accused of “reckless lend-
ing” by the gardener’s employer; the company threatened, in turn, to seek legal 
advice to protect its reputation from that employer’s “defamatory allegations.” 
There was a report on a groundbreaking decision by the High Court, which 
placed restrictions on the way in which creditors (including the sellers of over-
priced washing machines, various microlenders, and second-tier collectors who 
had bought debt from other creditors) would in future be able to recoup the 
unpaid installments owed to them. There was an account of debt collectors who 
were taken to court by a corporate employer to prevent their making deductions 
from mine workers’ salaries to repay outstanding debts for appliances, motor ve-
hicles, and other goods. And there were stories anticipating legal action against 
a moneylending and insurance company that had been deducting repayments 
from social grants before they were given to recipients.
The real economy as a concept has taken root not only in stable or highly 
developed economies (or both) but also in those characterized by “the rapid 
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growth of aspiration accompanied by massive incorporation of people into the 
current market economy, through the expansion of indebtedness and financial 
devices . . . [and] the impossibility of paying” (Neiburg and Guyer 2017: 272). 
As Federico Neiburg and Jane Guyer note, the real is a “shifting and pluri-scalar 
concept, which involves multiples agencies, agents . . . engagements and enact-
ments, claims of true and claims of justice, collective and personal lives, emer-
gent and submergent personhoods, experiences and feelings.” Here, as in other 
similar settings, one finds “a progressive fractioning of products; multiplication 
of mediations; the amplified reproduction of small gains; and interplay between 
different units of measure and scales” (to use a description coined by Federico 
Neiburg [2016: 82] about economic life in Haiti). This plurality, in the South 
African case, exists in a setting in which forces of state, market, and reciprocity 
intertwine: where “neoliberal means interweave with and facilitate redistributive 
ends” (Hull and James 2012: 16).
In South Africa, debates about the real economy have been muddied, in 
particular, by the imperfect data on indebtedness. The stories outlined above 
tell us about an economic system in which debt, repayment (or nonrepayment), 
and deduction (and counter-deduction) have come to play a major role, yet are 
not always fully acknowledged. They point to a new context in which financial 
markets and services have overtaken labor-intensive industrial growth, mak-
ing for a growth that has been termed “jobless” (Hull and James 2012; Marais 
2011: 130–32).1 By drawing attention to the phenomenon of payments (Maurer 
2012), here in the form of deductions directly from employees’ or grant-re-
cipients’ bank accounts, the stories also seem to indicate a highly routinized 
set of arrangements in an economic system that is predominantly formal. The 
extent of that formality has been said to leave less space for the emergence of 
what scholars dub a “second” or “informal” economy than in southern—and 
African—contexts beyond South Africa itself (Cichello, Fields, and Leibbrandt 
2005; Neves and du Toit 2012). Yet tactics and techniques used by these debt 
collectors, companies, and microlenders often turn out, when challenged, to be 
illegal—or at least to contravene the spirit of the constitution. They also, in many 
cases, belong within the zone of transactions that are “unrecorded” (MacGaffey 
1991) and are hence unavailable to statisticians. Nevertheless, the prominence 
1. The process, echoing global trends, is marked by an increasing dominance of financial 
markets and services as a proportion of national economies, and a corresponding 
decline in labor-intensive industrial growth (Hull and James 2012).
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of court judgments and legal action in the stories above speaks of a world in 
which formal regulations and legality do prevail. They also indicate the impor-
tance placed, in South African life, on establishing the rights of those once 
disenfranchised by using the law (Chanock 2001). Fierce battles are fought out 
in the courts to rule in favor of—or against—practices that seem intrinsic to the 
country’s economy, despite existing in an ambiguous space on the boundaries 
of the law. Do uncollected debts, debts collected through deductions, and debts 
whose collection is actively resisted or countered (often with the help of legal 
actors), form an intrinsic part of a “real” economy conceptualized as seamlessly 
integrated?
The challenges posed by the editors of this volume invite us to unsettle the 
sets of binaries often used to analyze the basis of communities’ and nations’ live-
lihoods. They also call for some comparisons: How is indebtedness calibrated 
elsewhere in relation to aspiration, precarity in economic life, and the role of 
the state? Both points are attended to in the work of economic anthropologists. 
Keith Hart coined the term “informal sector” (1973) at the moment when “the 
post-war era of developmental states was drawing to a close” (2015). After the 
enthusiastic adoption of this term by development professionals, Hart pointed 
out that he had always intended to show the inseparability of the formal and the 
informal, conceptually and empirically (2015). The work of Jane Guyer bears 
this out, with her now well-accepted insights into the way that the formaliza-
tion and financialization of economic arrangements are often accompanied by 
their opposite, all held within the same frame but not necessarily subject to 
some dominant hegemonic force originating in the capitalist West. She speaks 
of the need to think in multiplicities rather than binaries and shows how a 
West African logic of economic activity dovetailed with—while also counter-
manding—a capitalist one (2004: 11–12). Showing similar plurality and like-
wise repudiating polarities is the work of Parker Shipton. He maintains that the 
Luo of Kenya “are at times profit-seeking marketeers and at times reciproca-
tors and redistributors” (2007: 28). Janet MacGaffey’s book The real economy of 
Zaire [now the Democratic republic of Congo] (1991) is an earlier account 
that shows how these varied aspects must not be separated along binary lines 
but must all be reckoned as belonging within the entirety of economic activity. 
To understand the “real economy,” she insists, we need to recognize the “second 
economy,” which does not appear in official reports and statistics or in “national 
accounts of the official economy.” That arena of activity must be acknowledged, 
and not simply because of its size. It is also, she claims, intrinsically intertwined 
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with the state-linked economy (rather than being distinct from it). In interven-
ing decades, state power everywhere has both weakened and simultaneously in-
tensified to favor the interests of market players, giving new valence to informal 
economic activity. Hart claims that “the informal economy seems to have taken 
over the world, while cloaking itself in the rhetoric of free markets. . . . Money 
and markets have escaped from public control and cannot be put back in that 
straitjacket” (2015: 2).
These debates take on a particular character if we look at South Africa. 
The country industrialized far earlier and to a much greater extent than its 
African counterparts and levels of wage labor were far higher (Cooper 2002: 
194), although these were combined with a continued dependence on culti-
vation and herding, which has inspired Marxist-inspired theorists to debate 
whether and how to conceptualize diverse aspects of production, profit, and 
subsidy in one single frame (Wolpe 1972).2 Later, as unemployment soared 
following the peak years of growth in the 1960s and 1970s, and even more so 
after the country’s democratic transition in 1994, scholars explored the inter-
relation of what looked like diverse sectors of the economy. economists and 
policy-makers, adopting Hart’s concept, were puzzled about the failure of the 
“informal sector” to expand and to make up for the dwindling of its formal 
counterpart. Given the strength of the state and the capitalist sector in what 
was otherwise a developing country, informal economic activity, some thought, 
had been crowded out (Lund and Skinner 2003). others, however, showed 
that the two were entwined. According to David Neves and Andries Du Toit 
(2012: 143), although informal economic activity seemed to present only few 
economic opportunities, the “varied, variegated and non-linear . . . trajectories 
of economic development” it afforded seemed to go against the assumption 
“that the economy becomes progressively disconnected from society as it be-
comes more formal.” Its practitioners were able to negotiate “practices of eco-
nomic governance— both formal (state-led) and informal—which provide the 
conditions of possibility for economic activities.” Such practitioners positioned 
2. The “cheap labor thesis” (Wolpe 1972) held that capitalist growth was premised 
upon, articulated with, and only profitable because of, household labor performed in 
rural settings, which thus subsidized the capitalist sector. Challenging this account, 
economic historian Charles Feinstein showed that apartheid’s work force, largely 
unskilled and migratory, cost too much in relation to its productivity, rather than 
too little, achieving less for higher wages than their equivalents in other countries 
(2005: 245–51; see also Beinart 2012: 13).
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themselves “to harness the benefits of formalization, while evading its con-
siderable constraints” (Neves and du Toit 2012: 143). Such insights into the 
intertwining of state-regulated and off-the-record activities parallel the points 
made by Hart, MacGaffey, and Guyer. MacGaffey’s claims about the complex 
and often contradictory role of the state are particularly relevant to the present 
study, especially the part played by state employment. In South Africa, civil ser-
vice salaries—and in this case, welfare payments—are not (as in MacGaffey’s 
discussion of Congo) just a point of access to opportunities. They are also a 
reliable source of steady income that acts, in effect, as collateral for debt—and 
thus as a source for deductions.
In some respects, the economic activities of those formerly seen as excluded 
from the single economy are indeed governed—if not wholly subsumed—by 
the banks, furniture companies, clothing stores, and “micro-lenders” to whom 
they are in hock. Financial formality, in other words, is more prevalent here 
than in many other African settings and other parts of the Global South. It is 
also the case, however, that multiple registers coexist, enabling formalizations 
and informalizations to interpenetrate (Guyer 2004). Alongside the spread of 
sophisticated financial technologies, and partly interwoven with these, the dy-
namics of a second economy of lending and repayment are in evidence: to argue 
that these interconnected sectors have come entirely under the sway of one sin-
gle financialized arena would be to underestimate the plurality and multiplicity 
of arrangements.
While “credit apartheid” had previously restricted black people from bor-
rowing in a single market (DTI 2002, 2004), loans of all kinds, in the 1990s, be-
came readily available. It seemed as though the part played by those (primarily 
black) people, who for years had been partially excluded—if not from the wage 
economy then certainly from the formal financial sector—had been inverted. 
Instead of laboring for capitalist corporations while securing part of their sus-
tenance from rural cultivation or informal economic activities, their chief con-
tribution, and a new site of exploitation, was now that of making repayments 
on consumer credit agreements via highly routinized and technologized means: 
deductions. Many social actors, however, are intent on evading these technolo-
gies in various ways. Activists and human rights lawyers make efforts to shore 
up consumer rights. They devise systems of registration or regulation, or try 
to render illegal the proliferating technologies of debt collection by seeking 
redress and appeal through the courts. In a kind of arms race, lenders then 
invent new systems of payment or repurpose old ones. The struggle between 
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those activating deductions and those striving to enable counter-deductions is 
ongoing.
As economic life in this newly liberalized, newly democratized country turns 
toward financialization (Neves 2018), new questions must then be asked about 
its real economy. This financialization is taking shape in a space where borders 
of legality/illegality and ethical/unethical practices overlap, which allows for 
contests about and shifts of the limits or reach of the state. It is not only the case 
that we need to note the unrecorded alongside the recorded—and nonmon-
etized alongside monetized—aspects of the economy, as MacGaffey suggests 
(1991). We also need to pay attention to how the state both facilitates the inten-
sification of the repayment regime through providing civil service salaries and 
grants and also—by outsourcing grant payments to private companies—enables 
the emergence of a kind of parallel state, with its own database and payment 
system. At the same time, the financially incorporated have agency themselves, 
and are not reduced to mere conduits for flows of money.
DeDuCING INDeBTeDNeSS
The extent of indebtedness—or over-indebtedness—has been difficult to ascer-
tain. Although much of the money owed was being taken off—often through 
practices of borderline legality—in automated repayments or deductions, these 
do not necessarily show up in the official census or in reports by the newly es-
tablished National Credit register, surveys conducted by commercial companies 
keen to estimate their likely market share, or reports by agencies such as the Bu-
reau of Market research, which sell their results to such companies.3 The figures 
offered by such sources reflecting the extraordinary growth in “unsecured” indi-
cated debts that remained unpaid, rather than those that were being collected. By 
2014, the World Bank reported that 80 percent of the South African population 
was borrowing money (against a global average of 40 percent).4 Leading up to 
this high figure, sources showed that the sharpest rise had been in the early 1990s 
(Ardington et al. 2004). By 2008, nearly half the credit market’s 17.56 million 
3. This Bureau is attached to a university, uNISA, but its results are available only to 
those who pay for them.
4. Tanya Farber and Bobby Jordan, “Maxed out: SA’s debt headache,” Times Live, 
January 3, 2016. https://www.enca.com/money/maxed-out-sas-debt-headache.
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consumers had “impaired records.”5 By 2011, household debt as a percentage 
of disposable income was at 76 percent, ratcheting up from 50 percent in 2002; 
consumer debt stood at r1.2 trillion, up from r300 billion in 2002. By 2013, 
around half of consumers were at least three months behind on debt payments.6
Central to policy debates over this epidemic of borrowing (and nonrepay-
ment) were disagreements over whether it resulted from consumers’ over- or 
underexposure to financial formality, and over the socioeconomic profile of these 
consumers. During the 1990s, one study argued, it had been among the urban 
black working class that the growth rate in credit consumption had exceeded the 
growth in incomes. They were taking out unsecured loans from small lenders and 
retailers rather than the big banks, and more from informal lenders or mashoni-
sas—estimated at about 30,000 in number at the end of the twentieth century—
than from formal institutions, and many were borrowing at high interest rates 
to repay their other debts. People from this sector were getting into debt to buy 
consumables at high interest rates rather than solid assets at affordable ones, so 
borrowing increased their vulnerability. The authors of this study, writing in a 
high modernist paradigm, claimed that the answer was to enable greater finan-
cial “deepening” and thus to facilitate more borrowing from banks. This would 
help such people move away from their reliance on less formal and more ex-
ploitative loans and toward cheaper ones from financial institutions (Ardington 
et al. 2004: 607, 619). other analyses—reflecting similar patterns elsewhere (see 
Anders 2009 for Malawi; Parry 2012 for India)—emphasized that those with 
greatest levels of debt after 1994 were not those at the bottom of the pile but 
regular earners in the middle of the scale who were well placed to take advantage 
of the banking and retail sectors. Since their salaries served as collateral (roth 
2004: 78), they qualified for credit, but their “social obligations”—in other words, 
their embeddedness in networks of reciprocal exchange and care—placed “pres-
sure on them to borrow” at “unsustainable” levels (Daniels 2004: 842).7
5. Noted in the National Credit regulator’s maiden report; Sikonathi Mantshantsha, 
“7.3m in SA behind on bills,” Fin24.com, May 24, 2009. https://www.fin24.com/
Money/Money-Clinic/73m-in-SA-behind-on-bills-20090324.
6. Patrick McGroarty, “In South Africa, a consumer debt bubble forms,” Wall Street 
Journal, December 26, 2012. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732
4296604578177884108022670.
7. But being in debt, for such people, was not necessarily seen as all bad. one report 
claimed that whereas buying consumables at high interest rates was ultimately 
detrimental, buying solid assets at affordable ones constituted the basis of a solid 
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While these debates evinced great concern over the prevalence of unregistered 
lenders offering unsecured loans and plying their trade in the borderlands of fi-
nancial formality, the deduction stories with which this article is concerned tell of 
practices more central to that realm. These are practices that use devices within the 
terrain of legality, which benefit from the sheltering embrace of the law, and which 
have only recently begun to be challenged in the courts. These legal/illegal, formal/
informal zones have interpenetrated: they have resulted from, generated, and also 
sought to control, the exploitative processes of “credit apartheid” over more than a 
century. To understand this, we need to look in more detail at two distinct histori-
cal moments. The first, dating back to the end of the nineteenth century, involved 
an uneven combination of unbridled market freedom and paternalistic state con-
trol. The second, at the end of the twentieth century, again saw market forces given 
free rein and again saw the authorities attempting to curb these excesses.
BeTWeeN STATe AND MArKeT
Although the rises of financialization, indebtedness, and “debtfare” have been 
documented worldwide (Anders 2009; Han 2012; Guerin 2014; Kear 2013; 
Martin 2002; Soederberg 2015; Wilkis 2015), the South African debt story has 
some noteworthy particularities. The historical underpinnings of credit apart-
heid lie in the colonial roots of South African capitalism. In the later years of 
the nineteenth century, mercantile capital was pervasive. While antiapartheid 
campaigners have complained about white ownership of the land, at that time 
it was large companies that appropriated vast swathes of the countryside, and 
the role of big finance houses was crucial: an “oligopoly” of British-owned banks 
rooted in the english-speaking capitalist sector established, from early on, a 
fully-fledged system of property, mortgages, and frequent repossessions (Trapido 
1978; Verhoef 2009: 157, 181). The scene was set for a swift and uncompromising 
form of capitalist penetration. This was linked to the country’s thoroughgoing 
proletarianization, and in turn to the phenomenon of indebtedness. Whereas, 
in most of Africa, “wage-labor capitalism . . . takes place on islands in a sea of 
other sorts of socio-economic relations; in South Africa, wage-labor capitalism 
middle-class lifestyle. Kevin Davie, “Drowning in debt or rolling in riches,” Mail 
and Guardian, July 22, 2011. https://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-22-drowning-in-
debt-or-rolling-riches.
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pervades the economy,” noted Fred Cooper (2002: 194).8 The means through 
which that labor force was recruited was intrinsically tied to the extension of 
credit. And accumulation continues to operate, even after the heyday of capital-
ist growth had passed and despite high levels of unemployment, which stood at 
43 percent in 2012, through new incarnations of the creditor/debtor relationship.
Provided that cultivators could be persuaded to become wageworkers, the 
regular payment of wages was what opened up a stream of income for small-
scale traders, imbued with a pioneering spirit of enterprise in the late nine-
teenth/early twentieth century. These traders doubled up as labor recruiters who 
sold to locals on credit and later obliged them to “work it off.” rural cultivators 
in the eastern Cape, for example, were induced into work contracts, or tempted 
to leave employment in one sector in favor of another, by traders who gave 
“cattle advances” against these migrants’ future earnings (Beinart 1979). The re-
lationship between wage advances and labor procurement was even more direct 
in Bechuanaland (now Botswana), a British protectorate at the time. Agents 
recruiting for the South African mines “induced” locals to enter into contracts 
by paying them wages in advance, thus automatically indebting them (Schapera 
1947: 108). These arrangements were open to abuse by those on both sides, 
with agents often extending such large advances that the borrower “remained 
in debt even after having worked for several months,” but with borrowers often 
accepting advances from several agents at the same time, with no intention of 
honoring their debts to any of them (Schapera 1947: 109; Beinart 1979: 209). 
These cowboy-capitalist excesses were later regulated by the colonial authorities, 
who saw them as exploitative and unsustainable. Such regulatory measures did 
not, however, result in migrants’ getting free access to their earnings. Instead, 
fearing that cash received immediately would be too readily spent or diverted 
from “legitimate” uses (primarily the payment of various colonial government 
taxes and levies), or might encourage migrants to neglect or desert their fami-
lies, the authorities devised a system of deferring part or all of miners’ pay rather 
than giving it to them at the work site (Schapera 1947: 106–7; First 1983). The 
reliance on such measures, in which earnings were subject to various forms of 
external or social control rather than being individually “owned” by workers 
themselves, proved to be long-lived.
8. The (former) ubiquity of, and reliance on, paid work, has left in place an assumption 
that the main route to both a livelihood and citizenship is through a paid job 
(Barchiesi 2011).
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overall, a combination of freewheeling enterprise on the one hand, and its 
regulation by paternalistic authorities on the other, laid the basis for a mixed 
system. on the one hand, “external judicial control” (Haupt et al. 2008: 51) 
has meant that workers’ finances and salaries/wages, and even—eventually—the 
bank accounts used to transfer these, have tended to be viewed, unquestioningly, 
as controlled or regulated (or both) from the outside. on the other hand, earn-
ers have become accustomed to dodging, negotiating, and evading the forms of 
entrapment represented by such systems of finance and loan/advance. In their 
most recent form, these evasions—including confrontations in the courts—
have become the counter-deductions of this essay’s title.
We skip forward—over a century during much of which a particularly 
stringent form of “national capitalism” was in operation (Hart 2009, 2015)—to 
examine the moment of democratic transition in 1994. In a muffled echo of 
earlier arrangements, the economy began to liberalize. It also became exten-
sively financialized. The move away from—and the concerted attempt to abol-
ish—credit apartheid, combined with a rise in expectations for personal mate-
rial wealth, laid the grounds for a huge demand. This was met by a burgeoning 
supply, as short-term loans became available at high rates of interest. These were 
provided both by a rapid growth in informal lending—including the loan sharks 
or mashonisas—about whose proliferation economists and policy-makers had 
despaired (Ardington et al. 2004) (see fig. 1, sector 3)—and through an ex-
panded willingness by the formal (formerly white-dominated) retail and bank-
ing sector (see fig. 1, sector 1) to open its doors to black people. Alongside this, 
a new microlending sector was emerging: it was initially borderline illegal but it 
gradually became formalized and regulated.
The resulting credit landscape, perhaps unsurprisingly, mapped itself along 
racial lines. Sector 2 (see fig. 1) largely comprised white, Afrikaans-speaking 
civil servants. Fearing an abrupt end to state patronage, they had taken redun-
dancy packages with the onset of the new democracy. Seeking a place in which 
to invest their payouts, and emboldened by the repeal of legislation that for 
many decades had capped the interest rate but had now been abolished in the 
interests of extending credit to all, many of these ousted civil servants estab-
lished microlending businesses to lend money to black people at high interest 
rates. In this setting of newly ballooning aspiration, the new (black) civil serv-
ants and grant recipients in turn, despite receiving regular payments, needed 
more than what those could buy, so they turned to borrowing. replacing the 
fixed assets that lenders traditionally require by way of security (roth 2004: 62), 
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salaries and grants from the state came to serve as collateral: the term unsecured 
for such loans is thus misleading. Lenders, having direct access to the bank ac-
counts into which the salaries of this new swath of civil servants (or the grants 
of welfare recipients) were paid, were easily able to recoup their debts. Whereas 
the informal neighborhood lenders or mashonisas in sector 3 used the system—
only outlawed at the end of the 1990s—of confiscating a debtor’s ATM card 
and identity document in order to ensure repayment (for a similar practice in 
India, see Parry 2012), many lenders in sector 2 used garnishee or emoluments 
attachment orders (eAos) to get installments deducted directly from debtors’ 
bank accounts. Such an order is issued by a magistrate’s court against the sal-
ary of a debtor, provided that the application for it is willingly signed by that 
debtor. If a creditor is owed money and then presents an employer with the 
order, the latter must allow the former automatically to deduct a portion of the 
debtor/employee’s monthly pay before the employee receives it, with the credi-
tor bearing a 5 percent charge ( James and rajak 2014: 455–56; James 2015: 
61–64, 74). retailers in the mainstream (sector 1), continuing but intensifying 
a long-standing practice, were similarly dependent on the use of eAos, as seen 
in the deduction stories with which this article began. Some lenders originat-
ing in sectors 2 and 3 have formalized and effectively entered sector 1; these 
include African Bank and Capitec, both of which explicitly aim to cater to the 
low-income earning population.9
9. The “unsustainable” business model of African Bank, which offered loans but took 
few deposits, were exposed when, in 2014, it sought reprieve and the reserve Bank 
Sector Lender Type of loan 
1 Mainstream/formal financial sector 
(mainly english-speaking capitalists) 
Loans from the “big four” banks, 
recently joined by African Bank 
and Capitec; housing loans; 
vehicle finance; store cards for 
clothing and food; furniture and 
appliances on installments. 
2 New microlending sector (mainly 
Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants) 
Smaller/short-term/unsecured 
loans 
3 Informal microlending sector 
(neighborhood moneylenders—mashoni-
sas in black townships and villages) 
Smaller/short-term/unsecured 
loans
Figure 1: Credit supply
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What is crucial to note in this picture of credit supply and demand is the 
role of state salaries and grants. The situation in South Africa, with its devel-
oped capitalist sector and high levels of economic formality, both converges 
with and differs from that of the countries where informal/underground or 
“second” economies (MacGaffey 1991) are prevalent. State employment in the 
Congo, as in Ghana and uganda, was important mainly for the fact that jobs 
brought “access to the profitable opportunities of a parallel commercial system 
developing in the heart of the state” (MacGaffey 1991: 15) rather than for ac-
tual salaries, which often remained unpaid. In South Africa’s posttransitional 
civil service, by contrast, salaries are regularly paid. In this newly financialized 
setting, they not only fund recipients’ livelihoods, they also underpin an infor-
mal or second economy of credit: through their use either as a kind of “start-up 
capital” in an informal mashonisa business or, conversely, as a means of repay-
ing one of these (alongside other creditors). Dependence on moneylenders in 
the less-developed African countries of MacGaffey’s book is often unavoidable, 
given the absence of alternatives “to those exploitative relations and the crude 
‘social security’ provided by patron-client relations” (Beckman 1988, cited in 
MacGaffey 1991: 32). In South Africa, in contrast, alternatives do exist. These 
are used alongside illegal/informal moneylending by those newly liberated from 
the restrictive (or nonexistent) credit offerings of apartheid. MacGaffey claims 
that civil service employment provides “access to resources” and “opportuni-
ties to . . . extort from those lower down the social scale” (1991: 36). In South 
Africa, salaries can function equally as means to repay the extorters. In the 
case of the mashonisas (illegal moneylenders or loan sharks), this is achieved by 
the use of the confiscated ATM card; in that of buying a washing machine on 
instalments or borrowing from a registered microlender, deductions are made—
with endorsement by the clerk of a magistrate’s court—directly from the sal-
ary or grant. (Those without such incomes—or who are not receiving regular 
welfare payments—often find it difficult if not impossible to get a loan.) The 
interpenetrating first and second economies of MacGaffey’s book (1991: 154) 
are thus equally present, but with a different modality, in South Africa.
forced the “big four” mainstream banks to bail it out. Moody’s then downgraded 
the credit ratings of all these banks. For details on this process, see Tim Cohen, 
“editor’s note: unAbil to unwind,” Financial Mail, August 14, 2014; Agency Staff, 
“Moody’s downgrades Standard Bank, Absa, FNB and Nedbank,” Business Day, 
August 19, 2014; Times Live, August 17, 2014.
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DeDuCTIoNS AND CouNTer-DeDuCTIoNS
I have a problem. People are debiting the money from my account. That is why I 
am not getting that much money. I have been working in security. And I have to 
pay some of the accounts, like Jet, and those accounts that I have to pay by hand.10
This statement by a low-wage, hourly paid worker, who I met when he was 
attending debt counseling, conveys something of what it feels like to be caught 
in the web of automatic repayments whose origins have been sketched above. 
Besides those he was compelled to pay “by hand,” his monthly repayments in-
cluded those for store cards to the clothing retailer, Jet, alongside numerous oth-
ers that were deducted. His statement represents, in microcosm, what a judge 
later described as the iniquity of a system in which “millions of people across the 
country” were having their wages docked to an unsustainable degree.11
Figure 2: Jet store branch with advertisement for store card (Photo by Deborah James)
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We turn, then, to the stories of deductions and counter-deductions with 
which this article began. The first, about the overpriced washing machine, is 
not atypical but it attracted unusual levels of public attention because it was 
disseminated through social media. In early 2016, an employer in the Western 
Cape town of George posted on Facebook an account of his gardener’s battle 
with furniture retail giant Lewis, which included a photograph of a contract 
that the gardener had signed (fig. 3).12 What ensued was a kind of moral panic. 
Commentators were shocked that a low-wage employee could end up paying 
r18,000 for a washing machine that retailed for r6,000. The markup did not 
consist of interest alone. The appliance store, said a newspaper report, had “man-
aged to convince [the] 60-plus gardener” to sign a contract for
a 14kg twin tub that, apart from the r5999 price tag, included: a r975 contract 
fee, r750 for delivery, a r1311 maintenance agreement, interest at 23% per an-
num, customer protection insurance of r2052 and, again, protection insurance 
for clients of r3785. The total is r17955 and [the] employee asked him to have 
a look at the contract as Lewis Stores only asked him for r600 deposit and the 
gardener did not understand what the extra costs were for.
Lewis agreed to cancel the contract, but a bitter fight nonetheless ensued. The 
furniture retailer threatened legal action for defamation13 and the gardener’s 
employer unapologetically reaffirmed that its “lending practices are not fair to 
the poor and amount to exploitation.” He also maintained that while a court 
would have to rule whether this was reckless lending or not, and he could not 
speculate about that, the gardener’s “lack of ability to afford such a contract and 
lack of understanding of the full costs involved” made it quite likely that Lewis 
would “be found guilty of reckless lending.”14
12. The story was reported in the local newspaper, the George Herald: 
 https://www.george- herald.com/News/Article/General/r18-000-for-r5-999-






14. Shortly before this, Lewis’s practices had been exposed—using “mystery 
shoppers”—by a consumer watchdog and self-styled auditor of the credit industry, 
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The term reckless lending was particularly emotive. In a manner somewhat 
reminiscent of the paternalism of the colonial authorities a century earlier, 
a regulatory framework had already been put in place—the National Credit 
Act—precisely in order to stop retailers and lenders from making offers to those 
manifestly unable to afford them. Its passing, informed by the kinds of scenarios 
that transpired between Lewis and the gardener, had been designed by the De-
partment of Trade and Industry to counteract the egregious forms of “credit 
apartheid” that had earlier prevailed (DTI 2002), as well as tackling the effects 
of the new credit bonanza. But its umbrella organization, the National Credit 
register, severely understaffed and hence little more than a “consumer advocate 
that is charged with registering lenders,”15 was seemingly ineffectual.
Buying household goods in installments by those who cannot afford them 
outright is not in itself a uniquely South African phenomenon: in the united 
Kingdom, for example, a much-reviled company called Brighthouse has spe-
cialized in selling white goods in the same way.16 What did mark off the South 
African case, and what led to the social media furor, was a set of associated 
practices (Schreiner et al. 1997). retailers levied excessively high interest rates 
(despite having been able to ascertain—as with the washing machine purchase 
in George—that the purchaser has a secure line of income and hence did not 
pose a “risk”). They also charged for life insurance to cover the term of the loan, 
and added a fee for delivery. retailers rationalize this as part of their “risk assess-
ment” since it enables them to ascertain where—in a township, shanty town, or 
squatter camp—the customer lives and thus makes repossession easier should it 
come to that.17 What outstripped all of these in notoriety, however, was the way 
such retailers—and others—were able to make “deductions” if payments were 
not kept up. It had become habituated practice for retailers and microlenders 
alike to do this by using emoluments attachment or garnishee orders (eAos). 
Law Clinic attorney Stephan van der Merwe aptly summarized the situation: 
Summit Financial Partners: http://www.summitfin.co.za/; https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=uZN2lw- LMYQ&feature=youtu.be.
15. Patrick McGroarty, “In South Africa, a consumer debt bubble forms,” Wall Street 
Journal, December 26, 2012. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732
4296604578177884108022670.
16. http://www.brighthouse.co.uk/.
17. Interview with Marlene Heymans, Pretoria, April 15, 2009.
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“The rules . . . fail to cater for those matters where the judgment . . . [is] being 
abused to squeeze every last drop of blood from debtors” (2007).
Figure 3: The gardener’s contract posted on Facebook. (Photo by onne Vegter, used 
with permission.)
This brings us to the second story. As in the washing machine case, things 
were once again instigated by a white employer from the left-liberal establish-
ment: and this time court action was initiated not by a creditor hitting back at 
accusations but by an employer. What the cases had in common was the pres-
ence of one kind of (paternalistic) external control as a means to combat another 
(exploitative) variety, and the importance of the formal, legal domain as terrain 
on which these battles would be fought.
In the absence of meaningful action taken against reckless lenders by the 
government (which is what the drafters of the National Credit Act had intend-
ed), businesswoman and wine farm owner Wendy Appelbaum approached the 
Legal Aid Clinic at Stellenbosch university, which in turn instructed the pro 
bono practice of law firm Webber Wentzel. Several of the workers on Appel-
baum’s wine farm, De Morgenzon, she complained, were having “large portions” 
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of their monthly pay deducted by the use of such orders.18 In the judgment of 
the Western Cape High Court that heard the case, it was not this practice itself 
that was condemned. (It noted with concern, however, the epidemic levels at 
which such orders were being granted: in the case of one of the applicants the 
clerk of the court had “issued three eAos on the same day attaching almost 
her entire salary.”) rather, it singled out the “predatory lending practices” and 
“large scale abuse” including “fraud” in the process of issuing such orders.19 The 
fraud—eventually ruled against by the court—included debt collectors’ use of 
counterfeit signatures. It also included the issuing of orders by incompetent or 
corrupt clerks rather than by magistrates themselves, and the practice of “fo-
rum shopping,” in which retailers and lenders sought to have orders enacted 
in areas of jurisdiction, far from the debtor’s place of residence, where clerks 
were known to be compliant. Those who had been readily using these fraudu-
lent procedures, and were listed as respondents in the case, were not only the 
thirteen “credit providers” but also a firm of attorneys that specialized in debt 
collection on their behalf, and which had on its books debt to the “total value . . . 
of r1,597,585,832.00 (that is, over one and a half billion rands).”20 With a rich 
income source thus threatened, the association representing the debt-collecting 
law firm—despite the judgment being widely hailed as a “great victory for the 
poor”—lodged an appeal. even before the appeal was heard, however, there 
were signs that the numbers of “fraudulently” enacted eAos had fallen. The 
Constitutional Court eventually ruled in September 2016 that no such order 
may be issued without authorization by the court “after satisfying itself that it 
is just and equitable and that the amount is appropriate.”21 The efforts made to 
bring the case to court, unusually, involved not just pro bono lawyers and legal 
practitioners with an interest in human rights. They also involved “those with 
18. Desmond Thompson, “emoluments ruling ‘a great victory for poor in general,’” 
Sunday Times, July 15, 2015. For more information on how the system operates, see 
van der Merwe (2007).
19. These and the following citations are from the judgment: 
 http://www.sun.ac.za/eng- lish/Downloadable%20Documents/News%20
Attachments/Judgment%20universi- tyof%20Stellenbosch%20Law%20
Clinic%20080715%20(2).pdf. For the later judgment by the Constitutional Court, 
see http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/32.html.
20. At the time, this equated to £77,930,236.
21. http://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/ombuds-complaints-salary-
attachment-orders-fall/; http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/32.html.
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resources and influence,” such as the farm owner mentioned earlier, as well as 
a business in the private sector, Summit Financial Services, which had charged 
itself with auditing the unethical practices of creditors.22 effectively, the Court 
was here intervening at the highest level in a realm previously thought of as 
everyday, even banal. The collection of debts, once made through routine ad-
ministrative measures, had been ruled as involving abusive practices, and as hav-
ing negative implications for the rights and freedoms of South Africa’s lowliest 
citizens.
In the third deduction story, reported in 2015, it was—as in the previous 
case—an employer who was made aware of the effect of the whittling away of 
salaries on employee morale that initiated proceedings to curb this practice. The 
huge multinational mining company Amplats “launched a legal battle” against 
salary deductions for outstanding debts.23 The company was opposed, in particu-
lar, to the “12.5% fee charged by administrators, stipulated in the Magistrate’s 
Court Act,” and to the practice whereby attorneys undertaking debt administra-
tion were charging “what they wish” or were circumventing “the 12.5% cap by 
subcontracting their duties and adding that cost to the debt.” The Ceo’s argu-
ment “that this could turn some heavily indebted people into ‘indentured labour, 
working to pay off administrators as well as creditors—often for indefinite peri-
ods’” contained eerie echoes of the practices of nineteenth-century trader/labor 
recruitment agents enticing workers into the labor force by indebting them. In 
this type of deduction, practiced through “debt administration,” rewards were 
again arising from inadequate policing of the Magistrates’ Court Act of 1944 
that governed such matters. Debt administrators, appointed to officiate over 
the accounts of debtors who were in default, received funds through the ex-
ecution—yet again—of a deduction order from those debtors’ accounts. Their 
official role was to divert these funds into a trust account in order to distribute 
them to the unpaid creditors. But they were often unqualified and unregistered, 
overcharged their clients, or failed to pay creditors as they had undertaken to 
do, with outstanding interest from the unpaid debts then accumulating to the 
detriment of the debtor. In one case, administrators extended a loan to one of 
their clients, added themselves as a creditor, and “distributed the better part of 
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creditors.” In other cases, “administrators were attorneys who were struck off 
the roll or were themselves under administration” (Smit 2008: 14).24 The blurred 
boundaries between debtor and creditor are here evident.
The final story in my quartet tells of similar deductions, likewise made with 
impunity until a challenge was launched—in this case, by public interest law 
NGo the Legal resources Centre. In this case, however, the automatic deduc-
tions were being made from state welfare payments rather than from state pay 
packets, or salaries or wages paid in the private sector. What also made this case 
stand out was the way it combined the outsourcing of the state’s redistributive 
function with sophisticated new technologies of registration that were bringing 
potential (poor) borrowers more easily within the ambit of businesses aiming to 
profit from them (see Breckenridge 2005, 2014; Vally 2016). “Pensioners,” said 
the report “are signing over their social grants to a private lender in order to get 
loans.” The report went on to document how easypay, a service “launched by 
Net1/Cash Paymaster Services,” had access to “the details of 21 million grant 
beneficiaries.” It was using these to allow microlenders and funeral insurance 
salesmen—many of them subsidiaries of the grant-paying company—to target 
those beneficiaries by offering them loans and selling them products, then de-
ducting payments from their grants on payday (Torkelson, forthcoming).25 eth-
nographer Natasha Vally, who documented these processes in the rural setting 
of Bushbuckridge over two years, noted that officials spent more time involved 
in the business of these subsidiary loan and insurance arrangements than in the 
work of actually paying grants.
ultimately, Net1 had acquired the machinery and other hardware, the knowl-
edge of how to put them into practice in South Africa, the employ of people 
with the required skills and local knowledge to implement their infrastructure, 
24. “Struck off ” means removed from the register and prohibited from practicing as a 
lawyer.
25. https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20160221/28219653501
9414. Deductions from social grants: how it all works. https://www.groundup.org.
za/article/deductions-social-grants-how-it-works/; https://www.groundup.org.za/
article/deductions-social-grants-how-it-works/
 Sophia’s Choice: Farm worker has to decide which of her children to feed https://
www.groundup.org.za/article/sophias-choice-farm-worker-has-decide-which-
her-children-feed/
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and the information and databases that it needed in order to maintain a thriving 
business without direct connections to the state. (Vally 2016: 982)
The legal NGo involved in the case achieved some success: by the time of pub-
lication, a case in the Constitutional Court, in which human/consumer rights 
organisation The Black Sash had played a significant role, had led to the can-
cellation of the Net1 contract, and its awarding instead to the South African 
Post office. “It is a shameful travesty of justice,” said a spokesperson for the 
opposition Democratic Alliance, that such deductions had “been allowed to 
take place at all‚ from grants which are already way too small to survive on.”26 
Significant numbers of welfare beneficiaries, however, had opted to retain their 
“easypay” cards and to continue borrowing from Moneyline, one of Net1’s sub-
sidiaries. The story demonstrates, overall, how “the expansion of indebtedness 
and financial devices . . . [and] the impossibility of paying” feature prominently 
in accounts of settings where there is a “massive incorporation of people into the 
current market economy” (Neiburg and Guyer, Introduction).
More CouNTer-DeDuCTIoNS
The burgeoning supply of and demand for credit, the indeterminacy about the 
exact figures involved, and the socioeconomic segments most affected, have 
been outlined above. So have the belated attempts to regulate and curb the prac-
tice of ensuring repayment through deductions. It remains to be asked whether 
any means have been found to counter that practice, apart from expensive legal 
action undertaken by wealthy and paternalistic employers.
one answer suggests a protectionist, and perhaps equally paternalistic, rem-
edy. Drawing attention to the risky and unsustainable character of the unsecured 
credit market, those espousing this approach offer advice to unwary consum-
ers. Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan warned in 2012 against using unsecured 
lending to feed consumption rather than for investment purposes: “Take it 
easy on the consumption side. Lower your levels of indebtedness. Distinguish 
26. “Funeral policy deductions settlement a ‘step towards protecting society’s most 
vulnerable,’” Dispatch Live, May 27, 2016. https://www.africanewshub.com/
news/5072284-funeral-policy-deductions-settlement-a-step-towards-protecting-
societys-most-vulnerable.
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between what you want and what you need” (cited in Schraten 2012). As the sit-
uation seemingly worsened and as it became clearer that waged employees were 
among the worst hit, financial corporations like Alexander Forbes, concerned 
with employee well-being, presented a series of talks to audiences comprising 
the trustees of pension funds (among others) that were aimed at raising aware-
ness of the need for worker education and protection.27 These analyses, again 
reflecting a high modernist stance, stemmed from the idea that a population 
unused to—because previously excluded from—the possibilities of formal bor-
rowing, was not attuned to the conventional wisdom that “all loans and repay-
ments should cancel each other out” (Shipton 2011: 217; see also Graeber 2011: 
3–4). Far from overtly challenging or questioning that premise, consumers had 
been duped into borrowing beyond their means and would require “financial 
education” to stop them doing so in future. They should also be introduced to 
the benefits of “being banked,” which would lessen their reliance on higher-
priced loans from informal moneylenders (Ardington et al. 2004).
A second line of argument—one I have pursued in earlier publications—was 
that consumers knew more than they were credited with, and that neither edu-
cation nor banking could remedy a deep-seated bias in favor of lenders. Those 
in need of financial services have long made use of them ( James 2015: 107), and 
have been accustomed to make regular repayments. They have used their obliga-
tions to honor installment plan repayments as a savings mechanism or a way of 
selectively avoiding relatives’ requests for money (or both). As elsewhere, they 
have been able to “negotiate and challenge” such demands by choosing to repay 
some debts rather than others or by juggling various creditors’ claims against 
each other (see Guerin 2014). But these strategies cannot mitigate the fact that 
the cards are stacked in favor of lender/creditors. The ability of the latter to 
make automatic deductions from pay packets means they have little need of 
collateral, since wages serve as a collateral substitute in such cases (roth 2004: 
78), and their techniques for making deductions have, until recently, gone un-
challenged. Borrowers therefore have little muscle. unsecured lending enhances 
the principle of “advantage to creditors” that underpins existing insolvency law 
and that remains intact despite inconclusive attempts to provide debtor relief 
(Boraine and roestoff 2002: 4; Schraten 2014; 2020). What marked the break 
with earlier arrangements, according to this line of argument, was post-1990s 
27. The 2015 issue of their Benefits Barometer, to which I contributed, can be found 
here: https://issuu.com/alexanderforbescomms/docs/benefitsbarometer2015.
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financialization, plus the extensive use of bank accounts by the populace at large. 
It was this that definitively enhanced creditors’ advantage by facilitating the 
unimpeded flow of money, from salary or social grant, into the bank account at 
month’s end and out of it again ( James 2015: 110).
There is truth in both sets of claims, however. Some creditors do indeed 
exploit lenders with impunity, and have been able to shape-shift in parallel with 
changing legislation, avoiding all attempts to regulate their behavior. But many 
informal moneylenders (mashonisas), initially spotting the opportunities offered 
by lending money at high rates of interest but later prohibited from securing 
or otherwise unable to secure repayment through the financialized “deduction” 
system, have reverted (as an alternative, usually unsuccessfully) to the “formal” 
means of seeking repayment at the small claims courts.28 For other mashonisas, 
the extent of their lending, the interest they can charge, and their ability to call 
in loans, is limited by community norms about moral and appropriate behavior 
(Krige 2011: 154–58; for Argentina see Wilkis 2015). Spaza (informal) shops 
are likewise often able to stay in business only by selling on credit and often 
have difficulties in recouping moneys owed to them.29 As this suggests, credi-
tors—including illegal ones—are not all-powerful, since borrowers (albeit not 
always distinguishable from lenders) have some means—and not only illegal 
ones—of protection against them.
equally, borrowers have devised schemes to protect themselves from lenders. 
Many are ambivalent about using banks, feeling on the one hand that they seem 
trustworthy (Hull 2012), but on the other hand that they are being exploited or 
discriminated against on racial grounds by these institutions (Kibuuka 2006). 
Some resolve to steer clear of them. even middle- to high-income earners have 
decoupled themselves from the world of financial formality. Some are keen to 
escape from the clutches of stores that sell furniture on installment plan. “I 
wanted to prevent members from buying goods on credit,” said the founder of 
one savings club who had suffered the iniquities of “deductions” from his salary. 
“At the end of the year, you can buy what you want with cash” ( James 2015: 
144). others explicitly state their preference for clubs over banks because of the 
higher interest rates they offer on savings and the lower rate charged for taking 
out loans. Showing particular astuteness, they prefer to transact savings and 
loans through clubs in order to avoid South Africa’s notorious bank charges, the 
28. Nickle Felgate and Pippa reyburn, pers. comm., April 2015.
29. Interview with Marlene Heymans, Pretoria, April 15, 2009; see also Hart (1973).
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highest in the world (Kibuuka 2006: 51). Those of more modest means, having 
tried the simple option of fleeing from one bank account to the next as credi-
tors pursue them, have subsequently requested that employers pay their wages 
directly in cash or by using prepaid money cards delinked from bank accounts.30 
Formal and informal borrowing arrangements are judiciously combined, but 
people are sometimes forced by circumstances to convert from one to the other, 
and back again—or to combine all simultaneously.
Claims that excessive borrowing owes itself to a lack of education, then, 
are as well-rehearsed in South Africa as they are in many other settings where 
financialization is far advanced (see Lazarus 2016). The examples given here, 
however, paint a more complex picture of people’s navigation through the fi-
nancial landscape, suggesting that their decisions are founded less on ignorance 
than on a shrewd ability to evade obligations that are unduly onerous.
CoNCLuSIoN
How, then, can we make sense of South Africa’s post-1994 economy, in which 
repayment, deduction, and counter-deduction have played such a large role? 
Given the fierce battles fought out in the courts to rule against practices that 
often exist beyond the law, are tricky debt collection practices to be reckoned 
as entirely distinct from formal legal processes, perhaps in a new version of the 
formal/informal binary? or do they form an intrinsic part of the totality of the 
country’s (now financialized) version of capitalism? Do the high interest rates, 
paid by those formerly excluded, serve as a new version of the subsidy to capital-
ist production—a role formerly attributed by Marxist theorists to householders’ 
rural cultivation (Wolpe 1972)? or does refusal to repay amount to a repudia-
tion of financial inclusion?
The boom in both micro- and not-so-micro-lending of the post-1994 pe-
riod intensified the existing systems of extraction facilitated by technologies 
of deduction. These certainly fueled accumulation; new financial players like 
African Bank were founded on the back of that boom. When African Bank 
required a bailout this revealed the unsustainability of a scenario in which lend-
ers had clambered over each other in their determination to offer loans to all 
and sundry, without reckoning borrowers’ ability to repay. on the one hand, 
30. Tony Beamish, pers. comm., April 16, 2015.
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borrowers’ efforts to counter deductions, through evasive action and court hear-
ings alike, seem to suggest that borrowers were getting the upper hand. It might 
also be claimed, however, that the state was ultimately the loser in this system, 
with its salaries and grants being made the basis of illicit moneylending and the 
collection of high rates of interest. A regime that has been called distributional 
on account of its continued state spending (Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 314), 
and a setting where “neoliberal means interweave with and facilitate redistribu-
tive ends” (Hull and James 2012: 16) is what makes this possible. In the end, it 
is unclear who is exploiting, or subsidizing, whom.
As in the case of the Congo, it is true that “vested interests stand in the 
way of any reform” of the informal, illegal, second economy, and that the state 
and its agents are similarly reluctant to “clamp down” on it (MacGaffey 1991). 
But in South Africa, it is not only the “wealthy and powerful” that “consolidate 
their own position” through participation in these activities (MacGaffey 1991). 
rather, a multitude of small, informal lenders exist alongside the larger loan 
sharks and the rapacious retailers whose activities have been outlined above. 
Profits—and losses—have been difficult to trace, making it tricky to add the 
debts deemed “uncollected” to any statistical reckoning of the size or shape of 
South Africa’s economy seen as an integrated whole, or to identify a specific set 
of wealth flows or accumulations that it involves. An account of the real econ-
omy in MacGaffey’s sense—one that includes both recorded and unrecorded 
economic activities, both deductions and counter-deductions—might become 
easier to track as ethnographic researchers continue to explore and monitor 
these multiple activities.
ultimately, this economy is one in which high finance and the state’s re-
sources are inextricably entangled with the wages earned, consumption under-
taken within, and debts paid (and unpaid) by householders. To typecast it as yet 
another case of neoliberalism, with the state enabling extraction to privilege big 
business /capitalism, would be to tell too simple a story. Neither does this case 
square up entirely with MacGaffey’s analysis of the Congo. Where she wrote of 
jobs bringing access to profitable opportunities of a “parallel commercial system 
developing in the heart of the state” (1991: 16), that “system” in South Africa 
has taken on an unusual and unexpected form. Somewhere between the two 
characterizations, we may be witnessing a new formation of the state, with pri-
vate sector actors like easypay and Net1 taking over, duplicating, or hijacking 
its functions. Yet we also need to recognize the less readily acknowledged as-
pects of the economy, whether these be tacitly sanctioned illegalities or informal 
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economic practices. This article has shown how other factors, too, need to be 
stirred into the analytical mix. The varying modes of control range from the 
paternalism of white employers and the state, which echoes that of the colonial 
authorities that clamped down on nineteenth-century “advances,” to more di-
rect forms of exploitation. The constitutionalism of the courts is also important: 
one presaged by the human rights focus of certain key lawyers, even when the 
depredations of apartheid were at their worst. Finally, we must acknowledge 
the redistributive tendencies of a newly installed democratic dispensation, such 
that elite profits and state resources are channeled and find their way into the 
pockets of the rank and file.
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The favela as an (un)quantifiable reality
Eugênia Motta
IntroductIon
numbers, like words, are forms of expressing and creating the existence of things 
(desrosières and Kott 2005); they provide a way to conceive the world through 
which we move, and transform it. The subjects of this text are “large numbers” 
(desrosières 1993) or “public numbers” (Porter 1995) and operations involved 
in their production and use. As well as being one of the main modern modes of 
building social knowledge, large numbers are a key element of state reality, pro-
viding the reference point through which various agencies are mobilized in the 
effort to govern (neiburg 2011; Mitchell 2002; cohn 1996). Indeed, they oc-
cupy a fundamental place in the construction of the units, objects, and domains 
of state action, yet they are not purely state forms.1
As Theodore Porter argues, “statistics, preeminent among the quantitative 
tools for investigating society, is powerless unless it can make new entities” 
(1994: 398). In this chapter I discuss the production of a specific entity, the 
1. A version of this text was published as an article in Portuguese (Motta 2019).
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favela, based on operations involved in its creation and use as a statistical reality 
and, therefore, as an object of a certain kind of agency. My aim is to highlight 
the relationship between the difficulties and obstacles involved in the quan-
tification and conception of favelas as abnormal (or subnormal), problematic 
and dangerous. Ian Hacking calls attention to the proximity between two ways 
normality has been understood in the development of statistics, and affirms it is 
one of the most important ideas of the twentieth century. For the author: “The 
normal stands indifferently for what is typical, the unenthusiastic objective av-
erage, but it also stands for what has been, good health, and for what shall be, 
our chosen destiny” (1990: 169).
Statistics are produced through an extensive chain of transformations 
(Thévenot 1995) that involve agreements, conventions, negotiations, transla-
tions, and codifications (desrosières and Kott 2005). The processes of producing 
and using public numbers involve various kinds of negotiations and conflicts in 
which, in the effort to quantify the world, difficulties arise in collecting and clas-
sifying data, and contestations flare up over their accuracy. These are the critical 
dimensions in the production of statistical reality that interest me. I shall ex-
amine three types of oppositions to quantification, which I call resistances. They 
neither impede nor rule out the possibility of producing numbers, but on the 
contrary, form part of this always incomplete and conflictual process.
Quantification is understood here as a way of creating realities, categories, 
and objects of a particular kind. reality (or realities) is understood to be the ar-
rangements of elements and relations that people conceive as existent, relatively 
autonomous and external to subjectivities, observable, tangible, and intelligi-
ble—that is, it is a common reference point in both senses of the term: shared 
and ordinary. In adopting this approach, it not only makes sense to approach re-
alities in the plural rather than reality in the singular, it is essential that we do so.
The object of the statistics discussed here are favelas, places deemed prob-
lematic ever since they first emerged (Valladares 2000, 2005). The origin of 
these spaces dates to the occupation of hillsides in the center of rio de Janeiro 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Since this chapter explores the defini-
tions of what favelas are, it would be somewhat hazardous to offer any kind of 
objective description, given that the analysis that I propose questions precisely 
that kind of endeavor. nonetheless, the reader must be at least minimally situ-
ated. Provisionally, we can affirm that favelas are identified by distinctive land-
scape characteristics, such as high-density occupation by constructions, most 
of which are considered incomplete (lacking paint or other coverings), along 
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winding, unplanned streets and passageways, and very often located on slopes 
and hills, although not always. They are taken to be equivalent or similar to 
what are referred to in the English literature as slums, informal settlements, or 
shantytowns.
Figure 1: View of complexo do Alemão, rio de Janeiro, 2014. Photo by the author.
The analytic proposal presented here originates in ethnographic fieldwork I 
have conducted since 2012 in a favela in the large region known as the com-
plexo do Alemão in the north Zone of rio de Janeiro, which combines various 
neighborhoods considered to be favelas, though they constitute a fairly uniform 
urban continuum.2 My initial interest was to investigate people’s ordinary eco-
nomic practices through long-term and in-depth insertion in the life of one 
2. For reasons explained above, it is somewhat problematic to present statistical data 
with any descriptive objective in this text. recognizing the importance of statistical 
reality in the social sciences, however, I suspend the analysis for a moment to provide 
some information to the reader. According to the municipal government of rio de 
Janeiro, some 60,500 people live in the complexo do Alemão in approximately 
18,000 households (cavallieri and Vial 2012).
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family. This work revealed an intrinsic relationship between economics, family 
practices, and houses. The centrality of houses in the social life of the people in 
this community3 formed the basis for an approach that also considers houses to 
be analytically central. However, residents are not the only agents who act and 
think about their houses and the space in which they live or act in.
It was certainly relevant to the questions that interested me that the people 
with whom I conducted my research lived in a favela—for many reasons, such 
as the forms of economic and building regulations existing for these spaces, 
the stigma that they carry and even the fact that few researchers have been 
interested in understanding the economy of favelas. but what are favelas? or 
more precisely, what makes these spaces what they are? Among the numerous 
meanings that this word contains and ideas to which it refers, many are associ-
ated with disorder and the need to act. These are central dimensions in which 
quantification plays a key role.
I use three different kinds of materials as empirical sources for studying the 
production of favelas as quantified realities. one of them is the previously cited 
ethnography of everyday life in a specific community. The second are the writ-
ten documents produced by the brazilian Institute of geography and Statistics 
(IbgE)4 in different periods, which I use to establish continuities between the 
first formulations concerning favelas and the categories employed today in the 
national census, which are conducted by IbgE. Finally, I analyze the public 
debates that occurred in the wake of a self-census conducted by local organi-
zations in the Maré region of rio de Janeiro. This case contains a deliberate 
and explicit articulation of the same kind of critiques of numbers that I had 
perceived in a more diffuse form in my fieldwork in the complexo do Alemão.
I argue that by using these different empirical sources, it is possible to 
produce a new approach to the multiple dimensions of producing statistical 
realities. The ethnographic interpretation, therefore, is not limited to descrip-
tion, but refers to a proposal to depict the interconnections of diffuse practices 
and meanings related to social worlds that, in principle, are at some distance 
from each other, and where people conceive and experience favelas differently 
(public policy managers and residents of favelas, for example). This composition 
3. The word comunidade (community) is the most common way residents in the favela 
where I conducted fieldwork (and many others) refer to the where they live.
4. The national Institute of Statistics was officially created in 1934 and began 
operating in 1936. In 1938 it became known as IbgE.
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is justified by the nature of the object itself. My attempt is to investigate the 
production of statistical realities, a process that involves the diverse efforts, op-
positions, and practical and symbolic operations involved in the creation of an 
unstable agreement.
The idea of resistance that I am proposing highlights the relationship be-
tween dynamics that are distinct but share their presentation of oppositions and 
difficulties and their demand for solutions. What resists is the very object of 
quantification while it is being created. It is the disorder of occupied hillsides, 
the movement of people and houses, the favela residents themselves. Each form 
of resistance explored here corresponds to dissonances, and to a contraposi-
tion to a crucial aspect of statistical realities: measurability, stabilization, and 
accordance.
The idea of resistance employed here is not directly, nor even necessarily, 
related to opposition pursued by marginalized persons or groups, as discussed 
by James Scott (1985), for instance. I do not intend to examine interpretative 
disputes (though they also form part of my analysis) but dissonances that echo 
the main and pervasive questions that favelas raise in the public domain: how 
to recognize the favelas and, mainly, how to measure them, and what should be 
measured. resistance here is whatever opposes effort, and ordered and inten-
tional action.
I examine three forms of “resistance” by favelas to quantification. After a first 
section in which I sketch a panorama of the favelas and their historical con-
struction as problematic, I examine the category aglomerado subnormal (subnor-
mal agglomerate)—which is used to describe favelas in official statistics—and 
discuss how a particular, spatialized conception of poverty has been produced 
through the construction of the claim that these spaces are difficult to count. 
Hence, the aim is to explore how quantification is employed to conceptualize 
poverty as a reality—that is, as something existent, comprehensible, and upon 
which it is possible and necessary to act. by comparing the place of favelas in 
three different censuses (1950, 1991, 2010), I intend to show the nexus between 
normalization of the favela as a socially broad category and the idea that these 
were places in which and for which it was—and still is—difficult to produce 
numbers.
Second, I contrast the domicile, a statistical category that fixes and stabilizes 
persons and residences with “houses” as lived by favela residents. The endeavor 
to construct the residence as a discrete unit, fundamental to the construction of 
demographic statistics, contrasts with the constant movement involved in the 
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production of homes, as lived by favela residents. These spaces are difficult to 
count precisely because there is instability and movement within them.
Finally, I discuss the resistance that emerges through the explicit contesta-
tion of this census data by the arguments and justifications for a “self-counting” 
carried out by local organizations. The statistical realities produced by official 
agencies are described by ordinary people engaged in local organizations as 
false, the methodology used is considered inadequate and to be based on preju-
dices and stigmatization. Producing their own numbers, organizers of the local 
census argue, entails challenging the way that favelas are publicly perceived and 
treated by state agents.
FAVElAS AS A ProblEM SIncE tHEIr orIgInS
The category favela is difficult to define. It is employed daily by all kinds of 
people, including public administrators, as a self-evident reality and can be used 
in a purely descriptive form. It would not be an exaggeration to say that practi-
cally all of rio de Janeiro’s residents and most brazilians have an idea of what a 
favela is. The word is used routinely without any need for additional description 
or explanation. despite the naturality of its usage, the word contains multiple 
meanings and many concrete places exist whose categorization as favelas is open 
to discussion and dispute, given that the category associates landscape with vi-
olence and insalubrious conditions. derived words like favelado, which refers 
to “a favela resident,” are commonly used with a negative moral connotation. 
Favelado may be used as a strong term of accusation, implying that the person 
is badly educated and violent.5 to favelizar a location, for instance, generally 
implies allowing or inciting urban deterioration and impoverishment.
The end of the nineteenth century saw the first clusters of houses made 
from cheap and reusable materials, built on hill slopes close to the center of 
rio de Janeiro. According to the narrative that became widespread and per-
sists until today—an origin myth according to lícia Valladares (2000)—the 
first such place to be occupied was called the Morro da Favella (Favella Hill). 
The existence of a space with houses made from precarious materials, built in a 
5. Favelado does not always have a negative meaning. Activists from local organizations 
in favelas strive to affirm their identity in a positive way through its use. Some 
researchers use the term to describe residents.
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disorganized form on lands that did not officially belong to the people who had 
built on them, soon became a public issue. over time the word favela became 
more widely used and transformed into a generic term for a kind of urban form, 
associated with concerns about their alleged ugliness and insalubrity, and for 
supposedly harboring dangerous people.
More than a century later, rather than vanishing, as had long been the goal 
of public policies, rio’s favelas have grown in number and size, and today much 
of the city’s population lives in this kind of space. They continue to be a major 
theme of public debate, and are omnipresent themes in election campaigns and 
activities, for instance. Favelas were and continue to be seen publicly and treated 
by governments as a “problem” that needs to be addressed (Machado da Silva 
2002). Paradoxically, one of the main arguments repeatedly used in support of 
intervention is that these are spaces where the state has always been absent.
In the twentieth century, various solutions were discussed and executed in 
relation to what was called the city’s “cancer,” ranging from proposals in the 
1960s and 1970s for their complete extinction through demolition of housing, 
to the 1980s and beyond through urbanization programs and the installation of 
infrastructure (burgos 1998).The association with poverty began early on; stud-
ies almost always focused on poverty and the place to study urban poverty was 
the favela (Valladares 2000, 2005).
The most recent modality of problematizing favelas began in the 1980s 
and became more firmly established in the following decade. The emergence of 
armed groups that controlled drug trafficking and favela territories led to a new 
and unique configuration of crime in rio de Janeiro (Misse 2002, 2007). These 
places became perceived as the loci responsible for producing “urban violence” 
(Machado da Silva 2010). The dismantling of entire favelas, the implementation 
of urbanization projects, and investment in welfare policies still remain part of 
government actions for favelas, but they are accompanied practically and sym-
bolically by the alleged need for police action.
The most recent interventions in favelas have been projects developed as 
part of the federal growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento: PAc)6 and the installation of Police Pacification units (Unidades 
6. The PAc was a federal government program essentially designed to fund large 
infrastructure projects. created in 2007 during the first Workers Party (Pt) and 
lula administration, it was one of main vectors of economic growth during the 
2000s and one of the chief banners of dilma rousseff ’s first presidential campaign.
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de Polícia Pacificadora: uPP).7 These programs represent the two main ways state 
governments perceive favelas, through the themes of poverty and violence. The 
first creates a focus on urban infrastructure and corresponding “social” policies. 
The second sparked a new security policy.
In discussing the construction of favelas as a statistical reality, I show one 
aspect of their production as localities where order must be established. consid-
ering that the statistical reality is the main device used in the planning and im-
plementation of state actions, examining its construction entails analyzing the 
technical and moral foundations of the government of spaces and persons. nev-
ertheless, this process is not pacific, but involves various kinds of oppositions.
FroM tHE FAVElA to tHE SubnorMAl AggloMErAtE: 
PoVErty AS A SPAtIAlIZEd rEAlIty
In this section I analyze the uses of the categories favela and subnormal agglom-
erate in IbgE documents relating to three censuses: the 1950 census, the first to 
“see” favelas; the 1991 census, the first to use the term “subnormal agglomerate”; 
and the most recent census, conducted in 2010.
The 1950 census was the first national survey to include the population of 
favelas. The IbgE prepared a specific document analyzing the information col-
lected in these locations, in which it identifies the difficulties involved in collect-
ing and classifying the data:
In the favelas, the building-household survey generally proceeded in the same 
way as in other areas, but entailed different kinds of tasks that required additional 
efforts to be achieved. The terrain to be covered is not always easy to access, in-
deed it often demands hard work for the surveyor to gather data for the entire 
area. (IbgE 1953: 18)
7. The uPPs were a program of the rio de Janeiro state government to which the 
Military Police are subordinated. The declared objective was to enable close-range 
community policing as a strategy to contain armed conflicts in the favelas. For 
some time, in most of the favelas where they were installed, the uPPs led to an 
effective reduction in gun battles, but gun battles have returned to being near daily 
occurrences. About the uses of the category of “pacification” in different historical 
moments in brazil, see oliveira (2014).
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The document also highlights the difficulties in proposing an objective defini-
tion. The IbgE’s approach was based, therefore, on places considered favelas by 
“social consensus.” based on this research, the institute proposed the following 
definition for these spaces:
Hence, included in the conceptualization of favela were human agglomer-
ates that possess, totally or partially, the following characteristics:
1. Minimal proportions—groups of buildings or residences formed by units gen-
erally numbering higher than 50; 2. Type of habitation—Predominance in the 
grouping of small houses or shacks, rustic in type, constructed primarily from 
tin or zinc sheeting, planks or similar materials; 3. Legal status of occupation—
unlicensed and unsupervised constructions on lands belonging to third-parties 
or of unknown ownership; 4. Public improvements—Absence, either entirely or 
partially, of a sewerage system, electricity, telephones and piped water; 5. Urbani-
zation—non-urbanized area without street paving, numbers or signs. (IbgE 
1953: 18)
This definition presumes the concrete existence of the favela as a real phenom-
enon, which can be technically and objectively characterized through data col-
lection and field observations.
In 1991 IbgE included the category “subnormal agglomerate” in the census 
as a type of “census sector.”8 both categories are referred to as “operational.” In 
other words, they are used in the data collection phase rather than the logical 
and analytic organization of the information. A census sector is an area defined 
by the capacity of a single census worker to carry out all the activities related to 
data collection within a certain time interval. The definition of the subnormal 
agglomerate is as follows:
The special sector defined as a subnormal agglomerate is a group composed of 
at least 51 (fifty-one) residential units (shacks, houses . . .) most of which lack 
basic public services, and occupy or had occupied, until recently land belonging 
8. “The census sector is the territorial unit established for the purposes of registration 
control, formed by a continuous area, situated in a single urban or rural block, with 
a size and number of domiciles that enables its survey by a census officer. Hence, 
each official will proceed to collect information with the aim of covering the census 
sector designated to him or her” (IbgE 2010 census guide: http://censo2010.
ibge.gov.br/materiais/guia-do-censo/operacao-censitaria.html).
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to a third party (public or private) and generally built in a disordered and dense 
layout. Subnormal Agglomerates should be identified on the basis of the follow-
ing criteria: a) Illegal occupation of land, i.e. construction on land belonging to 
a third party (public or private) either currently or recently (acquisition of the 
land deed in the past ten years); and b) Possession of at least one of the following 
characteristics: urbanization not complying with existing standards—reflected 
by narrow roads built in an irregular layout, plots of unequal sizes and shapes, and 
constructions built without permission from public authorities; and precarious 
basic public services. (IbgE 2011: 27)
The definition of the subnormal agglomerate is clearly based on the definition 
of the favela from the 1950s. both highlight the lack of urbanization and an il-
legal land ownership system.9 The difference between them is that the older ex-
pression concerns the posterior description of a reality external to the statistics. 
In the second case the category refers to a kind of place whose characteristics 
generate difficulties for data collection.
Subnormal agglomerates, along with other spaces like indigenous villages 
and prisons, for example, were defined as units linked to a supposed difficulty of 
collecting information in the field.10 They shape a kind of practical and quotid-
ian resistance to the work of the researchers.
Since 2010, when the last national census was conducted, the category be-
came considered a unit of analysis and not just an operational category. As part 
of the results of its survey, IbgE published a specific document on subnormal 
agglomerates, which contains maps and tables, aggregated by state and region. 
There was a change in reference to the spatial units to which the term refers: a 
9. The relation between the categories is revealed by more than a logical perspective. 
The internal code used for the subnormal agglomerate in the documents completed 
by the researchers is “FAV” (IbgE 2010 census guide: http://censo2010.ibge.gov.
br/materiais/guia-do-censo/operacao-censitaria.html). 
10. The “subnormal agglomerate special sector” is one of the types of “special sector,” 
defined as an area “that presents characteristics that make it necessary to adopt a 
different approach to collection compared to the common or non-special sectors.” 
The other special sectors are: “Military barracks and bases Special Sector,” 
“lodging and Encampments Special Sector,” “Vessels, boats and Ships Special 
Sector,” “Indigenous Village Special Sector,” “Penitentiaries, Penal colonies and 
Jails Special Sector,” and “Asylums, orphanages, convents and Hospitals Special 
Sector” (IbgE 2003: 228–29).
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subnormal agglomerate, named after the ordinary name of the region, can be 
composed of various census sectors.11
These statistical framings try to make the mensuration of favelas a routine 
practice—data collection—placing it within the overall set of census units and 
categories. beginning with a shared definition of the favela, the first form of 
incorporation is the result of an exploratory field trip by IbgE experts, based on 
an attempt to define favelas in technical terms. As an operational category, the 
subnormal agglomerate represents an expansion of the notion of favela through 
a shift away from the specificity of rio de Janeiro that points to the specific dif-
ficulty of carrying out such surveys.
In 2010, the category was transformed from a purely operational category 
into a particular type of unit of analysis that violates the standard rule and more 
common way to conceive territorial units, which usually involves a successive 
aggregation in increasingly broader units that correspond to the sum, and only 
the sum, of a defined quantity of elements of the immediately preceding type. 
For example: a number of domiciles compose a census sector, a number of cen-
sus sectors compose a neighborhood, and so on up to the level of municipalities 
that compose states, and the twenty-seven states that compose the country. This 
means that the units are more commonly considered as continuous spaces. In 
contrast to this procedure, presenting the population data for subnormal ag-
glomerates per state, for instance, implies considering these places as the same 
significant type of space—which is also understood as an aggregate of persons—
whose identity allows (or forces) us to go beyond the logic of successive encom-
passment of contiguous spatial units.
These three forms of framing reveal the favela’s persistent resistance to quan-
tification, considering the changing attempts to deal with them over time. They 
also reveal a progressive normalization through an abnormalizing typification. 
The idea of the favela is expanded and objectified to apply beyond the reality of 
rio de Janeiro and is presented as a recurrent—and in this sense normal—form 
at the same time as it becomes an increasingly abstract category of abnormality, 
capable of encompassing an ever-larger number of cases.
11. Among the various platforms created by IbgE for publication of the 2010 census 
data is a specific web application for subnormal agglomerates. Visitors can use this 
application to search by state, city, and “name of the agglomerate” and access the 
information collected for each of the census sectors included in the agglomerate: 
see http://www.censo2010.ibge.gov.br/agsn/.
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The category of subnormal agglomerate generalizes the idea of favela, main-
taining their association with poverty and occupation of urban landscapes. 
two characteristics were transposed from the common category of favela that 
IbgE transformed into an object of systematic inquiry between the 1950 and 
2010 censuses. The first is a disorganized layout of the houses, roads, and paths, 
while the second is illegitimate occupation of land, presuming the construction 
and occupation of spaces that belong to other people or entities without their 
consent.
This statistical generalization of the favela as the spatialization of poverty 
is present in an IbgE document from 1953 and in analyses derived from the 
census. The citation below comes from the introduction to the data. It presents 
the technical principles and possibilities for interpreting data in time and space, 
making special reference to the limits to its generalization.
Thus, the results presented in the tables in annex cannot be taken to refer to the 
entire favela population of the Federal district. They concern only the popula-
tion present—including the inhabitants present on July 1, 1950, residents or 
otherwise—in the favelas listed in box 7 and who represent, according to es-
timates, 90% of the total inhabitants of rio’s favelas, commonly recognized as 
such. (IbgE 1953: 16)
Another passage found in the document’s “Final considerations” points to a 
different kind of logical operation:
What these results reveal above all is a snapshot of the life of poor populations 
in general, disseminated across all regions of the country and whose essential 
aspects probably do not vary much. This snapshot is useful, therefore, as a sam-
ple that indicates fundamental aspects of a socially defined portion of brazil’s 
population, providing an opportunity for productive research on the behavior 
of specific economically homogenous social groups, assembled, under specific 
conditions, in densely populated agglomerates. (IbgE 1953: 23)
Spatialized and “favelaized” through the category of “subnormal agglomerate,” 
poverty is only considered indirectly as a lack of money through the inference 
that people living in these spaces are poor. What stands out is a certain kind of 
usurpation involved in defining the predominant form of land occupation as 
illegitimate or illegal. This association is a sign of the overlapping of the two 
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meanings of normality mentioned in the introduction to this chapter and exam-
ined by Hacking (1990). Favelas and their practical resistance to measurement, 
because of their physical and urbanistic characteristics, serve as an abnormal-
izing and (im)moralizing modelization of poverty.
tHE “doMIcIlE” AS StAbIlIZAtIon oF PEoPlE And 
HouSES
The statistical reality of the population is determined by the establishment 
of fixed contacts. Exclusive relations need to be established between spaces 
and between them and people. The first stabilization operated by this kind of 
quantification, both in terms of data collection and in the construction of the 
logical framework for interpreting the data, is the association between persons 
and spaces through the idea of a residence and the management of resources 
for maintaining collective life. The category “domicile” defines the unit of data 
production—questionnaires are completed for each domicile—and represents 
the first form of aggregation of information about individuals, who, combined, 
form a “population.” The successive forms of data aggregation—based on in-
creasingly broader spatial categories—set out from the definition of each per-
son’s exclusive belonging to one, and just one, specific spatial and economic 
unit.
The favela, with its mutable houses, its intense and apparently disorganized 
circulation along narrow streets and alleys, and its family practices uncontained 
by the normative boundaries of organization in nuclear families, resists the 
stabilization required by the categories of the population census. What Pedro 
Abramo calls “urbanistic freedom” (2003)—that is, the loose or nonexistent re-
lationship to state regulations concerning buildings and urban organization—
makes the associations between built units and persons difficult to establish. 
Movement in the favela resists the stabilization required by the standards used 
by demographic statistics.
IbgE’s definition of the domicile is the following:
A structurally separate and independent place of residence, constituted by one 
or more rooms. Separation is characterized when the place of residence is de-
limited by walls, fences, etc., covered by a roof, allowing the residents to isolate 
themselves, assuming responsibility for part or all of the food or residential expenses. 
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Independence is characterized when direct access to the place of residence exists, 
allowing residents to enter and leave without passing through the place of residence 
of other persons. domiciles are classified as private or collective. (IbgE n.d.: 16; 
my emphasis)
The notion of domicile operates in the first phase in the creation of a population. 
It links several individuals with a territory, based on their “isolation” and the 
management of the resources needed for “food and residence.” It also encom-
passes the concept of “family,” the ideal configuration of this set of individuals. 
one of the classifications of domiciles refers precisely to the family status of 
their residents. The domicile, therefore, contains relations between individuals, 
the domestic economy, family, and built spaces.
The relation with the idea of family is important in the definition of a con-
cept that has acquired a central role in the discussion of public policies in brazil, 
which is the so-called housing shortage. The calculation of the size of this short-
age includes the number of “families” who live in the street, though the largest 
contingent refers to those who live in “inadequate” places, or share a space with 
other families. The ideal that one family, and no more than one, should cor-
respond to one domicile plays a strong role in the form in which large-scale 
policies are designed, executed, and evaluated.
Through my ethnography in a community in the group of favelas known 
as the complexo do Alemão, I show how these elements appear as part of 
the houses as they are actually lived in. While in a domicile relations are ex-
clusive and the units discrete and stable, in the houses I have observed these 
relations are typified by constant transformation, instability, disjuncture, and 
movement. This discussion is inserted within the broader agenda of a new 
anthropology of the house (cortado 2016). I shall quickly highlight three ap-
proaches that have been inspirational to my analysis. The first concerns what 
is typically labeled material culture, which I incorporate through an emphasis 
on the participation of constructed spaces, objects, and substances as vital 
dimension of social relations (Miller 2001; buchli 2013; Appadurai 1986). 
The second approach is that of the so-called new kinship studies, which have 
suggested exploring the house in its multiple dimensions as the privileged 
locus and institution for the construction of family ties (Marcelin 1996, 1999; 
carsten 2004). Its basis in subversive readings of the idea of maison developed 
by claude lévi-Strauss (1982, 1984, 1987, 1991) challenge normativity and 
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the search for explanatory models, by radicalizing his proposal to take the 
native concept of the house as a starting point for building a new analytic 
foundation for kinship (carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995). The third essential 
reference point are studies by brazilian anthropologists that introduced a new 
approach to sociological and political questions central to the tradition of so-
cial thought, and that focus on economic relations, labor relations, and domi-
nation in brazil (Heredia 1979; Palmeira 1977; garcia Jr. 1975; Woortmann 
1980).
based on these three approaches, I propose an anthropology of the house 
that contemplates specific variations of some of the issues examined by these 
authors. The first is the attention paid to the everyday economy—that is, peo-
ple’s ordinary economic practices, setting out from a radically ethnographic ap-
proach, which means taking them not just to be immersed, as they of course are, 
in relations of family, friendship, and politics, for example, but considering these 
relations as a fundamental and inseparable aspect of these economic practices 
and vice versa. The second focuses on forms of government (neiburg 2014; de 
l’Estoile 2014), specifically in relation to the debate on the construction of 
favelas as a problem and poverty and violence as realities in response to which it 
is necessary to act, but also to understand the ways in which houses are formed 
through daily life in favelas.
An anthropology of the house thus allows the comprehension of houses as 
a quotidian process, without failing to consider the various other agencies that 
participate in their construction in addition to those of residents, including the 
agency of state governments. by analytically placing the two conceptualizations 
of the house side by side—the statistical reality as a domicile and the reality of 
the way favela residents live in houses—my aim is to show the crucial impor-
tance of reciprocal resistances, dissonance and disjuncture.
The houses that I observed in my fieldwork are indissociably physical and 
symbolic constructions around which much of social life takes place. They are a 
place of care, where bodies and gendered persons are formed. People invest large 
financial and emotional resources in houses, such that their trajectories, rela-
tions, and prospects for the future are intrinsically linked to them. Houses are 
also constantly transforming, both physically and in people’s imagination. They 
are constituted by and through movements of everyday life, and I specifically 
focused on three that dialogue directly with the foundations of the conception 
of the domicile as a statistical reality (Motta 2014).
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Figure 2: Houses in complexo do Alemão, 2014. Photo by the author.
one of the things that circulates most frequently between and within houses 
is money. There is a native expression for a specific form of separating and mark-
ing types of money; “house money.” In practice, this money is defined by its 
source and the subsequent use made of it. It is usually composed of regular 
income from work, such as wages, or some kind of business. This revenue is used 
to cover expenses for household maintenance, including cooking gas, electric-
ity, cable tV, internet access, cleaning materials, and food. but these expenses 
do not refer to a discrete unit: they also maintain a house’s relations with other 
houses. This becomes clear when we observe the purchase of food, which is 
commonly used to prepare meals for many other people in addition to those 
considered residents of the domicile.12 children tend to be the most mobile 
between houses. For instance, in one of the families that I observed the children 
ate meals in their grandparents’ houses during the week.
12. In this specific ethnographic context, “living” in a house is defined as having a place 
to sleep every day and store clothes or other belongings deemed to be linked to 
specific persons.
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loans and presents in the form of money are also common between houses. 
In most situations, they are considered obligations between persons who perceive 
themselves to be connected by family ties. Various authors have demonstrated 
the importance of food, substances, and their circulations in the construction of 
these relations (carsten 2004). In the social universe that I observed, money is 
also an important means of making and sustaining ties (Zelizer 2005). House 
money is money that makes family.
The parents of young women who become pregnant, for instance, feel obliged 
to build a house for their daughter. This relation of origin between houses resides 
at the base of a hierarchical organization composed of moralities that transforms 
over time, but always involves specific forms of monetary circulation. What is 
thus in play in the houses as they are actually lived are not discrete reference units, 
as the statistical reality of the domicile presumes. These houses are constituted 
not through isolation but through relations, forming a configuration of houses.
louis Herns Marcelin (1996, 1999) uses this notion to describe arrangements 
composed of various houses and their importance in the relations expressed 
through the language of kinship among black families in the recôncavo region 
of bahia state. The physical proximity between the houses in this ethnographic 
universe suggests that they comprise sufficiently self-evident units for the author 
to be able to identify the precise number of houses belonging to a given configu-
ration. However, in the favela where I conducted field research, houses related 
within a configuration are not necessarily located close to one another. This is pri-
marily due to the intense movement of persons between houses during the course 
of their lives; people move frequently between houses within the same favela.
Physical distances are an important issue in the configurations of houses 
insofar as they are practical conditions that influence the forms of everyday cir-
culation of persons, substances, and objects. but differently than what Marcelin 
observed in bahia or Flavia dalmaso in Haiti (2014), spatial contiguity is not 
a necessary characteristic of house configurations in the favela. These facts led 
me back to the concept of configuration developed by norbert Elias (1980) as 
a means of reworking the concept formulated by Marcelin. These arrangements 
are not isolated units, they are visible through the circulations between the rela-
tively autonomous elements that constitute them. The relations between them 
are not symmetric: in fact, there is a marked hierarchy between the houses, re-
lated to the ties of interdependence between them. These ties, for their part, are 
not completely stable, such that every configuration an arrangement in constant 
movement that involves tensions.
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The physical houses are also in constant movement: they are mutable. In ad-
dition to the successive annexation of new rooms when resources permit, houses 
can be transformed, for example, into business spaces. A living room can be 
turned into a hairdressing salon, later into a clothes store, and then back into a 
living room, as I observed in one case. This specific kind of mutability is central 
to money-earning strategies among the people with whom I conducted field re-
search. The convertibility of house spaces also increases the value of the property 
on the favela’s real estate market. not even in terms of what may at first appear 
to be its most static aspect—its physical dimension—are houses stable.
The plasticity of houses and the intense mobility of people and things are 
related to forms of regulation of and in these places, which allow a significant 
constructive freedom and create a highly dynamic housing market. These places 
thus contrapose the stability and immobility needed to define statistical realities 
in various stages of production of numbers: from data collection in the field to 
the possible interpretation of population statistics in general.
tHE FAVElA tHAt countS ItSElF
In this section I examine another kind of resistance made explicit by particular 
subjects: the questioning of census numbers. The resistance to quantification is 
specifically directed toward official statistical data and is transformed into an 
initiative for constructing alternative numbers. As I shall show, this explicit re-
sistance to agreement on the figures expresses the ambiguity commonly related 
to public numbers, which, rather than invalidating them, strengthens them as a 
legitimate and common language in the dispute for public representation and 
government resources.
I began to frequent the complexo do Alemão in 2012. IbgE had just re-
leased the first data from the census conducted in 2010. According to the in-
stitute, the population of the region was around 69,000 inhabitants.13 I do not 
know precisely how people came to know about this figure, but it was a frequent 
13. A difference exists between the number of inhabitants of the complexo do Alemão 
recognized by different state agencies, even when based on the same census data. 
This is because the “complexo do Alemão” is, formally speaking, an “administrative 
region,” a territorial unit defined for the purposes of management of municipal 
public policies. In this unit, some areas are considered “subnormal agglomerates” by 
the IbgE and others are not.
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topic in talks with my interlocutors for weeks. I overheard conversations in bars 
and various people approached me, presuming my interest in the data, to tell me 
that the information was untrue. Some people knew the exact figures published 
by the IbgE. All the contestations that I heard ran along the same lines. They 
affirmed that “in reality” the number of residents was much higher. The data re-
leased by IbgE, especially the number of residents attributed to the complexo 
do Alemão, was an important issue for many residents, including activists from 
local organizations, and many others.
People cited as evidence of the false data the fact that they themselves, and 
many others who they knew, had not been “counted.” They alleged that the 
census officers may have omitted or lied about data because they were afraid to 
venture far into the favela, or were incapable of identifying the many residences 
invisible from the street. Almost always, other estimates would follow, ranging 
from 100,000 to as many as 200,000 inhabitants.
Maré is another huge cluster of favelas, not far from the complexo do 
Alemão, built on flat land across most of its territory. It was in this locality 
that the first “self-census” initiative took place. It began in 1999 and became 
consolidated through a project organized by the Maré Study and Solidary Ac-
tion centre (cEASM) (Silva 2002). A second Maré census was undertaken 
in 2011, through the initiative of other organizations, namely redes da Maré 
(Maré networks) and the observatório de Favelas (Favela observatory). In 
addition to the population count, the base maps for the region were updated 
(observatório de Favelas and redes da Maré 2012) and an Enterprise census 
conducted, to survey businesses and the jobs they generated.
The justifications for the need to mobilize residents and local organizations 
to collect the data focused on two types of arguments: the inability of the IbgE 
information to account for the specificities of the region, the real needs of the 
residents, and the form in which the stigmatization, prejudice, and ignorance of 
researchers foreign to the community impede well-conducted research. Accord-
ing to a more formal criticism:
Innumerable methodological distortions still persist in the surveys carried out 
in favelas. Most derive from the imprecision of the base maps, but it is also 
impossible to ignore the existence of biases arising from judgments about the 
favela whose impacts range from planning for the research to how interviews 
are conducted, such as the construction of marginalizing premises that hinder 
or prevent approaching the public. The process of stigmatization is one of the 
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innumerable historical effects of how favelas have been conceived and repre-
sented, since their appearance, in different fields of the social imaginary.14
This resistance discursively mobilizes two others that I mentioned earlier in 
this chapter: the association between spatial disorder, poverty, and movement 
and the illegitimate appropriation of spaces. on this basis, the organizations in 
Maré construct political and moral arguments to justify the effort to create new 
statistics.
Although the critique of official statistics may have been severe at times, the 
production of the Maré census involved the participation of various govern-
ment agencies. The national School of Statistical Sciences (EncE), which is 
part of IbgE, and the Pereira Passos Institute (IPP) run by the rio de Janeiro 
city council, are cited as “partners” in the project, which was funded through a 
grant from the banco do brasil Foundation.
The relation with these agencies is a sign of something that traverses the 
dynamics of criticism and the production of alternative data: namely, the am-
biguity between recognition of the relevance and real existence of the realities 
of statistics, combined with a permanent distrust toward them. Above all, it is 
widely understood that statistics portray reality as perceived by state agents and 
that, therefore, it is necessary to dispute them. As one activist from the com-
plexo do Alemão, who considers the population of the locality much higher 
than the number obtained by the census, affirmed: “A lower population, less 
investment.”15
While on one hand the objective of the self-censuses was to adapt the meth-
odology to local specificities, there was also another movement. In 2010, the 
research team from the Maré census covered the entire area and, in addition to 
correcting the official maps that were outdated, proposed that residents organ-
ize themselves to name streets that did not have one. The mapping, therefore, 
is a reciprocal process of transformation between statistical reality and everyday 
reality.
Quantification and the kind of order that it implies are not only state sup-
ported normative ideals that “abnormalize” resistances. The Maré census shows 
14. http://www.fbb.org.br/tecnologiasocial/banco-de-tecnologias-sociais/pesquisar-
tecnologias/detalhar-tecnologia-356.htm.
15. lucia cabral, from the ngo Educap, cited at: http://vivafavela.com.br/449-censo-
nas-favelas-e-controverso/.
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that the elaboration of a statistical reality can be a form of moral and political 
valorization of the favela that occurs by combining the order and rigor of data 
collection with the practices of activism—as an object of political struggle16—
and the way residents experience spaces. one example of this process is the 
naming of streets.
FInAl conSIdErAtIonS: rEAlItIES tHAt count
before my fieldwork in favelas, for two years during my doctoral research I ac-
companied the everyday practices involved in constructing a statistical informa-
tion system. Following the creation of the national Solidarity Economy office 
in 2003, it was necessary to produce statistics that could serve as a basis for poli-
cies in the region. The concept of the “solidarity economy” was not part of the 
vocabulary of national public administration at the time. It was necessary to cre-
ate the reality that would be the object of intervention. The process took years, 
hundreds of meetings, accusations and fights over how to produce this informa-
tion. The argument of most those involved was that it would be impossible to 
quantify the solidarity economy and, worse still, such quantification would be 
a violent reductionism that would put at risk its most characteristic aspects. I 
was apprehensive at the launching of the publication produced to disseminate 
the first data from the statistical study that was eventually produced. Several of 
the staunchest opponents of the so-called mapping were at the ceremony. one 
of them was on the event round table and spoke to the audience in a packed 
auditorium. He began his speech with the document in hand, shaking it in the 
direction of the public, and said: “Here it is! now we exist!” (Motta 2010).
An ethnographic approach to the production of statistics provides intel-
ligibility to the apparent paradox that appears in the episode described above. 
recognizing that different agents, practices, and concepts are involved in the 
production and use of large numbers makes their processual dimension and 
16. “Many citizens do not recognize the favelas as an integrated part of the city. 
nonetheless, to overcome the invisibility of a place, its residents also need to 
recognize and valorize their belonging to it. The Maré census is above all a means 
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complexity visible. controversies, conflicts, difficulties—which I have treated 
here as “resistances”—emerge through this perspective and prove to be highly 
revealing.
The difficulties involved in collecting data, classifying a certain kind of space, 
and generating trust in numbers are all interrelated. This becomes clear when 
the urban morphological characteristics of the favelas justify classifying them 
as spaces where information collection is difficult, about which it is difficult to 
produce statistical data. In a space that is constantly mutating, the stabilizations 
needed for the production of populational statistics are more complicated. These 
issues are recognized to be problematic by technical staff and managers, who 
seek to produce better numbers, and also by residents, who seek recognition of 
local specificities and responses to their political demands.
This is another reason why the idea of resistance seems suited to analyzing 
different social dynamics. It allows us to discern the relations between practi-
cal and logical operations of the quantification process. The idea of a “chain 
of transformations” advanced by laurent Thévenot (1995) is extremely useful 
because it emphasizes the different operations and types of investments needed 
to produce numbers. The perspective proposed here, however, questions the lin-
earity presumed by the image of a “chain.” The resistances make evident the 
reciprocal and continuous relations between the procedures involved in produc-
ing statistics.
Thinking about statistics implies thinking about the state government and 
its forms of agency. Through them and the studies of the tense relations involved 
in the production of statistical realities, the processual and distributed character 
of forms of government reveal themselves. These state categories are not ready-
made instruments for imposing a centralized power, but the outcomes, always 
provisional, of negotiations between various agencies. The favela as a statistical 
reality participates reciprocally in the construction of these spaces as lived re-
alities and urban realities, insofar as they serve as a basis for the production of 
diagnoses and solutions to problems that always need to be quantified.
In this chapter I have explored the possibility of bringing together different 
logics and scales of analysis. by identifying the transformation of the idea of 
the favela in brazil’s demographic censuses and the fundamental place of the 
concept of stabilization based on domiciles, I sought to show that the forms in 
which people construct and live in houses are interconnected, relevant, and sub-
ject to the action and concern not only of residents. based on the analytic strat-
egies presented here, I explore the relation between issues that are commonly 
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examined separately: domestic and family life, public policies, political disputes 
for recognition, numbers, and elaboration of the statistical realities.
The processes for producing public numbers, resistances, negotiations, and 
incorporations unfold around the forms of classifying and framing people, spac-
es, and relations. Examining these quantifications, therefore, involves examining 
the dynamics involved in the definition of the realities that are relevant, and 
suitable for discussion and dispute, and thus what are the realities that count.
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chapter four
What is a ‘real’ transaction in high-frequency 
trading
Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra
Past the turnstiles and security guards, walking into a stock exchange today is 
much like walking into the administrative offices of most other modern organi-
zations: greeted by sleek concrete, polished steel, and heavy architectural glass, 
visitors encounter areas peppered with conference tables, personal workstations, 
and communal sites for refreshments. One space is conspicuous for its absence: 
the trading floors where markets were once made in quick glances, jostling bod-
ies, calculated voices, and the cacophony of crowds. Bar a few exceptions, these 
spaces have mostly disappeared. To observe the sites of feverish market activity 
(Simmel 2004) where millions of financial instruments are traded every day you 
need to look further afield, to the data processing centers where stock exchanges 
host their digital marketplaces. Resembling minimalist warehouses occupied by 
neatly organized rows of computer servers, these are the places where markets 
come to life, not through conversations and the density of social interactions but 
through the varying electronic signals received and processed by the automated 
stock exchange.
The computer servers and sophisticated communications networks of stock 
exchanges are subjects of various arguments about the “realism” of financial 
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capitalism. This is clear, for example, in recent debates about high frequency 
trading, a series of practices that hinge on the use of computers, network con-
figurations, and speed to exploit minute arbitrage opportunities in the electronic 
trading platforms that structure stock and foreign exchange markets (Chordia 
et al. 2013). High frequency trading, wrote the leading broker Charles Schwab 
in a statement in 2014, is “an explosion of head-fake ephemeral orders—not to 
lock in real trades, but to skim pennies off the public markets by the billions” 
(Russolillo 2014). The firms participating in these activities, noted Peter Hen-
ning (2014) of the New York Times, have “no real interest in the underlying value 
of the companies whose shares they trade.” These critiques are underpinned by 
a fundamentalist conception of stocks as contracts that represent a materially 
valuable stake in a public corporation. A stock’s price is supposed to reflect 
the value of its associated firm or a future-oriented judgement of its strategic 
actions. Yet when stocks are traded thousands of times every minute, the con-
nection between price and value becomes less tenable. What does it mean, ask 
fund managers and other institutional investors, that high frequency traders 
own financial instruments for only fractions of a second?
This chapter focuses on one aspect of the realism of electronic, automated 
stock markets: it probes controversies about whether specific forms of market 
transactions are “real” or “fictitious.” Specifically, it looks into debates surround-
ing a set of contested trades known as “spoofing” that involve creating intentions 
to buy or sell stocks with the objective of manipulating prices and other market 
participants. An exploration of how spoofing is constructed as a false trans-
action implies uncovering some of the “performances of reality” (Mol 1999) 
that constitute legitimacy and a collective sense of taken-for-grantedness in 
the worlds of automated finance. As data packages traveling through computer 
networks, spoofs and “true” trades are physically and computationally indistin-
guishable. What matters, then, are the mechanisms through which actors come 
to see transactions not only as legal or illegal, legitimate or illegitimate, moral or 
immoral, personal or impersonal, but more fundamentally as being real against 
the possibility of being fictitious.
To make sense of these performances, I turn to one of the key infrastructures 
of modern stock exchanges: the electronic limit order book, a computational list 
that captures and matches the orders to trade received by anonymous investors 
from across the world. In this chapter I argue that the “performances of reality” 
of automated trading involve a combination of knowledge about the market 
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(such as market microstructure theory) and infrastructures of trading (such as 
the electronic limit order book) constituting the distributions of knowledge that 
make the actions of traders intelligible (Barnes 1988). What matters in the mar-
ketplace, surely, is not whether a transaction is real “in actuality” but rather the 
conditions under which participants come to evaluate it as such. The “regimes 
of truth” (Foucault 2012) governing electronic transactions are performed as 
much by the power of regulators, lawyers, and economists, as by the affordances, 
constraints, and possibilities of the material mechanisms that enable trades in 
the marketplace.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce the 
empirical context that makes spoofing possible by overviewing the operation 
of electronic limit order books and their connection to automated trading. This 
is followed by a brief theoretical discussion that highlights how infrastructures, 
market relations, and knowledge configure performances of reality in finance. I 
then explore an example of how spoofing in an automated market setting was 
contested in the courts to then compare this to similar instances of price manip-
ulation in face-to-face exchanges. This is followed by some concluding thoughts.
InSIde THe MACHIne
electronic limit order books are a fundamental technology of contemporary 
financial markets. Introduced at the margins of stock trading in the early 1970s, 
they became dominant exemplars of exchanges and other regulated trading plat-
forms by the late 1990s (Castelle et al. 2016; Pardo-Guerra 2019; Gorham and 
Singh 2009). Order books are simple devices: they act as centralized lists that 
record the intentions to trade of investors and allow either a human or a ma-
chine to “match” compatible trades (or what economist William Stanley Jevons 
once referred to as the “double coincidence of wants”; Jevons 1879). Consider, 
for example, the order book for Apple Inc. on the electronic exchange BATS 
Global Markets (see fig. 1; BATS is now operated by the Chicago Board of Op-
tions exchange). At any given moment in time, multiple investors might have 
slightly different valuations of Apple’s stock. Some might think that shares of 
Apple command a higher price than what others deem them to, and vice versa. 
In the book, these valuations are expressed as “limit orders” sent in the form 
of electronic messages to the exchange’s systems (the structure of individual 
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messages often follows the Financial Information eXchange protocol, or FIX, 
that identifies the instructions contained in each message; see fig. 2). Within the 
computer warehouses of stock exchanges, incoming orders are time-stamped 
and logged in the order book according the moment of their arrival, their vol-
ume (the number of shares an investor is prepared to trade), and the price at 
which an investor is willing to buy or sell (an “ask” is the price set by sellers 
for the shares; a “bid” is the price determined by buyers). In the left columns 
of figure 1, for example, at 14:14:23 eST on September 28, 2017, the lowest 
amount at which an investor could buy 210 shares of Apple Inc. was $153.44. 
Conversely, the best price an investor could get for 601 shares in Apple Inc. was 
$153.43. In this instance, the difference (also called the spread) between the best 
bid and the best offer (or, the “top of the book”) is $0.01. This is common in 
the most actively traded instruments—and is partly so by regulatory design: in 
the United States, in particular, shares cannot be traded in fractions of a penny. 
When an investor submits an order to buy at the best ask (or sell at the best bid), 
the system automatically matches these intentions and executes the trade. The 
right side of figure 1 shows the result of this automated matching: second after 
second, small lots of orders in Apple are traded at $153.44.
Figure 1. Apple Inc.’s top of book on BATS’s edGX at 14:14:32 eST on September 
28, 2017. http://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statistics/book/AAPL/?mkt=edgx.
From this very simple design of what is essentially an ordered list of inten-
tions to buy and sell shares, order books can produce complicated dynamics. 
For instance, because order books are transparent in the sense that they are 
visible to all the investors that are connected to them, they quickly reveal strat-
egies that can be gamed by other market participants. Imagine I wanted to 
buy one million shares of Apple Inc. Submitting an order at whatever prices 
are available (also known as a “market” order) would be an economically inef-
ficient strategy. The order book only has 210 shares at $153.44, so filling the 
107What is a ‘real’ transaction
order would require going deeper into book, paying increasingly more for each 
batch of shares of Apple. Conversely, submitting a single limit order for a mil-
lion shares at the best price would leave 999,790 shares outstanding and would 
likely trigger other market participants to increase their asks, thus increasing my 
overall costs. Much automated trading emerged around this problem of reduc-
ing “market impact.” To trade large volumes of shares, algorithms slice orders 
into smaller lots that limit the effects and they have on the market: they try to 
“hide” the transaction, like minute whispers spreading through the interstices of 
a crowd. This slicing is paired with geographic diversification (Pitluck 2011); the 
strategy is pursued not in one but many markets, transmitting orders to several 
exchanges and trading platforms to obfuscate even more the original order—at 
the time of writing, Apple Inc.’s shares were traded in twenty-three different 
venues across the world.
8=FIX.4.2 | 9=178 | 35=8 | 49=PHLX | 56=PeRS | 52=20071123-05:30:00.000 | 
11=ATOMnOCCC9990900 | 20=3 | 150=e | 39=e | 55=MSFT | 167=CS | 54=1 | 
38=15 | 40=2 | 44=15 | 58=PHLX eQUITY TeSTInG | 59=0 | 47=C | 32=0 | 31=0 
| 151=15 | 14=0 | 6=0 | 10=128 |
Figure 2. A “typical” FIX message. each element in the string of characters represents 
a meaningful instructions (PHLX, for example, corresponds to the Philadelphia Stock 
exchange, or field 49 in this example).
High frequency trading emerged in this context. Betting on the long-term 
movements of stocks is still a common practice, but the fragmented, multisited, 
and electronic character of order books offers the possibility of profiting from 
miniscule price differentials across multiple trading sites. If the price of Apple 
Inc. is lower in Hamburg than anywhere else, there is quick profit to be made 
by arbitraging across this and other exchanges—buying shares in the cheaper to 
sell in the dearer. Traders equipped with the fastest systems are at an advantage 
because they are the first to observe and react to such differentials, creating 
a relentless incentive for an arms race in speed and connectivity (MacKenzie 
2018). This leads to some well-known features of high frequency trading, such 
as the practices of colocation (where firms rent space next to the order books of 
stock exchanges at premium prices), or vast investments in telecommunications 
systems that reduce the transmission speeds between participants by small frac-
tions of a second (generally, a few milliseconds; see MacKenzie et al. 2012). And 
while these practices were peripheral and somewhat controversial to the world 
108 The Real economy
of equities a decade ago, they are now more or less standard. In a short article in 
Traders Magazine titled “We’re all HFTs now,” Tim Quast notes that “today’s 
stock market structure in large part reflects the pursuit of speed and price. . . . 
The entire structure has become high speed” (Quast 2017), diminishing the 
returns for even being called a high frequency trader.
THeORIzInG SOCIeTY In THe ORdeR BOOK
A frequent assumption about electronic order books is that they are altogether 
removed from “sociality,” that they are emblematic of some form of “post-social” 
world where algorithms and humans are ontologically equal (see Arnoldi 2016). 
This is a common trope of financial automation: that through electronic devices 
and the apparent removal of humans, the social relations that once reigned on 
the trading floor are now entirely gone. This is incorrect: behind every electronic 
order, there is a trader, an institution, an organization; and the order book itself 
is not just a practical albeit anonymous informational device: above all, it is 
designed as a depository of intentions and “truthful” valuations. Limit orders 
are meant to represent what investors consider the value of a stock to be, in 
the same way that bids in an auction reflect, at a first degree of approxima-
tion, the preferences and senses of worth of collectors (Smith 1990). As donald 
MacKenzie argues, precisely because they are spaces of perceived intentions, 
electronic markets are dense interactional orders (Goffman 1978) in their own 
right, populated by codes, expectancies, dissimulations, and multiple perfor-
mances acted through, not without, the order book (MacKenzie 2019).
Studying the order book as an infrastructure for the social has two im-
mediate theoretical implications. First, it underscores transactions as forms of 
relation-making rather than as ephemeral arm’s-length exchanges. When two 
agents transact, they are tied for the duration of their exchange; they are related, 
even if through their membership of a community of exchange (Weber 1978). 
The order book frames this community—through its affordances, it bounds the 
membership and its codes of conduct, it defines who can trade with whom and 
how. Here, I am evoking the work of Marilyn Strathern (1995) and her pro-
vocative querying of “the relation” as a central analytical object in contempo-
rary anthropological thought. Social anthropologists, writes Strathern, “route 
connections through persons,” attending to “the relations of logic, of cause and 
effect, of class and category, that people make between things [but also] to the 
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relations of social life, to the roles and behavior, through which people connect 
themselves to one another” (1995: 11). Such routing is the “substance of an-
thropological empiricism,” she continues, creating a “double emphasis” on rela-
tions “known to the observer as principles of social organization and relations 
observed as interactions between persons.” Social structure is located in relations 
that are “relevant to people’s acts and intentions” (1995: 12), encoded in shared 
knowledge about society (Barnes 1988). The consequence of this “double em-
phasis,” she adds, is that persons are discerned “by their relations to one anoth-
er”—by shared, authoritative forms of knowledge that, like legal, informational, 
and scientific infrastructures, establish meaningful connections. Take the Paiela, 
for whom relations are “subjected to the test of time fall by the wayside depend-
ing on the warmth of that relationship” (Biersack 1982). Biological relatives 
that fail to provide support are “false” kin, whereas those that offer are thought 
of as “true” kin. More proximally, think of discussions about relatedness at the 
intersections of law and biomedical knowledge: transformations in reproductive 
technologies and legislations around their use imply that biological familiarity 
no longer guarantees relatedness in Western societies but does so only under 
finite combinations of law and its technique. A surrogate mother can only lay 
claim on her child in specific legal circumstances, in the same way that the do-
nator of a gamete is not guaranteed relatedness to his or her genetic offspring. 
Relations are always underdetermined, be it by law, shared social knowledge, or 
by technologies of property and reproduction (Shalev 1998). The varieties of rel-
evant relations are plentiful. As Strathern notes referring to Gregory Bateson’s 
work with the Iatmul, kinship takes unexpected forms: for the Iatmul, “human 
beings are simply one manifestation of clan persons also manifested as every 
conceivable entity in the environment. . . . Yams have personal names, give birth, 
respond to speech, walk about at night” (1995: 16). The boundaries and dynam-
ics of relations are never entirely trivial: the task at hand is finding how relations 
and personhoods are co-constituted, rather than taking for granted the existence 
of a dense relational system that serves as the basis of order and signification.
Like Strathern’s anthropological relations, infrastructures deal with the ap-
parent opposition between categorical and transactional accounts of social life. 
The question is not whether all transactions in the order book are meaningful 
relations, or if there is an abstract set of knowledge that defines—as if a view 
from nowhere—what constitutes a true trade. What matters is the interplay of 
infrastructures and knowledge, transactions and categories. For Strathern, the 
anthropological relation is divided:
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On the one hand are those relations seen to make connections through a logic of 
power of articulation that acquires its own conceptual momentum; on the other 
hand are those relations that are conducted in interpersonal terms, connections 
between persons inflected with a precise and particular history. (Strathern 2005: 7)
These two elements, the abstract and the particular, are necessarily conjoined 
in a tandem. Interpersonal relations create what is conceivable, whereas the 
conceptual apparatus provides social life to—or infuses with meaning—the 
interpersonal:
It is through the interacting with persons that diverse interactions and further 
connections become intellectually conceivable [the interpersonal creates possi-
bilities for the conceptual], while it is through creating concepts and categories 
that connections come to have a social life of their own [the conceptual as a ter-
rain for the potential interpersonal]. (Strathern 2005: 8)
Kinship provides an example, where the eminently abstractive conceptual ap-
paratus of law meets the apparently thicker everyday experience of interpersonal, 
familial connections. It is, as Barry Barnes might argue, a particular distribution of 
knowledge that constitutes what can be known about actions, behaviors, and in-
tentions (Barnes 1988). The law is not independent of these, as it is through court 
cases and battles over relativeness that novel categories get made. Conversely, law 
shapes our everyday experience: who can marry whom, who is deemed a sibling, 
and who has parental responsibilities, are subjects of legal technique that affect 
our capacity to create kindred groups in our intimate lives. Through the tandem, 
Strathern evinces a connection between the relational and the infrastructural: 
between densely inhabited proxies of concepts—worlds of classifications, gate-
ways, standards, protocols, measurements, templates—that make relations pos-
sible—by connecting machines, encrypting signals, or locating cases in the same 
classification situations (Fourcade and Healy 2013). Infrastructures (the order 
book) are to relations (intentional trades) what the abstract (market microstruc-
ture theory) is to the particular (the identification of “real” trades).
A focus on the order book as an infrastructure for relations is relevant for a 
second reason. The concept of infrastructure matters not only because it speaks 
of relation-making in a Strathernian sense, but also because it is doubly and 
essentially relational. It is relational analytically, as Susan Leigh Star and Karen 
Ruhleder (1996) observed: something is infrastructural not in and of itself but 
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only with respect to a particular community and set of practices—there is no 
substantive quality of being infrastructural without reference to practices and 
knowledges. But infrastructures are also relational in an operational sense: they 
enact relations by re-creating categories of membership, equivalence, and in-
teroperability. Think of paradigmatic forms of infrastructure such as platforms, 
standards, and classification systems (edwards 2010; Bowker and Star 2000) 
that, like relations, “summon to the field,” discriminating between “all those 
possibly connected and those whom one choses to recognize.” Standards and 
classifications order entities by locating them within specific categorical sys-
tems, but in doing so they also enact associations and dissociations, relations 
of similarity and relations of difference. This is visible in the recent work by 
Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy (2013), whose Weberian-inspired analysis 
of classification situations points at how infrastructures—from credit scoring 
systems to crowd-sourced mechanisms for wine rating—operate as distributed 
sieves that sort people, things, and evaluations along specific orders of worth.
Infrastructures facilitate this type of classification situations by making them 
durable and naturalized. The construction of a stable “reality” for market actors 
is necessarily predicated on the infrastructural work carried out by others (on 
the creation of a taken-for-granted arena of action): what is second nature to 
those involved in a transaction, what is obviously and blatantly a “meaningful 
relation” for parties to an exchange, is some other actor’s rebuttable convention 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 1999) of counting, ordering, and technical interop-
erability. Order books and the forms of knowledge that make them intelligi-
ble constitute something similar to an “intersubjective spacetime” defined by 
a “likeness of intention” (Munn 1992: 264–65). Like Strathern’s tandem, the 
double condition of infrastructures makes possible alternative accounts of how 
stable worlds emerge: they do so not only in reference to the creation of collec-
tive, intersubjective, front-stage categories shared by actors in a particular field, 
but also in connection to how relations are reflected upon the infrastructures 
that support the field’s operation; contested relations are “tested” by how well 
they fit with extant infrastructures.
note the potential shift in explaining sources of stability and change in the 
“real economy.” existing institutional, relational, and processual accounts place 
great emphasis on how, during moments of conflict and uncertainty, actors cre-
ate shared repertoires (Swidler 1986), dominant cultural conceptions (Fligstein 
2002), and accepted frames of interaction, narrative, and interpretation (Bandelj 
2003; Goffman 1978) that allow closing controversies and coordinating action. 
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In Ann Swidler’s classical account, for instance, unsettled times are wrangled 
by recourse to ideologies that bring together actors from distinct cleavages fix-
ing them on common expectations (Swidler 1986). For neil Fligstein, the key 
problem of market actors is curtailing competition by creating shared, field-
level conceptions of governance, exchange, and control that produce stable and 
predictable worlds within the market (Fligstein 2002). And for Viviana zelizer 
and Charles Tilly’s (2006) account, actors participate in the ongoing construc-
tion of boundaries through which they collectively stabilize exchanges and tie 
these to extant social categories. In these as in other approaches, the “real” field 
of the economy is conceptualized as a space of front-stage action: what mat-
ters to markets and institutions are the knowledge and practices of the actors 
engaged in exchange—producers observe producers, firms observe firms, “real” 
actors with “real” relations. The dual condition of infrastructures, however, al-
lows considering how front-stage actors refer to other operational planes to 
settle disputed moments and coordinate action. Actors do not invent the world 
anew every time there is a controversy or critical moment, nor do they con-
stantly engage in a reflexive production of boundaries and classifications (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977, 2005; zelizer and Tilly 2006; Barnes 1988). Rather, actors refer 
to “unquestioned conceptualization[s]” (Frank 1979) of what works in practice 
in taken-for-granted action. Infrastructures bootstrap the sense of reality shared 
by actors, anchoring accounts of what is possible, desirable, and permissible in 
moments of uncertainty. To determine what is “real” is to perform an infra-
structural inversion (Bowker et al. 2009) that exposes the devices, techniques, 
practices, and objects assumed to ground action in the field, to then cool their 
meanings into a stable form.
An example of this form of infrastructural inversion is offered by how fi-
nancial market participants deal with the “reality” of so-called spoofing in high 
frequency trading. Spoofing involves manipulating market prices by submitting 
“false” orders to buy and sell securities. In the context of electronic financial 
markets, spoofing has become a particularly notable object of contention for 
regulators and market participants alike (Lewis 2015): at the core, the issue is 
determining the reality of trades and the legitimacy of what seems, from the 
outside, an esoteric marketplace. Is a trade “real,” the product of clear intentions 
to exchange, or is it simply algorithmic smoke meant to hide an underlying 
reality?
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SPOOF!
What is at stake in the reality of spoofs? In addition to its pecuniary implica-
tions, spoofing elicits ontological and moral uncertainty in market transactions. 
Questions of spoofing remit to more substantive discussions about the makeup 
of society: if exchange is, indeed, productive of social cohesion (Bearman 1997; 
Mauss 1997), if relations matter for creating the forms that give life to the 
social, then “false” or “fake” exchanges corrode the character of markets. Fake 
transactions, like the danger of fake relations, challenge idealized principles of 
market and community, respectively.
Spoofs are challenging because they are difficult to identify: the process for 
generating a legitimate order to buy and sell securities and a spoof is much the 
same; both start their lives as standardized messages produced by the trading 
systems of brokers and other investment intermediaries that travel as electronic 
signals to the computer servers of exchanges where they are processed. A false 
order will not sink in water, nor will it look differently on the trading screen. 
Rather, what differentiates the real from the fictitious is the intent of whoever 
originated the trade or its underlying automated trading system. A real trade, 
market participants say, only exists when it was made bona fide. This is precisely 
how law singularizes spoofing: as an activity that distorts true prices through 
calculated (intentional) deception and manipulation. For example, since the se-
curities markets reforms of 2001, it became unlawful, under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities exchange Act 1934, “for any person, directly or indirectly [to] use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance.” Similarly, under section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act 1933, it is unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, or to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact . . . or to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” Legal 
prohibitions against spoofing in particular (rather than market manipulation 
in general) are even more recent: in the United States, they were only coded 
into law with the dodd-Frank reform of 2010, when spoofing was defined as 
“bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution.” 
This definition was reaffirmed in the courts, where spoofing was interpreted as 
“non bona fide orders, or orders that the trader does not intend to have executed, 
114 The Real economy
to induce others to buy or sell the security at a price not representative of actual 
supply and demand.”1
The notion of intent as a placeholder for reality is at the core of definitions of 
spoofing and market manipulation. establishing intent, however, is notoriously 
difficult (for example, in parenting, see Coleman 1995; Wald 2006), particularly 
in the context of a system (the market) where actors mediate and delegate their 
behaviors onto algorithms, remain mostly anonymous, and act in ways that are 
supposed to reflect personal, subjective valuations and the ever changing state 
of public information (Malkiel and Fama 1970). It is not unlawful to be a bad 
investor, mistakenly digit a wrong number, or change one’s mind. It is also not 
illegal to consider investment strategies that are contingent on other events 
(“Buy XYz while ABC goes up”). It is also perfectly legal to submit orders 
that are completely nonsensical (and thus that have no real likelihood of being 
executed). But determining the existence of spoofing requires discerning the ac-
tual motivations of an individual trader or the designer of an automated trading 
system. “Identification of an abuse,” writes legal scholar Jerry Markham “is itself 
problematic, since not every advantage or stratagem is abusive even if it provides 
advantage to its user at the expense of others” (2015). The phrasing of law is also 
far from trivial: if a strategy is based on a probabilistic expectation of execution 
(say, that 1 of every 100 orders submitted to an exchange will be executed, ex-
pecting to cancel the rest), can one speak of intent, as defined in dodd-Frank? 
How to distinguish lousy, erratic, jittery, or informed trades from active forms of 
deceit? In other words, when is a transaction real? When do market participants 
say that a market relation exists?
A partial answer is provided by the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion’s (CFTC) Interpretive Order on spoofing, a document that serves as guid-
ance in cases where there is suspicion of market manipulation.2 For the CFTC, 
distinguishing between legitimate trading and spoofing requires evaluating “the 
market context, the person’s pattern of trading activity (including fill charac-
teristics), and other relevant facts and circumstances.” To aid comparisons, the 
CFTC provides “four nonexclusive examples of possible situations for when 
market participants are engaged in ‘spoofing’ behavior, including: (i) Submitting 
or cancelling bids or offers to overload the quotation system of a registered entity, 
(ii) submitting or cancelling bids or offers to delay another person’s execution of 
1. https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Proceedings_set_20151211_panzz-oasis.htm.
2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2013-05-28/html/2013-12556.htm.
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trades, (iii) submitting or cancelling multiple bids or offers to create an appear-
ance of false market depth, and (iv) submitting or canceling bids or offers with 
intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards.”3 note that 
within the CFTC’s Interpretive Order, intentionality is framed with respect to 
specific technical conditions: “overload of the quotation system,” “delayed ex-
ecution,” “false market depth,” and artificial price movements. Indeed, although 
the CFTC does not interpret spoofing as an activity restricted to “trading plat-
forms and venues only having order book functionality,” it nevertheless ties its 
recognition to a specific technical device, the electronic limit order book. (note, 
also, that the CFTC ties intent to individuals, not distributed agencements of 
humans and nonhumans. Regulation behaves “as if ” all market actions are tied 
to a discernible human actant, the “market participant.”)
Order books are infrastructural to finance in at least two ways. First, across 
countries and asset types, the majority of trading today is either routed through 
or executed in an electronic limit order book. In the United States, for exam-
ple, at least 59.2 percent of the trades in equities are automated through order 
books (with a remaining 22 percent tied to manual, yet electronic, trading), 
whereas 97.1 percent of the most common (G10) foreign exchange operations 
go through the book. Indeed, soon after their introduction, electronic limit or-
der books became the undisputed standard for building a market.
Second, and perhaps more important, trading strategies are often designed 
in reference to the order book’s dynamics. Order books matter not only because 
they are operationally necessary; their technical details determine, to an im-
portant extent, the space of strategies available to market participants. A cur-
sory exploration of “practical” publications in algorithmic and high frequency 
trading exposes this well: unlike a previous generation of textbooks in finan-
cial economics—concerned mostly with determining risk adjusted equilibrium 
prices—contemporary manuals focus on so-called market microstructure that 
involves understanding order book dynamics and the effects of variations in 
market design on aggregate patterns of trade and the profitability of specific 
trading strategies. Algorithms are designed to fit the functionalities of specific 
order books, exploiting different ways of signaling information, modifying or-
ders, and executing trades (Balarkas and ewen 2007; interview with platform 
developer, 2013). In addition to the very simple limit order (an order to buy or 
3. https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/FederalRegister/FinalRules/2013-12365.
html.
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sell a certain volume of securities at a certain price), an order book may process 
Calendar Spread Orders (that instruct to buy one delivery month of a contract 
and sell another delivery month of the same contract, at the same time, and 
on the same exchange), deferred Orders (that sit on the order book until trig-
gered), hidden orders (that are not visible to other users), or any other of the 
1,200 order types available in American financial markets across the sixteen 
national securities exchange recognized by the SeC (Mackintosh 2014).
What matters is that action is tied to infrastructure in concrete ways. Such a 
tie (or tandem) is apparent in how the question of spoofing is resolved in courts 
of law. While market manipulation is as old as organized finance, the first le-
gal criminal for suspected spoofing under the dodd-Frank Act occurred only 
recently, in 2011, when the Commodity Futures Trading Commission of the 
United States and the Financial Conduct Authority of Britain brought charges 
against Michael Coscia and his Panther energy Trading for illegally manipu-
lating markets on the Chicago Mercantile exchange and the Intercontinen-
tal exchange. Agreeing with the department of Justice, a grand jury indicted 
Coscia in late 2014 on six counts of commodities fraud and six counts of spoof-
ing. during the ensuing trial, the government argued that Coscia knowingly 
“entered large-volume orders that he intended to immediately cancel before 
they could be filled by other traders” (US v. Coscia, Indictment, 2015). This case 
presents a useful illustration of the performances of reality surrounding high 
frequency trading.
Coscia’s defense relied on two arguments. First, that the trial was procedur-
ally incorrect because existing statutes against spoofing were simply too vague, 
encompassing “much routine, innocuous conduct by commodities traders” 
(US v. Coscia, Motion for Acquittal, 2015). Second, Coscia argued that both 
intent and manipulation were not evident. Since he never made an explicitly 
false statement or material representation about when or how he would cancel 
the orders submitted to the market, he rejected the representation of his actions 
as frauds (US v. Coscia, Memorandum opinion order, 2015).
For the prosecution, however, Coscia’s intentions were clear: his strategy 
manifested the intent to cancel orders systematically, differentiating his con-
duct from other, widely accepted legitimate practices such as fill-or-kill and 
partial-fill orders. (A fill-or-kill is an order to buy or sell that has to be executed 
immediately upon receipt. If it cannot be executed, it is cancelled. Partial-fill 
orders, on the other hand, allow for the execution of only some of the order if 
the market does have enough depth to fill.) According to the government’s legal 
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team, Coscia manipulated the market by conveying “a misleading impression 
to customers” through his activity (US v. Coscia, Memorandum opinion order, 
2015). That he had not misrepresented his intentions beforehand was simply 
immaterial. Indeed, much of the proof offered by the prosecution consisted in 
highlighting the logic of Coscia’s strategy, consisting of so-called layering or-
ders—that is, placing large orders to buy and sell instruments slightly above and 
under the best bids and offers in the book, creating a “false sense of supply and 
demand.” Through this, argued the government, Coscia affected the offers of 
other (principally algorithmic) market participants and profited from market 
movements artificially created by his fictitious orders.4
Layering is important because it references order books as depositaries of 
“truthful” intentions—it indexes a shared, moralized expectation of what order 
books ought to be. Recall the explanation of the order book given earlier in this 
chapter. One strategy for manipulating the market is submitting trades that do 
not have the aim of being executed but that are meant to elicit actions from 
other participants. In the case of Apple Inc., the top of the order book has a 
slight imbalance: I can sell up to 601 shares, whereas I can only buy 210 shares 
at the top of the book. This means that it is more likely that the next transaction 
will move prices down rather than up (more people are willing to buy shares at a 
lower price than sell at a higher). If I wanted to fool market participants, I could 
submit limit orders just below the top of the book. These would give the impres-
sion that markets are likely to move in a specific direction (this is, for example, 
how trading algorithms are often programmed; see Lange, Lenglet, and Seyfert 
2016; Goldstein, Kumar, and Graves 2014; Seyfert 2016). If I am fast enough, 
though, I can cancel these limit orders before they are executed and after bet-
ting against the likely movement of the market. This is what layering consists 
of: it involves creating deceitful orders in the book, playing with the system as a 
mechanism that ought to reflect true intentions. This form of trading is widely 
repudiated, and not surprisingly so: as fictitious trades, these deceits “fracture 
connectivities” (Munn 1992) in the order book and stand as threats against the 
market community and its alleged clarity of intentionality.
note, with this, the nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution: 
it involved opening up the CMe and ICe’s order books—performing an in-
frastructural inversion, of sorts—to discern the aggregate nature of Coscia’s 
actions by tracing the fine-grained logics of transactions. The indictment, for 
4. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7b9ccde8-638c-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html.
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example, accused Coscia of knowingly transmitting “to a CMe Group server 
euro FX currency futures contract orders that he intended to cancel before 
execution, so he could purchase 14 contracts at a below-market price and then 
sell them immediately thereafter for a higher price, in order to obtain a profit 
of approximately $175 in less than a second” (US v. Coscia, Indictment, 2014). 
(Though Coscia’s indictment included only six counts of spoofing, none of 
which resulted in more than $500 in profits, Coscia is thought to have engaged 
in multiple events, earning $1.4 million over little less than three months.) The 
intent of these orders was not established from confessions or other first-person 
accounts, but rather was inferred from the strategy followed by the defendant in 
the context of what was possible and expected within the order book. In addi-
tion to testimony by Coscia’s programmer, the government relied on the expert 
testimony of Hendrick Bessembinder, a professor of finance at the University 
of Utah and specialist in market microstructure theory, who set much of the 
tone for the trial. As Bloomberg reported, Bessembinder “went through data for 
the jury that showed that even after orders were filled there were attempts to 
cancel them by Coscia’s algorithms” (Louis, Massa, and Hanna 2015). The con-
struction of intent relied heavily on Bessembinder’s representation of how the 
book works. “The only way trading is generated in electronic markets,” noted 
Bessembinder,
is through order submission. So if one is seeking to generate trading, seeking 
to generate a reaction, the only way one could do that is by inducing people to 
change their order submissions. [The] high fill rates on the small orders [suggest 
manipulation]. They were not only very high relative to the fill rates on the large 
orders, they are actually remarkably high for fill rates for other high frequency 
traders, so the high fill rates on the small orders are certainly very much consist-
ent with the idea that the reaction that was generated was to induce other traders 
to submit orders to trade against, interact with the small orders. (US v. Coscia, 
Trial Tr. 1390, 2015)
Bessembinder did not speak directly of Coscia’s intentions; he did not “impli-
cate intent as to any element of the crime charged” (US v. Coscia, Memorandum 
opinion order, 2015). Rather, Bessembinder’s testimony suggested to the jury 
what is expected of normal order book dynamics, signaling that the only pos-
sible way of making sense of Coscia’s orders was as fictitious dealings. The order 
book linked native conceptions of intent with the specific technical repertoires 
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of market microstructure economics. And the coupling was effective: in early 
november 2015 and after but an hour of deliberation, the Chicago jury found 
Coscia guilty on all twelve counts.
The trial of Michael Coscia was historically momentous in at least one im-
portant dimension. In addition to testing the waters of dodd-Frank, it intro-
duced a new way of establishing intent—of testing reality—within the increas-
ingly electronic marketplaces of the American financial system. As economist 
John Montgomery commented,
the recent enforcement and criminal cases [against spoofing and market ma-
nipulation] generally involve allegations that orders submitted by the defendant 
induced changes in orders submitted by other traders. .  .  . It would then fall to 
economic experts to analyze whether such a pattern exists, and whether the trading 
suggests an intention on the part of the defendant to induce the other limit orders to be 
submitted. The pattern described could be consistent with benign activity as well. 
For example, the trader could have orders on both sides of the market to benefit 
from the spread. A more aggressive trader could enter and submit more aggres-
sive orders that then interact with the other side of the defendant’s orders. Seeing 
those more aggressive orders, the defendant concludes the market is moving, 
cancels his/her open orders, and submits orders on both sides of the new market 
price. If a trader is alleged to have pursued spoofing as a strategy, an analysis of 
the risk and expected return of the strategy can provide evidence on whether this is a 
plausible claim.5 (my emphasis)
There is, then, a test of “real” relations: if economic experts find risk-adjusted re-
turns abnormal within the context of a particular order book design, something 
must be amiss. The result of such logic, argues Steven Mcnamara, is that US v. 
Coscia “takes the natural step of inferring a second-order intent in the program-
ming of algorithms to accomplish certain tasks” (Mcnamara 2016). In this, 
the material cultures of electronic financial markets may not only be cultures 
of second-order-transparency, as Fabian Muniesa (2014) pointedly observes. It 
is also possible that, following Coscia, intentionality within the market is now 
observable only from a distance, through the judgment of experts that discern 
the boundaries of actions by discriminating between true and false transactions, 
5.  https://ankura.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Spoofing-Market-Manipulation.pdf.
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real and fictitious market relations, according to how they are positioned within 
the order book.
MAnIPULATIOn, In AnALOG
That infrastructures matter in configuring relations, that they create and shape 
the communities that exist above them, can be seen perhaps by looking at the 
past as much as at the present. Consider, in particular, the trading floor, an 
infrastructure that contrasts sharply with the logic of the order book. Whereas 
order books operate under strictly symmetrical rules of price-time priority, trad-
ing floors are spaces of slightly more asymmetric interactions. Order books are 
organized as queues of electronic messages; trading floors take the shape of 
crowds of traders. Order books are mostly anonymous; the dynamics of trad-
ing floors are characterized by interpersonal knowledge and communication 
(zaloom 2006; Hertz 1998). Yet spoofing is native to both, receiving quite dif-
ferent treatments across each setting. In the digital domains of electronic limit 
order books, spoofing is, quite clearly, an illegitimate transaction, a false relation 
that threatens the moral standing of the anonymous market. In trading floors, 
however, spoofing was at times tolerated, sort of a joking relation (Mauss 2013) 
through which traders on the floor teased and tested their market-kin.
One example jumps to mind: a case of spoofing on the floor of the London 
Stock exchange in the early 1980s. Then, prices were mostly verbal, sometimes 
represented through whiteboards propped on the pitches of market makers on 
the trading floor. Over interview, a once young trainee at one of the most repu-
table market makers in London recalled how representations were used to drive 
prices in particular ways. The individual in question was assigned to work on the 
Australian mining book, which consisted of a list of mining shares selected and 
managed by a senior partner. As part of his research, the senior partner traveled 
to Australia to inspect facilities, talk with managers and engineers, visit brokers 
in Sydney and Melbourne, and buy shares for the firm’s inventory. On an occa-
sion during which the trainee was on the pitch, the partner had returned from 
Australia, bringing shares of a newly found mining company. The market, as the 
trainee recalled, was “a bit frothy,” yet the price of gold was “really going through 
the roof.” Before the market opened at 9:30, the senior partner introduced his 
new finding to the firm’s members and trainees in the pitch: “Alright. I’ve got 
this company called GeM exploration, which I’ve bought 250,000 shares of . . . 
121What is a ‘real’ transaction
and I’ve bought them for the equivalent price of 3p. [We’ll] see what we can do 
with them.” So he wrote “GeM” on the whiteboard and next to it he wrote “5” 
as the opening price for the share. Because it was written rather than printed 
on the board, it was clear for everyone in the market that this was a new share. 
And so, the first brokers were drawn to it. The first to enquire about this strange 
new entry said “I see. . . . What’s this GeM you’ve got up there? They look in-
teresting. Tell me about that.” As the one responsible for managing Australian 
mining shares, the senior partner replied: “Well, I went to Australia. I saw this 
company,” and after explaining their business he mentioned he thought they 
were “a real prospect in the current market conditions.” Intrigued, the broker 
asked for a quote. “They’re 4 6” replied the senior partner. “What size would you 
like that?” asked the broker. “25,000” answered the market maker. “OK, well, 
thanks very much. I’ll go away and have a think about that one,” said the broker 
as he walked away from the pitch. Regardless of the fact that there had not been 
a transaction, the senior partner changed the price on the whiteboard, writing 
in blue the number 6. The next broker approached the pitch, seeing GeM ex-
ploration on the board.
“What are they this morning?” “Ah, well they’re 5 7.” “What’s the size?” “Ah, well 
they’re at bid for 25, offered in 10.” Which showed that I’m a buyer, obviously. 
And he said “Oh, OK, well, I’ll buy ten.” The next guy comes along and literally, 
within half an hour, the things are trading at 25p. By the end of the day, they’re 
trading at 40p, and we’ve turned over 2.5 million and we are long 350,000 shares 
instead of 250,000 shares.6
The case was blatantly one of market manipulation: the representation of prices 
on whiteboards was meant to elicit, like Coscia’s orders, reactions within the 
market community. But any similarities obscure an important difference: these 
types of manipulations on the floor, although certainly contested, had an al-
together different moral valence. To manipulate one’s relative is one thing; to 
manipulate a stranger in an anonymous environment is quite another. Those 
were the days of the floor. As Gregory Meyer of the Financial Times wrote, 
technology “changes the nature of violations” (2015). But if it does so, it is nec-
essarily because different technologies imply and enact different “mutualities of 
being” (Carsten 2013). The risk of spoofing is a risk of false, rather than joking, 
6. Interview with former market maker, London, July 2012.
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relations—a challenge to the legitimacy, morality, and sense of reality of modern 
markets (Arnuk and Saluzzi 2012).
SOMe FInAL THOUGHTS
So what do we gain by looking at infrastructures? First, they suggest focusing 
on relations and the mechanisms that bound, format, and enact them and their 
social worlds. The market is, indeed, an arm’s-length setting: agents in financial 
markets today, for instance, have an ease of exit that is quite unparalleled his-
torically. Yet markets are also bound by connections, mutual dependencies, and 
reciprocal obligations—materialized through settlement systems, contractual 
linkages, and connectivity standards, but also through associations, professions, 
employment matching patterns, and others. (As Turco and zuckerman [2014] 
show, exit is indeed quite limited, even in the putatively rational and calculative 
spheres of private equity.)
Second, if relations emerge in connection to infrastructures, then the politics 
of relations cannot be contained within the categorizations of social actors and 
their mobilization. Relational economic sociology, like broader relational ap-
proaches, stresses the unequal distribution of power and resources as shaping 
categorical (and thus relational) work. This is certainly part of the story—but 
what an infrastructural inversion would advise is looking further afield than 
front-stage struggles. definitional battles over spoofing were surely shaped by 
overt institutional politics (see Arnoldi 2016); but practical instances of spoof-
ing depended on an altogether different articulation of intent on the basis of 
overlapping (yet disparate) forms of knowledge and expertise. Spoofing was not 
the object of ideological intervention—rather, it was at best a boundary object 
(Star and Griesemer 1989), linking the different ecologies of trading platform 
designers, lawyers, market microstructure economists, regulators, and a mixed 
gamut of market participants.
Third, infrastructures compel us to think of the “invisible”—not as an in-
herent quality of infrastructures but as a positional achievement, as something 
that happens when a device or system becomes infrastructural to a community 
(but certainly, the site of action and activity for others; see Larkin 2013). The 
question of spoofing is unescapably linked to issues about the nature of order 
books, the implicit assumptions they make about how things can (and should) 
be meaningfully connected, and the politics of their dissemination in finance. 
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To understand how reality was “realized” in finance, how specific modes of ac-
tion emerged as second nature to market participants and their performances of 
reality as seamless parts of everyday action, requires tracing the histories of these 
invisible platforms and their multiple makers. For contemporary financial mar-
kets, so it seems, reality is partly manufactured by the invisible hands of others.
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chapter five
Soybean, bricks, dollars, and the reality 
of money in Argentina
Mariana Luzzi and Ariel Wilkis
A few months after Carmen passed away, her children—Vicente (73), Sara (70), 
Paco (66), and Tere (58)—decided to embark upon what would become a never-
ending journey: divvying up their mother’s inheritance. Camila had owned three 
properties: a 50 sq. m. apartment and a duplex, all located in a suburb north of Bue-
nos Aires. Two of her children were already living in the duplex: Santa had rented 
the ground floor unit for almost ten years; Pepe and his wife had recently moved in 
upstairs. When it came time to see what the properties were worth, the Torre siblings 
each called a separate real estate agent to appraise the three properties. There were no 
major differences in the appraisals given by the different agents, and the prices they 
finally agreed upon were the following: US$70,000 for the apartment, US$118,000 
for the ground floor unit, and US$135,000 for the top floor unit.1
Camila had also left her children US$17,000 in savings. From the point of view 
of how much each sibling would get, it was simply a question of dividing by four the 
1. Since the 1980s, the real estate market in Argentina has operated in US dollars. This 
applies both to the price of properties and to sales, the majority of which are cash 
transactions, even today. One important factor in this market is that home loans are 
practically nonexistent.
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total amount to be inherited. In other words, assuming the three properties sold for 
US$340,000 plus the US$17,000 in Camila’s savings, each sibling should have got-
ten US$85,000. Yet things did not turn out to be as simple or straightforward as this 
mathematical equation. Except for Toni, the youngest sibling, who expected to receive 
her inheritance in cash, all the others expected to get a property out of the deal. Victor 
wanted the apartment; Santa wanted the ground floor unit where she was already 
living, and Pepe wanted the top floor.
The difference in value of the different properties would lead to disputes over the 
amount of money to be paid and received by each member of the family. In other 
words, Santa should have paid her siblings US$33,000 to purchase the ground floor 
unit; Pepe should have paid US$50,000 for the top floor unit; Victor would not only 
get the apartment worth US$70,000, but also US$15,000 in cash; and Toni would 
get her US$85,000 from what Santa and Pepe paid, plus $2,000 from Camila’s sav-
ings (with the remaining $15,000 going to Victor).
The Torre siblings were squabbling over the inheritance between 2012 and 2014, 
a time in which the Argentine government progressively restricted access to foreign 
currency and finally put an end to the legal purchase of foreign currency for savings 
purposes. This made the calculations even more difficult, because no one could access the 
exchange market in order to buy the dollars they needed to settle their accounts.
So, when it came time to agree on the payments in dollars, a series of issues led to 
disagreements among the siblings. At this point, the siblings took sides: Toni and Vic-
tor versus Santa and Pepe. Toni and Victor expected to be paid in the same currency in 
which the properties were appraised. Pepe and Santa, however, argued that the houses 
“are not in Miami, they’re in Olivos” and refused to pay the price of the properties 
in dollars. Given the exchange restrictions, the only way Pepe and Santa could have 
come up with that amount in dollars would be to buy them at a much higher rate on 
the black market.
In summary, the problem was not about how much the properties were worth in 
dollars (its price) but what the equivalent rate would be in pesos to reach the agreed 
on sum. And that’s where the negotiations stalled.
***
In the final months of 2011, just as Argentine President Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner started her second term, the Argentine banking system suffered 
a massive withdrawal of dollars. According to the different analysts, and just 
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as had happened many times since the mid-twentieth century, the run on the 
national currency revealed how different business sectors were pressuring the 
national government to devaluate the Argentine peso and thus make Argentine 
goods and salaries more competitive. Starting at the end of October 2011, the 
state responded to this pressure by changing the rules for buying and selling for-
eign currency. The regulations and controls got progressively stricter until July 
2012, when the purchase of dollars or other currencies for savings was banned 
altogether. The restriction was partially lifted in January 2014, when it became 
possible to purchase dollars for savings once again, though some restrictions 
continued to apply up until December 2015, when they were completely elimi-
nated by the new government.
There is nothing extraordinary about the inheritance of the Torre siblings: 
their story is just one example of the type of controversies and negotiations com-
mon in a context where currencies multiply and currency exchange is altered or 
interrupted, as occurred when the exchange market regulations were amended 
in 2012. As occurs more broadly in economic life, personal ties are mixed here 
with assets, appraisals, and economic regulations. In this case, though, calcula-
tions are simultaneously done in different units of account. The story of the 
Torre siblings reveals the types of situations that arise from limited access to the 
exchange market, but it is also one chapter in a broader social and cultural his-
tory. The family controversies occur in the context of currency exchange controls 
but are based on money practices and beliefs that formed over a much longer 
period of time.
In Argentina, the popularization of a financial repertoire articulated around 
the peso and the dollar was a long and slow-maturing process. Since the end of 
the 1950s, and in a context of recurring balance of payments crises, the US dollar 
started to be progressively associated with speculation practices of “small” inves-
tors who looked to benefit from the sudden and repeated devaluations of the 
national peso. If until that moment the foreign exchange market had been dom-
inated by elites linked to international trade and the financial system, starting 
in the early 1960s, the purchase and selling of the US dollar became an opera-
tion extended to broader segments of the population. The media reports of that 
period bring continued attention to these new segments of the population with 
few financial expertise credentials; the figure of the saver who “keeps” dollars in 
his home to protect his patrimony’s value started to appear in the interpretation 
of the “lack of confidence” in the Argentine peso during this period (Luzzi and 
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Wilkis 2017, 2019). The following decades accentuated the diffusion of this 
financial repertoire, which found not only particular macroeconomic conditions 
to develop (high inflation, devaluations, balance of payments crises, and fiscal 
deficit) but also cultural devices (movies, literature, newspaper articles, graphic 
humor, and publicity), which helped to legitimate dollar accounts and payments. 
The subsequent adoption of the dollar by certain markets—such as the real es-
tate market—as means of payment further contributed to sediment a set of 
financial practices based on multiple currencies (Gaggero and Nemiña 2016).
The configuration of this financial repertoire can be interpreted in light 
of the literature that in recent decades, and in clear discussion with orthodox 
economic thought, has insisted on the normal—not pathological—character 
of currency pluralism. This notion is part of the developments from which dif-
ferent disciplines have reassessed the question about the nature of money. In the 
classic narrative, the figure of modern money is viewed as a “general equivalent 
of value” (Marx 1976), “the value of values” (Simmel 1978), or as an “all-pur-
pose currency” (Polanyi 1983). In contrast, in fields like history (Kuroda 2008), 
economics (Blanc 2000; Théret 2007; Servet, Théret, and Yildirim 2008), an-
thropology (Guyer 2016a, 2016b; Neiburg 2016), and sociology (Zelizer 1994; 
Dodd 2014), a new narrative focused on multiple meanings of money has been 
constructed over the last two decades. Nigel Dodd (2014) has recently summa-
rized this shift by arguing that while classic sociology focused on how money 
shapes culture, contemporary scholars do the opposite, revealing how money is 
formatted by culture. Unlike the perspective of money as an instrument that can 
be replaced or exchanged independently of the form it takes (coin, bills, checks, 
etc.) and of its origins, this new narrative brings up the question of the condi-
tions and limits of its fungibility.
Jane Guyer’s work has made a remarkable contribution to an empirically 
informed understanding of the multiplicity of money. On the one hand, her 
research shows that the multiplicity of currencies in the African economies is 
anything but exceptional (Guyer 1995, 2004): in fact, it has been characteristic 
of these economies and well documented at least since the 1950s, when Paul 
Bohannan studied transactions and currencies in the colonial world (Bohannan 
1955, 1959). Unlike Bohannan, whose work was solidly rooted in Karl Polanyi’s 
differentiation between primitive or “special-purpose” money and modern or 
“all-purpose” money, Guyer questioned this categorical division between coex-
isting currencies. According to the author, it is possible to find more modern 
features in precolonial monetary economies than what was once supposed, along 
133Soybean, brickS, dollarS
with fewer modern (or all-purpose) characteristics in the twentieth-century cur-
rencies than one would have imagined. By following this line of research, Guyer 
departs from traditional perspectives in which currency is described through 
its functions (unit of account, method of exchange, payment method, and store 
of value), perspectives that treat the absence of any of these functions as an 
anomaly. This serves as a reminder that territorially united currencies are only 
one of the many currencies that have existed historically; it would be a mistake 
to consider such currencies as universal (Helleiner 2003). Thus, Guyer’s works 
on the currencies in Western Africa—with its rich ethnographic descriptions 
and thorough historic inquiries—allow us to observe that currency pluralism 
is in fact characteristic of modern currency systems, as noted in other works as 
well (Blanc 2000; Servet, Théret, and Yildirim 2008; Théret 2008).
Guyer’s more recent works have gone deeper into the issue of the multiplic-
ity of money. According to her, starting in the 1990s the capitalist world entered 
a new phase of multiple currencies, which coincided with a proliferation of the 
circuits in which the US dollar became the sole common currency (Guyer and 
Salami 2012: 4). This second phenomenon spoke of a new economic and mon-
etary configuration that began to be observed in the world at the beginning of 
the 1970s: from the point of view of economic theory, the primordial monetary 
function was determined to be storing value (Guyer 2016b; Orléan 2009) and 
from the point of view of the configuration of monetary economies and eco-
nomic practices at the local level, the US dollar was consolidated as the currency 
used not only in foreign commerce globally but also as a common account and 
exchange unit in different regional and national scenarios.
This desegregation of monetary functions, no longer embodied in a single 
national currency—whose reign has been, in fact, comparatively brief—but in 
different coexisting ones, is expressed in the common distinction between soft 
currencies and hard currencies, where only those that serve as a store of value 
are considered “strong.” Yet the point that interests Guyer is not only how these 
multiple currencies are configured but also the way in which each of these “cur-
rency innovations” forges a space for new conversions, new regulations, float-
ing exchange rates, and new and existing agents who are forced to deal with a 
changing context on an everyday basis.
In line with these considerations, and in light of the Argentine experience, it 
is pertinent to wonder what happens when monetary regulations impact access 
and use of a currency—the dollar—that is identified as “hard.” What does a con-
text of limited access to the foreign exchange market teach us about the (historic 
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and contingent) hierarchical dynamic of currencies and monetary functions? 
The context of foreign exchange restrictions we alluded to above is perfectly fer-
tile for exploring a perspective that expands the thesis of monetary pluralism. As 
we will see throughout this article, the exchange constraints imposed between 
2011 and 2015 and the monetary practices they generated reveal the dynamics 
of currency pluralism in today’s Argentina. In a monetary system where differ-
ent currencies exist side by side (where, for example, real estate transactions are 
done in a foreign currency), this was a moment when money hierarchies were 
altered; when it became necessary for people to decide how to continue to do 
existing transactions or what new transactions would replace them.
The Torres siblings’ disputes over inheritance allow us to observe that in 
Argentina the implementation of accounts and payments in different curren-
cies isn’t necessarily problematic. On the contrary; the acceptance of monetary 
pluralism as a condition for negotiations between siblings shows how embed-
ded the use of “hard” currencies—dollars—and “soft” currencies—pesos—are in 
Argentines’ monetary practices. Nevertheless, given the context of foreign ex-
change restrictions, at no moment did the family consider that the payments be 
made with dollars in cash, as is usual in this type of transactions when there are 
not exchange control mechanisms in place. The disagreement between the Tor-
res siblings referred to the appropriate conversion rate to divide an inheritance 
among the members of a family. What is the nature of the dollar in these ne-
gotiations? A hard but “imaginary” and “immaterial” currency, like the Haitian 
dollar analyzed by Federico Neiburg (2016)? What is the nature of the peso? A 
soft but “real” and “available” currency?
The long conformation process of this financial repertoire, in which the peso 
and the US dollar articulate, had a turning point starting in the mid-1970s, 
when the inflationary process started to accentuate (Canitrot 1981). In the suc-
cessive economic crises that followed since the 1980s, the consideration con-
solidated, of the Argentine peso as an “ill” currency, whose evolution was always 
measured relative to the dollar, as a strong and “healthy” currency (Neiburg 
2010). A decade later, those imaginaries found a definitive expression in the 
currency board regime (1991–2001), which established a fixed parity between 
the peso and the dollar as a part of a stabilization plan based on the “healthy” 
properties of the dollar as a means to “cure” the peso. This opposition between 
the dollar as a healthy or even true currency and the peso as an ill or even false 
currency (Muir 2015) remained usual during the 2001–2 crisis (for example, in 
the demands of bank clients whose deposits had been devalued [Luzzi 2016]) 
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and after that crisis, when the distinction served as argument to justify safe in-
vestment strategies, such as real estate developments (D’Avella 2014).
The perspective we assumed in this chapter to analyze the context of foreign 
exchange restrictions—where the limitations to access the foreign exchange 
market combined with successive devaluations of the peso—allows us to have 
another approximation to these properties attributed to the Argentine peso and 
the US dollar in Argentina. A pragmatic point of view on monetary plural-
ism (Maurer 2006) allows us to go beyond the consideration of currencies and 
monetary functions based on attributes and fixed oppositions such as hard/soft, 
real/fictional, material/immaterial—to name some properties that repeatedly 
bring the nature of money into question (Neiburg 2016). The perspective we 
chose here identifies within specific transaction universes the level of analysis 
where it is possible to observe an intense and rich dynamic of imaginaries and 
monetary practices that establish orders and hierarchies between currencies and 
monetary functions. This allows us to understand, for example, how transac-
tions go beyond state regulations that try to discipline practices and monetary 
imaginaries through the display of a plurality of currencies whose properties 
are temporally and relationally contingent. In the following sections, we will 
analyze two transactional universes embedded in the currency pluralism config-
ured by Argentina’s recent exchange restrictions. Based on qualitative fieldwork 
conducted between 2014 and 2015 in the cities of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, 
Argentina, we will describe uses of the US dollar in two specific markets (real 
estate and soybean production), which have been extremely dynamic after the 
major socioeconomic crisis of 2001 and in which the dollar has served as an ac-
counting or payment currency (or both) for at least the past four decades (Luzzi 
and Wilkis 2019). We will see how real estate developers and soybean producers 
make profits by organizing and establishing hierarchies of multiple currencies, 
disaggregated monetary functions, and differentiated monies. In these two cases 
we will also observe the creation of new currencies, relying on the definition of 
what is considered “real” in each universe (for instance, soy producers who take 
soybeans as the unit of account and store of value, or real estate developers who 
use square meters as a unit of account). As we will show, this multiplicity of 
currencies does not constitute an anomaly or create new borders or barriers, but 
does provide a new and profitable means for transactions.
Our work allows pluralism to be understood not merely as a dichotomy 
between soft/ hard, real/fictional, and imaginary/concrete currencies but by 
differentiating and establishing a hierarchy between the currencies that each 
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of these figures assumes. These hierarchies are multiple, conflicting, and mutu-
ally coexisting. The fact that it is not—even within the same market or set of 
actors—a fixed hierarchy (dollar over peso, or soybeans/bricks over dollars), but 
precisely that this varies both temporally and relationally, is the reason why it is 
fundamental to destabilize interpretations that affix a stable property, be it soft/
hard, real/fictional, or imaginary/concrete to a currency or monetary function.
TrANSACTIONS
Real Estate Developers
The real estate market has been one of the main focuses of our research due to 
the fact that it is almost entirely dollar-based. As the recent work by Alejandro 
Gaggero and Pablo Nemiña shows, since the end of the 1970s, purchase and sale 
transactions have been carried out in US dollars (Gaggero and Nemiña 2016), 
as also seen in the story of the Torre siblings at the beginning of this chapter.
The construction sector witnessed a boom after the 2001 crisis; a great num-
ber of new office and apartment buildings were constructed across the city of 
Buenos Aires. During this period, part of the impulse to invest in the sector 
could be attributed to the appeal of investing in “bricks” (ladrillos) over sav-
ings accounts or time deposits. The experience of the corralito (the freezing of 
dollar deposits and their conversion to pesos at an exchange rate lower than 
the going market rate during the 2001 crisis) made Argentines highly distrust-
ful of banks. Encouraged by new investment options (real estate trusts), small 
investors frequently opted to purchase new apartments.2 The time in which an 
investor’s money was tied up was relatively short, two years at most, and part of 
the investment—which yielded a high return—could be made in pesos and in 
installments.3
2. Over the past decade, trusts became a common way to finance new buildings. A 
pool of small investors makes an investment in dollars to finance the purchase of 
a lot; this investment yields an apartment in the newly constructed building, an 
apartment that will be handed over within a period of time established by contract 
(usually less than two years). This initial investment in dollars is usually combined 
with monthly installments in pesos over the course of the project. The investors who 
opt in during the later stages can make payments in pesos, at least until the building 
is finished.
3. Nicolas D’Avella has reconstructed this period in great detail (D’Avella 2014).
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The exchange restrictions put new limits on these transactions, historically 
done in cash. Since the late seventies, not only have most real estate sales in 
Argentina been cash transactions, they are also priced and paid in US dollars. 
This means obtaining actual dollar bills, which buyers and sellers must take with 
them either to or from the location where the transaction is carried out. As we 
saw in the story of the Torre siblings, limited access to the purchase of foreign 
currencies represented a challenge for real estate transactions. At the same time, 
the parallel currency market led to multiple exchange rates, making negotiations 
on the prices of properties even more difficult.
Gerardo is an engineer in his late thirties who owns a construction company 
and sells apartments. We wanted to know how real estate developers were car-
rying out sales transactions given the restricted access to the “official dollar,” 
so Gerardo invited us to see his latest building venture. It was a group of three 
eleven-floor buildings, each with studio, one bedroom, and two bedroom apart-
ments. One of the buildings was already finished but construction continued 
on the other two. He showed us some of the apartments and pointed out their 
advantages—the number of square meters and the quality of the materials.
The conversation continued at a coffee shop near the construction site. 
“Nowadays, I always tell my clients, it’s up to you. I’ve got a building that’s 
nearly done and one I haven’t started on yet.” This explanation was a summary of 
how this builder puts together his real estate transactions. If the market is para-
lyzed, with transactions occurring “in slow motion,” to use the phrase of another 
builder we interviewed, profit margins are buttressed by combining currencies. 
Two different formulas may be used for constructions right next door to each 
other if these are at different phases in the business cycle. A finished property 
and a property under construction represent two different transaction types. A 
finished property is appraised in dollars; Gerardo left no doubt about that. Once 
the construction has finished, the dollar is the currency for establishing what the 
property is worth and it also serves as a payment instrument. The completion of 
the building brings the business cycle to a close, although until that point, the 
Argentine peso is a valid unit of account and payment method. There is a clear 
method to how builders do the numbers to determine the construction costs.
Like many other real estate developers we met during fieldwork, Gerardo 
uses the lot where the building will be constructed as the base value. Since the 
purchase of the lot will be in dollars, its impact on the final price will also be in 
dollars. However, the other two fundamental components, the workforce and 
construction materials, are calculated and paid for in pesos. The total cost of 
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the construction is thus the sum of outlays in both dollars (the lot) and pesos 
(the workforce and materials). This formula permits multiple currency transac-
tions in which different monies are used depending on the building’s phase of 
production. Since after construction, the building no longer requires workforce 
or materials, the peso is excluded as a unit of account and payment method at 
this stage: the sale price is in dollars. At the same time, these transactions are 
connected with the start of a new business cycle for the developers, who must 
now acquire a new lot for the next project and pay for it in dollars. In contrast, 
the unfinished property (which is also up for sale) generates constant expenses 
in materials and worker salaries, and here the peso plays a fundamental role in 
the construction cycle. This part of the transaction, then, can be paid for in the 
Argentine currency, with prices stated in pesos. Since the peso is circulating 
during this stage, it can be used as a payment method for transactions like the 
developer’s purchase of materials and salary payments.
The formula for calculating this transaction involves one additional element: 
a price index determined by the Argentine Chamber of Construction. Install-
ments in pesos are adjusted by this index, which takes into account increases in 
the prices of construction materials and construction worker salaries, both stated 
in pesos. In 2007, this formula began to be used when inflation began to creep up-
ward and the credibility of the INDEC (National Institute of Statistics and Cen-
suses)—which also publishes its own Construction Cost Index—was challenged.4
In 2008, when the inflation index exceeded the rise of the US dollar against 
the Argentine peso, Gerardo decided it was time to “reduce risks.” He started 
talking to his father about using the Construction Cost Index when selling an 
apartment in installments and in Argentine pesos. His father objected because 
of the price-indexing ban, which dated back to the times of the currency board 
(pre-2001) but remained on the books. Gerardo, however, thought there was no 
other option if they wanted to keep earning profits in a time when the produc-
tion costs in pesos were rising more quickly than the US dollar. Convincing his 
clients to accept this clause in the sales agreement was the only way to ensure 
that a building would get finished without “anyone losing.”
4. In 2007, the INDEC was subject to government intervention: the highest ranking 
officials were fired and technical personnel were replaced. The reliability of the index 
and the worthiness of its data have been a source of controversy ever since. As a 
result, new (and equally questionable) inflation indexes were introduced by private 
consulting firms. The inflation rates presented in these new indexes vary by up to 
twenty percentage points. For more on this issue, see Neiburg’s article in this issue.
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Gerardo tells us something that is reiterated by many business executives 
in different sectors other than finance or the exchange market. In terms of the 
transactions that take place within each sector, the dollar’s importance abates. 
“For me, the dollar is just another good. Bricks are my business.” A businessman 
from the timber industry had something similar to say: “I know what the wood 
is worth and how to make money off it; I don’t need to calculate that in dollars 
or get my hands on dollars.” This perspective changes when the question is not 
about planning a transaction but evaluating an investment or an increase in 
equity. Here the dollar acquires a new hierarchical position and competes with 
other currencies.
The builders’ real estate transactions are developed according to their profit 
margins. These margins are modified when the bricks, to use their term, are 
added to the equation as their own currency. Thus several transactions take place 
here. On the one hand, builders can postpone the sale of real estate if it looks 
like the dollar is going to rise. “Stockpiling” square meters is a way to protect the 
value of their investments. On the other hand, the dividends of an investment 
are assessed in dollars, in a practice common among Argentine entrepreneurs, 
who use the US currency to calculate their equity or earnings; however, the 
quantity of square meters is also a benchmark of the investment. How many 
apartments or constructed square meters the developers will be able to offer 
involves adding this currency to a transaction which also depends on dollars 
and pesos. The developer knows that this is a relatively steady business with low 
risks. Gerardo followed in the footsteps of his father, who shared the secrets of 
the business with his son: real estate never goes out of style; you can get out eas-
ily; the risk is limited; and if things go south, the worst case scenario is no profit, 
but never forfeiting your initial investment.
“I think about how many square meters I can buy when the building is 
finished. My profits are based on volume, and I find people who want to grow 
by the square meter.” Through the acquisition of “bricks” his investments have a 
profit margin even when pesos are subject to inflation and dollar access is lim-
ited. Both pesos and dollars can function as payment methods, while “bricks” or 
“square meters” function as units of account.
This reconstruction reveals that the currency pluralism that characterizes 
these real estate developers is embedded in myriad forms of experiencing and 
maneuvering the temporalities in which transactions occur. In a context of infla-
tion and exchange restrictions, the Argentine peso serves as a current transac-
tion payment instrument; the US dollar is a payment method, store of value, or a 
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unit of account for transactions that will take place in the near or distant future; 
and finally, bricks are a unit of account to compare transactions over a long 
period of time. In this relationship between bricks and the long term, Gerardo’s 
family has repeated the same adage since the 1960s: “Growing by the square 
meter is the secret to this business.” And Gerardo could verify this saying with 
his own experience. After the fall experienced during the 2001–2 crisis, prices in 
the real estate market have gradually improved in recent years. According to the 
local Ministry of Urban Development (2013), while in 2001 the average value 
of an apartment in Buenos Aires was $891 per square meter, this value reached 
$2,000 in 2011.
Soybean Producers
“The soybean is like the dollar,” a farm owner from the province of Santa Fe told 
us. This was one of our first visits to this region, whose social, economic, and 
productive milieu had changed since the expansion of soybean planting at the 
end of the 1980s. The soybean boom was accompanied by a true technological 
revolution in the countryside, thanks to the incorporation of genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs) and the direct sowing method (Hernández and Gras 
2014). In the years since, the crop had transformed into a global commodity 
that contributed billions of dollars to the Argentine economy. According to 
the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), almost $20 billion 
from the export of soybean entered Argentina in 2014, which represented 
30 percent of the foreign sales made by the country. It is no wonder, then, that 
an attempt by the national government in 2008 to increase the taxes on export-
ing soy farmers ignited one of the most severe political conflicts of the past 
decade. Farmers responded with a strike that stretched on for months, which 
led the minister of economy to hand in his notice and divided the government 
coalition.
Three years later, soy farmers were back on the front pages due to the ex-
change restriction policies. The government accused soy farmers—in conjunc-
tion with major trade companies—of attempting to “destabilize” the Argentine 
peso. Farmers, claimed the government, were stockpiling soybeans instead of 
selling them on foreign markets, thus keeping much-needed dollars from en-
tering the country and speculating with the peso’s devaluation. Such practices 
had been common during the 1980s, a decade of strong currency instability and 
drastic fluctuations in exchange rates.
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San Justo is a small town located north of Santa Fe, the capital city of the 
province of the same name in the middle of the country. An area of small- and 
medium-sized farms, Santa Fe has undergone a profound transformation in the 
past fifteen years that has marked the entire fertile region of Argentina known 
as la Pampa húmeda (humid Pampas). Soybeans have gradually replaced other 
grains—and livestock—making this region almost monocultural. At the same 
time, this change has reduced the number of small farmers, who have increas-
ingly rented out their lands to the large crop pools (Gras 2009; Manildo 2013), 
which have become more profitable than farming on one’s own. In this way, al-
though the structure of property ownership has remained more or less the same, 
the dynamics of production have changed entirely, as has the life of the rural 
towns in the region, where farmers went to make a new living after abandoning 
their trade altogether.
During our fieldwork, we found out more about the production and sales of 
this crop, which had been Argentina’s number one export for over a decade. In 
San Justo, we talked with men and women from the countryside: old farmers 
who inherited the family farm and other new farmers who joined the bonanza 
of the past decade, employees of the cooperatives that stockpile crops, retailers 
selling agricultural machinery, and agricultural technicians working for large 
farms.
In these conversations, our informants discussed diverse accounts and trans-
actions with multiple units of account. We thus learned that the yields were 
measured in different ways, such as by weight (in quintals, equivalent to one 
hundred kilograms); by the surface area of the lands where crops were planted 
(in hectares); and by their volume, in “trucks” (truckloads). Each of these units 
revealed the moment of measurement and different accounts: when production 
was measured in quintals, it was to calculate the profit of a crop; hectares were 
used when discussing net earnings; and “truckloads” were used to estimate the 
sale of grains and the accounts associated with them.
Abel was born on the farm his grandfather had bought after arriving from 
Italy at the beginning of the twentieth century, and where he had begun farming 
as an adult, following in his father’s footsteps. Although the family had initially 
bred livestock, they had begun cultivating soybean slowly, starting with just a 
few hectares at the beginning of the 1980s. Now his entire farm is dedicated to 
soybean production. Abel explained the different ways grains are sold: through 
a co-op, that guarantees storage of the grain and makes contacts with the ex-
porters, or through “direct exports” via the rosario port (the most important 
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port for grain exports in Argentina). Although the second option is cheaper, 
because it eliminates the commissions and other co-op costs, it is only available 
for major producers: “you have to fill the truck,” as Abel explains. Only farmers 
with a volume of production by the truckload can contact exporters directly, and 
grain export is a highly concentrated business in Argentina. The truck option 
is also used for other accounts associated with the sale of grain. When he takes 
inventory of his production costs, Abel mentions the question of the dispute 
between farmers and the government on grain export retentions, which are set 
at 35 percent of their sales abroad. “Thirty-five percent is madness! Think about 
a hundred trucks [of grain]: they take thirty-five of those trucks: it’s insanity! 
The taxes are unbelievable. . . . The government steals your money.”
However, the units not only serve to measure production but also to price 
the products or raw materials. The basic calculation for the transactions of ex-
porting farmers is based on the price per 100 kg of soy, which generally reflects 
its Chicago market value (in June of 2015, US$345.85 per ton). The production 
costs are comprised of different currencies. The workforce salaries, fuel, agricul-
tural machinery rentals, and transportation costs are calculated in pesos. The 
dollar is the currency used for the purchase of seeds and agrochemicals sold by 
large multinationals like Monsanto.
Thus, the accounting involved in production costs always involves different 
currencies. The US dollar is the currency used to calculate the price of the grain, 
the machinery, and the agrochemicals. The Argentine peso is the unit used to ex-
press the cost of field workers, fuel, and utilities (like electricity). The cost of oth-
er production components is defined directly in soybeans. When a farmer rents 
the land of those who have left farming, it is done in two ways: either by paying 
the owner a percentage of what the renter ultimately makes or in an agreed 
quantity of soy quintals, regardless of the total crop yield. In both cases, the cost 
of the rental is measured in soy quintals and the final price depends on the price 
of soybean when payment is made. When equipment (harvest machines) is not 
used but rented, the agreement with the contractor is the same: the rental value 
is based on soy quintals, as a percentage of the harvest (usually around 9 percent).
Numerous devices help farmers in their daily calculations: websites, cell 
phone apps, and cable TV channels keep farmers abreast of the international 
commodity markets and the weather, other numbers that farmers check on a 
daily basis. Industry journals provide useful information for farmers to estimate 
their costs and earnings, periodically offering data on the cost of the raw materi-
als. Although we mentioned that certain sectors are paid in pesos, the total value 
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is estimated in dollars in order to have a single value for reference purposes. This 
means also converting to dollars whatever has to be paid in taxes.
This multiplicity of currencies configures the accounts and the transactions 
of soy farmers. The dollar clearly takes precedence as a unit of account, although 
it is rarely used as a payment instrument. Producers generally reinvest the pe-
sos they receive in their fields, and pesos are usually the currency of everyday 
transactions. The most important currency in these transactions, however, is the 
soybean itself. As the farmer we interviewed said, the soybean functions like 
the dollar; but soybeans are easier to access, and farmers are more accustomed 
to this currency. Once the value of their soybean has been calculated in dollars, 
it serves as a payment method and a store of value. The dollar that farmers use 
for their calculations is the official dollar, which is what they receive for their 
exports, and the dollar known as the soybean dollar, which is the official price 
minus a government withholding of approximately 35 percent.5
“Soybean is a common currency. I pick up the phone and I’ve made a sale,” 
explained one farmer in reference to soybeans stored by a co-op that sells his 
crops for him. The way grains are sold facilitates the currency conversion of soy: 
the crop is never sold all at once, but gradually, based on the producer’s own 
needs. The portion corresponding to land and machinery rental, in addition to 
other running costs of the producer, is sold right after the harvest. The rest of 
the “truck” (truckload) is sent out according to the need to buy fuel (diesel) or 
agrochemicals for the next harvest or if investments in machinery are necessary. 
The storage co-ops play a key role in this system, as they store the majority of 
what is produced and thus allow resources to be used in different ways.6 For 
this reason, others talk about the soybean as a financial circuit unto itself: it can 
be saved; it can be used as means of payment; and it also serves for currency 
speculation—that is, an upcoming devaluation of the national currency. The last 
option is the one that became most common after the exchange rate restrictions 
5. In addition to these two dollars, the other reference dollar for businesses (though 
not for soybean producers) is the so-called blue dollar, which is the US dollar 
exchanged at the black market rate.
6. In the last few decades, development of “silo bags” allowed producers to store grain 
on their own farms and thus forgo the co-ops, which represents a paradigmatic 
example of the way in which productive processes can combine with technological 
innovations to generate an economic phenomenon. In any case, the use of these 
silos requires having space available (the grain must be stored “horizontally”) and 
care (to avoid leakage or insects) that can make such storage costly in the long term.
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were implemented. In the eyes of government officials, producers were destabi-
lizing the Argentine currency; according to farmers, they were simply waiting 
for an upswing before selling.
As we can see, far from limiting producers, plural currencies offer the po-
tential for a range of transactions. On the one hand, in a context of exchange 
restrictions, the hierarchy of soybeans (convertible in dollars) places farmers in 
a privileged position, allowing them to dollarize their transactions without the 
need to lay hand on a single dollar, in a context characterized by limited access 
to the US currency. On the other hand, beyond the restrictions, plural currencies 
allow them to multiply their profit margins, eluding intermediaries or expand-
ing the time available for transactions (or both). As in all cases of a pluralistic 
configuration of the monetary system, the conversion processes are essential. 
Knowing when and how “to convert” soybean quintals into pesos, dollars into 
pesos, or pesos into dollars (or when and how to avoid these conversions) will be 
the secret to conducting (and understanding) their transactions.
The possibility of making these conversions shows how the soybean allows 
agricultural producers to maneuver different temporalities, from same-day sales 
to transactions in the near or distant future. Soybeans can thus be exchanged 
as part of day-to-day production (for a machinery rental, for example), saved 
for transactions that will take place at different points during the agricultural 
cycle or stored in a co-op for long periods. This even allows farmers to plan 
their retirement, as they contribute to a “pension fund” in the soybean silos. By 
maneuvering these transaction cycles (from the present to the near or distant 
future), producers can treat the soybean as an actual currency. This is why farm-
ers say, “The soybean is like the dollar.”
FINAL THOUGHTS
“I have a trauma, which is the cepo (clamp),” affirmed the ex-president of the 
Central Bank of the republic of Argentina (BCrA), who was in charge of the 
regulatory authority of the monetary system when foreign exchange controls 
known as the cepo were implemented in 2011. The public that heard this state-
ment was composed of young social science students who were attending the 
presentation on a book about monetary policy, in which the ex-official was the 
main commentator. The year 2016 was in full swing and several months had 
passed since those measures had ended. The new government had previously 
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held as one of its main campaign promises the lifting of exchange controls. At 
the time, the president of the Central Bank had carried out a very active public 
defense of the restrictions as an instrument in a “cultural battle” oriented toward 
“undollarizing the minds” of Argentines. No doubt, the so-called trauma she 
confessed in 2016 responded to a profound sentiment of having lost that battle, 
given that despite the nearly five years of restrictions to foreign exchange trans-
actions, Argentines’ tendency to use the US dollar had not decreased.
The regulations oriented toward limiting currency pluralism—like the re-
strictions implemented between 2011 and 2015 in Argentina, or the attempt to 
prohibit the Haitian dollar, as analyzed by Neiburg (2016)—are efforts made to 
domesticate practices and imaginaries sedimented over a long period of time. 
During public debates regarding foreign exchange restrictions, Argentines’ pref-
erence for the dollar constituted an “anomaly” that had to be corrected (Luzzi 
2013). The “trauma” of the Argentine Central Bank’s ex-president was the ex-
pression, in a psychoanalytic language, of the failure of those attempts when 
they clash with financial repertoires that present more resistance and flexibility 
than the regulations that intend to domesticate them. We have shown through-
out this chapter that this flexibility and resistance corresponded to a plurality of 
currencies and monetary functions, with contingent and relational properties.
Table 1 presents our descriptions of the transactions we analyzed in the 
universe of real estate developers and soybean producers, where we discovered 
multiple currencies at work (pesos, dollars, constructed square meters/bricks, 
and soybeans). In addition, we noted a disaggregation of the functions of these 
currencies and a differentiation based on these functions, as the result of ex-
change restrictions (the official dollar, the blue dollar, the soybean dollar).
Table 1: Multiple currencies at work in different transactions
Money Functions Real Estate Developers Soybean Producers
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We find that the agents do not simply replicate patterns from the past. 
Beyond common traits such as rising inflation and exchange control policies, 
the scenarios are never quite the same and people reveal a localized ability to 
deal with them. And precisely because there are margins of innovation, prof-
its are also possible. Yet, we never saw agents making instrumental decisions 
that respond only to specific situations, as other hypothesis would have it. Their 
transactions are innovative, always anchored in historic processes of economic 
socialization; they are reactivations of individual and collective lessons learned 
in unique contexts (as we have seen, “bricks” and “soybean” were not created as 
units of account during the exchange restrictions, but before).
In his study of currencies in Haiti, Neiburg (2016) showed “how nonunifi-
cation [of different currencies] is in line (in the Weberian sense) with the ways 
in which people live in an environment of extreme monetary scarcity” (Neiburg 
2016: 87). On our part, we have showed here how some economic agents in 
Argentine society find a condition to display their business activities, in curren-
cy pluralism. Despite the differences, both cases allow us to further understand 
the close relationship that exists between the ways in which currency pluralism 
is configured and the definition of particular imaginaries about the state, its 
capacities for regulation, and the resistances it encounters.
In this chapter, we found that agents define, handle, and experience dif-
ferent objects as real currencies. Currency pluralism expands when real estate 
developers treat “bricks” as a real currency and farmers do the same with “soy-
beans.” In fact, developers promote bricks as the only real currency, since bricks 
keep their value over time. Similarly, soybean producers prefer soybeans to 
other currencies, as they can save soybeans, invest them, or exchange them for 
other goods, as if they were running a bank. The brick is a currency parallel to 
the state currency; developers add and subtract in square meters and convince 
their customers to do so as well. This account unit is more “real” than the peso 
since it allows them to make estimates and protect themselves from the fluc-
tuations of an unstable currency. Accounting in square meters provides greater 
power over one’s assets because it is done in a currency parallel to that of the 
state. On the other hand, for farmers, the soybean is a real currency that creates 
resistance and at times antagonism with the state. When a producer complains 
about the quantity of truckloads the state withholds, the producer is monetiz-
ing political criticism. When producers define soy as a parallel banking system, 
they reveal the social and political power anchored in the multiple reality of 
money. In this way, how they imagine money affects how they imagine the 
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state, based on a currency whose reality expands in parallel to their opposition 
to the state.
From a certain interpretation, Argentina’s recent monetary history, but also 
Israel’s (Dominguez 1990), Ecuador’s (Nelms 2012), Nigeria’s (Guyer 2004), 
russia’s (Lemon 1998), and El Salvador’s (Pedersen 2002), can be narrated 
through a currency pluralism that confronts a “hard,” “healthy,” or “real” curren-
cy (the US dollar) against a “soft,” “ill,” or “false” currency (in our case, the peso). 
Undoubtedly, these narratives contribute to the thesis about the recent configu-
ration of a monetary pluralism articulated by the hegemony of US currency as 
store of value in heterogeneous spaces. Starting from the analysis of a particular 
context (the foreign exchange restriction from 2011–15 in Argentina), in this 
chapter we dialogue with this thesis, examining the contingent and relational 
dynamics of the properties of multiple currencies that integrate the financial 
repertoires. The two cases we present here—experiments in bricks and soybeans 
as real currencies—provide insight on the connection between dynamic cur-
rency pluralism and the temporalities of transactions. The hierarchy of curren-
cies and currency functions is embedded in cycles both long and short, but also 
in the day-to-day maneuverings of agents eager to increase their gains.
Plural currencies allow agents to manage the different times in which trans-
actions occur. Agents define bricks and soybeans as real currencies because these 
objects enable them to plan and conduct transactions in the near or distant fu-
ture, giving them some leeway, and neutralizing or exploiting (as necessary) the 
uncertainty of the economic context.
In our reconstruction, currencies and their functions are associated with 
both the here and now (the peso is used in both cases), the near future (soybeans 
and bricks), and the distant future (the US dollar). However, this hierarchy is 
subject to fluctuations; real estate developers can swap the dollar for bricks as 
their currency for the distant future, just as farmers can “save” their soybeans for 
lengthy periods or use them for immediate transactions.
In this context, bricks, soybeans, and dollars can be considered hard curren-
cies, to return to the term used in the narrative of monetary configurations since 
the end of the Bretton Woods Agreement. Yet unlike the usual classification, 
in which this figure is generally associated with the US dollar, our work allows 
pluralism to be understood not merely as a dichotomy between soft and hard 
currencies but also by differentiating and establishing a hierarchy between the 
currencies that each of these figures assumes. From this perspective, currency 
pluralism assumes a fluctuating hierarchy that can only be understood through 
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an ethnographic reconstruction of the transaction cycles and ways to maneuver 
the temporalities established by each of the currencies.
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A political anthropology of finance in 
cross-border investment in Shanghai
Horacio Ortiz
This essay proposes to analyze global financial flows based on fieldwork carried 
out in a consulting company working in the domain of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions in Shanghai. Marcel Mauss highlighted the fact that exchanges 
within and among social groups have multiple co-constituted meanings, which 
are, among other possibilities, economic, moral, political, and religious. The hi-
erarchies within and between groups, constituted with those meanings, are thus 
both determining for and transformed by the objects exchanged and the modal-
ities of exchange. Mauss thus stressed that the idea that the “economy” should 
be distinguished from the “political” or “religious” domains is itself part of a 
particular moral, political, or religious imaginary (Mauss [1923–24] 2016; Hart 
and Ortiz 2014; Sahlins 2013). This insight was central in Karl Polanyi’s analysis 
of the political process establishing the “market” as an institution that would be 
separated from other social institutions ([1944] 2001). Michel Foucault showed 
how the theoretical formalization of this process by ordo-liberalism attempted 
thus to separate the “economic” from the “political,” constituting the “market” 
as an institution with a technical character that would guarantee a distribution 
of resources, the justice of which would be politically neutral, and therefore 
politically undisputable (2004). Within this theoretical orientation—central in 
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neoclassic economics and in financial regulation worldwide—money is consid-
ered as a technical medium that allows for exchanges in a “real economy,” of 
which it is not a part. Jane Guyer (2016) shows, on the contrary, how the term 
real economy is mobilized with different meanings, reactivating certain “legacies,” 
which must be understood as part of a political configuration, where the term 
plays particular roles in relations of forces. Economy can therefore be a slippery 
analytic concept, especially when one is doing research on practices that actors 
and analysts readily define as “economic,” with all the potential of de-politiciza-
tion this implies. To explore one of the ways in which this can be avoided, this 
essay proposes to consider global finance as an object of political anthropology.
In line with the Maussian insights highlighted above, this text considers 
that the meaning and uses of money are multiple, and relate to the social rela-
tions in which they take place (Dodd 2014; Guyer 2016; Hart 2000; Hart and 
Ortiz 2014; Maurer 2006; Zelizer 2009). This implies that money is defined by 
these social relations, but also contributes to define them in turn: gifts, debts, 
and expenses partially define kinship and friendship (Zelizer 2005); monetary 
policy contributes to define and legitimize a polity, its citizens and social hi-
erarchies among them (Hart 1986; Hertz 1998; Neiburg 2006); indemnities 
imposed by the state against polluters shape conceptions of nature (Fourcade 
2011); money rituals define the attributes of gods (Chu 2010); and consump-
tion practices (Stark 2011) and budgetary disciplines (Zaloom 2016) can estab-
lish the standards of religious morality. Approaching these practices through 
this understanding of money allows for seeing how, as Mauss highlighted, dif-
ferent meanings and uses of money—which correspond to mutually constituted 
religious, political, and moral hierarchies established through the distribution 
of resources—can be combined in multiple ways, with conflicts, conversions, 
and the production of hybrid or new meanings in the process (Guyer 2004). 
Guyer (2016) has proposed to consider these sets of practices and meanings as 
a multiplicity of “repertoires” conforming “ecologies” navigated differently by 
different actors, in what are often (but not only) power relations (on this point 
see also Maurer 2015). I will use here the term imaginaries to talk about these 
repertoires, only to hint slightly more at their creative and labile character, as 
they can be vague, wavering, and not even recognized as changing by the actors 
themselves (de Certeau [1980] 1990).
This pragmatist approach (Maurer 2006) eschews the idea that money 
would be the representative of one particular form of practice or social relation, 
be it relations of production, as in the Marxian tradition, of exchange, as in the 
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liberal tradition, or some universal moral idea, as proposed, differently, by Georg 
Simmel ([1900] 1978) and Mauss himself ([1923–24] 2016). In very different 
ways, all these approaches tend to stress what money “really” is, in a way that 
relates then to some definition of the “real economy.” In the anthropology of 
finance, this can lead to considering finance as “fiction” or to focus on the sole 
issues raised by these approaches, such as relations of production or matters of 
calculation, knowledge, and information. The danger in this move is that the 
distinction between the “real” and its “other” may obscure the social processes in 
the latter that are crucial for the former.
One of the seeming advantages of these approaches of money and finance 
from the point of view of a “real economy” is that they often imply a much 
broader conceptual frame, which also contains a series of concepts and narratives 
providing for a political critique of the social processes under study. Pragmatism 
does not grant a politics warranted on a single reality. Instead, the “political” as-
pect of finance proposed here is itself termed along some possible uses of money 
that may allow for addressing a limited series of concerns. As money is constitu-
tive of imaginaries of gender, kinship, religion, citizenship, and entrepreneurial 
profits, among others, it is also fundamental in the production and transforma-
tion of the social hierarchies that make sense according to them. Analyzing the 
multiple meanings mobilized to make sense of transactions such as mergers 
and acquisitions allows for understanding how this distribution of resources 
does not belong uniquely to the constitution of financial social hierarchies, but 
also to the constitution of political and moral relations of forces that cannot be 
separated from the former. As a series of organizations that collect, produce, and 
distribute money on a global scale, the finance industry ranks activities accord-
ing to multiple conditions, rights, and duties, allowing some of them to exist 
at the expense of others. Thus, it articulates relations of forces that contribute 
to the production and transformation of the multiple social hierarchies where 
money plays a constitutive role, on a global scale (Hart 2015; Ortiz 2015). This 
use of the category political connects, thus, with Georges Balandier’s definition 
of political institutions as those that organize relations of forces (1967), and 
Foucault’s analysis of power as the production of differences in the capacities 
to act (1975, 1976). The political anthropology of everyday financial practices 
proposed here consists in studying the multiple repertoires that contribute to 
the production of these social hierarchies.
The research presented in this article is based on ten months of participant 
observation with a team of consultants based in Shanghai, conducting mergers 
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and acquisitions (M&A) between Western Europe and China, and about fifty 
interviews with financial professionals, mostly concerned with cross-border in-
vestment, in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.1 Analyzing the way in which 
they channel money from a large corporation based in China to a medium-
sized enterprise in Europe, through the purchase of one of its subsidiaries, this 
chapter highlights how the imaginaries of profit mobilized in the negotiations, 
calculations, and establishment of rights and duties in the deal were actually 
multiple, and how they also combined with different imaginaries of the state 
and cultural identity. These imaginaries, often vague, co-constitute each other, 
but can also be in conflict and disconnected. Thereby, this chapter shows not only 
that it is important to analyze financial calculation practices within other social 
processes—in particular, personal professional and nonprofessional trajectories, 
organizational issues, legal issues, stately and macroeconomic concerns, and im-
aginaries of the global (Montagne and Ortiz 2013)—but also that the imagi-
naries about “profits” are co-constituted with those about “states” and “culture,” 
in ways that cannot be disentangled in everyday practice. Doing so, the article 
shows the fruitfulness of the pragmatist approaches of money outlined above 
to understand the practices and meanings whereby money is distributed around 
the world through these particular operations. The social hierarchies established 
through these exchanges make sense in terms of “states,” “culture,” and “profits,” 
the limited possibilities of which are combined and transformed through the 
everyday practices described here. The analysis of these practices thus allows for 
locating the politics of distribution within these multiple imaginaries, instead of 
limiting it to problematizations in terms of the “economy.”
The article will first show the multiple imaginaries of “profit” that were mo-
bilized by the people observed, as they conducted a transaction that lasted more 
than two years. I will then analyze the importance, in the process, of imaginar-
ies of “states” and “cultures.” In the conclusion, I will come back to the com-
plex relations between these imaginaries, and the questions that they raise for 
a critical and reflexive pragmatist approach of finance as an object of political 
anthropology.
1. Previous research was conducted with stockbrokers and fund managers in New York 
and Paris between 2002 and 2005, and in business schools in Paris and Shanghai 
between 2008 and 2014. In agreement with the people I observed, and to respect 
their anonymity, all names have been changed.
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IMAGINArIES OF PrOFIT
The jobs and income of Merge Consulting employees and owners depended 
on their capacity to attract clients whose service fees comprised the company’s 
yearly sales of about 3 million euros. These fees came from different companies 
for different activities, and were distributed within Merge Consulting accord-
ing to professional standards that comprise relations of collaboration, conflict, 
and hierarchy between people and between organizations. In professional fi-
nance, monetary gains can have multiple moral and political meanings, linked 
to the presuppositions embedded in the formulas and procedures (Maurer 2002; 
Muniesa et al. 2017; Ouroussoff 2010; Ortiz 2014a; Zaloom 2006) to organi-
zational rules (Arjaliès et al. 2017; Godechot 2016; Ho 2009; Ortiz 2014b; 
Zaloom 2006), and to the macroeconomic and political context in which they 
operate (Hart and Ortiz 2014; Ho 2009; LiPuma and Lee 2004; Montagne and 
Ortiz 2013). In the case of activities such as those of Merge Consulting, “profits” 
meant different things, within several imaginaries about personal trajectories, 
organizational power relations, notions of entrepreneurship, and circuits of debt 
and credit with multiple more or less defined rights and duties and the possi-
bilities to circumvent them, as they were claimed in conflicting ways by various 
stakeholders. I will present a transaction whereby a large company based in 
China purchased a small company based in Western Europe,2 because it will 
allow us to see how these multiple imaginaries could be combined, opposed, or 
unrelated, as they were produced in particular situations.
Merge Consulting was composed of ten people. Four associates (who owned 
the company) and four employees were based in a mid-sized town in Western 
Europe, Villagiund, while two employees were based in Shanghai. The main 
source of income of the company came from its services as consultant in merg-
ers and acquisitions. The client, a potential purchaser or seller, would pay Merge 
Consulting to find a counterparty in the transaction, and to assist at all the 
stages of the negotiation until the closing of the deal. In accordance with profes-
sional standards, clients paid “operating fees” upon completion of intermediate 
tasks, such as finding and establishing relations with potential counterparties 
and negotiating the price and the conditions of the purchase—for instance, in 
terms of the rights and liabilities of former owners or of potentially remaining 
2. In what follows, when I use the terms China and Western Europe without brackets, 
I refer to the territories.
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management. These tasks could take between several weeks and more than a 
year and, according to the opinion of many interviewees in the profession and 
of Merge Consulting’s members, usually less than half of the transactions that 
were started did reach completion. Once the transaction was concluded, Merge 
Consulting would be paid a success fee, potentially much bigger than the op-
erating fees, of between 3 percent and 5 percent of the amount of the transac-
tion. While operating fees usually were around 100,000 euros, distributed over 
a long period of time, the sale or purchase of a company valued at 10 million 
euros would imply payment of a success fee between 300,000 and 500,000 euros 
in one installment. This impacted the bonus distributed hierarchically within 
Merge Consulting, where the yearly salaries of financial analysts and the rep-
resentatives of the company in Shanghai were between 40,000 to 60,000 euros 
and those of associates around 100,000 euros.
The company was established in the late 2000s in Europe, where it con-
ducted most of its activities. In 2012, in order to develop its operations in China, 
the company hired Peter, in his late thirties, who had arrived to Shanghai from 
Europe two years earlier. When Peter decided to leave the company in 2015, I 
replaced him partially—as an external consultant in Shanghai—for ten months. 
During that period, one of my tasks was to assist in the purchase of one of 
Merge Consulting’s clients, Bolbus, a small company producing medical mol-
ecules and devices based in Western Europe, by Alpha, a large company based in 
China, producing chemical and medical products. The transaction was eventu-
ally completed at a price of 15 million euros, which were paid to Bolbus’ mother 
company, Calcus. This transaction allows for seeing how the members of Merge 
Consulting and the owners and representatives of these companies mobilized 
different imaginaries of profit.
The interactions between the members of Merge Consulting based in Eu-
rope and those in Shanghai were made of a daily stream of emails and regular 
conference calls, which happened at least once a week, and sometimes more, 
in particular when transactions reached moments that were considered to be 
crucial. The members based in Europe also came to Shanghai at least once a 
year, and, at the time of my observations, a trip to Europe was being planned 
for Vicky, who was previously Peter’s assistant and who replaced him as head 
of the Shanghai office after his departure. In these exchanges, there were mo-
ments of misunderstanding that allowed for margins of play and clarifications 
that shifted the terms of the relations. But concerning the transaction, there 
was a clear agreement among all the members that they wanted the deal to 
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be completed as soon as possible. All operating fees had already been paid the 
previous year, and any action by Merge Consulting on this project would only be 
funded in the event of a success fee. This would also be the first deal concluded 
with a Chinese company, and it could be used in marketing material to expand 
business. Merge Consulting had explored several potential buyers, and reached 
the final stage of the exploration with two of them. This meant the signing of 
confidentiality agreements between the potential buyer and the seller, so that 
the latter would disclose information deemed sensitive and confidential about 
its operations. Before the final negotiations that could ensue in the agreement 
about the price and conditions of purchase, the professional norm was that the 
representatives of the companies would meet personally. Just before the sum-
mer of 2015, the owners of Calcus and Mr. Hecks, head of Bolbus, came to 
Shanghai to meet the representatives of two potential buyers. While the way 
fee payments are organized presupposes that they “align the interests” of the 
consultancy with those of its clients, once the last stage is reached this turns 
into an explicit tension. The owners of Calcus did not want to sell Bolbus at just 
any price and under any condition, and although they wanted the transaction 
to take place, they preferred to go slower. The two days spent in Shanghai by 
Merge Consulting’s clients were thus marked by a tension not only between the 
representatives of the buying and selling companies but also between Merge 
Consulting and its client.
The morning of the meeting, Vicky, Peter, and I met two owners of Calcus 
and Mr. Hecks in their hotel, and took them to the headquarters of Alpha, 
one of the two potential buyers, situated in an industrial park on the outskirts 
of the city. The first three hours involved an exchange between the representa-
tives of the companies, mediated by Merge Consulting, followed by a lunch 
and a visit to Alpha’s premises. At the negotiation table with representatives of 
Alpha, the owner of Bolbus who conducted the talk insisted on the idea that 
theirs was a family business; for the owners it was important to ensure that 
the sale of Bolbus would not create a difficulty for its employees and manage-
ment, for whom they cared personally. They explained that the head of Bolbus, 
Mr. Hecks, had worked in the company for decades, and was practically part 
of the family. The presentation then shifted from the insistence on the mo-
rality of family entrepreneurship to presenting a particular arrangement for 
the deal. Mr. Hecks had worked in China for the last thirty years, and had 
established other companies there, some that were unrelated to Bolbus and 
some that had direct dealings with it. Calcus’s proposal was that after the 
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sale to Alpha, Mr. Hecks would continue to be the head of Bolbus, and that 
his own companies would still benefit from the contracts with it. Mr. Hecks 
then explained at length that the sale would help him to “spend more time in 
China”—in particular, to continue developing his personal businesses there, 
with and without Bolbus. He conducted most of the discussions with the rep-
resentatives of Alpha concerning the qualities of Bolbus, staging the figure of 
an independent businessman with whom it was profitable to deal, not the least 
because he would remain a partner in the long term (as he was relocating to 
China). Alpha was listed in a Chinese stock exchange, and the negotiations 
were conducted in the presence of its management, composed of engineers, 
and of representatives of its main shareholder, Monatu, an investment fund 
based in another Asian jurisdiction. While the engineers mobilized arguments 
concerning the need to verify how compatible the technologies of the two 
companies were, implying that if they weren’t, more investment was needed, 
and therefore the price of Bolbus should be lowered, the representatives of 
Monatu were concerned about the timing of the operation in relation to evo-
lutions in the stock market. The announcement to the financial analysts that 
Alpha was upgrading its technology by purchasing top-of-the-line technology 
from Europe would boost Alpha’s stock price, as long as the purchase could be 
presented as cheap enough. After all parties acknowledged that they consid-
ered the proposal by Calcus to be potentially acceptable, the lunch was spent 
talking about life in Shanghai and generalities, and the afternoon centered on 
technicalities of the medical devices.
The different meanings of the deal, staged at the negotiation table, were 
further explored in conference calls and exchanges of emails and documents. 
These meanings were partly connected to the attempt by all parties either to sell 
at a high price or to buy at a low one. But some arguments carried more weight 
than others or served different purposes. Calcus’s management insisted that the 
sale was due to “purely industrial reasons,” meaning that they considered that 
Bolbus was a very promising company; they were not selling it because it had 
no financial value but because operations needed further investment to profit 
from their potential expansion in China, and this was too far from Calcus’s “core 
business.” The talk of a family company only enhanced their argument that they 
would have preferred not to get rid of a technologically advanced asset. The 
responses from Alpha’s representatives were ambiguous on this point. Insisting 
on the need to assess the technology was aimed at opening the door for a lower 
price. At the same time, the price proposed by Merge Consulting, 15 million 
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euros, was acceptable due to differences in the methods of valuation for the 
acquisition of a company.
As I heard many times in interviews with professionals of cross-border 
investment (Ortiz 2017), the mainstream methods of valuations are the same 
in China and in Europe and the United States, with the exception of one. In 
Europe and the United States3 a company would be evaluated by assessing the 
price of each of its assets, by comparing it to similar companies, and by calculat-
ing the potential cash flows that could be obtained in the future, discounted at 
a required rate of return. According to most interviewees, this last method is 
much less prevalent in transactions in China. These methods have moral and 
political meanings. The method of “discounted cash flows” is usually termed a 
“fundamental valuation,” concerned with long-term ownership of the company, 
and it is intimately related to the idea that if “investors” search for all available 
information, in “efficient markets,” this information will be “reflected” in the 
price, which will then serve as a signal contributing to a socially optimal allo-
cation of resources (Doganova 2014). Valuing the company by its assets, or by 
comparing it to other listed companies, implies something closer to a “specula-
tive valuation,” with its “bubbles” and “crashes,” where the aim may not be to 
profit from the company in the long run, but to sell it whenever market prices 
go up (De Goede 2005; Hertz 2000; LiPuma and Lee 2004; MacKenzie 2006; 
Muniesa 2007; Ortiz 2014b).
According to several interviewees, one of the practical problems posed by 
this difference in the methods of valuation is that when the parties disagree on 
the price, they may also disagree on what the object of the transaction is. In the 
current case, this difference had the opposite result. Using the discounted cash 
flows method, Merge Consulting’s analysts considered that Calcus could gain 
15 million euros by keeping Bolbus in operation. This price was lower than the 
stock price of comparable companies listed in China, taken as a standard of 
valuation by financial analysts of Monatu, and potentially by brokerage compa-
nies who would report on the deal. The purchase would be considered a bargain, 
and push up the price of Alpha’s stock, and therefore the monetary value of 
Monatu’s portfolio. The associates of Merge Consulting, connecting the techni-
cal and political elements of financial valuation, commented that the deal was 
therefore benefiting from this mismatch in valuation methods and from the 
inefficiency of the “stock market bubble” in China.
3. But not exclusively.
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The meanings of the 15 million euros paid by Alpha for Bolbus were there-
fore multiple. Some referred to different techniques of financial valuation, 
themselves predicated on different definitions of what a company is as financial 
investment and its relation to the technical and political meanings of market 
efficiency. But the money, considered a profitable transfer for all parties, was also 
supposed to make sense as part of a personal entrepreneurial project, as the “best 
industrial solution” for the development of an activity irrespective of its owners, 
or on the contrary, as the painful disposal of a family jewel, marked by employers’ 
paternalistic moral responsibility toward employees. From the point of view of 
Merge Consulting, these different imaginaries were rendered compatible, in the 
deal, with the strategies of the associates to obtain a success fee and to expand 
their prestige and business in China. For employees like Vicky, the company’s 
representative in Shanghai, this meant the potential upgrade of her position in 
the company, with the prospect, evoked by the associates, that she could herself 
become an associate in the future. These multiple imaginaries became more or 
less compatible or even mingled into one, depending on the situation, and their 
similarities, disconnections, and contradictions were used to articulate and de-
fuse conflicts around price, rights, and duties in the transaction. Mobilized to 
strengthen or explore positions during the negotiation, their potential contra-
dictions did not need to be explored further by the people involved as the trans-
action approached completion and tensions diffused. With technical, moral, and 
political aspects, they composed a complex set of possibilities, which marked 
the paths through which the actors concluded the transaction and went on with 
their lives. These imaginaries were inextricably linked to imaginaries of the state.
IMAGINArIES OF THE STATE
Merge Consulting’s practices implied mobilizing imaginaries of the state that 
usually related in multiples ways to a broad understanding of a relative posi-
tion between a rising Chinese economic power, where the state had played a 
central role in economic policy and wealth accumulation for forty years, and 
a decline in the places most affected by the financial turmoil that started in 
2007–8, in particular the United States and Western Europe (Ortiz 2017). Yet 
these imaginaries did not conflate into one but were, on the contrary, some-
times disconnected and sometimes in contradiction with each other. Merge 
Consulting was itself partly an actor of different states that paid for its services. 
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Its associates understood their commercial strategy as benefiting from—and 
supporting—certain macroeconomic policies in China, with their narratives of 
nation building, socialism, and sustainable development. And the legal frame-
works that were crossed by the transactions implied detailed strategies to avoid 
or profit from their provisions. In all these cases, the state was mobilized, among 
others, as a potentially mighty force orienting macroeconomic policy, as a series 
of unrelated entities, and in China, as an organization with a complex link to 
the Communist Party. It is therefore important to understand how the state 
is itself produced from its margins by actors who imply its existence, and who 
are officially not part of state bureaucracy (Abélès [1990] 2005; Das and Poole 
2004). These imaginaries, in turn, must be understood in the case presented here 
as they were co-constituted with the imaginaries of profit described above.
Merge Consulting did not provide regulated legal services for its clients. 
Nevertheless, its associates, with decades of experience in M&A, did scrutinize 
closely each clause of the contracts that were signed between the parties of the 
transaction at each step of the process and when the final sale occurred. Thereby, 
the company’s activities were constantly gauged against the regulatory frame-
works that were brought together by the transactions. These frameworks could 
be perceived in terms of benefits—for instance, when it was considered that 
the contract should explicitly be covered by European laws because judges were 
supposed to be more independent of other state actors in Europe than in main-
land China, or in terms of constraints that should be avoided—for instance, 
when establishing companies in Hong Kong to avoid certain tax requirements 
in Europe and China. This understanding of state regulation, which could be 
assessed and calibrated in detail in certain moments of the transactions, cohabi-
tated with the fact that Merge Consulting sold its services to the municipal-
ity of Villagiund, where it was located, and to the municipality of a mid-sized 
Chinese town, Zhongzhen, in order to help them enhance the commercial re-
lations between the companies operating in the territory under their jurisdic-
tions.4 This meant interpreting the political tensions within each municipality 
and the career prospects of the municipal teams. While municipal officials in 
Villagiund would use increased activity with China as an argument in electoral 
contests, for municipal officials in Zhongzhen, these activities responded to 
the central government’s injunction to increase GDP and internationalization, 
4. The names of these two cities have been changed to preserve the anonymity of the 
people observed.
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and could therefore help their career advancement within the Communist Par-
ty, and hence, within the state administration. These municipalities were not just 
clients paying fees but also facilitators, as they opened their contacts to Merge 
Consulting—for instance, when the consultants were looking for potential cli-
ents in Europe and buyers in China. Thus, just as the sale of Bolbus was being 
negotiated, Merge Consulting was working on another project, aiming to create 
a joint venture between a small company based in Europe and a state-owned 
company in China. This deal, which ultimately did not reach completion, was 
being brokered by the municipality of Zhongzhen, in whose industrial park the 
joint venture would be located, benefiting from tax rebates.
The transaction around Bolbus also activated another important imaginary 
of the state. The company produced avowedly high-tech molecules and devic-
es that could be used in medical treatment. All the participants evoked as an 
evidence that this purchase, and the potential growth of Bolbus in China, was 
predicated on the hopes of success of the Chinese government’s official pro-
ject to reorient the economy from exports toward internal consumption, where 
middle-class consumption would take a leading role, in particular that of an 
aging and wealthier urban population. Investment was therefore supposed to 
go to sectors such as health, education, and environmental protection and away 
from heavy manufacturing or luxury, the latter being under attack by central 
government discourse as oiling the gift-giving circuits of state officials’ corrup-
tion. Benefiting from the sale of Bolbus, for the members of Merge Consulting, 
thus implied navigating and trying to leverage the multiple facets of legislation, 
understanding and taking part in local-level politics in case they could be help-
ful if the transaction stalled, and participating in the application of government 
policy, within the understanding that the Chinese state indeed had the capacity 
to transform what was thereby supposed to be a malleable economic structure. 
This latter point contrasted with the assessment Merge Consulting’s associates 
made of states in Europe, against which they held an explicitly “conservative” 
view that demanded less state participation in economic life.
These imaginaries combined with others where the power of the Chinese 
state was seen as a danger due to corruption and the weakness of the rule of law. 
On the same trip in which Mr. Hecks and the owners of Calcus met with the 
representatives of Alpha and started exploring the concrete modalities of the 
transaction, Merge Consulting had arranged a meeting with a representative 
of one of the largest state-owned investment funds, which was introducing as 
potential buyer the owner of a company of which the fund was an important 
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shareholder. Contrary to his attitude in front of the representatives of Monatu, 
Mr. Hecks was extremely evasive, and did not disclose the fact that he owned 
a company that sold high-tech components to Bolbus. After the meeting, once 
we were back at the hotel, he explained to us that he did not want to deal with 
companies owned by the Chinese state. According to him, in that case, not only 
would it be very hard to negotiate the price and especially his right to stay in 
the company, but there was even the risk that the counterparty would send spies 
to copy the technology that he himself was producing in China and selling to 
Bolbus. This would make him lose the chance to expand his own business after 
the sale and, he claimed—following a narrative line that I had heard with many 
other professionals working in mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures be-
tween state-owned and foreign-owned companies—there would be no legal 
protection against this theft of intellectual property, as Chinese judges would 
not enforce the law against a state-owned company.
These imaginaries became further complicated by the events in stock mar-
kets in 2015. After a steady rise since the beginning of 2014, the summer of 
2015 saw the collapse of most stock prices. According to the technical and po-
litical imaginaries of market efficiency described above, “markets” were “correct-
ing a bubble,” where prices had veered too far away from fundamental valuation. 
Members of Merge Consulting understood it thus as a “necessary” correction 
but also one that put the transaction of Bolbus at risk. If prices fell too low, the 
company, priced at 15 million euros, would start to look too expensive in rela-
tion to comparable companies listed in the stock markets of China. Monatu 
would then be unable to justify the purchase as a “good deal,” and would either 
have to propose a lower price or put the transaction on hold, waiting for a new 
hike in prices. These fears were calmed by the intervention of the Chinese cen-
tral government. Considering that the collapse of prices was dangerously hitting 
middle-class savings, the government used the rhetoric of market efficiency to 
claim that the fall was excessive in relation to fundamentals, and detrimental 
to a smooth economic life. A dedicated fund of US$200 billion, dubbed the 
“national team,” was used to purchase stocks across the board, from most of the 
companies whose prices were falling. Intervening with media discourses and 
actual purchases, this strategy had the result of stemming the collapse and giv-
ing the fund 6 percent ownership of the whole market.5 Even if prices did not 
5. Many of the companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange were already, in one 
way or another, state-owned or state-controlled.
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recover their levels of the beginning of the summer of 2015, they remained well 
above prices of the beginning of 2014, which allowed for a narrative of slow 
growth spurred by the government’s protection against excessive volatility that 
did not respect the fundamentals. In informal conversations, Merge Consult-
ing’s associates wavered between the relief that the transaction could go on, re-
proving state intervention, and justifying it as a way to sustain market efficiency 
against speculation.
This state presence in the deal’s valuation issues only rendered more complex 
the team’s imaginaries about the state’s role in the transaction. In the last stage 
of the transaction, the approval of the Ministry of Commerce was needed before 
payment money could be transferred. This added a few weeks to the conclusion 
of the deal, which the owners of Bolbus and the members of Merge Consulting 
had not considered. Fearing that any delay could derail the deal, they pressed 
the counter-party to speed up the process. In a conference call with Vicky and 
me, where we told the associates of Merge Consulting that representatives of 
Alpha communicated that it was a bureaucratic procedure that they could do 
nothing about—even in the case the Ministry’s officials would refuse the deal—
one of the associates, Jack, started to shout that such an answer was “unaccep-
table.” He went on to explain that now that the state had invested in Alpha, the 
latter was part of “the system,” and should be able to mobilize its newly acquired 
connections within the Communist Party to make the administration go faster 
and in the right direction. State participation in stock market valuation was thus 
translated into the capacity to bypass bureaucratic processes in order to secure 
profits by guaranteeing the completion of the transaction.
Merge Consulting’s activities were carried out by mobilizing different imag-
inaries of the state that were more or less compatible, conflictive, or independent 
from each other. These imaginaries were co-constitutive of the imaginaries of 
profit. Valuation techniques, or the rights to set up a company and to expand 
its business, made sense in relation to certain understanding of the state, the 
legal framework, and the local politics of where profits could be made. Further, 
an investment project that aligned with the macroeconomic project of Chinese 
central government mobilized images of a state trusted for its capacity to steer 
the economy, an imaginary with ambivalences as to where political legitimacy 
lied, and which contradicted other imaginaries about European states’ impact 
on profits. The technical, moral, and political aspects of valuation, entrepreneur-
ship, and investment were inextricably linked to also technical, moral, and po-
litical imaginaries about states’ multiple facets. Thus, “states” and “profits” were 
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constituted as practical categories and concerns that were both different and 
partly defined by each other. These imaginaries were also co-constituted with 
imaginaries of “cultures.”
IMAGINArIES OF CULTUrE
The relations between the professional and nonprofessional, often termed “per-
sonal” lives in finance, are marked by the fact that certain social identities play 
a strong role in both domains, notably age (Ortiz 2014b; Zaloom 2006), social 
class (Godechot 2001), race (Ho 2009), and gender (Fisher 2012; Ho 2009; 
roth 2006; Zaloom 2006), while the imaginaries of professional practice may 
at the same time silence or even oppose this. The “cross-border” character of the 
transactions in which the members of Merge Consulting took part was partly 
problematized as the crossing of a divide between what were loosely designated 
as two “cultures” or “mentalities,” among other expressions: China, on the one 
hand, and the West or Europe, on the other hand. The meanings of these enti-
ties were multiple, and they were mobilized in often labile and contradictory 
ways. Yet, these imaginaries of culture played crucial roles in certain situations, 
articulating and diffusing conflicts, establishing common narratives to continue 
the transactions, and providing meanings and practices that were developed, 
feared, enjoyed, or accepted, among other emotional possibilities, in everyday 
professional and nonprofessional lives (Ong 1999). It is important, therefore, 
not to consider “culture,” “China,” or “the West” as our own analytic categories 
but to see how they are produced in everyday practice (Anderson [1983] 2006; 
Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Pieke 2014; Trouillot 2003). This will allow for un-
derstanding how these imaginaries of “culture” are mutually constituted with 
those described above, concerning “profits” and “states.”
In interviews with financial professionals working on cross-border invest-
ment, three main narratives tended to be mobilized when articulating a differ-
ence between China and the West, Europe and the United States, or “the rest of 
the world,” which could also be found in media and state-backed official reports 
(Ortiz 2017). They mobilized concerns about financial techniques, political or-
ganization, and personal trajectories of the participants. One imaginary built 
these entities as bound to become undifferentiated, either because China would 
become like the West, or because the opposite would happen. Another narrative 
considered that these entities were bound to enter into a violent conflict, since 
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their differences were irreducible. A third narrative used words such as hybrid 
or mixture, developing the idea that something new was being produced, which 
took elements from both entities and put them together in a way that neither 
of them presented before. Merge Consulting’s members tended to mobilize the 
third narrative the most. They insisted both on some unavoidable character of 
the differences between China and the West, and on the idea that these differ-
ences could be bridged by specialists like them.
In one of the associates’ visits to Shanghai, as they were celebrating the fact 
that the sale of Bolbus had been completed, John, one of the founding associates 
of Merge Consulting, told to me as a justification that it was after an experi-
ence where “misunderstandings” had jeopardized a deal in China that he “real-
ized” that it was only by “being there” that business was viable: only by having 
Chinese employees who lived in China could the company create a common 
understanding between parties in China and Europe and achieve transactions. 
This was also the company’s marketing line to its potential customers in Europe. 
Many interviewees in the profession problematized the valuation differences 
described above in terms of “cultural differences.” Although Merge Consult-
ing’s members, during my observations, did look for clarification concerning 
valuation differences, just like the other professionals I observed, and echoing 
an important production of manuals in cross-cultural management, they put 
forward “communication,” “understanding,” and “learning” between “cultures” 
as a central component of the company’s activities.
I joined the company in replacement of Peter, who had lived in China for 
five years and had developed the Shanghai section of Merge Consulting in the 
last three years. We had first met for an interview and had maintained regular 
contact until he informed me that he was going back to Europe and could pro-
pose to the company that I replace him temporarily, given my research interests. 
He explained that my presence would be needed because “in some meetings, 
they just want to see an older white guy,” a role that Vicky—“Chinese” and 
in her early 30s—could not fulfill. He considered that this was also necessary 
because counterparties are “usually older Chinese men, and they tend to not 
respect Vicky, because she is a woman and she is too young.” In his narrative, 
these elements came together with other ones composing a distinctive “Chinese 
culture”: “Sometimes it is really surprising that they really don’t understand the 
simplest things. Vicky is very smart, but sometimes she just does not get it. I had 
many times the same problems with counterparts here. You send them the draft 
of the contract, it is crystal clear, and yet they ask you the most stupid question 
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about how to interpret it.” He would then give examples of deadlines that would 
not be understood to be strict, or guarantee clauses that would be doubted and 
needed explanation or rewriting.
These imaginaries of culture allowed for articulating conflicts with clients, 
as in the case presented by Peter, when a discussion and eventual resolution of 
the interpretation of a clause was not termed as an opposition of interests but 
as a “cultural misunderstanding.” It also articulated, as evoked by Peter, relations 
within Merge Consulting. When Peter left, Vicky came to occupy a stronger 
position in the company, as head of the China office. Feeling that the arrival of 
an external consultant like me could threaten this, she initially insisted that I did 
not need to come to the office and that there was no need that I have access to 
the contracts that had been signed by clients with whom the company was still 
conducting operations. Her refusal to allow me to access the basic information 
I needed to work as a consultant for the company, and the insistence of the as-
sociates in emails and telephone conversations with me that I take a more active 
role in the company’s daily operations, led to clarifying each other’s positions in 
a conference call a few weeks after my arrival. The tense conversation found a 
point of compromise, when the associates insisted on the fact that Vicky would 
manage the office but that I would assist her in financial matters, on which I had 
a formal education that she did not have, and which was sometimes demanded 
by clients in Europe as part of the resources present in Shanghai. After this 
conversation, she stated her position, as a summary of the exchanges, in a long 
email, where she explained that I would only bring my expertise in financial 
technical matters, and that her role was centered on “cultural communication.” 
She explained that Chinese counterparts did not understand the “European 
way to do business,” and that they did not trust “Europeans” but would only 
express “what they think” “in Chinese” and “to a Chinese person.” At the same 
time, in her narrative, Western counterparts, and even the members of Merge 
Consulting, did not know the “political situation in China” well enough to un-
derstand the reactions, fears, and expectations of Chinese counterparts. Her role 
in the company was therefore crucial. This email received the approval of the 
associates and my own, as a sort of chart of principles that would allow to clarify 
any potential conflict in the future, which eventually never occurred.
What is interesting about these mobilization of different elements around 
the idea of Chinese and Western “cultures” that needed knowledge and under-
standing was that it was explicitly accepted and found legitimate by the other 
members of the company, and that it combined, in a way that was specific to 
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the situation, imaginaries of culture that could be found in other interviews and 
media or official reports. The assertion of Jack, Merge Consulting’s associate, 
concerning Alpha’s capacity to mobilize supposedly newly acquired connections 
in the Ministry of Commerce because the “national team” investment fund had 
acquired a share of its stocks was one of these instances. After the talk, as she 
understood that I was aware that this interpretation did not correspond in any 
way to Alpha’s situation, Vicky explained, echoing John’s own comments quoted 
above, that this was just an example of Merge Consulting associates’ ignorance 
concerning China, and their need of a Chinese person to deal with clients and 
operations in the country. The formulation of misunderstandings and hierarchi-
cal conflicts within the company and between the company and its commercial 
partners could therefore be formalized in terms of “cultural” differences, in ways 
that reshaped the meaning of these relations, establishing specific possibilities 
and limitations.
These “cultural” entities were part of both professional and nonprofessional 
lives. This could concern attempts to understand the moral or political ten-
sions that Merge Consulting’s transactions were supposed to bridge by crossing 
the border. John, Merge Consulting’s associate quoted above, combined Euro-
pean nationalism with an admiration for Chinese governmental policies. He 
explained that he did not want to live in China because he was “too old” and it 
was not “a place to raise your children,” given pollution and the cost of a “good, 
quality education.” In our first meeting, he expanded on how much Europe was 
“suffering” from the influx of immigrants. Conveying an avowedly conservative 
political view, he considered that the continent needed to start closing its bor-
ders in order to retain its social stability. He asserted that terrorist attacks were 
due to this European “openness,” and that China could provide an alternative 
perspective, in particular with the way in which it dealt with what John consid-
ered to be Islamic terrorists, echoing the official discourse of the Chinese central 
government about the bloody attacks attributed to Uighur separatism. Consid-
ering that China needed European technology, he said that Europe could learn 
from China’s political system. In his visit to Shanghai, remarking that all bags 
were screened in the access to subways, he said: “Maybe Europe could learn 
from China, after the terrorist attacks, and stop refraining from taking some 
measures in the name of the respect of individual liberties.”
But the mobilization of imaginaries about culture could also articulate life 
and career trajectories. After five years in China, Peter told me that he was tired 
of being an expatriate, that he could barely connect with “other expats,” who 
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were too focused on “business alone,” and that he felt “totally shut off ” from 
becoming friends with Chinese people, due to language barriers but also—more 
importantly—to “cultural differences.” He had a new job as a consultant for a 
large Chinese company, for which he would work while living in Europe, to 
contribute to its expansion through mergers and acquisition and business devel-
opment there. He explained that this was part of a longer-term project, in which 
he wanted to develop a consultancy on “intercultural relations in business,” con-
necting Europe and China, based on the experience he had accumulated during 
the five years he lived in Shanghai and after that. Vicky, in turn, explained that 
she would want to continue working for Merge Consulting and become an as-
sociate in the company. She explained that she could earn more money in a Chi-
nese company, but that she was not interested in doing this because it was an 
environment that was much more hierarchical and where there were not many 
career prospects for someone who, like her, lacked political connections and an 
elite education. While she expressed her strong desire to travel to Europe and 
to acquire European luxury items, she explained that she would never want to 
live outside China, where she liked her life, was planning to build a family, and 
could enjoy closeness to her parents and friends. This was exemplified by the 
way in which she could use her Chinese name with Chinese counterparts, and 
her English name with non-Chinese ones. This practice was widespread in the 
profession and elsewhere where Chinese nationals worked with foreign compa-
nies, and it was common with many employees of Chinese companies that dealt 
with Merge Consulting. “Europe” and “China” were thus defined in multiple, 
vague ways that could be combined to make sense of the everyday professional 
and nonprofessional life of the people conducting Merge Consulting’s activities.
Merge Consulting’s activities mobilized several imaginaries of culture, 
China, and the West that gave meaning to the commercial strategy of the com-
pany, to conflicts and agreements between employees and between companies, 
and to life trajectories inside and outside the realms of professional practice. 
They concerned feelings of belonging, of trust and mistrust, differentiations 
between groups of people that could be recognized, as business partners and 
employees, and of imagined communities that connected with national iden-
tities and geographical borders and locations. These imaginaries were partly 
constituted by imaginaries about profits, concerning methods of valuation, of 
organizing companies, of negotiating contracts as a well as imaginaries about 
states, concerning citizenship, legal frameworks, the Communist Party, and im-
aginaries about the global, defined partly in terms of financial methodologies 
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that could converge, clash, or be combined, but also in terms of geopolitical ten-
sions, of “migration” and “terrorism.” Thus, the production of culture as an entity 
that was supposed to give meaning to everyday practice was partly determined 
by imaginaries about financial rules and about states, and provided in turn some 
of the elements to make sense of the latter. These imaginaries contain technical, 
moral, and political aspects, they are labile, sometimes contradictory, and can 
be transformed within limits that are explored in particular situations but that 
connect with shared understandings and practices that never coalesce into a 
single narrative. This co-constitutive character of imaginaries of profits, states, 
and cultures allow for a questioning of the “economy” in the narratives of “real 
economy.”
CONCLUSION
This essay has shown how, in the everyday practice of people engaging in cross-
border investment, the categories of profit, states, and cultures have multiple 
meanings, which are mobilized to make sense of practices in ways that can be 
contradictory, vague, and disconnected, but that also make them co-constitutive 
of each other. Profits are understood within multiple temporalities and morali-
ties, such as those of a life-long entrepreneurial career, the fast-paced movement 
of stock market prices, or the years-long development of Merge Consulting’s 
operations. The meanings of owning a company and exchanging it for money 
vary accordingly. These meanings are co-constituted with those of states, which 
can be imagined as mighty actors capable of shaping the content and use of the 
law as well as the economic structure and particular transaction, but are also 
considered as commercial partners or legal frames that allow for manipulation 
and negotiation and as entities that can be themselves objects of investment. 
The political legitimacies of the Communist Party and the European project—
when impacting stock prices through purchases by a “national team” or issuing 
licenses for deals that correspond to macroeconomic policy objectives—are part 
of the notions of market efficiency central in calculations and in justifications 
of prices, and play a central role in the design of long-term projects of busi-
ness development in China and Europe by Merge Consulting, and its clients 
and counterparts in the transactions. Finally, the spaces designated as China 
and Europe, and the practices and imaginaries related to them, are conflated 
into more or less homogenized “cultural” entities, used as causal explanations 
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in everyday interactions, but also central for the stabilization of the meaning of 
professional rules, career perspectives, and identities. In everyday practices, these 
imaginaries are co-constitutive in ways that may not allow for disentangling 
them. They make sense in connection to each other, even when they contradict 
each other, in particular situations, such as in the discourse of a same person in a 
same interview, or in different moments and by different people participating in 
the same transaction over a period of time that can last years. Their analysis here 
shows how this co-constitution implies that the social hierarchies established 
through the distribution of monetary resources, like the one effected through 
the purchase of Bolbus, are not uniquely “economic” but they relate to multiples 
meanings of “profits” that must be understood as part of legitimations also prob-
lematized in terms of states and cultural identities.
The political character of the distribution of resources becomes therefore 
more complex than what an analytical distinction between real value and fiction 
or between the real economy and money can allow to observe. These dichotomies 
obscure the processes under observation more than they help clarifying them. 
The practices of professionals like those of Merge Consulting contribute to 
channel money to particular activities at the expense of others, participating in 
the constitution of global hierarchies in the access to money articulated by the 
financial industry. These hierarchies cannot be understood if we only try to see 
them as “economic”—for instance, by focusing the analysis solely on how they 
relate to coordination through the production of information and knowledge 
or to a distinction between fiction and production. The imaginaries of profits, 
states, and culture described here mark a series of paths that are navigated, mo-
bilized, and produced by financial professionals, but also in many state-backed 
official reports and discourses and financial and nonfinancial media, in order 
to organize, describe, and legitimize this particular distribution of resources. 
According to these imaginaries, contributing to the distribution of 15 million 
euros from a major chemical corporation based in Chinese territory to acquire 
the rights to expand the operations of a small company based in Europe and 
specializing in medical devices could be seen as a way to speculate in the stock 
markets, to enhance one’s career, to develop an industrial project, to contribute 
to the reordering of social relations by the central government under the control 
of the Chinese Communist Party, and to bring together the cultures of China 
and the West, among others.
Stressing social processes that would refer to a particular disciplinary niche 
that connected more or less loosely with the way the people observed made 
174 The Real economy
sense of the situation—for instance, saying it is mainly a “cultural,” a “stately,” 
or an “economic” process—would mean risking to miss important parts of the 
social process itself, and also risking to reproduce some of the legitimizing nar-
ratives that the actors themselves put forth to make sense of the distributive 
effects of their practices. Thus, the practices described above allow for seeing 
that the notions of profit, states, and cultures, and those connected to them, such 
as investor, market, law, corruption, China, and the West, must be considered in 
the way in which they are used and produced, instead of being used as readily 
available analytic categories. The pragmatist definition of the political anthro-
pology proposed here, following the practices of money production, collection, 
and distribution, with all the imaginaries they involve, allows for broadening 
the critical gaze to all the imaginaries mobilized to legitimize and reproduce 
these global hierarchies. Interdisciplinary dialogue is necessary to understand 
the imaginaries and social organizations whereby money is produced and used 
elsewhere than in the settings observed in particular fieldworks, making global 
social hierarchies possible. In this way, without claiming a grounding on a “real 
economy,” a pragmatist approach of money can also open doors to explore the 
multiple places where global monetary distribution could be imagined to be 
different.
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David Pontille, Başac Saraç-Lesavre, and Guillaume Yon. 2017. Capitaliza-
tion: A cultural guide. Paris: Presses des Mines.
Neiburg, Federico. 2006. “Inflation: Economists and economic cultures in Bra-
zil and Argentina.” Comparative Studies of Society and History 48 (3): 604–33.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ortiz, Horacio. 2013. “Financial value: Economic, moral, political, global.” Hau: 
Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3 (1): 64–79.
———. 2014a. “The limits of financial imagination: Free investors, efficient 
markets and crisis.” American Anthropologist 116 (1): 38–50.
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chapter seven
Corporate personhood and the competitive 
relation in antitrust
Gustavo Onto
On the face of it, North American railroads are no longer controlled by 
trusts, and are therefore subject to free-competition; on the face of it, 
the Steel Trust has now been split off into forty independent companies 
that rival each other in terms of goodwill and fair prices. And now that 
Standard Oil has disappeared, innumerous oil pipelines transport oil to 
ports and reservoirs, with the price being set by a free market. The trusts 
have fragmented; it might appear that it is no longer the Rockefellers, 
the Schwabs, the Armours that control the oil, the steel, the canned meat. 
But everyone knows that behind this apparent compliance with the law, 
North American capitalists have held on to the essential part of their 
organizations. Their chosen men administer all the new companies. Most 
of the shares are still held by the same capitalists. And North American 
industry is increasingly under the “control” of certain groups of magnates.1
—Marcel Mauss, La Nation
1. “En apparence, les chemins de fer américains ne sont donc plus trustés, ils sont 
soumis au régime de la libre concurrence, en apparence la Steel Trust est maintenant 
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In July 2014, the Brazilian antitrust agency Conselho Administrativo de Defesa 
Econômica (CADE; the Administrative Council for Economic Defense) ap-
proved a merger between two corporations, Kroton and Anhanguera, which led 
to the establishment of the world’s largest private higher education company. 
The new company began its life with a market value of approximately 10 billion 
dollars and over 1.2 million students. What most struck the regulators, more so 
even than the scale of new enterprise, was the underlying phenomenon that was 
sweeping through the Brazilian educational market. The merger was, in fact, the 
latest in a series of deals that had transformed the Brazilian educational sector 
into an extension of the national financial sector. Almost all the major cent-
ers of higher education were being bought up by banks and investment funds. 
This mass financialization posed a significant challenge to the antitrust author-
ity and was considered by commissioners to be “a sensitive competition issue.” 
Given that the ownership of these companies and, therefore, their administra-
tion, was distributed among similar individuals and/or corporations, it became 
increasingly difficult to pinpoint the extent of their influence on the market 
and, therefore, to distinguish between competitors. The question that arose was 
this: If market entities are apparently related, how is it possible to ascertain 
whether or not a market is competitive? This problem, so succinctly described by 
Marcel Mauss, is as old as antitrust itself. It raises fundamental issues about the 
relationship between corporate personhood, economic agency, and competition, 
which this chapter explores through an ethnographic perspective on regulatory 
knowledge practices.
In seeking to encourage fair competition, antitrust (or competition) policy 
in Brazil and elsewhere has followed two main directions. The primary is the 
launching of investigations into current or past business practices that might be 
harmful to other companies or consumers in a given market, such as the for-
mation of cartels that increase prices for consumers on the basis of agreements 
brisée en 40 compagnies indépendantes, et rivalisant de bonne volonté et de bon 
marché. Et la Standard Oil disparue, de nombreux pipe-lines indépendants mènent 
aux ports et réservoirs un pétrole dont les prix sont débattus par un libre marché. 
Les trusts se sont morcelés; apparemment ce ne sont plus Rockefeller, Schwab, 
Armour, qui possèdent le pétrole, l’acier, la viande conservée. Mais tout le monde 
sait que, sous les apparences d’obéissance à la loi, les capitalistes américains ont 
maintenu l’essentiel de leurs organisations. Ce sont leurs hommes qui administrent 
la totalité des nouvelles compagnies. Les majorités d’actions appartiennent toujours 
aux mêmes capitalistes. Et l’industrie américaine est de plus en plus sous le ‘contrôle’ 
de quelques groupes de magnats” (Mauss [1920] 2013: 306).
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between companies.2 In Brazil, where the antitrust authority is responsible both 
for the investigation and for the judgment of antitrust issues, companies found 
to have broken the rules face stiff penalties.
A second is the activity of so-called merger review, which is the focus of 
this chapter. The antitrust authority is responsible for authorizing or prohibiting 
corporate concentrations—mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, et cetera. The 
decision is based on a finding as to the probability of the proposed concentra-
tion altering market conditions to the detriment of other participants in the 
near future. Each merger review case referred to the antitrust authority is dealt 
with in administrative proceedings that always involve a comprehensive inves-
tigation into the characteristics of the markets in which the relevant companies 
operate, including an inquiry into the conduct of competitors and consumers.
In order to decide whether to approve or reject a merger, antitrust regula-
tors first of all need to identify all the participants in the market under inves-
tigation—that is, all the competing players, including, of course, those who 
submitted the merger application. They then need to consider the respective 
market share of the competitors, which is estimated in terms of the volume/
quantity of products each one sells on the market, or by means of analysis 
of each competitor’s turnover. This procedure is in line with the established 
(structural approach) view that a reduced number of participating competitors 
in a market increases the likelihood of the proposed merger causing excessive 
concentration. This concentration is, in turn, considered likely to afford the 
new company disproportionate “market power”—a market share that is signifi-
cantly larger than that of the other participants (Hovenkamp 2005). On the 
other hand, when a market has several competitors in addition to the merger 
applicants, there is less likelihood that the merger will be harmful to competi-
tion, as the newly merged company will not be capable of prejudicing the other 
participants or consumers in the market. Thus, the identification of the agents 
that compete on the markets and the estimation of their relative market share 
constitute a prerequisite to assessing the effects of a corporate merger on mar-
ket competition.
2. Corporate practices commonly deemed anticompetitive include cartels, price-fixing, 
exclusionary dealing contracts, tying (bundling), nontransparent, noncompetitive, 
and/or corrupt bidding processes. Anticompetitive practices may involve the actions 
of one company alone or may be “horizontal” when two or more companies act 
together.
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Drawing on the ethnographic material taken from investigative procedures 
conducted by Brazilian antitrust analysts, this chapter describes how regula-
tors identify or singularize market competitors in circumstances in which it 
is not easy to precisely quantify or identify them. This particular difficulty has 
become more commonplace in markets such as the private educational sector, 
in which the applicants seeking permission to merge are owned and controlled 
by investment funds. If a fund holds shares in more than one company in the 
market, or otherwise exercises administrative control over such companies, it 
may be capable of influencing the companies so that they do not compete 
with each other, because competition would be prejudicial to the fund itself. 
The problem then faced by analysts is how to know whether the company 
submitting the application for merger is in fact competing with other busi-
nesses in the same market, when a private equity firm holds shares in both the 
applicant company and in other market participants. When the investments 
of a private equity firm are apportioned between various companies, does this 
lead to all these companies effectively being part of the same assemblage, act-
ing in a concerted and unidirectional manner? If that is indeed the case, then 
the companies that receive such investment cannot be considered competitors, 
or distinct economic agents but rather should be classed as part of the same 
economic group.
According to regulators, these difficulties in singularization are due to the 
fact that the legal form of corporations, presented when companies file a peti-
tion to merge, might not reflect the economic reality of the extent and nature 
of their participation in a given market. Recent work in the anthropology of 
corporations has highlighted practices of reification that confer upon corpo-
rate entities a marked degree of coherence, unity, and intentionality (Welker, 
Partridge, and Hardin 2011). These studies describe the manner in which dif-
ferent conceptions of corporations are enacted through routine internal cor-
porate practices (Welker 2014) or by legal developments, including case law 
from the courts and the teaching of legal scholars. They also describe the effects 
of these reifications.3 The manner in which corporate personhood is perceived, 
3. For studies that refer to US legal history and case law reflecting the transformation 
of the legal rights of US corporations, illustrating how companies have increasingly 
acquired legal status and treatment equivalent to that afforded to human beings, see 
Barkan (2013) and Coleman (2014).
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ascertained, and classified has highly significant consequences in terms of cor-
porate responsibilities and liability, powers, and duties.4
In a similar vein, this article considers “what is neglected or obscured when 
corporations are construed as persons” (Kirsch 2014: 210) in the context of 
antitrust policy. What are the effects of mobilizing corporate personhoods in 
merger reviews? These effects become visible when we contrast the usual legal-
economic reifications of companies applying for authorization to merge with 
the more recent regulatory analytical procedures for the identification of com-
petitors in a market, which suggest a relational perspective of corporations and 
economic agency. The task of identifying the agents that compete in a given 
market is complex, as examining property relations alone is insufficient to ad-
equately distinguish between them (Strathern 1996). As I describe below, the 
analytical difficulties that follow on from the recent financialization of markets 
has led to a need for regulators to expressly consider the ontological nature of 
the entities being investigated, and to identify and characterize various forms of 
relations between natural and legal persons.
In the next section, I describe the dual legal and economic nature of corpo-
rate entities that are subject to regulation in accordance with Competition Law 
and demonstrate how this duality is taken for granted in most antitrust rulings. 
In the following two sections I recount the procedures that regulators adopted 
in order to identify the market share of a competitor in a 2013 investigation of 
a proposed merger in the private higher education sector. In the case in ques-
tion, the issue of how to identify an economic agent led the investigators to 
question the standard ways in which governed entities were conceptualized in 
antitrust analysis and to adopt a fresh approach. I conclude the chapter with 
some remarks on the pragmatic meanings attributed to competition in antitrust 
practice, as evidenced by CADE’s approach to the merger application I describe.
4. An example of this is the research of anthropologist Suzana Sawyer (2006) 
into the legal arguments employed in a dispute between a US oil company and 
Ecuadorian rural dwellers. The author cites various instances in which the accused 
company, ChevronTexaco, was ascribed human qualities that rendered its actions 
comprehensible. This was applied to all the subsidiaries of the company in several 
countries, which were dealt with as the offshoot of a larger entity. According to 
the researcher, the representatives acting in the lawsuit used the personal pronoun 
tu (second person singular) to refer to the company. This form of qualifying the 
company, rendering its actions coherent, was one of the means used to hold the 
company legally liable for damage caused by a petrol spill in a rural region of 
Ecuador (Sawyer 2006).
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LEGAL ECONOMIC MESHES5
The “competition sheriff ” (as CADE is frequently referred to in the Brazilian 
press) is best known for its role in analyzing major mergers and for its investiga-
tion of the formation of cartels by large corporations. The Brazilian legislation 
on competition does not, however, limit the agency’s role to the investigation 
of companies that are large enough to be known among the general public. In 
fact, the law does not even define the type of legal entity over which CADE is 
to exercise its powers.6
The “subject of Antirust law” is, in the words of the Brazilian jurist Paula 
Forgioni “any [person or entity] that is capable of performing an act that re-
stricts competition” (2013: 145). However, the legal definition given to these 
acts means that they are generally deemed to have been committed only by 
entities that have the legal form of corporations. In industrialized countries, 
most of the goods and services used by the population are produced, distrib-
uted, and sold by business organizations rather than individuals. The viola-
tions of the economic order referred to in the Brazilian Competition Law 
are, therefore, committed by such business organizations, which compete with 
other similar entities in various markets. In terms of CADE’s role in author-
izing mergers, the premerger notification procedures and requisites mean that 
in practice only large organizations are subject to antitrust/merger regulation.7
5. Part of the material included here and in the following section was previously 
published in Onto (2017).
6. Article 31 of the Law 12.529/2011 establishes the following: “This Law applies 
to individuals (natural persons) or legal entities from either the public or private 
law spheres, and to any legally constituted or de facto associations of entities or 
of persons, even those constituted on a temporary basis, with or without having 
formal legal personality and even if they carry out their activities under the regime 
of legal monopoly.” http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/legislation/laws/law-no-12529-
2011-english-version-from-18-05-2012.pdf/view.
7. In relation to “acts of economic concentration”—mergers, acquisitions and other 
forms of union—the law, in Article 88, states that “the parties involved are to submit 
to CADE acts of economic concentration in which, cumulatively: I—at least one 
of the groups involved in the operation has registered, in its last financial statement, 
gross annual billing or total volume of business in the country, in the year prior to 
the operation, equivalent to or higher than R$400,000,000 (US$110,000,000); and 
II—at least one other group involved in the operations registered, in its last financial 
statement, gross annual billing or total volume of business in the country, in the year 
prior to the operation, equivalent to or greater than R$30,000,000 (US$8,300,000)” 
( June 2016 exchange rates).
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The fact that the legislation does not expressly specify the legal personality/
form of the entities that are subject of legal rules on competition should not be 
considered a legislative oversight. It is, rather, characteristic of contemporary 
antitrust policy, in which regulatory decisions are based on economic analyses of 
the functioning of markets and market players. In these analyses, the legal form/
personality of the parties involved in a merger—that is, whether they are listed 
or closely held corporations, partnerships, or individuals (“natural” persons)—is 
less relevant than the manner in which these parties act and relate to other 
market participants. In other words, the antitrust agency aims to identify spe-
cific “economic agents” in the market, whatever their legal personality may be.8 
This can be clearly seen from the criterion stipulated in the legislation for the 
characterization of the unlawful act of “dominating a relevant market of goods 
and services.” Article 36 of Law 12.529 provides that “a company or group of 
companies is presumed to have a dominant position whenever”
§ 2 [. . .] it is capable of altering market conditions in a unilateral or coordinated 
manner, or when it controls 20% (twenty percent) or more of the relevant mar-
ket. CADE may alter this percentage share for specific sectors of the economy.9
The legislation therefore sets out certain requisites or markers that guide the 
antitrust investigation into acts of corporate concentration. According to the 
wording of the law, acts aimed at “dominating the market” constitute “violations 
of the economic order.” As such, the characterization of market domination 
and of possible abuse of market position by the applicants for authorization to 
merge draws on a criterion of participation in the affected markets, also known 
as “market share.” This numerical criterion provides to analysts an indication of 
the potential existence of violation of the statutory rules—that is, of the pos-
sible abusive exercise of market power. In Brazil, if the future company arising 
8. It is worth noting that while the law applies the notion of person (“natural” person or 
“juridical” person), conferring rights and obligations accordingly, economic theory 
relies on the concept of agent to describe any entity that acts in a given market, 
producing or consuming products or services either as an “individual” or as a “firm” 
(these being the categories normally used in microeconomics). The use of the notion 
of agent implies that economic theory focuses precisely on the economic conduct of 
the entities and particularly the manner in which they make decisions and exercise 
choices relating to consumption or to production. For an analysis of the notion of 
agent in economic theory, see Ross (2010).
9. http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/legislation/laws/law-no-12529-2011-english-version-
from-18-05-2012.pdf/view.
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out of a merger will hold a market share of over 20 percent, CADE antitrust 
analysts are likely to consider that the merger will be prejudicial to competition 
in the market; in other words, that it will be harmful to other competitors or 
to consumers. Therefore, in line with knowledge practices common to many 
governmental bodies, the first step CADE officials usually take when presented 
with a request for authorization to merge is to seek information as to who the 
competitors are in the relevant market and to ascertain their respective market 
shares.
Estimating market shares presupposes a prior definition of precisely who the 
competing agents are. Each of these agents must be construed as a separate or 
discrete economic unit, which acts independently and competes with the others 
for the sale of specific products or services. In many cases, this singularization 
of economic agents is not difficult. Indeed, in most merger cases the analysts 
consider the economic agents in the relevant market to be the legal entities fil-
ing for merger and other legal entities that compete with them. In other words, 
for many (and possibly most) markets, there is no need to look beyond the legal 
form of corporate entities in order to establish the identity of the competing 
agents. That is possible because the owners and controllers of the companies 
do not generally have significant holdings in other companies operating in the 
same market. Furthermore, the corporate entities involved are usually owned 
by the same individuals that control them administratively. Even nowadays, the 
vast majority of Brazilian companies are family owned and administered, so 
that it is relatively straightforward for analysts to group the companies, their 
owners, and their administrators into one independent economic unit, as one 
competitor.
The fact that in most cases, the corporate persons requesting authorization 
for the merger can be taken as representative of the market competitors means 
that CADE’s task of identifying and distinguishing economic agents is gener-
ally relatively straightforward. In addition to possessing this juridical-economic 
quality, these entities are deemed, during the administrative proceedings, to 
have a “volition” of their own (Foster 2010), which allow regulators to assume 
that they take rational decisions, based on the furtherance of their own interests 
and, most importantly, that these decisions are taken autonomously (see Welker 
2016). Until recently, there did not appear to be any need for the investigat-
ing officers in Brazil to question these corporate meshes. However, because of 
the financialization of the economy, the lines have been blurred, as the scope 
and reach of market competitors appear to have extended beyond the defined 
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limits of the legal form or personhood adopted by the companies applying for 
permission to merge. The difficulties of singularization or identification of the 
competition agents in a given market has become an obstacle to estimating 
market shares and, therefore, of ascertaining the likelihood of a competition 
issue arising as a result of a corporate merger.
REALIzING MARKET AGENTS
The antitrust authority, based in the Brazilian capital, Brasilia, is staffed by ap-
proximately 300 professionals who hail from various professional backgrounds, 
predominantly economics and law. Six commissioners, including the Chair of 
the Council (and Head of the CADE agency), sit on the Administrative Coun-
cil and are responsible for the final ruling on cases. Each commissioner has 
either four or five assistants that help them in the investigation procedures and 
economic analysis.
Toward the end of 2012, I spent some weeks observing the work of the assis-
tants to one of the commissioners on a merger between two small companies in 
the higher education sector.10 One of the assistants, Camila, a thirty-five-year-
old lawyer, explained the case to me, and also explained why CADE profession-
als considered it so significant, particularly bearing in mind that it was unlikely 
that the investigation would lead to CADE rejecting the proposed merger.11 In 
fact, Camila’s colleagues joked that she was “borderline obsessed” with the case, 
to the extent that her computer screensaver was a photograph of the eighty-
year-old businessman who “was behind the investigated companies.” This was 
the “the guy who commands the market,” according to Camila.
The case on which Camila was working involved the acquisition of two 
education companies: Instituto Grande ABC de Educação e Ensino S/C Ltda 
(IGABC) and Novatec Serviços Educacionais Ltda, both members of the An-
chieta Group and located in the São Paulo metropolitan region. They were 
10. The material used in this section resulted from observation of the parties during an 
investigation undertaken as part of case number 08012.003886/2011-87, and from 
conversations and interviews of the officers responsible for the investigative work. I 
have also drawn on the public version of the case records, accessed via the CADE 
website (www.cade.gov.br) on February 15, 2014.
11. The reason for the subsequent approval of the merger was that the two education 
companies had only minor shares of the market in the geographical region analyzed.
188 The Real economy
being taken over by Anhanguera Educacional Ltda, which develops and pro-
vides a range of higher education services in Brazil. In 2013, Anhanguera was 
“the largest private profit based professional training organization in Brazil and 
the largest listed company, in the Education sector, in terms of market value” 
(CADE 2013: 1881). At the time, Anhanguera had 54 campuses, 450 distance-
learning centers, and over 650 professional training locations.
Camila told me that her initial interest in the case arose from the fact 
that it was clearly indicative of the increasing degree of acquisition by private 
equity firms of shares in companies providing private higher education ser-
vices in Brazil. This development was already a cause of considerable concern 
to the CADE commissioners. As was stated in the opinion of the rapporteur 
Commissioner for the case (the jurist Alessandro Octaviani), the formation of 
large-scale private education groups in Brazil is a process “for which there is no 
precedent in world history” (CADE 2013: 1859). Of the five main Brazilian 
educational groups, four are run by companies from the financial sector (2013: 
1861).12 In the case in hand, the advisor (Camila) discovered on the internet, 
both in media reports and on the website of the applicant, that two companies 
in the private higher education market—namely, Anhanguera (the proposed 
incorporating company) and Anhembi-Morumbi (a supposed competitor) had 
some form of mutual relationship via legal entities and natural persons.
The assistant discovered a newspaper report bearing the headline “Two com-
petitors and a professor in common” (Duas concorrentes e um professor em comum), 
published in the O Estado de São Paulo newspaper on June 11, 2012. Accord-
ing to the report “Professor Gabriel” (Gabriel Rodrigues, the man on Camila’s 
computer screen) had sold the administrative control (51 percent shareholding) 
of Anhembi-Morumbi (of which he was the founder) to Laureate Education 
Inc, a multinational company operating in the field of education. Despite hav-
ing sold control of the company, which had been transferred to the majority 
shareholders, he continued to “advise on administrative issues” (CADE 2013: 
1883). The company entrusted with putting into effect this corporate restructure 
of the Anhembi-Morumbi University was a well-known financial consultancy 
12. As is set out in the Opinion of the commissioner, the Grupo Estácio is controlled 
by the GP Investments fund, Grupo Anhanguera is controlled by the Pátria bank 
and fund, Kroton is controlled by the Advent Internationale fund, and Anhembi-
Morumbi/Laureate Education is controlled by the North-American fund KKR 
(Kohlberg Kravis Roberts). Only the Unip university did not, at that time, have an 
investment fund as its owner or controller (CADE 2013: 1860–61).
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and fund manager, Pátria Investimentos, run by close acquaintances of Professor 
Gabriel’s daughter, Ângela Rodrigues, who, in turn, worked at the Anhembi-
Morumbi financial department.
In Camila’s opinion, things “began to get complicated” when, according to 
the newspaper report, two years after the partial sale of Anhembi-Morumbi, 
Pátria Investments (which had organized the corporate restructure) was then 
hired to handle the public offering of shares of Anhanguera Educacional Ltda. 
To this end, Pátria set up a specific fund, the Fundo de Educação para o Brasil 
(FEBR, or Education Fund for Brazil), which purchased 17 percent of the 
shares in Anhanguera. The “Rodrigues family,” the former majority owner of 
Anhembi-Morumbi, secured for itself via negotiation a guaranteed 70 percent 
share in the fund. Even with just 17 percent of the shares, the FEBR, a legal en-
tity, became the controlling shareholder of Anhanguera, according to the report. 
Camila had therefore discovered that the founder of the Anhembi-Morumbi 
University, Professor Gabriel Rodrigues, who continued to have an influence 
over the decisions taken by his (former) company, was also a shareholder in a 
fund that held shares in—and controlled—Anhanguera.
As the advisor explained, the “Gabriel issue” gave rise to practical difficulties 
in the analysis of the private higher education market in the São Paulo metro-
politan region and indeed in the country as a whole, since the extent of the mar-
ket share of the applicant was unclear. In her view, although the case involved 
the takeover of a third-party company, Anchieta, it was necessary to establish 
Anhanguera’s share of the market and to ascertain what type of relationship it 
had with its supposedly major competitor, Anhembi-Morumbi. If the common 
influence of Professor Gabriel Rodrigues imposed coordinated conduct on the 
companies, which rendered competition impossible, the market share of both 
companies, Anhanguera and Anhembi-Morumbi, would need to be considered 
together, because the two companies “would be operating as one agent in the 
market.” As such, according to Camila, the CADE decision as to whether or 
not to authorize the merger required investigation of the relations that Profes-
sor Gabriel Rodrigues and his family maintained with these other companies.
In addition to researching newspapers, journals, magazines, and websites, 
the advisor sought relevant information from the records of the company reg-
istries (juntas comerciais) of the Federal District, the States of São Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, which are available online. The information ob-
tained cast doubt on the declaration made by the applicant Anhanguera in its 
petition (Request for Merger) to the effect that no member of the Executive 
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Board or of the Board of Directors of the educational group acted as direc-
tor or executive at other companies operating in the same sector. According 
to information set out in the Minutes of Board of Directors of Anhanguera 
on September 15, 2010, submitted to CADE by the Applicant, Ms. Ângela 
Regina Rodrigues de Paula Freitas, the daughter of Professor Gabriel Rodri-
gues, had a seat on the Anhanguera Board. Camila then discovered an entry on 
the records of the São Paulo Companies’ Registry (Junta Comercial do Estado de 
São Paulo) that indicated that Ângela Rodrigues was also a director of ISCP, 
the Anhembi-Morumbi/Laureate University (CADE 2013: 1888). Ms. Rod-
rigues also had other commercial relationships that linked the two (supposed) 
competitors. For example, in accordance with the Minutes of the Anhanguera 
General Meeting of October 29, 2010, Ms. Rodrigues had a personal office at 
the same location as one of the campuses of the Anhembi-Morumbi/Laureate 
University (2013: 1889).
In order to illustrate and explain some of the multiple relations involved in 
the issue, Camila used the website MarketVisual, which gathers publicly avail-
able information on listed companies in Brazil and abroad. The website collects 
data on the corporate, financial, and administrative structure of the companies 
and publishes it in the form of tables or images of organograms or networks. 
These tables or images identify different types of relations between individuals 
and legal entities, as can be seen from the chart Camila used (see fig. 1).13
In her investigation, the advisor carried out a search of the name of Ms. 
Ângela Rodrigues as well as other board members of Anhanguera Group. Using 
the colored lines that can be selected on the website, Camila sought to highlight 
the relations of corporate control such as seats on boards of directors or on 
executive boards, as well as share ownership or financial control, family ties, or 
even educational background (that is, the institution at which the individual in 
question completed their higher education). The variety, multiplicity, and den-
sity of these relations that the lines on the chart demonstrated and made explicit 
constituted what the CADE advisors called an irrefutable “relevant influence” 
between the individuals and legal entities highlighted by the rectangles.
13. This image is available in the public records of the proceedings contained on the 
CADE website (www.cade.gov.br) in black and white. The original image, however, 
used colors that were (and are) an important part of the investigation undertaken by 
the advisor. The different colors represent different forms of relations as indicated in 
the box on the upper right corner of the image.
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Figure 1: Chart setting out the “links between Anhanguera Educacional Participações 
S.A., Pátria Investimentos, Ms. Ângela Rodrigues and Anhembi Morumbi” (CADE 
2013: 1898).
In his formal Opinion on the proposed merger, the rapporteur CADE com-
missioner, who drew on the findings of the advisor, held that it was possible to 
identify a “mesh of company relations (or holdings)”—in other words, a network 
of ownership links—and a “mesh of directors”—that is, a network of adminis-
trative control extending between Anhanguera and Anhembi-Morumbi and 
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involving investment funds and individual members of the Rodrigues family. 
According to the rapporteur commissioner the evidence provided revealed the 
“true central organizer of the decisions, the punctum saliens of the business: the 
network commanded by Prof. Gabriel Rodrigues and his family, with the assis-
tance of Pátria, which submitted two competitors, Anhanguera and Anhembi-
Morumbi/Laureate, to its strategies” (CADE 2013: 1895). A diagram included 
in the Opinion of the commissioner-rapporteur enabled a clearer overview of 
this “mesh” (novelo), “central organizational nucleus” (núcleo organizador central), 
or “assemblage” (arranjo), as he variously termed it, based on the shareholdings 
of both of the supposed competitors:
Figure 2: Chart labeled “Mesh of Shareholdings” (CADE 2013: 1900)
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This “real organizational nucleus” (núcleo organizacional real) brought to-
gether the two companies: the investment funds that controlled them and 
the individual members of the Rodrigues family (who part owned and par-
tially controlled/administered the funds). In the opinion of the rapporteur- 
commissioner, this nucleus could, in line with a previous CADE ruling, be 
classified as an “economic group.” According to him, for the purposes of 
Economic Law, an “economic group” is deemed to exist when there is “central 
direction of competition, defined by the leadership of the group, whatever the 
form of its constitution, which the other members are expected to comply 
with” (CADE 2013: 1908). The relations between the legal entities and the 
individuals involved, in the case before him, meant that it was reasonable 
to infer that the two companies had mutual knowledge of their actions and 
strategies and did not act in any manner that was inconsistent or prejudicial 
to each other.
If all the entities present in this “assemblage” could be considered “to be, in 
effect, one competitor” for the purposes of enforcing Competition Law, then ac-
cording to the commissioner it would be necessary to calculate “all the holdings 
and related resources of the Anhanguera/Anhembi-Morumbi-Laureate/Pátria 
groups” (CADE 2013: 1913), not only for the purposes of the proceedings at 
hand, but also whenever it was necessary to calculate the market share of par-
ticipants in analyses involving any of these three companies. The investigation 
conducted in this case was able to demonstrate that the applicant Anhanguera 
had, given its ties with Anhembi-Morumbi (its purported competitor), a greater 
share of the market than it had formally declared.
A RELATIONAL REALITy
In handing down his decision on the merger of the companies, the antitrust 
agency’s commissioner highlighted a key issue in the investigation under-
taken by his staff. The question he posed in his written Opinion was this: 
“Do the legal (juridical) forms correspond to the economic fact” (CADE 
2013: 1878)? He considered that the new context of dispersed share owner-
ship and expanded administrative control of the companies required antitrust 
analysts to always inquire into the possibility of “convergence” between the 
legal personality of the corporations and their economic actions. As justifica-
tion for CADE’s extensive investigation into the corporate and administrative 
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structure of the companies operating in the market (only briefly described 
above), the commissioner stated that he and his advisors had sought a “realis-
tic interpretation of the facts,” paying heed to “content, rather than just form, 
concrete effects rather than declarations and rhetorical statements of intent; 
to de facto articulation rather than the legal (juridical) forms that are merely 
the external appearance of the businesses; to the true centers of command 
rather than the corporate architecture that masks it” (CADE 2013: 1902). 
He stressed the fact that had his officers “merely analyzed Anhanguera in 
the precise terms set out in the case records by the applicants, [the analysis] 
would simply not be in accord with reality” (CADE 2013: 1882; emphasis in 
the original Opinion).
In the case in hand, the legal forms clearly did not correspond to the eco-
nomic facts, in that one of the companies that had applied for authority to 
merge could not be considered an independent competitor of one of the other 
companies operating in the market. According to the commissioner, this had 
significant wider practical implications, in that the legal/corporate forms might 
have the effect of covering up the identity of the actual agent that the antitrust 
authority needed to identify. In fact, as Annelise Riles (2011) explains, legal per-
sonality produces an effect of opacity that companies may deliberately promote. 
These companies take advantage of their status as corporations to avoid the 
liability of the individuals that are “behind the company,” in the event of said in-
dividuals engaging in unlawful conduct. The techniques and relations by means 
of which these market competitors are established and maintained, including 
the relationships of ownership and control, are concealed by the aesthetic effects 
of the legal form (Riles 2005).
Moreover, the fact that the applicant corporation Anhanguera insisted that it 
should be considered a single competitor in the relevant market was a very clear 
attempt at seeking to rely on its corporate personhood in order to be recognized 
as an independent unit for the purpose of antitrust analysis. Such treatment 
would be clearly beneficial to Anhanguera, in terms of reducing its estimated 
market share. The rapporteur-commissioner, alert to the consequences of rely-
ing on official form (legal or administrative) as an analytical criterion, stated the 
following:
As Mark Granovetter suggests, those that believe that the structure of a com-
pany resides in its official organogram or in the formal corporate structures are 
“like babies lost in the woods of sociology,” because the “formal” organization of 
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a business organization (or indeed its informal organization, in many cases) are 
not sufficient for the purposes of antitrust analysis. (CADE 2013: 1917)14
The commissioner was not, in his criticism, questioning or advancing some 
theory of the legal personhood of corporations. He was merely stating that if 
the aim was to ascertain economic reality, the legal forms in which companies 
organize themselves should not be considered an accurate representation of 
competitors. In his view, merely assessing competition in terms of the legal form 
of the purported competitors would risk underestimating the degree of concen-
tration in a market and could lead to the approval of mergers that prejudiced 
consumers and other companies. In the case in hand, according to the commis-
sioner, some characteristics of this reality, such as the shareholdings of the indi-
viduals involved (even if they were minority holdings), the coinciding business 
strategies adopted by several participants in the market, and the interlocking 
directorates, made it possible to identify economic agents that extrapolated or 
were distinct from the legal forms presented by the applicants for merger and 
other key players on the market.
In other terms, according to regulators, in cases such as this, economic agen-
cy can only be discerned from a particular internal perspective (Riles 2011), 
one that foregrounds relational qualities. As anthropologists have previously af-
firmed, the nature of corporations is essentially ambiguous, being both personal 
and impersonal at the same time—a company is simultaneously an abstract 
socio-legal entity and a collective (grouping) of the individuals that work for 
it or own it (Hart 2005; Riles 2011; Welker 2016). However, these particu-
lar perspectives on corporate personhood need to be qualified depending on 
the context in which they are being employed. In antitrust cases, the epistemic 
challenges faced extend beyond uncovering the internal ownership and admin-
istrative relations of companies. In considering a corporation solely in terms of 
its legal/corporate structure, as well as an independent economic agent, anti-
trust analysts run the risk of overlooking relations between corporate entities 
that are key to defining the competitive character of a market. Disregarding or 
looking beyond corporate personhoods in merger reviews, entirely or in part, 
can enable regulators to identify and highlight types and qualities of relations 
14. The rapporteur cited in a footnote the well-known article by the North American 
sociologist Mark Granovetter (1985), referred to in the bibliography to this chapter.
196 The Real economy
between companies. This type of investigation requires the regulators to ponder 
and specify in greater detail their own definition of a competitive relation.
In the case examined in this chapter, the antitrust investigation, drawing in-
spiration from sociological studies of organizations and social-network analysis, 
demonstrated that one of the economic agents in the market (the Applicant), 
had a greater market share than it had formally declared, given that its supposed 
competitor, Anhembi-Morumbi, was part of the same organizational “assem-
blage.” Despite that, following further examination of the facts, CADE ap-
proved the merger. The CADE commissioners took the view that competition 
in the affected markets in the greater São Paulo region would not be signifi-
cantly reduced by the merger, even with Anhanguera and its supposed competi-
tor, Anhembi-Morumbi, being considered part of the same group. However, the 
findings of the investigation highlighted the importance of detailed analysis of 
concentrations involving investment funds and led to CADE setting out clear 
new guidelines in its case law on the examination of merger reviews involving 
the higher education market in Brazil.
COMPETITION AS A FORM OF DETACHMENT
In La Nation, written in 1920, Marcel Mauss dedicated several pages to a phe-
nomenon that, almost a century later, has emerged as a source of concern for 
Brazilian antitrust regulators. Mauss was somewhat more optimistic in his out-
look than later regulators tend to be. In the chapter entitled “Economic facts,” 
directed almost entirely to an analysis of the formation and effects of North 
American cartels and trusts, he set out the benefits of the new “capitalist collec-
tives”—that is, corporations—characterized by a collective form of ownership, 
since they foreshadowed the future socialization of capital (Mauss [1920] 2013). 
For Mauss and for others, including Karl Marx (writing fifty years earlier), these 
new corporate forms might be considered an indication of a transition to a new 
economic mode of production (Barkan 2013). Others, such as the jurists Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means, were more skeptical about the benefits of these new 
corporate structures (Mizruchi and Hirschman 2010), and their concerns about 
the possible perverse effects of the separation between corporate ownership and 
control proved to be largely justified. They foresaw that the growth of these cor-
porations would lead to excessive economic concentration in the market. Their 
predictions turned out to be accurate and this increased concentration gave 
197competitive relation in antitrust
rise to legislation such as the Celler-Kefauver Act in the United States (1950), 
which prohibited companies from buying shares in another if the acquisition 
was likely to lead to a reduction in competition between them (Sklar 1988).
The problems relating to the separation between owners and controllers of 
companies were examined in important North American researches into power 
structures in the 1960s and 1970s (see Domhoff 2005). This topic has also been 
the focus of considerable interest in the field of organizational sociology, with re-
searchers seeking to identify the factors—such as personal relations (Burt 1983; 
Mintz and Schwartz 1985), position in the “organizational field” (DiMaggio 
1985; Fligstein and Brantley 1992), “conceptions of control” (Fligstein 1990), 
among others—that influence the formulation of corporate decisions and goals. 
In sum, sociological research has sought to explain how companies or other or-
ganizations conduct themselves in an environment in which they are embedded 
in a set of relations with varying degrees of formality with other entities or with 
the state (Granovetter 1985).
The literature I refer to above focusses on the essentially relational nature of 
modern capitalism, which can be examined by considering the ties of ownership 
and administrative control of corporations. Recent antitrust practice in Brazil 
has also been influenced by sociological studies, and has sought to devise rep-
resentations and definitions of economic agency by drawing on relational visu-
alization techniques. Regulators have increasingly examined corporate entities 
in the light of the relations, positions, and professional trajectories of relevant 
individuals. In terms of the practical difficulties faced by Brazilian antitrust 
regulators to which I refer in this chapter, there is a complementary movement 
or perspective that is characteristic of antitrust policy and that merits attention. 
Their focus on the competitive relations in a market highlights the practices that 
separate, cut, or detach market entities. These entities are then defined in terms 
of the extent to which they are independent of each other. Inspired by recent at-
tention in anthropology to detachment as a mode of relationality (Candea et al. 
2015), I contend that the justifications put forward by companies seeking leave 
to merge and the considerations relied upon by antitrust analysts in defining 
the contours of economic agents (that is, where they “begin” and “end”) clearly 
reflect this movement. That, in turn, calls for reflection on certain practical no-
tions of competition in the light of detachment.
Competitive relations can provide an insight into the ways in which “de-
tachment and engagement are interwoven; the ways in which they limit, com-
plement and enable each other” (Candea et al. 2015: 2). Georg Simmel’s (1955) 
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definition of competition as a social form of interaction with a triadic structure 
in which two or more competitors struggle for the same scarce goods or au-
dience (third party), without directly interacting with each other (see Werron 
2015), already indicated that there are several possible forms in which it can 
be envisaged. An indirect interaction might be the result of a great variety of 
combinations of attachments and detachments.15
In the dynamics of corporate merger analyses presented above, we can see 
two possible practical meanings of competition, or the types of relationality that 
characterize it. As explained in the previous section, one of the main effects of 
the reification of corporations in antitrust practice—so that they are deemed to 
be, simultaneously, both legal entities and economic agents—is that any possible 
relationship between different corporate entities is denied or masked. In this 
context, corporate forms are means that are employed to enact detachment and 
segregate relations between economic agents, not simply hide internal relations 
within companies. Competition emerges here as a radical form of detachment 
that separates different persons/agents at the particular time companies file a 
petition to merge. Detachment in this sense is not an ethic (Cross 2011), but a 
corporate strategy that implies and provokes (Muniesa 2014) competitive rela-
tions to an external observer. The legal personalities and brand names employed 
by the companies are meant to convey to regulators (and also to consumers) 
that there is diversity in the market. For the legal and official representatives 
of companies seeking to merge, presenting the corporations and other entities 
in the market as being separate (or detached) from each other is a straightfor-
ward method employed to bypass potential antitrust investigations and merger 
prohibitions.
Regulators, however, are becoming wary of the formal means by which enti-
ties are defined in the market. For them, the indirect form of interaction that is 
competition can only be ascertained by defining certain degrees of detachment 
15. The etymology of the term competition (and also concurrence) also indicates several 
possible modes of relationality. Up to the end of the fifteenth century the Latin 
verb competo had a relatively neutral meaning, denoting, in certain circumstances, 
simultaneity, reunion, parallelism, coincidence, or accord. Nowadays, in English, 
the verb to concur and the substantive concurrence embody this original meaning. 
From the sixteenth century onward, in Spain, the verb concurro began to be used 
in the sense of “running together” with overtones of “opposition” or “fighting.” 
Competition was only associated with “rivalry” or “emulation” since the eighteenth 
century, with the work of Thomas Hobbes (Dennis 1977).
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that are to be expected between market players. If the competing agents in a 
market are engaged in some form of relational assemblage, they can only be 
delimited in accordance with the intensities, temporalities, and the number and 
extent of the relations between them. The notion of “relevant influence” that 
is increasingly used by analysts, implies that even when there is a degree of 
influence and indirect relations between entities, only some of these relations 
and means of influence characterize a form of entanglement that signifies that 
the agents in question are in fact unified (and therefore not competitors for 
antitrust purposes). In general terms, a greater degree of intensity in relations 
arises from the physical presence of individuals in positions of ownership and 
administrative control. That may be the result or the manifestation of family/
friendship ties and may be indicated by the geographical locations at which the 
individuals involved live and work. A perceived excess or an absence or scarcity 
of relations between legal entities and individuals enables regulators to gauge 
the closeness/distance between agents in a market. Long-term presence of close 
relations indicates a heightened probability of coordinated conduct. Competi-
tion is deemed to exist or to be possible when an entity begins to acquire a 
certain minimum degree of autonomy.
Antitrust as a governmental policy designed to regulate conduct and market 
relations, frequently differs between nations; however, the overriding objective 
in all jurisdictions is to ensure fair competition remains a principle and, when-
ever practicable, a structural condition of markets. An ethnography of antitrust 
practices of evaluation/investigation of mergers and acquisitions reveals some of 
the difficulties that are inherent to a relational analysis in economic regulation. 
The means of ascertaining competition in a given market and of analyzing the 
entities found to be in competition is a source of conflict between antitrust ana-
lysts and the representatives and advisers of companies seeking to merge. The 
advisers of the companies tend to rely on formal legal aspects whereas regulators 
are increasingly drawn to a relational approach. In this chapter, I have sought to 
portray how the reliance on corporate personhoods and certain related reifica-
tions in antitrust analysis can be misleading for regulators.
Antitrust knowledge practices illuminate underlying ontological conflicts 
that are present in the formulation and implementation of economic policies 
or regulatory contexts. That is exemplified here in the recurring potential and 
actual divergences between legal and economic enactments of the real. The ar-
guments pertaining to the conditions and extent to which a legal entity can be 
considered the economic agent for the purposes of antitrust are also a point of 
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departure toward understanding of certain practical meanings that are given to 
competitive relations in regulatory knowledge practices. Competition is con-
sidered a form of detached agency in a variety of analytical procedures. This 
detachment may be in the form of a legal/formal separation of the entities, but 
it can also be envisaged in more subtle, relative distancing, ascertained from ex-
amination of the temporality and the intensity of relations between the agents.
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chapter eight
Making workers real on a South African 
border farm
Maxim Bolt
On the Zimbabwean–South African border, migrant laborers toil in gangs of 
thirty to fill trailers full of fruit, or work their way, backs bent, along rows of 
cotton. Black overseers stand nearby, shouting to keep the pace up. A little far-
ther away, black foremen and white managers look on from their pickup trucks. 
Occasionally a white farmer drives up, clad in khaki, an Alsatian alert in the 
pickup’s passenger seat, to check on progress. As month-end nears, recent bor-
der crossers sit within reach, hoping that attrition will translate into opportuni-
ties for recruitment. After all, in the wake of Zimbabwe’s political and economic 
troubles, the border’s agricultural workforces—almost entirely Zimbabwean—
are far from stable entities. Indeed, they are full of people who until recently 
never thought they would set foot on a commercial farm, who still have a hard 
time thinking of themselves as farm workers at all, and who in some cases keep 
going southward as soon as their first month’s pay arrives. As night draws in, 
workers trudge down the access roads, past row upon row of crops, back to the 
barrack-like labor compounds where they are housed on their employers’ land. 
In this landscape, characterized both by transience and plantation-style isola-
tion, recent arrivals feel like they are barely in South Africa. Morning register 
is called in TshiVenda, the language of the border region, or ChiShona, the 
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majority language of Zimbabwe. Only overzealous police, arriving with escorts 
from the border garrisons to load the undocumented into vans, remind work-
ers that they are in a country with the best-resourced state institutions in the 
region.
Yet, if the farms are located on the geographical margins, they are also nodes 
in a globalized economic network. This is revealed by turning from the orchards 
and fields to the packsheds into which crops flow, and specifically to Grootplaas 
Estates, one of the border’s citrus operations. Here, a huge double-conveyor sys-
tem carries oranges and grapefruits from washing to waxing, to inspection and 
grading stations, and to packers’ boxes via an optical machine that photographi-
cally organizes fruit by size. In the loading bay, pallets piled high with crates 
of oranges and grapefruits await trucks to the Indian Ocean port of Durban. 
From there, ships will take them to countries across Europe, the Middle East, 
and East Asia. Crate designs signal different agents, buyers, and brands: lo-
cal, national, British, American. Michael, Grootplaas’s personnel manager and 
packshed administrator, moves between the stacks, dressed in a white coat and 
armed with a clipboard as he prepares labels that detail each pallet’s journey. The 
pallets evoke industrial-scale production, global connections, and the clinical 
formality of factories in the fields—far from the stereotypes of South African 
farms as quasi-feudal, anachronistic backwaters.
On display, at the very center of the packshed’s network of conveyor belts 
and observation gantries, is Michael’s harvest-time office, a statement about 
the importance of paperwork. Bureaucratic categories structure the whole 
packing process: fruit size; exportability versus rejection for local sale or juic-
ing; export grade A or B, which affects price although it depends only on the 
superficial assessment of skin blemishes. By contrast, out on the lands, main-
taining standards is restricted to the periodic admonishment of pickers who, in 
their haste, leave stalks attached (puncturing other fruit) or crowns ripped out 
(leading the fruit to rot faster). Nevertheless, paperwork extends into workers’ 
lives. Alongside the export labels and documents lie Grootplaas’s personnel 
records, for which Michael is also responsible. These follow him in a bank of 
filing cabinets, as he moves seasonally between the packshed and the farm’s 
workshop. The contents tell a particular version of work and life on the border 
farms. Applications for employment, contracts, South African documents for 
“normalization” (regularization), and records of dismissal all speak in a corpo-
rate register—“thank you for your interest in our company.” But, among these 
documents, Zimbabwean departure permits signed by thumbprint speak of 
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other experiences—migrant workers fleeing the estate, even without their of-
ficial identification.
For black workers, laboring on the border’s white-owned commercial farms 
involves constantly relating to official and semiofficial documents and institu-
tionalized arrangements. This is what we expect of formal employment. But 
how is formality realized? What does this tell us about the “reality” of this wage 
economy more generally?
On South Africa’s border farms, formal employment absorbs migrants into 
social arrangements that organize space and time. Labor hierarchies bring 
around-the-clock authority that extends into the residential labor compounds. 
This reflects the enduring spatial significance of hubs of production in South 
Africa. Under apartheid, migrants’ rights to residence and mobility in “white” 
areas came with formal employment. Resident workforces themselves repre-
sented sites of thoroughgoing incorporation, not merely income (Ferguson 
2013). On today’s border, being regarded as a “worker” rather than a “border 
jumper” legitimates migrants’ presence in a strikingly similar manner, and at-
tachment to officially acknowledged workplaces mitigates the extreme transi-
ence that characterizes the area.
Membership enables residents to use the labor compounds to anchor in-
formal economic activities: trade such as running shebeens (illegal bars) and 
spazas (general stores); services such as running taxis, cutting hair, and repairing 
clothes; and smuggling, such as of cigarettes and marijuana. Considerable op-
portunities are created through proximity to the border, and the isolation on re-
mote farms of hundreds of residents with monthly wages. Indeed, workers even 
acquire formal employment as a means to establish existing business activities. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Bolt 2012), what comes to matter is not remain-
ing invisible to state officials. Rather, the necessary scope for diverse livelihood 
strategies is created by being visible and recognized in a particular way—as a 
farm worker.
This article traces how contracts, permits, and inspections shape and sustain 
the all-important notion of a formal “worker.” This means going beyond a fo-
cus on labor dynamics themselves, and beyond examining divergences between 
management rules and employees’ self-understandings and practices (e.g., 
Burawoy 1979). It means tracing fragmented “formalities” in the plural (see 
Guyer 2004), and appreciating how coherence emerges as an effect of different 
projects and interactions in and beyond a workforce. Different parties have a 
stake in upholding the reality of formalized labor relations, and the figure of 
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the worker at their heart. For white farmers who are often considered apartheid 
throwbacks, a corporate style keeps regulatory authorities at bay, even though 
managerialism and personnel documentation have little reach beyond their of-
fices. For state officials, recognizing workers as opposed to border jumpers is 
key to reading the landscape of the border, even if this is often arbitrary and 
relies on a murky negotiation of ambiguous documentation. For the employed 
themselves, recognition promises to stabilize the terms of everyday life, even if 
the ultimate goal is often to use institutional validation as a means to escape in 
search of better opportunities. In a turbulent border setting, formality remains 
fragile. But asserting it establishes the terms on which workers and the wage 
economy are experienced as real—and how that reality comes to appear self-
evident (see Neiburg and Guyer, Introduction).1
FORMALITY, “THE ECONOMY,” AND ECONOMIC LIVES
In what sense is the formal economy real? Substantial intellectual energy has been 
invested in understanding informality (see, for example, Hart 1973; MacGaffey 
1991; Roitman 2004; Meagher 2010). This has produced the notion of a real 
economy as making a living beyond official measurement (see MacGaffey 1991), 
therefore exposing the restricted parameters of a state perspective. What hap-
pens under the radar is key on the Zimbabwean–South African border, where 
regulation has limited reach and livelihoods are patched together by multiple 
means. But how does formally measuring and recognizing workforce member-
ship make a wage economy in such a setting?
If one version of the real economy is informal, recent analyses take a very 
different starting point. Here, “the economic” is produced as an object of ex-
pertise (Callon 2007), and through infrastructures of distributed human and 
nonhuman agency (see Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010). Indeed, it is through 
“socio-technical practice” and measurement, including from within the disci-
pline of economics, that the economy itself is brought into being in this sense—
by drawing together diverse practices into a single field of administration and 
1. This account draws on seventeen months of ethnographic fieldwork (2006–8), while 
in residence in Grootplaas’ labor compound. During the citrus harvest, I worked 
unpaid in a picking team and grading fruit in the packshed. Much of border farm 
life has remained unchanged, and I write in the present tense to avoid an undue 
sense of distance, but I draw attention to relevant shifts.
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engineering (Mitchell 1998, 2008). In this set of perspectives, economies are 
realized through networks of regulation and calculation, and their categories 
and effects. But they provoke questions about economic lives more broadly, and 
about a more expansive notion of the economy “as consisting of all the processes 
that are involved, in one fashion of another, in ‘making a living’” (Narotzky and 
Besnier 2014: S5).
How might the realization of this narrower economy be brought into con-
versation with the other, under-the-radar “real economy”? How do people’s at-
tempts to make a living weave in and out of the infrastructures and the frames 
of reference that constitute “the economy” as object? As they do so, what other 
kinds of practical knowledge underpin the realization of formality’s infrastruc-
tures and regulatory frameworks?
Timothy Mitchell (2002) helpfully notes that formalization is not simply a 
matter of representing economic activity, or a dichotomy between measurement 
and its object. The material economy comes to appear starkly opposed to im-
material and disembodied observation. Instead, however, the concrete practices 
of regulating and measuring create and sustain a distinct economic field. Meas-
urement is part of the real economy, understood as the formal organization of 
diverse processes concerning wealth and livelihoods, as the latter come to be 
defined. Mitchell is interested in how national economies are realized, and his 
approach consequently restricts the use of the term economic in the manner dis-
cussed above. But his insights can usefully be applied to the intertwining of key 
economic categories and the pursuit of livelihoods at smaller scales—here, the 
figure of the worker in a single workforce. Workers are not simply catalogued 
and regulated through distant processes of formal documentation. Rather, 
processes of documentation are integral to life on the border farms, and the 
resulting paperwork creates workers—explicitly recognized by state and farm 
authorities as incorporated into settings that are both farmers’ private worlds 
and globalized places of production. Where one body of scholarship presents 
the real economy as beyond measurement, and another defines it precisely as 
what is measured, this article explores the space in between. It examines the 
co-constitution of a regulatory regime and the broader livelihood projects that 
weave in and out of it.
If economies are at one level realized through regulatory regimes, the making 
of economic formality through documentary processes is far from straightfor-
ward. Documents are implicated in the diverse projects of workers, employers, 
and state officials. They thus enable performances of formality—including the 
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coproduction of the figure of the worker—that are motivated by goals irreduc-
ible to formal logics. The corollary is that, even as documents produce shared 
understandings of formality, they fail to forge well-measured economic prac-
tices in the way recent scholars have emphasized.
Indeed, workers’ visibility to and recognition by state officials and other ac-
tors may be fragmentary and multiple. That is why I take the metaphor of spot-
lights as a starting point here. State institutions “see” (Scott 1999) workplaces 
through spotlights such as inspections, permits, and employment contracts, 
and these do not simply comprise a coherent network. Connections emerge 
as the result of strategy and skill. They do so as different parties make use of 
the agreed authority of documents in a range of encounters, augmenting that 
authority in the process, to get things done in and beyond the labor setting 
itself. Hence, the second metaphor in this article: that of stepping-stones. Focus-
ing on how projects are enacted by jumping from one document to the next 
reveals the goals and the techniques through which documentary networks 
are given a particular coherence. Crucially, in the kind of transient, migratory 
setting explored below, the status of worker may itself be a stepping-stone to 
something else.
Recent scholarship has explored the place of documents in governing people 
and space, and in the ways people “acquiesce to, contest, or use this governance” 
(M. Hull 2012b: 1). Documents are “graphic artifacts” whose “circulation .  .  . 
creates associations among people that often differ from formal organizational 
structures” (M. Hull 2012b: 18). Whether in large bureaucracies or on remote 
border estates, such associations have far-reaching consequences. As publicly 
acknowledged “traces”—“inscriptions” that attest to people’s past acts and cur-
rent status (Ferraris 2013: 253–54)—documents take on especial significance in 
a place where migrants strive for stability amid transience. In a range of settings, 
migrants are forced to navigate bureaucratic infrastructures and create their own 
coherence from the informal and improvised practices that characterize state 
institutions themselves (Coutin 2000; Vigneswaran et al. 2010; Tuckett 2015). 
This essay offers the view from within a workforce where the allure of formal-
ity lies at the heart of a migrant-labor regime. Formality is brokered through 
social relations, in which official and semiofficial paperwork—with its apparent 
fixity of meaning—becomes the focal point for negotiation and efforts to shape 
circumstances.
On South Africa’s border with Zimbabwe, beyond the packshed with its 
labeled, bar-coded crates and its conveyor belts, formality is a diverse mosaic of 
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connections to officialdom. Grootplaas’s white farmers learn how to navigate 
these spotlights skillfully, presenting the farm appropriately while continuing to 
operate according to their own rules. In the process, state and farm institutions 
together shape black workers’ lives while sustaining a field of delimited “person-
nel relations.” Amid a range of patterns of movement and settlement on the 
farms, and a range of forms of trade and dependence in residents’ livelihoods, 
official and semiofficial documents are key to recognizing workers—that is, to 
making workers real as a distinct category.
Grootplaas’s workers also navigate the terrain of formality. Idioms of due 
process have little effect on personalized hierarchies, but a range of more or less 
official documents is key to employees’ lives, strategies, and self-understandings. 
Migrants are extremely diverse in terms of their class backgrounds and places 
of origin. Many arrive with little other than their Zimbabwean identity cards 
and sheaves of qualification certificates, whose power comes from the presumed 
durability of their meaning and value through time. Once employed, different 
identity documents attaching workers to the farm enable new conditions for 
life. For workers, as much as for their employers, using documents takes adept-
ness: deciding when to reveal them; extending their uses to new circumstances; 
converting between them. Between the two extremes archived in Grootplaas’s 
filing cabinets—corporate personnel records and abandoned identity cards and 
papers—is a world in which everyday lives and possibilities for the future are 
negotiated through the category of worker.
My emphasis on the production of formality offers an alternative way of 
approaching how workers are made. Given the context, a more obvious starting 
point would be migrants’ subjection to the requirements of export agriculture 
in particular, and capitalism in general. Certainly, workers’ lives on the border 
farms are powerfully shaped by the temporal regimes of capitalism. As I have 
explored previously (Bolt 2013), the relatively independent task orientation of 
permanent employees contrasts with their seasonal counterparts’ tight labor 
discipline—the latter coordinated to harvest fruit for export within northern-
hemisphere tariff windows. Yet, at a more general level, all workers are defined 
through the interchangeability of their different activities as abstract labor time, 
mediated by an equivalent standard of value created by the commodity form 
(see Postone 1993). Capitalism in Zimbabwe and South Africa was classically 
shaped by “delayed proletarianization”: the persistence of rural agricultural bases 
that could supplement, although not ultimately reduce dependence on, com-
modities and waged employment (for Zimbabwe, see Arrighi 1970; Phimister 
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1988). Yet many Zimbabweans have seen even this eroded amid economic crisis, 
as rural homes come to rely overwhelmingly on remittances (Bolt 2015: 212).
This subjection to capitalism—life premised on the commodity and the 
wage—leaves migrants vulnerable. But it therefore becomes all the more im-
portant to understand how they work to stabilize the terms of their lives by 
gaining everyday recognition as workers, not simply by providing their labor. 
The view from one migrant workforce reveals attempts to control and stabilize 
the meanings of connections between workers, between workers and employ-
ers, and between the workplace and state officials. In turn, particular objects 
and processes enable the wage economy to be recognized as the real founda-
tion of all of these interactions, by recognizing workers. Despite the imagina-
tive power and apparent coherence of the formal sector and the figure of the 
worker in South Africa (Barchiesi 2011), workers and employers encounter 
formalities as a constellation of points through which to navigate. Yet the result 
is that formal registers of labor have a common-sense reality about them, as 
they become bound up with plans and projects for making a living. Formal-
ity—fragmentary, ambiguous, and emphasized and de-emphasized by different 
parties at different times—nevertheless anchors the everyday terms of life in a 
transient setting.
FORMALITY AND MARGINALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
Grootplaas is one of a string of family-run crop estates on the southern bank of 
the Limpopo River, which marks the border. Large and high profile like some 
of its neighbors, Grootplaas employs 140 permanent workers, and 460 seasonal 
workers during the picking season. The farm reached one million crates of citrus 
in 2007, its oranges and grapefruits sold in British and other European Union 
supermarkets as well as in the Middle East and East Asia.
Tied into global supply chains, Grootplaas is regulated through both state 
and nonstate inspections. The Department of Labour, for example, visits the 
border farms for periodic evaluations of working conditions. GLOBALG.A.P. 
(formerly EUREPGAP), a standards agency that certifies produce for European 
markets, surveys hygiene conditions as well as “worker welfare.” Some super-
markets have their own, even stricter investigation processes. It is during all of 
these that the filing cabinets of worker records become important, as they stand 
for proper procedure on the farm.
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This appears indicative of a South Africa of far-reaching formality, in which 
the economy is dominated by regulated international linkages, oversight is the 
basis of a pervasive infrastructure, and workforces are governed by distinct and 
explicitly monitored codes. Formal logics of state and capital have a greater 
bureaucratic reach and imaginative hold than elsewhere in the region. Life on 
the ground is deeply enmeshed in interlocking public and corporate institu-
tions (see, for example, James 2014; Ferguson 2015). Yet, analytical terms that 
constitute the economy as object can betray a bias to formal regulatory rhetoric 
(Guyer 2014). In debates about the fate of formal work (for example, Seekings 
and Nattrass 2005; Callebert 2014), what emerges is a world in which formality 
is a “sector,” and in which workers’ livelihoods might plausibly be addressed in 
the universalist, material/structural idiom of a “standard of living” (Guyer 2014: 
149). South Africa can appear less messy, more structurally determined, more 
sharply categorized. But, like elsewhere on the continent, regulatory islands have 
stood in contrast to a conspicuous lack of information. The far-reaching ambi-
tions of state and capital to register and categorize nonwhite people, beginning 
around the turn of the twentieth century, were always frustrated by incapacity 
and the profusion of blind spots (Breckenridge 2014). The South African state 
has been “defined by its control of the flow of resources, fiercely delimiting the 
transfer of benefits, constitutionally disinterested in and incapable of knowledge 
about the vast majority of its subjects” (Breckenridge 2014: 214).
Scholarship on wage labor in southern Africa has long explored the im-
plications of inclusion in export-oriented enclaves (for example, Gluckman 
1961; Moodie with Ndatshe 1994). Sites of formal employment—epitomized 
by South Africa’s hyperpoliced, total institution-like mines—were built on mi-
grancy but experienced as sharply distinct from hinterlands of subsistence. Yet 
inclusion did not mean conforming to anything resembling the official view 
of the workplace. The “institutionalisation of industrial relations” has remained 
fragile (von Holdt 2010: 128). Formal labor hierarchies, and official forms of 
recognition and regulation, are easily challenged by alternative—and often vio-
lent—“local moral orders” (von Holdt 2010).
Even centers of control, then, have been less planned that they appear. Nev-
ertheless, places like Grootplaas are distinctly marginal in relation to centers of 
urban and industrial infrastructure. Official linkages are dim spotlights, exem-
plifying less order or regulation than is often assumed to typify South African 
labor arrangements. Hubs of production on South Africa’s northern border have 
been shaped by cross-border migrants responding to periodic crises at home, 
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and coercive but ad hoc regimes of policing and recruitment (see, for example, 
van Onselen 1976; Werbner 1991; Bradford 1993; Murray 1995; Bolt 2015). 
This, in turn, has meant that recruits have had little attachment to a thorough-
going worker identity.
If industrial relations have been shallowly institutionalized elsewhere in 
South Africa, this is exacerbated on the border farms by the sheer diversity of 
employees, itself the result of spiraling hyperinflation, economic contraction, 
and the persecution of opposition supporters in Zimbabwe after 2000. Employ-
ees hail from marginalized rural areas across the border and beyond, and from 
cities including the capital, Harare. They range from lifelong farm workers to 
erstwhile professionals. And they may have little education or be school gradu-
ates, even occasionally university graduates. Indeed, recently displaced Zimba-
bweans on the northern border actively deny being farm workers at all. Former 
teachers or nurses, or recent A-level graduates, speak of being “in exile,” and of 
putting life on pause in the meantime. The police share this diffidence, for dif-
ferent reasons—everyone is assumed to be a border jumper first. All of this, of 
course, renders documents still more important in making formal workers real; 
they do not simply confirm a widely accepted state of affairs.
One result is a highly vulnerable farm working population (Rutherford and 
Addison 2007; Rutherford 2008). Here, as elsewhere in the country, a floating 
reserve of migrant labor has proven useful for farmers responding to market 
liberalization ( Johnston 2007). This setting resembles others where the vulner-
ability of cross-border migrants is underpinned by gray legal regimes, which 
leave them perpetually “deportable” (De Genova 2005; see also Heyman 2001). 
Workers are often confined to their places of work, in a broader environment 
where they are potential fugitives, as elsewhere historically in South Africa. Such 
regimes support Ananya Roy’s claim that informal lacunae are best understood 
as state effects: deliberate “suspensions” of legal order, defined as beyond the 
law but allowed to persist (2005: 149). Yet places like the Zimbabwean–South 
African border also reveal the complex configuration of employers’ and workers’ 
projects through which formality comes to be realized. This is especially visible 
on agricultural estates where state oversight has always been extremely limited.
Especially at its margins, South Africa has historically been characterized 
by limited state capacity and piecemeal accommodations. From the first half 
of the twentieth century, the northern border was the site of different schemes 
for achieving a measure of control, in turn the result of ever-shifting relations 
between state institutions and representatives (see MacDonald 2012). Further 
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complicating the picture, a range of private individuals variously acted as infor-
mal intermediaries and operated as illegal “labour pirates” (Murray 1995).
Nevertheless, heated debates over regulation were the terrain for contesting 
the control of territory and human mobility. Messina Copper Mine, the border 
region’s first major employer, attempted in the early twentieth century to gain 
formal jurisdiction over a large tract of land, ostensibly to prevent malaria but 
also to police the movement and enlistment of people. Farmers soon began 
cultivating the border in the same ecosystem of shadowy recruitment, and in 
periodic competition with ineffective state labor depots (see Bolt 2015). The 
result was a plurality of ambiguous forms of authority over land and labor.
On South Africa’s farms, assumptions persist that white landowners enjoy 
paternalist sovereignty over their territory and “their people.” Government bu-
reaucrats anyway have little capacity to “see” the population they regulate (see 
Hoag 2010). But such assumptions further complicate what it means for es-
tates like Grootplaas to come under state purview (see, for example, Rutherford 
2008), and leave idioms of kinship competing with those of employment (du 
Toit 1993). If farmers’ extralegal coercion on their “little republics” has largely 
receded, it has given way to vigilante justice presided over by senior black work-
ers (Bolt 2016). What is more, labor compounds are unfenced, and gradually 
adapted over years (e.g., housing improvements, food gardens) by more or less 
embedded residents, all despite lacking security of tenure. Foremen and super-
visors often cast themselves as headmen and elders, even holding court and 
judging disputes, rather than emphasizing formal working roles. Meanwhile, 
employment itself fluctuates. Even in a postapartheid era of minimum wages, 
required work conditions, and stipulated access to housing, determining what 
exactly is formal in farm employment—and delimiting recognizable categories 
of worker and personnel among farm dwellers—is no simple matter. And work-
ers’ rights are extremely difficult to defend as a result. Periodic inspections come 
and go, met with silence out of fear of repercussions. There is, anyway, little 
scrutiny of connections between workplace and residence—precisely those that 
complicate the category of “worker” in the first place, and that render much of 
the legal framework discretionary (Human Rights Watch 2006).
Farmers’ experiences, meanwhile, are of making their own way. They provide 
their own infrastructure: graded roads; borehole and pump water; and school 
buildings for publicly employed teachers with sporadic attendance records. 
Nondigitized personnel records leave the farms further disconnected from state 
infrastructures. During my fieldwork, a Department of Health mobile clinic 
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began coming to the farms, but its visits were infrequent. Different state institu-
tions stand for particular kinds of regulation, with different interplays of atten-
tion and absence. But in this case, absence predominates.
The army and the police are notable exceptions. For workers and farmers, 
much everyday interaction with state employees means negotiating their pres-
ence. Displacement across the border because of the Zimbabwean crisis has 
produced a wider climate of popular and media hostility in South Africa, and a 
border regime of frequent, aggressive police deportation raids.2 Fearing discov-
ery, seasonal workers during the period of fieldwork would sleep in dry riverbeds 
in the bush. For farmers, the advantages of docile working populations (see Hu-
man Rights Watch 2006) were counterweighed by the bureaucratic nuisance 
of replacing workers. Deportees anyway generally returned to their jobs within 
days, after climbing back through the border fence. As for the police, their ag-
gressive presence was only matched by their absence when it came to keeping 
the peace.
Yet even this coercive dimension of state attention is localized in important 
ways. Farmers regularly meet police and army chiefs to negotiate exemptions 
for their workers. As I discuss below, one result has been to recognize private 
farm ID cards. Farm workers have themselves localized the army presence. Sol-
diers, lonely in their garrisons, spend weekends at the farm compounds’ shebeens, 
and even once assembled a football team to compete in the border’s interfarm 
tournament. Workers draw on soldiers, with their apparently incontestable of-
ficial positions and uniforms, to mediate disputes and underwrite everyday vigi-
lante justice. By contrast, performance reports to superiors leave the lion’s share 
of garrison life unmonitored.
While states are constituted through mobile presences (see Quirk and 
Vigneswaran 2015), spotlights of official attention are disconnected and am-
biguous. Each is a point of partial regulation. Yet these spotlights become con-
nected. In workforces, official and semiofficial documents are far from incidental. 
They have varying degrees of authority, which transcend the patchy reach of state 
institutions, and they become points around which a sense of formality is built 
through relationships in and beyond the workforce. And these locally authorita-
tive documents become stepping-stones, as recruits try to get ahead as workers 
2. In 2009, deportations were suspended, and the Zimbabwe Documentation Project 
was instituted to register undocumented Zimbabweans en masse. This only reached 
a minority, and deportations recommenced in late 2011.
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and subsequently make further plans. In a setting where the difference between a 
worker and a transient migrant is often just a matter of timing—as people make 
and revise plans about when to move and when to stop for a while—documents 
are the focal points for recognition. And this is especially so in South Africa 
and its wider regional political economy. Despite the stark deficiencies of grand 
attempts to register nonwhite working populations (see Breckenridge 2014), 
bureaucratic apparatuses and their lacunae have for a long time shaped people’s 
experiences of capitalism. Nevertheless, even the legitimation that comes with 
established symbols of formality needs to be constantly negotiated.
THE CONTRACT
The farm’s contracts make workers in a literal sense, by officially marking their 
recategorization. They make workers real, while also investing them in the real-
ity of a chain of formal documentation. They therefore offer a useful starting 
point for examining how all this works. The contracts are especially limited 
spotlights, representing a juxtaposition of formal categorization and fixity, and 
half-hearted and flexible execution. They demand specifications of “position of 
employee,” area of operation on the estate, working hours, and daily pay. Three 
lines for completion at the foot of the page—“on behalf of employer,” “date,” 
“employee”—suggest a parallel symmetry in the employment situation. But, 
within this rubric, matters are left as vague as possible. Most employees are sim-
ply “farm hands.” The workplace of those not based in the packshed is usually 
“lands,” the estate’s vast hectares of orchards, and even this is flexible. And the 
employee may not actually sign the contract at all.
As for hours and pay, the form of the contract suggests that clock time 
predominates across the farm. The packshed, run around its conveyor belts, 
somewhat conforms to this model if one ignores unpaid “preparation time.” But 
picking in the orchards is worlds away from the contract’s abstract regularity. 
It is driven instead by the rhythms of gang labor, responding to the exigencies 
of piece rates and fluctuations in batch processing, and maintained by strings 
of insistent calls and insults. Teams, and especially their supervisors, compete 
aggressively and use chalk to mark tallies onto the backs of trailers—a form of 
inscription whose dynamics of incitement and rivalry are far more clearly con-
nected to the labor process. Payday is a ritual affirming the formality of the con-
tract. One at a time, workers “sign” for pay with a thumbprint, at a table outside 
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the office, in return for a paper packet with an unverifiable amount typed onto 
the front.3 In this interaction, employees who consider themselves simply in ex-
ile from happier lives confront the flip side of the corporate register of the con-
tract itself. Being recognized as a farm worker by the farm offices means being 
assumed illiterate, and losing the capacity to sign with a pen.4 Such treatment 
has especial historical resonance in South Africa, especially when seen alongside 
the farm’s unsigned contracts. In the formative early years of apartheid, bureau-
cratic arguments for fingerprinting precisely undermined the autonomy of black 
people. Central was the contention that the latter’s signing of labor contracts 
was an unnecessary inconvenience, in contrast to the efficiency promised by bio-
metric identification. Meanwhile, workers needed written consent from white 
employers to leave agricultural and other jobs (Breckenridge 2014: 146, 157).
The contract, despite its selectivity and vagueness, draws life through its 
place in a chain of documentation—a self-referential assemblage in which an 
official story gradually accumulates (see Latour 2009). This chain is crucial to 
how workers live through and around paperwork. Their claims to formal identi-
ties are negotiated through documents, whose effectiveness comes from their 
material and aesthetic qualities (see Riles 2006; M. Hull 2012a, 2012b; E. Hull 
2012), but which also require convincing performances when they are mobilized 
(Reeves 2013). Jane Guyer (2004) notes that formality often appears to people 
in African settings on the margins of bureaucracy through the apparent fixity 
of more or less official documents. In a workforce like Grootplaas, these work 
as fragmentary badges of formality—as putative connections to officialdom—
because of people’s investment in ensuring their authority and efficacy. Such 
investment renders the formal categories of the wage economy real, especially 
through the recognition of workers in interactions on and beyond the farm. The 
next section turns to how workers trace stepping-stone routes through their 
conversions between documents.
3. The amount always falls below the minimum wage. Piece rates are set so that 
workers cannot pick fast enough to make up their theoretical daily amount. There 
is no risk of added state scrutiny: reportedly, the state’s loss of test farms since 
apartheid removed its capacity in this regard. Farmers must simply ensure that they 
coordinate their rates, in conversation with lawyers.
4. Literacy rates were strikingly high at the time of fieldwork, as many people 
experienced abrupt downward mobility. They may now be lower because of the 
decline since 2000 of Zimbabwe’s famously strong education system.
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DOCUMENTARY STEPPING-STONES
Workers are well aware that their stability relies on the skillful mobilization of 
documents. For new recruits, this awareness is doubly sharpened. Given their 
transience and vulnerability on the border, migrants’ documents—as socially 
recognized inscriptions of their histories (Ferraris 2013)—represent a particular 
kind of stability. Zimbabwean national identity cards (zvitupa, singular chitu-
pa)—durable metal plates—bear their owners’ personal information, including 
area of origin. Sheaves of certificates bearing histories of qualifications—school 
and even university grades, and various courses and training sessions—are care-
fully protected in plastic, ready to be revealed and mobilized at the right mo-
ment. Yet the same transience presents a problem of everyday storage. I have 
shown elsewhere (Bolt 2014) that difficulties storing cash lead seasonal workers 
to entrust their pay to more established permanent workers, and this in turn 
underpins the farm hierarchy outside of work time. Similar challenges pertain 
with official and semiofficial documents as well as other possessions that prom-
ise to connect past lives to future prospects—from lists of contact numbers to 
photo albums that prove recruits not “really” to be farm workers. But documents 
that identify people and their potential value, especially, cannot be entrusted 
like money. Migrants hang onto the objects that make them who they are, at 
least until these are superseded by more effective ones. Once migrants are em-
ployed, they carry at all times the papers that make them workers in the eyes 
of police—stapled, tattered, their quarter-fold lines permanently marked with 
dust.
How does this conversion work? The self-evident way that Zimbabwean 
identity cards stand for their owners enables them to become points around 
which workers and jobseekers negotiate their positions. Officially, the recruit-
ment of seasonal workers happens in the open: an official process in which 
a senior worker stands on a low wall and collects the cards from throngs of 
outstretched hands. But identity cards are also central to quieter recruitment 
offstage. The understanding is that if a senior figure agrees to take one’s card, 
it means that one will be given work—an arrangement quickly learned by new 
arrivals.5 There are risks in giving up cards. They are periodically misplaced, and 
5. This negotiation is highly gendered, as are dynamics in the workforce more generally. 
The predominately male senior workers are known to demand sexual favors from 
women in return for preferential access to employment. This may extend into 
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workers find themselves in the strange limbo of being on the farm’s books but 
in danger of losing any officially recognized identity. This is all the more alarm-
ing because of the difficulty and expense of replacing them. Conversely, once 
migrants acquire alternative badges of officialdom, a few are willing to abandon 
their Zimbabwean cards altogether.
Those who do secure a job enter the world of farm paperwork. A corporate-
style “application for employment”—which closes with the line, “Thank you for 
your interest shown in our company”—contrasts with the subsequent finger-
printing and the queue for mug shots, in which exposure to objectification and 
humiliation by management introduces recruits to the farm’s racialized hierarchy. 
As with the contract, the information requested is vague and its relevance appears 
confined to the filing cabinet. Linguistic ability is largely determined by self-as-
sessment. The only two references from previous employers I found in the person-
nel records simply stated that the workers moved on, “seeking greener pastures.”
But the real importance of these documents is in laying the foundations for 
others that enable workers to be recognized in everyday terms. In other words, 
they are offstage parts of the documentary chain through which the formal 
wage economy is realized. The contract is a point where existing documents 
are converted into worker status. It asks for the recruit’s ID document number, 
etched onto the metal card that has already circulated as part of recruitment. It 
also records any educational qualifications, which may affect getting a job, and 
some skill is involved in mobilizing them. If they need to be carefully guarded, 
they also need to be presented quietly and to the right people. One seasonal 
worker, a former teacher, had A-levels, a bachelor’s degree, and a postgradu-
ate diploma. Announcing his background to Michael, the highly educated per-
sonnel manager, initially secured a clerical job. But a soured relationship with 
him—borne of a sense of competition—soon led to demotion back to picking. 
Michael himself had kept his certificates a secret, and then taken them straight 
to the farmer, not to a fellow worker.
The farm’s own ID number, generated in completing the contract, gains 
its true significance after recruitment, because it enables a migrant to live as a 
worker. It is the basis of a farm ID card, made and issued by farms responding to 
huge delays in processing seasonal workers. Farm IDs are built on an enduring 
demanding that women undertake domestic tasks, in relationships whose context is 
men’s overwhelming control of accommodation. I describe the gendered character 
of farm life and workforce hierarchy in detail elsewhere (see Bolt 2013).
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local understanding of what makes a farm worker. Dependence on proof of at-
tachment to white landowners evokes apartheid-era pass laws, and underlines a 
legacy on both sides of the border of farmers’ partial sovereignty over land and 
labor (see Rutherford 2001). Seasonal recruits have long been regularized after 
they start work, bearing the risks themselves, and then required to prove that 
they belong to particular estates—sometimes only tacitly and sometimes more 
explicitly, through ad hoc agreements between farmers, police, and army.
Farm IDs are recognized documents attesting to sponsorship by white farm-
ers, which identify migrants as workers, protect them, but also confine them to 
their estates. Moving around on the border road, or elsewhere off the estates, is 
more dangerous. Yet the provisional security afforded by proof of connection to 
the farms is so valuable for diverse livelihood strategies that a market in forged 
employment cards developed in the Zimbabwean border town of Beitbridge. 
The cards’ material form underlines the power relations they represent. As a 
“graphic genre” (M. Hull 2012b: 15), these documents stand for the private 
authority of farmers and their families, yet they are in effect semiofficial. Each 
is homemade, cut from a piece of paper prepared on a home computer. And on 
each, a cartoon-style, Clipart image of a fruit tree—the farm’s logo—dominates. 
A monthly hole punch confirms that the bearer has been working on the estate 
since the card’s date of issue.
Recruits with ID cards are generally considered workers, but this has to 
be negotiated and renegotiated. Given the market in forgeries, farm ID cards 
may not be enough to prevent arrest if workers flee when the police arrive—a 
response that itself renders them suspect. It does not help that farm IDs bear 
no photographs, unlike the pieces of paper that workers carry once they have 
been fully regularized. The cards are ambiguous: semiofficial (at least as they are 
treated by representatives of the state), usually accepted, probably issued by a 
farmer, but forged with relative ease.
The next stage in workers’ recognition and realization is a work permit from 
Home Affairs. Michael, the personnel manager, decides who among the hun-
dreds of recruits will be taken first to the border post to be processed. During 
the period of fieldwork, this meant receiving a Zimbabwean Emergency Travel 
Document (ETD, a photocopied sheet of paper6), with a photograph stapled to 
6. ETDs were developed to streamline the documentation of Zimbabwean farm 
workers, because of a shortage of passports. Access to Zimbabwean passports has 
since improved.
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the front and a South African short-term visa subsequently affixed to the back. 
Some acquire official papers quickly. Others never receive legal documents, a 
situation worsened by the Home Affairs backlogs that became notorious dur-
ing fieldwork. Key are connections to powerful senior workers whose threats 
Michael cannot afford to ignore, or Michael’s own demands for favors or his 
attempts to build a retinue of dependents. Either way, gaining state-issued pa-
perwork and realizing the unambiguous status of worker are inseparable from 
one’s incorporation into around-the-clock farm hierarchies. Beginning in the 
orchards and the packshed, these extend to entrusting pay to superordinates, 
and even obtaining the protection required for informal trade and services in 
the compound. And it is not only that incorporation opens the way to formal 
documentation. As workers guard their paperwork in back pockets—as it disin-
tegrates and becomes softer and darker, and perhaps accumulates more stamps 
and adhesive visas—it represents a record crucial for negotiating encounters 
with border patrols. Even so, police have been known to tear up workers’ papers. 
The only way to be sure that one’s worker status transcends particular encoun-
ters with police patrols—that it is really real—is to be attached to senior workers 
who can approach the white farmer, who in turn can chase up the case before 
deportation occurs.
Recourse to the farmer is most visible, of course, among permanent work-
ers themselves. Fully documented, they are far less vulnerable, and there is no 
doubt that they are real workers, not border jumpers. Nevertheless, permanent 
workers’ projects for still greater stability occasionally misfire, revealing the con-
tinuing importance of being recognized as part of a border workforce. Claiming 
questionable citizenship (reportedly by having dubious credentials confirmed by 
employers or purported kin) is risky.7 One senior worker’s ID featured a South 
African Venda name that he was unable to back up with sufficient local knowl-
edge at a roadblock. The worker called the foreman, who in turn contacted the 
farmer, who intervened and had his employee released. Further bribes and ap-
peals to the farmer would follow, in future encounters with police. The apparent 
fixity of meaning of documents gives them a powerful allure, but they remain 
7. Others have legally acquired a South African ID (although not citizenship) 
following a letter proving long-term service on the farms. During the Zimbabwe 
Documentation Project (see footnote 2), some permanent workers were also able 
to acquire four-year South African visas. But this depended on being physically 
present at the farm when Home Affairs officials visited—and many workers were 
not—which emphasizes the contingent nature of access to documents.
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subject to processes of everyday negotiation in which the ultimate fallback re-
mains that farm residents are understood to be real workers.
A final twist is that as recruits build personal histories through documenta-
tion, being a worker enables a life beyond the border farms. Whereas papers 
attach a worker to a particular employer, for a fixed period, many see them as 
passports to more open-ended mobility. Police on the roads are assumed not to 
be able to check immediately whether the permits of absconded workers have 
been canceled. So many seasonal migrants head for Johannesburg, armed now 
not only with their certificates and contact numbers but also with pieces of pa-
per—a permit and a visa-adorned travel document—that appear to render them 
workers in a less personalized and localized register than that of farm ID cards.
CONCLUSION
Regulation in practice is relational, and it produces formal people (“workers”) 
in formal places (“workplaces”). While this may be especially marked in mi-
grant labor regimes that perpetuate vulnerability and dependence on employers, 
formal regulation classifies people in other labor settings too (see, for example, 
Dunn 2005 on “standards”). Indeed, more generally still, “persons and relations” 
are “enacted and realized” through the categories asserted as basic to economic 
reality (Neiburg and Guyer, Introduction). This is often a piecemeal process. 
Workers and workplaces on the border are made through a multiplicity of 
regulatory lenses, with different purposes and different effects, mirroring the 
multiplicity of state institutions (see Abrams 1988). Especially noticeable in a 
setting like South Africa’s margins, official spotlights are limited and bureau-
cratic infrastructures and documentary networks sparse—far from constituting 
a thick system of regularities.
Nevertheless, documents are more than just window dressing. Rather than 
simply standing as the opposite of a “real” informal economy, paperwork’s 
relative fixity enables the realization of economic roles and places, and their 
stabilization through time. This fixity is inflected by South Africa’s distinc-
tive history of documentation. Capitalism has for over a century developed 
symbiotically with the bureaucratic registration of people and the regulation of 
their movement and settlement. Governmental fantasies of omniscience have 
always faced the reality of limited control, over people and over the very tech-
nologies used to identify them (Breckenridge 2014). Indeed, the awareness 
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of these limits has been as formative as the ambition to achieve control: the 
particular South African penchant for fingerprinting, for example, began to 
develop at the turn of the twentieth century because of the “presumption of 
universal deceit” (Breckenridge 2014: 76). On the Zimbabwean border, fanta-
sies of control have been especially challenged. Militarization jostles with state 
overstretch, and overlapping documentary regimes coexist with countless tran-
sient strangers. Resonating with South Africa’s longer history of bureaucracy 
and its limits, attempts by officials and employers to identify and categorize, 
and by migrants to be recognized, become all the more important. Despite 
liberalization, the end of the apartheid order, and the lack of sufficient capac-
ity to enforce new legal measures, paperwork continues to script a range of 
interactions. Paperwork’s fixity, then, reflects its significance over a long period 
of time, in establishing the terms of life at the intersection of bureaucracy and 
capitalism.
Yet the result also produces and sustains everyday formality. Documents 
make workers, opening up possibilities through recognition in day-to-day en-
counters. As Ian Hacking (2004) notes, “making up people” requires under-
standing as much through Goffman-esque face-to-face interactions as through 
Foucauldian disciplining discourses. Workers learn to convert between different 
documents, using them like stepping-stones to realize an identity as a worker 
that carries weight with an increasing range of state officials. As people develop 
pragmatic logics for enacting official process from below (see Coutin 2000), 
they produce a real economy that is as much made of negotiated formal statuses 
as it is about their own contingent projects.
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chapter nine
How will we pay?
Projective fictions and regimes of foresight 
in US college finance
Caitlin Zaloom
Attending college is an imperative of the middle class in the United States 
today. In the first fifteen years since 2000, however, as the median American 
household income slumped, the average cost of in-state tuition and fees for 
public colleges rose 80 percent (Fei 2016). The financial costs of higher educa-
tion have been rising since the 1980s, though, with tuition at public and at 
private four-year colleges each roughly tripling from 1980 to 2010 (Draut et al. 
2011: 26).
Federal and state governments, together with financial firms, have empha-
sized financial planning as a remedy for families facing this escalation. Govern-
ment programs first define the achievement of higher education as a problem of 
household finance, offering options for saving and investing as a way to make 
paying for college possible. These programs require aspiring college students 
and their parents to ask the question “How will we pay?” and guide them to 
answers through policies that promote and support financial planning. Govern-
ment programs and investment companies broadcast financial planning as the 
necessary activity of virtuous families.
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Across my ethnographic work and more than 160 in-depth interviews con-
ducted with middle-class American families throughout the country who faced 
the daunting task of paying for college, I have seen the power of these govern-
ment and financial programs to compose a calculative and moral field. Mothers 
and fathers survey their tools and act on the promise that their children will reap 
opportunities in the future. They then measure success and failure as mothers 
and fathers by their children’s results in the college years. In order to understand 
such practices of middle class family life in the United States today, it is crucial, 
first, to examine the policy frameworks within which they operate to be good 
parents.
In this chapter, I compare two sets of household finance policy that promote 
planning and analyze their distinct conceptions of economic and moral virtue. 
Both hinge on paying for higher education and establish conditions for the 
possibility of planning by configuring household trajectories and implicating 
more extensive intergenerational relations of support. In doing so, they define 
parents’ responsibilities to their families’ futures and call on them to organize 
their current household economies around these obligations. I turn first to the 
mid-twentieth century, examining the practices of planning established by the 
GI Bill, especially its higher education provision, and Social Security programs. 
Second, I examine the contemporary investment programs for higher educa-
tion, which also promote particular procedures for establishing family futures.
Each of the institutional configurations examined here mobilizes what I 
call a “regime of foresight,” an institutionally sanctioned trajectory for fam-
ily life that offers calculative devices for achieving these futures. The financial 
tools do not act on families alone, however. Regimes of foresight gain traction 
by endorsing future calculation as a moral project. From the postwar period 
onward, US financial policies have shaped an ethics anchored in projecting 
futures and ordering household economies around these forecasts. Through 
policy and financial tools, the federal government and financial firms have es-
tablished the conditions for planning and elaborated the project of household 
calculation. Their sanction has rendered planning a critical moral project of 
middle-class life.
Planning draws its compelling power from a notion of the “real” rooted in 
the household. Federico Neiburg and Jane Guyer note that the concept of the 
real has historically been tied to an idea of truth that both lies beyond hu-
man storytelling and that emerges from the laws of nature (Neiburg and Guyer 
2017). Similarly, the category of the household constitutes economic reality by 
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contrasting the natural realm of reproduction with the public domain of finance, 
where the unnatural, impersonal multiplication of money takes place. Given 
the central role that financing college plays in today’s middle-class households, 
establishing an ethnographic understanding of real economy, as Neiburg and 
Guyer propose, requires examining these links between household economies 
and the financial policies with which families must operate. Examining the in-
stitutional and moral ties between these historically opposed conceptual spheres 
also provides fodder for rethinking the real in an age of financial capitalism.
PRoJECtIvE FICtIoNS
The concept of reality employed by policymakers and financial institutions is 
shared, ironically, by those opposed to their programs and its broader ideology. 
Critics of neoliberalism, like political theorist wendy Brown, argue that con-
temporary governmental regimes successfully deploy financial instruments and 
accounting logics as tools of social and political discipline, spreading economic 
calculation into even the most intimate spheres of life (Brown 2015; Martin 
2002; Joseph 2014). Anthropologists too have consistently noted the success of 
neoliberal economic rhetoric and programs in harnessing and transforming the 
self-conceptions, agendas, and feelings of middle-class people, albeit sometimes 
with complex effects (see Cahn 2008; Dunk 2002; Freeman 2007; Shever 2008; 
Muehlebach 2011). Critics often share a central conviction with conservative 
policy-makers, as well as many liberal ones, in the sense that both give budget-
ary reckoning the power to define responsible action.1 Calculation, according 
to each, reveals economic constraints that cannot be shaken off. Framed in this 
way, budgetary reckoning does not leave room for alternative evaluations or 
conflicting agendas. Both policymakers and their scholarly critics agree that 
contemporary governance appeals to economy as a central, irreducible reality.
1. Here I have in mind policies like President obama’s college scorecard. The interactive 
online tool scores colleges based on the net price of attendance, graduation rate, 
loan default rate, average amount borrowed, and graduates’ employment. touting 
the program in his 2013 State of the Union address, the president affirmed both the 
possibility and the virtue of weighing the college decision in terms of household 
finance: “Parents and students can use [the scorecard] to compare schools based on 
a simple criteria: where you can get the most bang for your educational buck” (US 
Department of Education 2013).
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The practices of planning, however, contradict this position. Planning re-
quires imaginative acts that outstrip the confines of economic calculation. to 
understand the impact of the financial economy more fully we have to take a 
closer look at the processes and mechanisms of projection and the moral stories 
on which they confer governing authority. “Projective fictions” anchor a form 
of rationality essential to the regimes of foresight that have developed around 
college finance.2
Projective fictions are moral stories that organize visions of the future to 
direct economic activities in the present. Planning requires the anticipation 
of a range of conditions, potential college costs, income, future expenses, and 
how the broader economy will unfold. These projections are then layered into a 
model, which can be explicit but can also operate without full articulation. The 
model depends on defining a starting condition, designating a goal, establish-
ing a timeline, and outlining the variety of conditions that can affect the out-
come. The model generates an account of future success or failure, here related 
to whether or not the family will be able to pay their portion of a child’s college 
expenses. These layered projections define a future course.
I employ the term fictions because projections sketch the outline of a world 
to come, one accessible only through imaginative acts. By fictions I do not mean 
loose fantasies, however, but rather structured narratives that proceed according 
to a set of conventions, or genres. In this, I extend Mary Poovey’s analysis that 
generic conventions govern our understanding of economic facts. In Genres of the 
credit economy (2008), she argued that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pro-
cesses of generic differentiation divided the “hard” facts of the modern economy 
2. I distinguish between the practices of projection and those of prediction. Predictions 
calculate the likelihood of a particular event, based on probability. Risk assessments, 
like the likelihood of loan defaults, would come under the banner of prediction. 
Projections can encompass such probabilistic calculations, but include a much 
wider set of future-oriented forms of reasoning, like rule of thumb calculations, 
scenarios, and morally oriented trajectories, that come together both in policy 
domains and in households to give contours to the future and define a decision-
making field. Recently, future orientations have become central to the study of 
capitalism. Political theorist Ivan Ascher posits that our financial economy has 
organized society through financial means of “prediction and protection” (Ascher 
2016); in Imagined futures, sociologist Jens Beckert (2016) argues that temporality 
of capitalism is organized around future-oriented imaginaries. These works join 
anthropological work on the speculative and temporal dimensions of capitalism 
that foreground projects of future-making and control (Rajan 2006; C. Hayden 
2003; Peterson 2014; Miyazaki 2013; Zaloom 2006, 2009).
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from “fictional” literary accounts. This division continues to buttress contempo-
rary notions of economic reality; it also obscures the imaginative foundations of 
economic knowledge and activities, like planning (see Poovey 2008).
At the same time, projective fictions mobilize generic, moral projects. In 
higher education, these center on the development of the nuclear family. In the 
process of assembling projective fictions, family members encounter themselves 
as a moral unit tied by bonds of obligation and devoted to a common future. 
The projection then becomes an object through which a family can work on 
itself, defining its trajectory in both moral and financial terms. The family’s self-
narration joins the narration of financial planning, guiding the family forward 
along a storyline sanctioned by government and financial experts alike.
The economic theories that subtend household financial policy also proceed 
according to their own generic conventions, including the fictions contained 
within their most basic concepts. Jane Guyer has drawn attention to the life cycle 
as such a fiction, one fundamental to ideas of economic rationality and house-
hold planning. The concept of the life cycle narrates a normative, moral story 
about approved economic behavior across time, such as investing in education. 
These behaviors are then associated with appropriate calculations. Departures 
from the life path described in economists’ and policy-makers’ projective fictions 
register as betrayal of reason itself.3
Government programs anticipate the sanctioned style of reasoning from 
citizens who stand to benefit from their largesse. They project macro-level out-
comes based on expectations of disciplined behavior by citizens and allocate 
present resources accordingly. Expert projective fictions structure the resources 
available to families as they pursue their own visions of the future; they are em-
bedded in the tools—like investment vehicles and loans—with which families 
must operate. These visions of the future shape action in the present. like the 
government’s scenario-based disaster planning strategies tracked by Andrew 
lakoff and Stephen Collier, projective fictions govern households by shaping 
strategies and decisions in the present (lakoff 2017; Collier and lakoff 2014).
3. Jane Guyer’s “The life cycle as a rational proposition; or, The arc of intermediate 
links” (2001) introduces the intellectual history of the idea of the life cycle and its 
imbrication with American federal policy through the theories of mid twentieth-
century economics. Guyer’s paper, and her work more broadly (2016), provide 
inspiration for this analysis, especially her observation that the life cycle concept 
forms “an economic plan, subject to rational quantitative calculation.”
234 The Real economy
with government and industry-sponsored tools in place, planning becomes 
both a means of caring and a demonstration of citizen responsibility.4 when 
families are unable to adhere to its steps, they expose themselves to both finan-
cial disadvantage and the disapprobation of the state, financial experts, and their 
fellow citizens. once associated only with the poor (and, albeit less often, with 
the “irresponsible” affluent who blow vast fortunes), difficulty in planning has 
come to the middle class. The familiar moral accusations have followed: Those 
unable to plan are irrational, inept, or lackadaisical. Planning lies at the heart of 
the American moral economy today.
NEAR-tERM PRUDENCE AND DIStANt MoDElING
two US policies, each enacted at distinct historical moments and character-
ized by distinct qualities of planning, have shaped the projection of family fu-
tures into regimes of foresight. The first, which I call the mid-century regime of 
“near-term prudence,” was organized around a bundle of federal policies that, 
together, ordered the projection of family futures: the education and housing 
provisions of the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, or GI Bill, and So-
cial Security. These policies first had to summon the families that they would 
support, directing their interventions through the fiction of the nuclear family. 
They then mobilized resources to create a channel through which these citizen 
families could navigate. These government supports structured the life course, 
quietly guiding long-term visions, so that family decisions could focus on cur-
rent conditions and present choices.
4. Key professional groups—economists, policy analysts, and financial industry 
advisors—also endorse planning as both a financial solution and as a duty. In 
order to establish economic virtue in the eyes of government and financial experts, 
students and families must treat higher education as a problem of investment. 
Investment begins early with planning for future costs and investing savings, and 
results in a decision to attend a college that will yield profit—wage earnings—
in the future (Akers and Chingos 2016). laying bare their own moral economy, 
economists Beth Akers and Matthew Chingos, based at the think tanks Brookings 
and the Urban Institute, respectively, describe their prescriptions for funding US 
higher education as “predicated on the notion that borrowing for college should be 
treated as an investment decision” [Akers and Chingos 2016: 10; my emphasis]. 
The normative dimensions of these economic prescriptions are common in policy-
oriented economics.
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This contrasts with the second policy moment, which institutionalizes what 
I call a regime of “distant modeling.” within the distant modeling framework, 
families also engage financial policies for intergenerational support. to do so, 
however, they must marshal and deploy long-term projections across a much 
broader range of conditions. They inherit the middle-class definitions of family 
and its milestones defined in mid-century, but today’s household finance policies 
enjoin citizen families to make models of the future, taking into account fluctu-
ations in their incomes, in college pricing, and in the broader financial economy. 
They also must craft projections of their own behaviors under these conditions.5 
This regime of foresight operates through the genre of financial modeling. to 
examine this process, I turn to 529 plans. Named for a section of federal tax 
code, these investment vehicles, offered state-by-state, enable families to invest 
for college educations still decades in the future. Both in mid-century and today, 
government and financial programs gain purchase in households both by creat-
ing the conditions for financial success and failure and by distributing moral 
credit and blame for following or departing from these sanctioned paths.
Near-Term Prudence
Mid-century social policy was founded on a set of projective fictions that 
we would hardly recognize as realistic today, but which continue to structure 
American ideas about the trajectory of a good, middle-class life: the nuclear 
family led by a male wage earner and a predictable life course. The elements of 
this system were laid along the tracks of social policy and the economic theories 
it supported, in particular those of the New Deal, like the GI Bill. New Deal 
policies used federal power to promote the general social welfare through re-
distribution, and the GI Bill, historian Jennifer Frydl argues, may be the most 
comprehensive example of New Deal beneficence.
of course, none of these policies covered all Americans as their more liberal 
designers would have liked and, in many ways, the policies reproduced existing 
hierarchies, especially those anchored in moral and racial ideas. The GI Bill’s 
5. Ethical management—employing calculative practices to balance conflicting moral 
agendas—appears in practices across the financial economy. Here, families engage in 
modeling to reconcile financial and parental responsibilities. See Zaloom (2016) for 
an analysis of American Evangelical practices in which ministries teach budgeting 
as a way to resolve tensions between God’s kingdom and the ungodly demands of 
everyday economic life.
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liberal architects themselves worried over the legislation’s creation of a privi-
leged group, although the veterans’ moral “worthiness” proved critical in pass-
ing the bill through Congress. Conservative supporters ensured that important 
provisions of the bill would work through private parties and through the states, 
guaranteeing that white veterans would benefit more than their black partners 
in war, and ensuring that the bill would provide not a general “hand out,” but a 
“hand up” to those they considered deserving (Frydl 2009).
Still, the GI Bill’s benefits represented a broad New Deal goal related to 
household futures. The GI Bill, like other mid-century social policies, was de-
signed to blunt life’s jagged edge. Such legislation could never entirely smooth 
out the “hazards and vicissitudes” of life, as President Franklin Roosevelt noted 
in his statement on signing the Social Security Act, another New Deal pillar. 
The postwar order did, however, “smooth” the future for those it benefited. In-
stitutional supports created conditions of predictability beyond the lives of in-
dividual families, and allowed for a style of reasoning that focused on decisions 
about the near-term future. Moral evaluation was then focused on the activities 
taken up, such as college education or parenting children; it did not hinge on 
whether or not a family had planned and planned correctly.
I borrow the idea of a smoothed future from the field of economics. Start-
ing in the 1950s with Milton Friedman’s permanent income theory and Franco 
Modigliani and Richard Brumberg’s life cycle model, economists have described 
the spending people engage in when they expect their fortunes to rise across 
their lifetime as “consumption smoothing.” The theory suggests that higher 
spending—and taking on debt—in young adult life reflects the anticipation of 
increased future income and the desire for relatively stable consumption across 
the decades. In turn this spending raises near-term consumption toward the 
higher levels of well-paid middle age, “smoothing” the graphed curve.
The projective fictions of consumption smoothing enable economists to 
make macro-level predictions about the economy and guide policy toward gov-
ernment goals. Guyer (2001) has noted that these postwar economic theories 
did far more than enable predictions and planning at the government level, 
though. In the unacknowledged background of these theories lay the very gov-
ernment policies they purported to guide. Higher education subsidies, home 
ownership incentives, and state pensions gave shape to the future for millions of 
American adults in the period. Economists’ ability to naturalize the fictions of a 
generic life course and its operations depended on government institutions that 
rendered privileged lives relatively predictable.
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Economic theory promoted, rather than simply reflected, an imaginative 
vision of family futures and the operations that would bring them about: house-
hold budgeting and planning. In economists’ expert modeling, citizens would 
be able to anticipate the broad outlines of their life’s course and save and spend 
accordingly. Planning for a household future became the definition of consumer 
rationality at this intersection of theory and federal policy. But what kind of 
planning was shaped at this nexus? And what is its relation to the form of plan-
ning today?
Mid-century projective fictions established the conditions for what I call 
“near-term prudence,” a style of future-oriented reasoning organized around 
preferences related to the imminent future rather than around long-term sce-
narios.6 with projective fictions in the hands of the experts and policymakers, 
families could focus on future-oriented decisions over which they had signifi-
cant control. A regime of near-term prudence meant that economic decisions 
could be based in experience and local information that would consistently yield 
the planned-for results. These policies set the expectation that individuals and 
the families can and should navigate their own course. only those left out of 
or expelled from its framework needed to be engaged in the kind of planning 
taken for granted today.7 For the designated beneficiaries of life-cycle institu-
tions, as Guyer has argued, “active calculation becomes optional” (2016: 3). This 
alleviated both the institutional and the moral responsibility to plan.
The mid-century regime of near-term prudence departed from early twen-
tieth-century history. with sufficient prosperity and longevity, defining a future 
6. Jane Guyer has noted the shift in capitalism from a mid-century focus on the “near 
future” to the contemporary “evacuation” of that temporal zone. She argues that a 
bifurcated temporality has risen in its stead, one oriented to the present and to long-
term futures without consideration to intermediate horizons. Although I demur 
from the idea of this evacuation, I am inspired by Guyer’s incitement to gauge 
the conflicting temporalities within capitalist political economy (Guyer 2016: 
89–109). like Guyer, Bill Sewell argues that the conflicting temporalities within 
capitalism—which he characterizes as simultaneously “lumpy” and “eventful” and 
“smooth” and “predictable”—constitute a critical area of investigation for socially 
and historically minded analysts (Sewell 2008).
7. See Cybelle Fox, Three worlds of relief (2012) on the logic of “expulsion” from 
government programs directed at latino immigrants, and Margot Canaday, The 
straight state (2009) on the expulsion of homosexual service members from the 
benefits of the GI Bill through dishonorable discharge. on the exclusions of African 
Americans from Social Security and other federal programs, see Ira Katznelson, 
When affirmative action was white (2005).
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and fashioning a pathway toward its realization emerged as a distinctly modern 
problem in that period. For instance, the household budget as we know it came 
into being through the Home Economics movement of the Progressive Era. 
These educators, writers, and activists worked to organize middle-class house-
holds around the goals of “social advancement” or “higher life,” propelling a 
family to higher moral standing through more efficient management of the 
home.8 Home economists’ columns and manuals for instruction promoted the 
budget as an essential tool for both projecting a future life and for realizing its 
operational assumptions.
According to the home economists, budgeting began with husbands and 
wives constructing a vision of their future lives. together, preferably even with 
their children, the couple would define goals for education and training, spend-
ing and saving for the family. The household budget would guide the family 
toward social and economic advancement, the moral good as defined by the 
same set of reformers.
The budget book encoded these goals and set the terms for their achieve-
ment, directing spending and saving at weekly and yearly intervals along the 
way. These middle-class budgets placed responsibility in the hands of the nu-
clear family organized around the companionate marriage (itself a projective 
fiction of future-oriented conventions) and the goals of future family economic 
and moral growth. The responsibility for moral growth was mirrored in the re-
sponsibility to plan as a method of achieving the family’s goals.
The period from the Depression through the aftermath of world war II 
developed the institutions of household planning as we know them today. In 
particular, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s landmarks, the 1935 Social Security Act 
and the GI Bill of 1944, established social policies that lay a path toward to the 
future for American citizens and took the responsibility for future projections 
into the hands of the federal government.9
8. My research into the history of the household budget has focused on the home 
economics movement and its promotion of future-oriented budgeting for middle-
class families. I’ve found the writings of Christine Frederick, the home economics 
entrepreneur and columnist for Ladies Home Journal from 1912–19 to be particularly 
helpful in constructing this history.
9. As Jennifer Mittelstadt (2015) has documented, the US military has offered 
a comprehensive welfare plan for soldiers and veterans that has expanded in 
significance with the rise of a volunteer army and the parallel decline in other 
welfare supports outside the service. As with other welfare programs, I argue that 
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together, the Social Security Act and the GI Bill created a powerful frame-
work for envisioning family life over time and across generations. Based on pro-
jective fictions of family form and working lives, they established a defined life 
course and intergenerational pathway for millions. This is well known: educa-
tion and training programs lifted GIs’ incomes, while home values raised them 
up on the equity escalator, and Social Security alleviated the burden of caring 
for their parents and, eventually, themselves.
The details of these landmark policies and their subprovisions tell an impor-
tant story and one that usually goes unnoticed. The GI Bill provided supports 
across a set of key life moments. These policies established an “arc of intermedi-
ate links,” to use Guyer’s term (Guyer 2001). For younger adults, the bill offered 
skills, workforce credentials, and an asset (their home) that would grow over the 
course of the husband’s thirty-year working life. Arriving at the veteran’s mid-
dle age, Social Security provided support for the GI’s aging parents. later, at 
old age, support was available for the GIs themselves. Examining these policies 
from the perspective of the state, we can call them the “safety net,” providing 
security by taking on individual risks. looking at these programs from the posi-
tion of the household shows something different, and complementary: These 
policies created a decision field where GIs and their families could train their 
foresight on the near-term future and exercise prudence.
let’s start with the education and training provision of the GI Bill. The 
numbers of users were tremendous and so were the benefits: 7.8 million citi-
zens—51 percent of returning vets—used this provision. The benefit offered up 
to 48 months of education or training. This included all tuition and fees, up to 
$500 per year (which covered all university costs at the time) and delivered a 
stipend to the GIs that increased in generosity with marriage and kids (Mettler 
2007: 7). The veterans Administration (vA) paid colleges and universities di-
rectly, and universities welcomed veterans by increasing seats and by building 
married student housing.
The GI Bill defined an avenue of household formation, upward mobility, 
and economic stability over the arc of a family life. This is particularly clear 
when looking at education and training in connection to the housing loan guar-
antees also offered to the returning GIs. From 1944 to 1952, the vA backed 
it is important to think not only about the services and security offered through 
the military but also the provision of a predictable life course that makes military 
service appealing.
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nearly 2.4 million home loans for world war II veterans. This provision, of-
ten credited for the growth of suburban America, also established a model for 
family responsibilities and working life tied to home ownership. The program 
provided a clear path for stability across decades and generations and offered a 
set of working assumptions from which GIs and their families could reap the 
benefit of full American citizenship.10
The provision didn’t merely support GIs and their families, though; it also 
boosted the banks. The GI Bill guaranteed loans for up to half the purchase 
price of the home, securing the ability of banks and financial firms to recoup 
potential losses. At the time this was viewed as the creation of a virtuous cycle: 
By restructuring risk, banks could write loans to veterans with low interest rates; 
low capital costs allowed the GIs to purchase and build equity in their homes; 
security helped GIs shelter and provide for their new families. within that arc, 
consumption took off.11
The home ownership provision created a direct and long-term relationship 
between veterans’ and government’s projective fictions, all organized through 
the financial system. The thirty-year loan operationalized a key government 
projective fiction: a population of homeowners bound by a three-decade loan 
and to a working life that would support it. At the same time, the loan enabled a 
young GI’s family to wrap its individual projective future around the instrument 
that delivered the home, tying the stream of their wages to the future growth of 
their nascent family. The government-backed mortgage also normalized long-
term debt relations with banks. They taught GI families that a large debt mobi-
lized through a financial institution was the way to give institutional backing to 
their own imagined future.
The GI Bill in particular was an especially unusual policy in US history 
because it supported young adults during a critical period for establishing a 
household and for gaining the means of economic attainment later on (Sckopol 
1997). one notable feature of the program was its regularity and ease of use 
(Mettler 2007). The direct institutional supports required little in the way of 
thought or advocacy on the part of the GIs and their families. The GIs reported 
10. Historians and urban planners credit the growth of suburbia in large part to the 
home mortgage subsidies of the GI Bill and the patterns of family and residence 
it encouraged. See, for instance, Kenneth t. Jackson, Crabgrass frontier: The 
suburbanization of the United States (1987); and Dolores Hayden, Building suburbia: 
Green fields and urban growth, 1820–2000 (2004).
11. See louis Hyman, Debtor nation: The history of America in red ink (2011).
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with gratitude that the vA was quick to enroll them and consistent in support-
ing them during their years in the program. The housing provision—except in 
conditions of default—worked without obvious government mediation between 
banks and households, rendering its intervention invisible in the GI’s monthly 
payment checks, which they wrote to local banks.12 Social Security raised the 
final strut in the infrastructure of near-term prudence for the GIs. The first 
regular, monthly Social Security checks started arriving in January 1940, reliev-
ing at least some of the financial pressure to care for parents in their old age as 
the GIs planned for their own future.
Instead of focusing on how to best access the necessary capital and project 
economic futures, these programs enabled participants to focus on questions 
whose answers they could reasonably judge from their own current experience. 
what kinds of work would they find satisfying and profitable? what neighbor-
hood could they afford to live in? Thanks to government guarantees, GIs could 
answer these questions without having to worry about anticipating the fluctua-
tions of the credit markets or its requirements of them. These institutions made 
it possible for members of a family to look toward the future and roughly ap-
proximate what was ahead. They generated enough stability to develop limited 
foresight, and kept beneficiaries’ attentions trained on their local environments.
Mid-century policy did not cover all Americans, however, as has been well 
documented. Through exclusion of certain kinds of work and workers, Social 
Security distributed benefits in ways that gave weak or no support to large 
groups of American citizens, for instance, to women’s domestic labor (both paid 
and unpaid), and to categories of work done at the time by African Americans 
(like farm work and, again, domestic labor). Gay and African American veter-
ans also faced restrictions in using the benefits of the GI Bill. Until the 1990s, 
homosexual activity was grounds for dishonorable discharge from the armed 
forces, and disqualification from GI Bill eligibility. African Americans suffered 
a different kind of discrimination too. The federal Home owner’s loan Corpo-
ration defined African American and mixed-race neighborhoods as financially 
risky, which led banks to deny mortgage loans to black vets, denying them the 
full benefit of their military service.13
12. Suzanne Mettler (2011) argues that such programs result in a “submerged state” 
whose benefits are invisible to those they benefit.
13. Even a single black family conferred a “mixed race” categorization on a neighborhood. 
See the “Mapping Inequality” project for a digital library of the HolC maps across 
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By negatively defining the conditions for full participation, these exclusions 
lent force to the moral power of Social Security and the GI Bill. The programs 
established a powerful “ethical affordance” (Keane 2015), that planning consti-
tuted the grounds for household economic virtue. The excluded provided the 
critical negative case: they proved the virtue of those who could and did follow 
the projective fictions promoted by the programs from which they benefitted.
Exclusion from the policies left the excluded open to the moral invective that 
they did not or could not “plan”—that they were not future-oriented enough. 
From the 1970s on, anthropologists and sociologists alike have contradicted this 
charge with detailed descriptions, showing that planning under conditions of 
economic deprivation directs families’ investments toward expanding and deep-
ening relationships with kin and close friends rather than toward the formal 
mechanisms of saving and investment—like bank accounts—that undergird 
the planning apparatus (Stack 1974; Edin and lein 1997; venkatesh 2006). 
without participation in the institutions that support the projective fictions of 
middle-class life, poor, often minority, citizens could not and did not plan in 
ways familiar to the white middle class. to reap the moral rewards of planning 
a citizen must be included in the projective fictions of policy and of the formal 
and lay economic theories they support.
The social supports of mid-century together created an infrastructure for 
foresight, delivered by top-down powers and taken up as central projects of 
family life by their beneficiaries. today the regime of foresight has changed, but 
core projective fictions remain, like the middle-class family and its trajectory as 
well as, of course, the moral responsibility to plan.
Distant Modeling
Planning today operates within a different regime of foresight. Economic con-
ditions have changed, as have the policies that enable planning. Instability in 
the job market, short-term and contract employment, financial market vola-
tility, precarious housing values, and rising college costs have transformed the 
landscape in which middle-class families must craft projective fictions. today’s 
policies focus families on a long-term future, one often decades away. This fu-
ture is made up of dissonant time frames established through a cacophony of 
the United States. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=4/36.71/-
96.93&opacity=0.8&text=intro.
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government programs and financial instruments, asking families to plan one, 
eighteen, thirty years out (and all of that at once) while carrying debts that tie 
future funds to past decisions. Planning relies on the possibility of crafting fu-
ture visions, at the same time that the complexity of the scenarios today troubles 
the very idea of projection.
Comparison to the social policy of mid-century can be tricky since coherent 
policies like Social Security and the GI Bill have been replaced by investment 
choices, tax breaks, and loans of varied interest rates, which work through tech-
nical means and through the private household. Governments working through 
financial institutions is not new, however. An icon of New Deal liberalism, the 
GI Bill housing provision also operated through private banks and its education 
provision worked through payments to colleges and universities, both public and 
private, changing the terms of the school’s broader finances. US policies have 
long delivered government direction through private financing. today, however, 
the policies are layered and sometimes conflict. Contemporary planning requires 
families to assemble a set of projective fictions from these policy fragments.
Planning for a child’s future education represents a hallmark of middle-class 
and aspiring US parenthood. Those who plan for college are the inheritors of 
the cultural goals of the returning GIs. For most American households today, 
college education—like the other major mainstream goals of home ownership 
and retirement—requires government supports. Few will have either the cash to 
pay out of pocket or have access to grant funds to cover the total cost. Govern-
ment programs deliver a clear message to aspiring students and their parents, 
one very different from the college supports of mid-century: They should begin 
planning to pay for college early in a child’s life. Children’s college education 
requires families to plan decades in advance. Government programs define what 
financial paths families can and should consider, communicating to applicants 
that a solution lies in combining long-term investment strategies with debt 
across the college years.
As I have seen in my research, college-educated parents have learned this 
lesson. They hold themselves responsible for beginning to think about children’s 
educations shortly after they are born. what will they have to pay? And how 
will they manage those costs? These questions assert themselves across their 
lives as they raise their children. with college expenses outstripping inflation 
and wages no longer able to cover it all, financial planning and its vehicles—in-
vestment programs and loans—extend the primary path for securing a college 
education.
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Even the act of contemplating college launches families into a set of fictional 
projections vastly different from the conventions of mid-century foresight. The 
rising cost of higher education places a significant burden of payment on fami-
lies, even those whose aid packages will diminish the often-shocking sticker 
price. And for those who have the possibility to save, anticipating college ex-
penses requires elaborate projections. How much money should be socked away 
for college when enrollment might be eighteen years in the future? And how 
should they invest it? what will be the shortfall that might be financed with 
debt? when spring of the enrollment year arrives, how should families account 
for their income and assets to student aid agencies? when the “expected family 
contribution” decision arrives in the mail from the Department of Education, 
how should families plan to make up the balance? what loans should they take 
on and how much: subsidized, unsubsidized, Parent Plus, private loans, or home 
equity? Addressing these questions directs parents through a machinery of pro-
jective fictions, with a structure and plot far more complicated than anything 
the beneficiaries of the GI Bill could have imagined.
Consider state-based 529 plans. These tax-advantaged accounts encourage 
parents and other relatives to begin saving early in their child’s life for their 
eventual college enrollment. only the child’s social security number and the 
contributor’s own tax information is necessary to open an account. 529 plans 
allow family members to contribute up to $10,000 a year without paying cur-
rent state taxes on the sum and the federal government sweetens the investment 
with its own incentives to be gleaned on withdrawal. within the 529 plan, con-
tributors select a mutual fund in which to invest. The program’s design assumes 
that funds will grow as the child approaches college enrollment and throughout 
the college years. Funds can also be used for graduate school education, and if 
there are sums left over, can be transferred to siblings.
Uncertainty is a constitutive feature of these plans, however, as is the mo-
rality of planning. New york State 529 promotions intone, “one of the most 
important things you can do for your children is to save for their future. Many 
of us know we can’t save all of the money we need for our child’s college tuition. 
But every dollar you do save now is a dollar you and your child may not have to 
borrow later” [my emphasis].14
14. https://www.nysaves.org/home/college-savings-articles/content-secondary-col0/
how-much-do-you-need-for-college.html.
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Planners must then begin to craft their projective fictions, assessing future 
economic conditions, weighing the possibilities of gain and loss in securities 
investments, gauging the path of interest rates and inflation, anticipating the 
acceleration of college prices, and evaluating investment instruments for their 
effectiveness in this landscape. But how much should a parent save? what will 
college cost in 2035? These questions are answerable only with the projective 
fictions of financial models. 529 contributors must assume a growth rate for 
college costs and another for financial market rise (or decline). They also must 
model changes in their own nearer-term costs. If they invest too much and need 
the cash, they will have to pay not only the taxes owed, but also a penalty for 
early withdrawal. Assembling projective fictions requires students and families 
to act as specialists with regard to the complex expert system of finance.
once the investment is made, the projective fictions shift to the experts 
behind the programs. The New york 529 assures potential investors: “you’ll be 
able to take advantage of professional investment management from vanguard, 
one of the world’s largest and most respected investment management firms.” 
Still, in order to construct their basket of mutual funds, these experts face simi-
lar uncertainties that require assessing the potential of individual companies’ 
stock growth, of the future of industries, and of overall patterns of market vola-
tility, or of assessing the future performance of other fund managers based on 
their past performance.
Even when outsourcing the modeling to professionals, parents need to 
have predictions about their own behavioral reactions. These will be completely 
opaque to their arms-length Fidelity investment managers. will they be able 
to tolerate a downturn in the financial markets that may place their daughter’s 
college fund in jeopardy? will they adjust the portfolio, appropriately reacting 
to changing economic conditions? or will they simply cross their fingers and 
hope?
Models of parents’ own future behavior come into play as they choose in 
which among New york 529’s sixteen funds to invest. Thirteen individual port-
folios are adjustable according to “your own investment strategy and risk toler-
ance.” For those who anticipate their own failures to monitor and appropriately 
adjust their investments, three age-based options automatically reinvest assets as 
children age, increasing conservative investments as college matriculation draws 
near. The “age-adjusted” options transfer the responsibility of adjusting invest-
ments from the contributor to the vanguard manager. But either way, managing 
the account demands models of growth rates, risks, returns, and behavior that 
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will guide decisions about how much to invest and how to invest and reinvest 
it. The family’s financial reasoning relies on this layering of projective fictions.
As college matriculation comes closer and admissions decisions begin to roll 
in, families are thrust into another set of models, ones imposed by the federal 
government and colleges: the model of financial need. These models carry a 
different projective time frame. They assess the need over the coming next year 
by pressing the variables of last year’s income and expenses through a hidden 
algorithm.
In the months before a child enrolls in college or begins a new school year, 
the families of rising freshman go through the spring ritual of filling out Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA is a list of 108 fields, 
each of which asks for a detail of the student’s household, earnings, savings, and 
national service status. Here are a few:
35. Student’s Adjusted Gross Income  45c. Student’s Child Support Received
73. Parents’ number of family members  87. Parents’ 2015 Exemptions Claimed
when the student or parent hits enter, the US Department of Education takes 
over, weighing eligibility for grants and loans and determining the Expected 
Family Contribution, the amount the government requires families to put to-
ward their child’s college expenses. Access to crucial financial assistance hang 
on this calculation, particularly subsidized government loans that are offered at 
a low interest rate. College-based student aid also depends on this calculation. 
Colleges take the FAFSA’s information into account, sometimes supplementing 
it with their own model of family need. The amount of private loans—student, 
home equity, or credit card—also hangs on that number, since they are an alter-
native (and mostly higher cost) supplement to federal loans. Banks offer each 
of these private loans according to their own carefully calibrated models of risk 
and repayment. The federal models of need also interact with private risk assess-
ments, as some federal loans hinge on private risk models. The Department of 
Education gives access to parent loans only after a review of family financial data.
The models of need and expected family contribution also interact with the 
projective fictions of earlier financial planning. For instance, monies that have 
grown inside a state 529 plan will not be held against the family in the federal 
government’s calculation of their need. Savings account balances that have not 
been invested in the governmental projective fictions of college, however, must 
be reported.
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As in the mid-twentieth-century programs, exclusions again structure the 
morality of planning. The results of privileged behaviors, like investing in edu-
cation savings accounts and in home equity, receive a support that is at once 
financial and moral. 529 investments and house equity remain outside of the 
Department of Education’s calculation of need. Those who have followed the 
government’s model of a family organized around the projective fictions reap 
both greater assistance and the reward of their government’s approval. Exclu-
sion acts at another level here too. Those who have been unable to save, whose 
wages haven’t offered more than life’s basic needs, are taxed twice: first, by ex-
clusion from the benefits from financial planning’s vehicles, and second by the 
sense of failure that follows from the moral demand to plan.
Planning today stretches projective fictions across many years. For parents 
who want to send their children to college this can be almost two decades or 
more. Government and financial industry policies and instruments give families 
the narrative and the tools with which to engage this long-term future. They 
have created a situation in which families must model both their lives and com-
ing financial conditions; they must engage the projective fictions they are given 
and, at the same time, create their own. Their virtue as parents and citizens 
depends on this act, while the outcome hangs on whether their modeling will 
approximate a future yet to come.
REGIMES oF FoRESIGHt
Planning anchors both regimes of foresight examined above. In both, the gov-
ernance of household policy produced conditions for calculation to guide “re-
sponsible” citizens toward their future lives. tapping into an enduring moral 
imperative, policies from wwII onward have sought to establish prescience in 
American middle-class citizens. Citizens’ responsibility to plan has remained 
constant but the tools and calculative practices of foresight have changed.
A temporal difference is central to these shifts. In mid-century, policies kept 
families focused on the near-term; today families must look decades into the 
future. This difference has reorganized the calculative nature of planning. while 
the rise of the household budgeting elaborated a moral requirement to plan, 
by mid-century, financial supports meant that planning itself carried few de-
mands. Mid-century institutions elaborated a stable life course and organized 
household planning around a set of near-term problems. Families could rely 
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on economic information from their local environments to develop judgments 
about the activities that would yield the future their family desired. I’ve called 
this form of reasoning near-term prudence. Families with access to these sup-
ports could advance their lives along a sanctioned path that included higher 
education. The moral economy of planning distributed virtue to those that acted 
with forethought defined by a near-future in which they could reasonably pro-
ject their expectations and desires.
today, foresight involves decades of anticipation. Planning requires families 
to engage in practices that resemble those of financial experts, and household 
finance policies present tools around which to craft models of layered projec-
tions. There has been also been shift in the subjects targeted for this work of 
financial fashioning. In the mid twentieth-century, household finance policies 
were addressed specifically to GIs and the white middle class; today parallel 
policies hail nominally universal subjects. In both, exclusions from the planning 
apparatus buttress its moral power.
tracing this shift in regimes of foresight shows that the way capitalism or-
ganizes time both shapes rationality and defines notions of virtue for its citizens. 
The case of higher education allows us to see that as family futures have been 
stretched across longer time horizons, the rationality involved in planning fam-
ily futures has been transformed. In this shift, assembling projective fictions 
and acts of modeling have become moral staples of middle-class family life. 
Still, current household finance policies and their promoters follow the mid-
century moral assumptions of planning; failure to progress along a middle-class 
life arc indicates either self-inflicted errors of calculation or an abdication of 
responsibility.
Under financial capitalism, the future—often the distant future—has be-
come a central category for citizens’ household operations, one that recursively 
links household finance policies and family behaviors. The future has always 
been a central matter of family life, involving its central reproductive concerns. 
today, however, the distant future is also a shaping force of the family, not only 
as an intimate personal unit but also as a constitutive unit of American political 
and economic life and the object of future-oriented policy.
within the larger conversation of this special section, closely examining 
these evolving regimes of foresight also leads to new conclusions about the real-
ity at the foundation of the economy. Historically, this reality was linked to na-
ture and human reproduction, in contrast to the deviant reproduction of finance. 
Although this division continues today in economic concepts and vernacular 
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understandings, families and their futures have become dependent on finance in 
essential ways. As I’ve shown, there is a tight feedback loop between the policies 
and governing institutions of finance and the modeling practices of families as 
they operate under the contemporary regime of foresight. In this system, the 
reality to which families are responsible is essentially financial. In the act of 
crafting projective fictions and modeling futures, they create family life. That 
which stood against finance is now founded in it.
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chapter ten
Smuggling realities
On numbers, borders, and performances
Fernando Rabossi
If we follow the figures about smuggling that appear frequently in media re-
ports in Brazil, we could conclude that there is grounded knowledge about the 
phenomenon. The same figures are used by and within different media and they 
are presented with regularity, accompanying the (reported) growing volume of 
smuggled products. Nonetheless, if we pay attention to the chronology of those 
numbers—their sudden emergence in the public discourse—to the actors enun-
ciating them, and to the strategies used to publicize them, many questions arise. 
How are these figures produced? Who produces them? In which debates are 
these figures mobilized?
In this chapter, I will describe the efforts made to portray the so-called real-
ity of smuggling by analyzing the instruments used, the actors involved, and 
the effects they produce. It is claimed that the Brazilian economy suffers great 
losses due to smuggling; provoked by the notion of this great figure, I discovered 
a transformation at the level of compositions, discourses, and practices that re-
vealed the growing importance of smuggling as a productive trope for interven-
ing in Brazilian political and economic dynamics.
Three fields of inquiry converge in my interest for these numbers: first, the 
economic practices that lie outside official accounts—what has been called 
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informal or second economy (Hart 1973; MacGaffey et al. 1991); second, the 
government of ordinary economic practices, particularly through the Fou-
cauldian notions of illegalismes and governmentality (Foucault 1975, [1977–78] 
2004); and finally, the ethnography of public numbers—their production, circu-
lation, and operation as instruments of government (Desrosières 1993; Porter 
1995; Neiburg 2006, 2010; Hull 2012; Guyer 2016).
The estimates for smuggling have always surprised me, doing long-term eth-
nographic research on the dynamic border trade between Brazil and Paraguay. 
My research focused, precisely, on what doesn’t count: the jobs and the wealth 
produced in those circuits. Is it possible to calculate the losses that smuggling 
produces without considering its gains? This is a naïve way of positing the ques-
tion, of course. I raise it, precisely, to underline the perspectives that can inform 
our approaches to these issues and the limits that they have—here, I want to 
emphasize the selective character of the choices undertaken to depict the “real-
ity of smuggling,” which I will describe in this chapter.
Analyzing the estimates for smuggling led me to investigate definitions, 
measurement techniques, and models of analysis. In part, this text is about 
that, although it is much more than that. This is a text about the orchestrated 
production of definitions of reality constructed by certain actors, conveyed 
by the media, and expected to reach very specific goals—specifically, a re-
ality that is productive, both in terms of political articulations and of legal 
transformations.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I present the coverage by the 
main Brazilian television journal of the 2015 National Day to Combat Smug-
gling. Smuggling—suddenly—became such a huge problem in Brazil that even 
a National Day to Combat Smuggling was established. But when did that hap-
pen? Who was responsible for highlighting that “problem”? Next, I describe 
the legitimation of the discussion about smuggling in press conferences and 
through seminars organized by the print media (Folha de São Paulo and Correio 
Braziliense), which constitute crucial contexts for the presentation of “facts”—
through the mobilization of research data—and proposals. Data from research 
became a crucial element to objectify a reality that—it is said—is considered to 
be known but “is not envisaged in its real dimension and consequences.” The 
numbers produced by those researches are facts mobilized through the media 
and incorporated in official discourses. It is crucial to analyze these numbers 
in order to understand their performative character. Finally, I explore some of 
the effects they produce: the legitimization of corporate and industrial groups’ 
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claims, the spatialization of the problem of smuggling, and the criminalization 
of certain economic practices.
The issues analyzed in this essay are not unique to Brazil. As Peter Andreas 
and Kelly Greenhill pointed out in the introduction of Sex, drugs, and body 
counts: The politics of numbers in global crime and conflict,
these difficult to observe phenomena are not perceived to be “real” until they are 
quantified and given a number. Consequently, death tolls, refugee flows, traffick-
ing, and smuggling estimates are commonly inflated, deflated, or simply fabricat-
ed, all in the service of political goals. Identifying the sources of such numbers—
as well as recognizing the agendas of their producers and proliferators—can be 
critically important in helping to mitigate some of their more pernicious effects. 
(Andreas and Greenhill 2010: 6)
I align myself with these interests, following a growing literature on control 
policies of border flows and markets in Brazil—particularly in its Paraguayan 
border1—and copyright enforcement and antipiracy strategies;2 elements that 
are crucial in order to understand the growing importance of smuggling as a 
productive trope.
Both the contexts for the presentation of the problem of smuggling and 
the facts staged in those events through numbers need to be scrutinized in or-
der to understand the interested nature of the interpretations presented in and 
through them. The contexts for the numbers were not the natural emanation 
of journalistic interest; neither were the numbers the descriptive expression of 
real dimensions. However, the interested claims presented through smuggling 
are gradually heeded—tax reduction, legal transformations—and the reality of 
smuggling constructed through these numbers and emplaced in certain borders 
and slums have concrete consequences for everyday life in those spaces. In sum-
mary, the chapter seeks to analyze the relationship between performances, num-
bers, and performativity in contemporary discourses on contraband in Brazil.3
1. See Rabossi (2004, 2013); Pinheiro-Machado (2010); Cardin (2011); Francisco 
(2014); Renoldi (2015). For the Brazilian border with uruguay, see Dorfman 
(2015).
2. See Mizukami et al. (2011); Dent (2012, 2015); Castro and Mizukami (2013); 
Bandeira (2013).
3. As developed in performance studies, I use of the concept of performance as special 
events where participants “are thoroughly conscious of their action or practice as a 
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PeRFoRMING “PRoteStS” AND PRoDuCING “NAtIoNAl 
DAyS”
on March 3, 2016, William Bonner, the anchorman of Jornal Nacional—the 
primetime news program of Brazilian television—announced that “This Thurs-
day, the National Day to Combat Smuggling, there were several protests de-
manding more measures from the government.” An off-screen voice described 
the protests while showing them: “In Brasilia, under rain, protesters walked 
before the esplanade of the Ministries and stopped in front of the presidential 
building, the Palacio do Planalto. There was also a protest in São Paulo, in front 
of the government house, the Palacio dos Bandeirantes.” The image switched to 
a man throwing cigarettes into a machine, while announcing that the Brazilian 
Association for Combating Counterfeiting (ABCF) destroyed smuggled ciga-
rettes. After presenting several figures and places, another journalist appeared 
in front of a road saying, “every time that a product enters in Brazil without 
paying taxes, Brazil is losing. last year, smuggling rose 15% and produced a loss 
of R$115 billon,” equivalent to uS$30 billion at the time. on screen, the source 
was displayed: IDeSF.4 “Who produces according to the law and pays their 
taxes, complain of unfair competition” continued the off-screen voice, showing 
a seminar room with a table with eight speakers—seven men, one woman—and 
a canvas behind that read, National Day to Combat Smuggling. In a corridor 
outside the seminar room, evandro Guimaraes, president of etCo,5 said that 
jobs, industrial activity, and all sectors were affected by smuggling, adding: “I 
would say that everything remains to be done at every government level.” less 
than two and a half minutes later,6 William Bonner reappeared on screen to pre-
sent the government version in ten seconds: the Ministry of Justice said that it 
performance to be witnessed or participated in as such” (Kapferer and Hobart 2005: 
11). The concept of performativity, although inspired in Michel Callon’s proposal 
of studying the performative effects of economics on the economy (Callon 1998) 
and its subsequent developments (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Neiburg 2006), 
it is taken in a broader sense to analyze the performative effects of discussions 
legitimated by numbers and staged in particular performances.
4. IDeSF stands for Instituto de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social de Fronteiras 
(Institute for economic and Social Development of Borders).
5. etCo stands for Instituto Brasileiro de Ética Concorrencial (Brazilian Institute for 
ethics in Competition).
6. 2:16 minutes, to be exact.
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had improved the structure of the Federal Police and the Federal Road Police at 
the border, and that it was carrying out special operations in the states of Mato 
Grosso do Sul and Paraná.7
The coverage by the Jornal Nacional can be summarized as the presenta-
tion of certain facts—the protests and the destruction of smuggled merchan-
dise—and the interpretations given by several actors spurred by a national 
commemoration. However, when analyzed in detail, alongside the reports that 
were published in the newspapers, a different picture emerges. As I will try 
to demonstrate, what were presented as facts and interpretations were, in fact, 
performances and contexts for normative discourses. The same actors that or-
chestrated media coverage invented events such as the National Day to Combat 
Smuggling.
If we look at the images of the protest in Brasilia and São Paulo, we can 
see that the characters, the posters, and the aesthetic are all exactly the same. 
All the participants (almost sixty in each case) wore the same t-shirts—white 
with black stripes—that resembled prison uniforms. Many of them, especially 
men, used black knit caps and black gloves. They look like lego characters of 
city burglars.8
The posters were the same in content, format, and material. They presented 
different slogans. “Brazil, smuggler country.” “Welcome smugglers, our borders 
are open for you.” “Paraguayan cigarettes, national preference.” “More taxes, 
more cigarettes from Paraguay.” “Government and smugglers, united to end 
your job.” A photograph of Paraguayan president Horacio Cartes, with the mot-
to: “our hero, our president.” Written on a huge packet of cigarettes, a question: 
“economy going wrong? Join cigarette smuggling, the fastest growing industry 
in the country.” In São Paulo, there were a lot of balloons saying: “Blah, blah, 
blah,” mocking the governor who said that the fight against smuggling would 
be a priority.
Given the peculiar characteristic of the protests—people using the same 
costumes and carrying banners put together by the same hands (see fig. 1)—it is 
noteworthy that neither the news programs nor the newspapers mention any-
thing about that aesthetic redundancy. I only found an explanation regarding 
7. Jornal Nacional, “National Day to Combat Smuggling has protests,” March 3, 2016, 
22h20, Rede Globo, Channel 4 VHF ( Jornal Nacional 2016).
8. See http://brickset.com/sets/853092-1/City-Burglars-Magnet-Set, corresponding 
to the 853092 City Burglars Magnet Set, released in 2011.
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the nature of the protests in the website of the National Confederation of In-
dustry (CNI 2016). At the protests, we can see the same numbers and details 
presented as we saw exhibited in Jornal Nacional. The activities displayed during 
the National Day to Combat Smuggling were organized by the Movimento em 
Defesa do Mercado Legal Brasileiro (Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian 
licit Market), which gathers together entrepreneurs and representatives of dif-
ferent economic sectors. The protestors were described as groups of “smugglers” 
that, in a “playful protest,” thanked the federal government for its inefficiency in 
combating smuggling, a practice that “only benefits organized crime.”
Figure 1: Protest against smuggling, in front of the Planalto Palace (Brasilia). Credit: 
Antonio Cruz / Agência Brasil.9
The Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian licit Market was created 
in September 2014, when the Instituto Brasileiro de Ética Concorrencial (etCo) 
and the Forum Nacional contra a Pirataria e a Ilegalidade (FNCP), together with 
eighteen associations from several economic sectors, presented a manifesto in 
which they requested the support of candidates in the october presidential 
9. empresa Brasil de Comunicação S/A—eBC. licença Creative Commons 
Atribuição 3.0 Brasil.
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election toward the protection of the licit market.10 The subtitle of the mani-
festo expressed the scope of the point of view of enunciation: “A society united 
against smuggling, piracy, and counterfeiting.”11 The manifesto outlined twelve 
demands that revolve around the commitment to fighting piracy, smuggling, 
counterfeiting (tightening enforcement), the reduction of taxes, and the sim-
plification of bureaucratic procedures (liberalizing the economy). At the end of 
2014, the Associação Brasileira de Combate à Falsificação (Brazilian Association 
for Combating Counterfeiting—ABCF) and the Instituto de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social de Fronteiras (Institute for economic and Social Develop-
ment of Borders—IDeSF) also became organizers of the movement, which 
nowadays—they say—represents over seventy associations.
The Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian licit Market represented 
a new articulation of several organizations financed by corporate actors and 
industrial sectors that work on intellectual property lobbying and advocacy, an-
ticounterfeiting, and cross-industry coordination (Mizukami et al. 2011: 248ss). 
I will present the main institutional actors behind the constitution of the move-
ment in order to identify the interests they represent. The proliferation of acro-
nyms that makes the text difficult to follow can also be interpreted as part of the 
illegibility of this field.
The etCo was founded in 2003 by the initiative of the several enterpris-
es that constitute its current sectorial chambers: tobacco (Souza Cruz), beer 
(AmBev), soft drinks (Coca-Cola, Pepsi, AmBev), and fuel (SINDICoM—
Fuel Distribution Association). It promotes actions for a better business en-
vironment through studies, legislative lobbying, and education. It focuses on 
the fight against illegal commerce, smuggling, informality, tax evasion, and cor-
ruption. until october 2016, its president was publicist evandro do Carmo 
Guimarães, who worked from 1979 to 2011 for the Gupo Globo—the main 
10. The groups that signed the manifesto included several sectorial chambers (among 
others, tobacco, software, optic and sporting goods, and toys), interindustry 
coordinators, and intellectual property associations. The letter, with the complete 
list of institutions, can be found here: http://www.etco.org.br/11/wp-content/
uploads/Carta_etCo_v1_eMAIl_1.pdf.
11. Analyzing the meetings of the National Council on Combating Piracy and 
Intellectual Property Crimes (CNCP)—where the same groups analyzed here meet 
regularly with State officials—Pedro Francisco has already called attention to the 
use of the concept of civil society to nominate nonstate representatives, eclipsing 
the fact that they are private industrial representatives (Francisco 2014: 91).
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media corporation of Brazil—and was responsible for its institutional relation-
ships. The association’s headquarters is in São Paulo.
The FNCP (National Forum against Piracy and Illegality) was established 
in 2003 during the Parliamentary Commission for Inquiry on Piracy and it was 
legally constituted in 2004. Its focus is the combat of piracy and counterfeiting, 
having among its associates several companies—like HP, Microsoft, Colgate-
Palmolive, Xerox, Philip Morris, Souza Cruz—sectorial associations and other 
groups and organizations. Founded by the economist Alexandre Cruz, it has 
been headed from 2009 until 2016 by lawyer edson luiz Vismona, former 
Secretary of Justice of the state of São Paulo (2000–2002). In october 2016, 
Vismona assumed the direction of etCo, showing the close connections be-
tween these institutions. The association’s headquarters is also in São Paulo.
The IDeSF (Institute for economic and Social Development of Borders) 
was founded in 2013 in Foz do Iguaçu, in the border region with Paraguay and 
Argentina, the tri-Border Area.12 Its declared purpose is “to promote equality 
and integration in border regions,” through diagnosis, research, education, and 
training with government and society, for the protection of the national market 
and the formal economy. Its president, economist luis Stremel Barros, was pre-
viously (and for a long time) the representative of the Brazilian Association for 
Combating Counterfeiting (ABCF) in Foz do Iguaçu, before he came to run 
IDeSF. He is also the Paraná Regional Director of the ABCF.
12. The tri-Border Area—or tBA, as it is internationally known (the Triplice Fronteira, 
in Portuguese)—is the region where the borders of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina 
meet. Ciudad del este, in Paraguay, and Foz do Iguaçu, in Brazil, are important 
commercial cities with the presence of significant commercial diaspora groups like 
lebanese, Chinese, Koreans, and Indians, among others. During the 1980s, Ciudad 
del este (then Ciudad Presidente Stroessner) became the main market for imported 
goods in Brazil, and Foz do Iguaçu was the main market for Brazilian goods in 
Paraguay. Since the 1990s, the region has been denounced as a regional security 
threat. For an analysis of the commercial circuits of the region, see Rabossi (2012). 
For a description of the Arab and Muslim presence in the region, see Rabossi 
(2014). For a deep ethnographic analysis of microcredit and financial technologies 
in Ciudad del este, see Schuster (2015). Ieva Jusionyte (2015) undertook an 
ethnographic analysis of how security is perceived, constructed, and experienced 
through the lens of the media, particularly from the Argentinean side of the border. 
See Montenegro and Béliveau (2006) for an analysis of representations of the 
region. Carmen Ferradás (1998) also provides an anthropological analysis of the 
region.
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The Brazilian Association for Combating Counterfeiting (ABCF) rep-
resents companies like Abbot, AmBev, Caloi, Coca-Cola, Globo, H.Stern, 
Johnson & Johnson, Kaiser, levi, Motorola, Philips, Souza Cruz, unilever, Vo-
torantim, and others. It investigates and intervenes judicially in cases of coun-
terfeiting of their brands, and gives support to the enforcement agencies of the 
state. Rodolpho Ramazzini is the association’s main figure. Its headquarters is 
also in São Paulo.
As Pedro Francisco indicated in his research on Paraguayan cigarettes in 
Brazil while witnessing the emergence of IDeSF,
ABCF and IDeSF can be classified as operational Support organizations . . . 
with the provision of direct assistance to public authorities. . . . Assistance may 
be material—including direct funding through contributions—and logistical, 
with training and support for programs focused on repressive measures; and the 
advocating of interest in the form of public relations, lectures, research produc-
tion and marketing anti-smuggling, focusing on messages about the damages 
to consumer health and to the national economy and the constant reference to 
organized crime. The etCo and FNCP are crosscutting articulators, since they 
aggregate a number of stakeholders in the fight against illegal practices. Here, 
the modus operandi is also divided into two areas: lobby, with actions aimed 
directly to legislators, focused on specific legislative changes; and coordination 
of the activities above mentioned, between different sets of actors. Increasingly, 
it is this activity which is the main engine of the institutional system to com-
bat cigarette smuggling. (Mizukami et al. 2013: 49, quoted in Francisco 2014: 
94–95)
one of the first proposals of the Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian 
licit Market was the creation of the National Day to Combat Smuggling, to be 
observed annually on March 3. The aim was to establish a day for drawing the 
attention both of the government and of society to the problems of smuggling. 
The media presented the first National Day to Combat Smuggling on March 3, 
2015, without any reference to its unofficial character. The implicit officializa-
tion of the date in the media was possible thanks to the role played by some of 
its proponents: the president of etCo was the lobbyist of the main conglomer-
ate of Brazilian media for decades. on the other hand, the model of a national 
day to highlight a particular topic of the agenda of law enforcement was well 
known to etCo, FNCP, and ABCF actors. It had already been implemented 
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with the National Day of Combating Piracy and Bio-piracy, which was estab-
lished by federal law in 2005.13
CoNteXtS FoR NuMBeRS
The first edition of the National Day to Combat Smuggling was in 2015. The 
organizers prepared several main events, including the presentation of the re-
sults of research undertaken by the IDeSF, in Foz do Iguaçu, and a meeting at 
Brasília where the figures for smuggling and proposals for combating it were 
presented. each event was designed in accordance with a spatial inscription of 
the logic of governance: the border as the scene for the facts of smuggling; the 
capital city as the site for presenting demands to the government and influenc-
ing the legislative process.
In Foz do Iguaçu, which is one of the main points of entrance of mer-
chandise from Paraguay, the scene was prepared for the presentation of data 
on smuggling. In a press conference at the Brazilian federal revenue service 
agency headquarters, the president of IDeSF presented the results of The cost of 
smuggling, research that would henceforth provide the numbers quoted in every 
report on smuggling.14
At a modern convention center in Brasília, in the name of the Movement 
for the Defense of the Brazilian licit Market, the presidents of etCo and 
FNCP presented their demands: tightened controls at the border, a “positive 
agenda” for Brazil-Paraguay relationships to find alternatives to smuggling, and 
reduction of taxes for Brazilian products. Congressman efraim Filho, from the 
state of Paraíba and affiliated with the right-wing party DeM, presented the 
proposals that he was putting forward to Congress: the official constitution of 
the Parliamentary Front against Smuggling and Counterfeiting and a toughen-
ing of penalties against smuggling offenses.15
13. For an analysis of the Brazilian policies regarding piracy and the actors and 
coalitions that intervene in the field, see Mizukami et al. (2011). Their analysis was 
fundamental for my description and perspective.
14. The Receita Federal do Brasil (RFB) is a secretariat of the Ministry of Finance of 
Brazil. It administers the tax collection and the customs of Brazil.
15. The penalties for smuggling had already been modified in 2014 (law 13.008/14), 
following a proposal by congressman efraim Filho that created independent 
categories for crimes that had not been legally sanctioned as different infractions: 
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As the media treated the day as something given—particularly, the news 
programs of Rede Globo channels16—the intentions behind its creation were 
effaced and all that remained were the aims of its creators: to transform smug-
gling into a worrying problem that must worry everybody. The performance of 
two seminars organized by two of the main Brazilian journals, Folha de São Pau-
lo and Correio Braziliense, was another step in constructing the context wherein 
smuggling would be raised to a national problem.17
The multimedia project “everything about smuggling in Brazil” was organ-
ized by Folha de São Paulo, the newspaper of another key media group in Brazil, 
Grupo Folha. “everything about smuggling in Brazil” was the result of two 
months of research undertaken by thirty professionals that sought to map and 
explain smuggling in Brazil. on March 18–19, Folha de São Paulo organized the 
seminar “Smuggling in Brazil” where it analyzed the impact of smuggling on 
the Brazilian economy, the relation between smuggling and urban violence, and 
the means to combat it. The speakers were federal and state officials—including 
the Minister of Justice—businessmen, politicians, journalists, and the spokes-
men of the Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian licit Market. In fact, the 
project and the seminar were sponsored by etCo, FNCP, IDeSF, and ABCF.
contrabando (introduction of prohibited or regulated products) and descaminho 
(introduction of merchandises without paying taxes). While descaminho remains 
a crime with one- to four-year prison sentences, the penalty for contrabando rose 
from two years to five years of prison time, which means that there is the possibility 
of preventive prison, no chance of parole, and the crime now only prescribed after 
twelve (rather than eight) years. A new proposal (Pl 1530/2015) to penalize the 
drivers that transport contraband and the merchants that sell smuggled goods was 
sanctioned in January, 2019 (law Nº 13.804). The Parliamentary Front Against 
Smuggling and Counterfeiting was established on May 14, 2015, including 230 
members of the Congress and the Federal Senate and it is the parliamentary 
articulation for the modification of the law and for presenting demands to the 
government.
16. Besides Jornal Nacional presented above, see Jornal da Globo (Kirche 2015) and Bom 
Dia Brasil (2015).
17. Newspapers in Brazil are state-based, not national. In 2015, according to the 
Associação Nacional de Jornais (Newspaper National Association), based on data 
of the Instituto Verificador de Circulação (IVC), Folha de São Paulo was the third 
newspaper in circulation in printed version in the country—after Super Noticia 
(Minas Gerais) and O Globo (Rio de Janeiro). Correio Braziliense was the twentieth 
(ANJ 2016). If we include paid subscriptions with its digital version, Folha de São 
Paulo was the main journal in paid circulation in Brazil—with 335,895 daily readers 
in 2015—followed by O Globo and Super Noticia.
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Some months later, on october 6, 2015, the Correio Braziliense newspaper 
and etCo organized in Brasília the seminar “Smuggling in Brazil: Impacts 
and solutions.”18 The seminar was sponsored by etCo, IDeSF, FNCP, and 
ABCF, and was presented as an activity of the Movement for the Defense of the 
Brazilian licit Market. Many of the speakers had already been present in the 
other media events produced by the movement, together with representatives of 
the industry, and auditor of the Federal Audit Court and the Minister of Jus-
tice, José eduardo Cardozo.19 The numbers mobilized in its announcement and 
coverage were also present in the other events. “A crime that cost R$100 billion 
to the country,” was the headline in the newspaper the following day. A special 
issue on the seminar, entitled “Illegal market,” was published in the Correio Bra-
ziliense print edition on october 15, 2015.
In little more than a year, the same actors, numbers, and arguments ap-
peared repeatedly in the media, presenting smuggling as a huge problem for 
Brazil. Since the presentation of the Manifesto in Defense of the Brazilian 
licit Market that addressed the presidential candidates in 2014 election, the 
movement managed to produce the contexts for its own presentations: press 
conferences, a “national day,” and seminars in the newspapers. The centrality of 
the media coverage is crucial for us to understand the nature of these events: 
performances where certain facts and interpretations can be presented as news.20
The media attention that the movement gained was grounded in the tra-
jectory of some of its members and in the power of the companies that they 
represent. When the manifesto was launched in 2014, the coverage of Veja—
the leading weekly news magazine of Brazil, published by another media 
18. As the main newspaper of the capital city (seat of the political power of the country), 
Correio Braziliense is important for the composition of its audience, not for the 
numbers that it sells.
19. The participants at the Correio Braziliense seminar were evandro Guimaraes 
(etCo), efraim Filho (Federal Deputy), Rodolpho Ramazzini (ABCF), luciano 
Barros (IDeSF), edson Vismona (FNCP), the president of Souza Cruz (British 
American tobacco subsidiary), the president of Brazilian Association of Soft Drink 
and Non Alcoholic Beverages, Federal Audit Court auditor Mario Bertuol and the 
Minister of Justice, José eduardo Cardozo.
20. The repercussion of these events was a permanent preoccupation for the organizers 
of the movement. See, for example, the 176-page report produced by FSB—the 
main communication agency of Brazil—to etCo and FNCP, clipping all the 
media production about the presentation of the manifesto in September 2014 at 
the press conference in Brasilia (FSB 2014).
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conglomerate, Grupo Abril—made no reference in the title to smuggling or 
to the movement. “The return of evandro” was a small column, explaining that 
evandro Guimarães had assumed the direction of etCo, proposing to the 
presidential candidates several measures to combat smuggling and piracy. In 
an intimate tone, the text commented, “After a decade of services for Globo, 
evandro left his position as the official lobbyist of the station in 2011.”21 In fact, 
he stopped being the lobbyist of one company to become the lobbyist of several 
companies. It is no surprise that all the Globo channels treated etCo and the 
movement’s interpretations as “givens.” The main institutions of the movement 
sponsored “the interest” on smuggling of the Folha de São Paulo and Correio 
Braziliense; journals that produced seminars and special issues on the topic. The 
presence of the Ministry of Justice in the seminars organized by the newspapers 
shows the convening power that they managed to aggregate in very little time.
In short, the Manifesto in Defense of the Brazilian licit Market turned 
smuggling into the reference trope that organized the discourse and the de-
mands of the movement, and the IDeSF’s research as presented in the Cost of 
smuggling provided some of the numbers that were continually repeated since 
its release. Given the centrality of these numbers, it is fundamental to look into 
them.
SMuGGlING NuMBeRS
The Cost of smuggling resulted from a study coordinated and applied by IDeSF 
together with Empresa Gaúcha de Opinião Publica e Estatística (eGoPe), a 
company dedicated to market and public opinion research based in lajeado, a 
small city of Rio Grande do Sul State. The study has three components: a de-
scription of the smuggling circuits that connect Ciudad del este, Foz do Iguaçu, 
and São Paulo (general data); an analysis of the cost and profits of the ten most 
smuggled products at the time of their purchase in Paraguay and when they are 
sold in São Paulo (top 10); and a description of the smuggled cigarette market.
General data—displayed as findings in the presentation of the research and 
amplified by the media—were derived from fifteen interviews with “smugglers” 
about topics such as income, number of persons that work for a boss, number 
21. In fact, Guimarães’s relationship with Globo dated from the end of the 1970s. For 
his trajectory, see MemóriaGlobo (2013).
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of trips, and amount of goods transported. Indirect speech—such as “It is esti-
mated” or “It was identified”—allowed the authors to present the data without 
the need to qualify it. Almost all the figures are presented without any explana-
tion as to how they were calculated, including claims that “15,000 people are 
directly involved with smuggling in the Foz do Iguaçu region” (IDeSF 2015a: 
8), that the average income in the smuggling world is R$985, or that income is 
concentrated among the 2 percent that control the business. If the general data 
was obtained through qualitative methodologies, the text does not explain how 
it was transformed into quantitative data.
The Cost of smuggling report presents “The top 10” most smuggled products, 
based on seizures by the Federal Revenue Service. The graph shows data that 
indicates the following products and figures smuggled through the Brazilian-
Paraguayan border (in %): cigarettes (67.44), electronic devices (15.42), com-
puters and accessories (5.04), clothes (3.03), perfumes (2.45), watches (2.03), 
toys (1.89), glasses (1.5), medicines (0.85), beverages and drinks (0.35).22 When 
the report turns to the smuggled cigarette market, these percentages are pro-
jected nationally: “As we saw previously, cigarettes today represent 67.44% of all 
the smuggling that enters through the borders, the equivalent of R$6.4 billion 
considering losses for industry and taxation. Included among them, R$4.5 bil-
lion are taxes that the state fails to collect.” (IDeSF 2015: 11).
Before considering the procedure that generates these estimates, let’s ex-
amine the numbers. The percentages were calculated from seizures at the Foz 
do Iguaçu office of the Federal Revenue Service in 2014. Those percentages, 
however, were calculated without four items of the Federal Revenue Service list 
and the exclusion of these items was not justified in the report (see table 1). In 
table 1, we can see the percentages calculated by IDeSF (the blank cells cor-
respond to the items excluded). The second column (RF—Foz do Iguaçu) pre-
sents the percentages considering total seizures in Foz do Iguaçu (lichacovski 
22. After presenting the “top 10” most smuggled products, the report presents a table 
with the gains that each item can produce; it compares the prices between in 
Ciudad del este, Paraguay (provision market) and São Paulo (selling market). The 
prices were determined by consulting 180 stores in Ciudad del este and 120 stores 
in São Paulo. The average price of the products—which is very interesting data—is 
accompanied by three other columns: the cost of smuggling for each product, the 
minimum gain, and the maximum gain. Although explained in the text, the reader 
does not have all the elements necessary to understand the percentage that appeared 
in each column for every product.
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2015). The third column (RF—Brazil) presents the percentages of that mer-
chandise in relation to all seizures done by the Federal Revenue Service in 2014 
in Brazil (RFB 2014).
Table 1: Smuggling seizures in 2014, Brazil (% by products according to different 
sources: IDeSF 2015; lichacovski 2015; RFB 2014)
Products IDESF RF—Foz do Iguaçu RF—Brazil
% Position % Position % Position
Cigarettes 67.44 1º 51.86 1º 28.61 2º
Vehicles 16.57 2º 5.38 4º
electronic devices 15.42 2º 11.86 3º 8.43 3º
other products 5.92 4º 40.74 1º
Computers & accessories 5.04 3º 3.87 5º 2.29 7º
Clothes 3.03 4º 2.34 6º 5.24 5º
Perfumes 2.45 5º 1.88 7º 0.7 12º
Watches 2.03 6º 1.56 8º 2.18 8º
toys 1.89 7º 1.45 9º 1.23 9º
Glasses 1.5 8º 1.15 10º 3.09 6º
Medicines 0.85 9º 0.65 11º 0.25 13º
optical media (recorded) 0.46 12º 0.78 11º
Beverages and drinks 0.35 10º 0.28 13º 0.83 10º
optical media (blank) 0.15 14º 0.25 14º
total 100 100 100
The distortion produced by the exclusion of certain items (that is, vehicles, 
other products, and both recorded and blank optical media) guaranteed the 
inclusion of other items (that is, beverages and drinks) among the top 10 list of 
IDeSF. The distortion was aggravated by the recalculation of the percentages 
without the amounts of the items excluded. to visualize that, we need to incor-
porate the total amounts reported by the Foz do Iguaçu office of the Federal 
Revenue Service.
to recalculate the percentage of seizures with a smaller total amount ensures 
the inflation of the toP 10 figures of IDeSF (compare IDeSF / RF—Foz do 
Iguaçu columns, in table 1). two other procedures transform these numbers 
in a superlative dimension. First, the report projects those numbers nationally 
(“cigarettes today represent 67.44% of all the smuggling that enters through the 
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borders,” IDeSF 2015, 11). Second, it converts the percentage back again in a 
total amount of money (“the equivalent of R$6.4 billion considering losses for 
industry and taxation. Included among them, R$ 4.5 billion are taxes that the 
state fails to collect,” IDeSF 2015: 11).
The national projection of the arranged percentages produced by IDeSF 
creates a gross misrepresentation in its portrayal of smuggling. The difference 
between the amount of cigarette smuggling according to IDeSF and the sei-
zures by the Federal Revenue Service in Brazil (third column in table 1) is 
enormous: from almost 70 percent of all smuggling for IDeSF to less than 
30 percent according to actual seizures. That number not only captures the 
Table 2: Comparison of seizures according to the Federal Revenue Service and the 
IDeSF in 2014 (amounts, ranking, and resulting %) (IDeSF 2015; lichacovski 2015).





















14,855,021.00 3º 2º 14,855,021.00 15.42
other products 7,405,453.00 4º
Computers and 
accessories
4,852,927.00 5º 3º 4,852,927.00 5.04
Clothes 2,921,005.00 6º 4º 2,921,005.00 3.03
Perfumes 2,359,588.00 7º 5º 2,359,588.00 2.45
Watches 1,957,027.00 8º 6º 1,957,027.00 2.03
toys 1,820,297.00 9º 7º 1,820,297.00 1.89
Glasses 1,440,367.00 10º 8º 1,440,367.00 1.5










totAl 125,268,302.00 96,327,653.00 100
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attention of the media—appearing in several headlines and tV spots23—but it 
is one of the main examples used by the spokesmen of etCo, FNCP, IDeSF, 
and ABCF to confirm the connection between the rise in taxes and the expan-
sion of smuggling.
The conversion of the percentage back again into a total amount of money 
inflated the figure used to calculate losses of industry and taxation. The total sei-
zures by the Federal Revenue Service in 2014 was R$1.8 billion and the seizure 
of cigarettes corresponded to R$515,319,232.73—equivalent to 28.61 percent 
(RFB 2014: 7). If we recalculate the total amount using the percentage pro-
duced by IDeSF (67.44 percent of R$1.8 billion), we will have an amount of 
R$1.2 billion. That amount was multiplied by an apparently “official multiply-
ing factor,” which says that only between 5 percent and 10 percent of smuggled 
goods entering the country are seized.24
Next, the report calculates what the industries could have profited by 
producing and selling the same number of cigarettes that correspond to that 
amount of money, and how much the government could have earned with taxes. 
“Brazilian losses” are obtained from this kind of projection. However, at this 
point, we perceive that the aggregated numbers of losses are an assemblage 
of disparate sources, guesses, and manipulations. The limit between descrip-
tion and lobbying is blurred and the manipulation of numbers for imposing an 
agenda in the public debate becomes clear. As we have already seen, Souza Cruz 
(the British-American tobacco subsidiary in Brazil) is a partner of IDeSF; it is 
also associated with ABCF, etCo, and FNCP. Philip-Morris is also associated 
with FNCP.
23. Bom dia, Brasil, for example, a television news program broadcast by Globo Channel, 
on the National Day to Combat Smuggling declared: “Cigarette is the most 
smuggled product in Brazil, points out research. The product represents almost 70% 
of all smuggling in the country. Brazil lost R$4,5 billons in taxes” (Bom dia Brasil 
2015). The same claim appears in Jornal da Globo, the news program broadcast by 
Globo Channel at the end of the day (Jornal da Globo 2015) as well as in several 
reports and articles.
24. In the report, that estimation was credited to the Brazilian Prosecutor Service (“Foz 
do Iguaçu, 17/12/2014,” p.4). In fact, the quotation corresponds to declarations 
of Federal Prosecutor Alexandre Collares Barbosa to the media. The prosecutor 
presented that estimation in a Civil Action against the union asking for more 
federal agents to control the region. In the action, the estimate is also quoted in the 
indirect speech “It is estimated that. . .” without qualifying the agent of estimation 
(MPF 2014: 6).
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even if the figure for cigarette smuggling is a flagrant distortion, the “R$100 
billion that Brazil lost with smuggling” that was reported in the first edition of 
the National Day to Combat Smuggling in Foz do Iguaçu and Brasilia did not 
even appear in the IDeSF report.25 It was a projection already taken for granted 
among the organizers of the Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian licit 
Market,26 a projection that was updated the following year—growing to R$115 
billion—with no other specification than the worsening of the problem.
The figure of “R$100 billion lost with smuggling” corresponds to what Max 
Singer has called mythical numbers; numbers produced by guesstimating and 
made for exaggerating the scope and urgency of a portrayed problem. In the 
area of crime, he said, those numbers come to be “more mythical and have more 
vitality” (Singer 1971: 6).27 Precisely, the difficulty of measuring unregistered 
markets and transactions opens the possibility for distortions and manipula-
tions. As Peter Andreas affirmed, “illicitness makes possible a politics of num-
bers that is particularly susceptible to speculation, distortion, and sometimes 
even outright fabrication that is rarely questioned or challenged in policy de-
bates and media reporting” (Andreas 2010: 23).
In Brazil, Pedro Mizukami and others called “magical numbers” those that 
were produced in the Brazilian enforcement context regarding the global value 
of the pirate market, the jobs lost to piracy, and the lost tax revenue (2011: 
276–78). The “R$100 billion lost with smuggling” is a direct derivation of these 
magical numbers. In the case of smuggling, the “politics of numbers”—to use 
25. The regional director of the Federal Revenue Services, luiz Bernardi, started to 
use that figure in 2005 when he declared that the damages to Brazilian economy 
produced by smuggling corresponded to R$100 billion (Agência Brasil 2005). He 
repeated the same number in 2013 (Wurmeister 2013), but the media presented 
that data as an official number. luiz Bernardi is the head the 9th Region of the 
Federal Revenue Service since 2001. The 9th Region includes the estates of Santa 
Catarina and Parana, where Foz do Iguaçu is located.
26. The accuracy and the magnitude of the number turn it into a doubtful figure. In his 
field guide to identifying dubious data, Joel Best warns about Big Round Numbers. 
In his description, “Big round numbers make big impressions. They seem shocking: 
‘I had no idea things were that bad!’ They are easy to remember. They are also one of 
the surest signs that somebody is guessing” (Best 2013: 30).
27. Singer’s classic text analyzed the exaggerated number of property theft by heroin 
addicts in New york, derived from the hyperinflated number of addicted people in 
the city. Thirteen years later, in “The (continued) vitality of mythical numbers,” Peter 
Reuter resumed Singer’s analysis of mythical numbers regarding the drug market 
(Reuter 1984).
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Andreas’s expression—was a particular development of antipiracy politics that 
has produced specific effects: the legitimization of corporate and industrial 
groups’ claims, a singular spatialization of the “illicit market,” and the criminali-
zation of economic practices. I will explore these elements to conclude.
FRoM PIRACy to SMuGGlING: SPAtIAlIzING PRoBleMS, 
CRIMINAlIzING PRACtICeS
Since the constitution of the Movement for the Defense of the Brazilian licit 
Market, smuggling has replaced piracy in the practice and rhetoric of institu-
tions such as etCo, FNCP, and ABCF. The strategy of a “national day to 
combat” was accompanied by the same practices of lobbying, training, and 
educational campaigns that characterized their work against piracy. As with 
piracy, the presumed connection with organized crime is a crucial aspect of 
the construction of the urgency of the campaign. According to their script, 
the conditions that encourage smuggling are high taxes and a difficult envi-
ronment for business. Behind every intervention denouncing the increase of 
smuggling and its connection with organized crime, there is a demand for tax 
reductions.
The FNCP launched the most transparent campaign in this regard, Imposto 
cresce, crime agradece (loosely translated, “taxes rise, crime obliges”). As the logo 
of the campaign states, “When taxes on cigarettes rise, smuggling carried out 
by organized crime—together with arms and drugs—also rises.” The campaign 
included television spots in which actors from Globo television introduced “an 
interview” with a cigarette smuggler in what seems to be a slum house.28 A 
blurred out figure with a distorted voice says, “to us, when taxes on cigarettes 
28. While the smuggler talks, the legend on the screen says, “Interview with a cigarette 
smuggler by Adriana Bittar (15/04/2016).” The “interview” is part of a “documentary” 
presented by Adriana Bittar in a slum—“like any slum of any Brazilian city”—
where she interviewed a bartender that sells cigarettes from Paraguay and the 
smuggler already mentioned (FNCP 2016). The last minute of the film shows 
scenes of armed robberies, confrontations, kidnappings, and armed displays of force 
in slums. Bittar’s voice narrates: “Cigarette smuggling is directly connected with 
organized crime and violence.” Her final words are revealing: “taxes, organized 
crime, smuggling. That is a heavy load. . . . It is not possible for Brazil to carry it 
anymore.”
272 The Real economy
rise, it is very good. It is very profitable. We thank the government. It is easier 
and better working with Paraguayan cigarettes than with arms and drugs.”29
The campaign of the FNCP is coarse, as we saw in the “playful protest” 
presented at the beginning of this chapter, or in report produced by the IDeSF 
about the amount of cigarette smuggling. A similar conclusion was reached in 
the analysis of the antipiracy campaigns in Brazil.30
Studying anti-piracy public awareness campaigns in Brazil is a dismal exercise. 
Demagoguery and scare tactics are the norm, often to a degree that reads as 
comedy rather than instruction. All are localizations of templates developed at 
the international level, and all hit the same simple messages: “you wouldn’t steal 
a car”; “kidnapping, guns, drugs . . . the money that circulates in piracy is the 
same money that circulates in the world of crime”; “tomorrow I will sell drugs in 
my school because of that DVD”; and “thank you ma’am, for helping us to buy 
weapons!” are typical. (Three of the four quotes come from recent spots produced 
by the uBV, the organization of Brazilian film distributors, which has developed 
a particular specialization in the genre. The spots run on tV, in theatres, and in 
DVD preview materials.) (Mizukami et al. 2011: 288)
Comparison with antipiracy politics is grounded on the notion that we are talk-
ing of the same actors, and elaborating the same strategies and arguments that 
they previously deployed. The introductory words of Joe Karaganis in the Social 
Science Research Council research on Media piracy in emerging economies (where 
the Brazilian analysis was carried out) are relevant:
What we know about media piracy usually begins, and often ends, with industry-
sponsored research. There is good reason for this. uS software, film, and music 
industry associations have funded extensive research efforts on global piracy over 
the past two decades and, for the most part, have had the topic to themselves. 
Despite its ubiquity, piracy has been fallow terrain for independent research. 
With the partial exception of file sharing studies in the last ten years, empirical 
work has been infrequent and narrow in scope. The community of interest has 
29. See http://www.fncp.org.br/impostocrescecrimeagradece/.
30. For a detailed analysis of a campaign against piracy launched in 2009 by the FNCP, 
see Dent (2012).
273SMuGGlING ReAlItIeS
been small—so much so that, when we began planning this project in 2006, a 
substantial part of it was enlisted in our work.
 That community has grown, but there is still nothing on a scale compara-
ble to the global, comparative, persistent attention of the industry groups. And 
perhaps more important, there is nothing comparable to the tight integration of 
industry research with lobbying and media campaigns, which amplify its pres-
ence in public and policy discussions. (Karaganis 2011: 1)
A judgment that dismissed the application for the prohibition of the “taxes rise, 
crime obliges” campaign television spots provides the clearest demonstration 
of the interests represented by organizations like etCo, FNCP, and ABCF. 
The campaign was denounced by antitobacco activists as a way of reintroducing 
cigarettes into publicity spots. An action against the campaign was presented at 
CoNAR (National Council of Advertisement Self-Regulation) but the judg-
ment—unanimously—considered that it was not an apology for tobacco but 
a campaign of a productive sector against taxation, something that it is not 
against the Brazilian Self-Regulating Advertising Code. The vote of the coun-
selor André luiz Costa is revealing:
The film does not advertise cigarettes. Although increasingly combated but le-
gally established, the tobacco industry produces a free drug whose trade is regu-
lated. This industry, to avoid losing even more ground with tax increases, uses 
advertising time and free expression to avoid changes in the tax burden of its 
sector, something that is legal. That’s what is portrayed in the movies. While 
not doing cigarette advertising, the tobacco industry is free to manifest itself as 
productive sector. (CoNAR 2016)
As the counselor explicitly states, it is the tobacco industry that is talking 
through the FNCP campaign, defending its interests: to reduce the tax pressure 
of the state.
After more than a decade crusading against piracy, smuggling has become 
the new privileged problem in the battles over taxes and property claims imple-
mented by corporations and industrial groups in Brazil. Piracy, counterfeiting, 
and informality are still important, but at present they orbit smuggling. Perhaps 
this new emphasis on smuggling is related to particular conjunctures: the gov-
ernment transition of 2014, the economic crisis in Brazil, and the destitution 
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of the elected president in 2016.31 However, this emphasis allows us to follow 
the heightened commitment to the “licit market” that legitimates a moralizing 
discourse and a criminalizing strategy by corporate actors; that is, discourse and 
strategy that help consolidate the proliferation of new markets for law enforce-
ment. The border becomes a privileged scenario for the emplacement of the 
markets for law enforcement through the proliferation of vehicles, radars, arms, 
drones, and all the technologies for control and surveillance.
Smuggling presupposes the border and the border is a perfect scenario in the 
battle for the “licit market.” In a long-term perspective, seizures have been on 
the rise at the Brazilian borders. The tightening of controls was part of a gen-
eral policy of integration of the economic space of Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur)—the regional trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, uruguay, 
and Paraguay—since the 1990s. During the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, São Paulo gradually replaced Ciudad del este (Paraguay) as the port of en-
try of imported products for the Brazilian market (Silva 2014). This was further 
matched by a policy of repression at the borders and on the roads (Rabossi 2004; 
Pinheiro-Machado 2010).
The border had been already politicized in Brazil and abroad (Heyman 
1995, 2004; Andreas 2009), long before it was highlighted by the antismuggling 
campaign. In the last decade, discussions on urban insecurity—especially during 
elections—started to single out Brazilian open borders as responsible for the 
arms and drugs that funnel into major Brazilian cities. echoing the debates of 
the presidential campaign of 2010 that put the border as a threat to internal se-
curity, Dilma Rousseff ’s government inaugurated the Strategic Plan for Borders 
in 2011, which included the creation of the National Strategy of Public Security 
at the Border (Ministry of Justice) and the organization of operations mobiliz-
ing the Armed Forces (Agata operations) and the Federal Police (Sentinela 
operations). In 2014, the border returned to the fore with the pending elec-
tions. There seems to be a paradox between the growing control of the border 
31. on July 28, the president of etCo evandro Guimares visited former Vice President 
Michel temer, who occupied Dilma Roussef ’s position, to register the commitment 
and receptivity that the new government team has to their suggestions and the 
careful attention they are paying to problem. In his words, the temer government 
team “has shown, in two and a half months, a willingness to listen to the affected 
companies and a determination that the competent body act to create barriers to 
smuggling” (Planalto 2016).
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in the long run and the accusation of uncontrolled borders.32 The creation of the 
IDeSF signals a change for both the traditional antipiracy and counterfeiting 
agenda and for the border research and policy agenda. As a representative of the 
Brazilian Association for Combating Counterfeiting (ABCF), its president was 
part of the traditional strategies. However, IDeSF started to further its own 
agenda, where knowledge of the border was becoming increasingly important. 
As he spoke about the elaboration of the data the Cost of smuggling presented, 
eGoPe33 director and economist Adriano Strassburger said,
In the first discussion we had with luciano [Stremel Barros], president of 
IDeSF, we tried to show him that there is no use in just showing a problem, 
presenting a difficult situation, often a bad one. .  .  . So, to the extent that one 
wants to know, it is necessary to look for data.
As we have already seen in the analysis of that research, looking for data does 
not mean that it will qualify as consistent or robust. At any rate, preoccupation 
with the production of data on the border could trace a different path. Three 
seminars where organized by IDeSF in october 2014, 2015, and 2016—called 
Seminário Fonteiras do Brasil—and several publications followed The Cost of 
smuggling report: Security operations in border areas (2015b), Characteristics of 
border societies (2016a), and Crime routes: The crossroads of smuggling (2016b). The 
data used is different, and extensively employs secondary data. In 2016, together 
with the Association of Graduates of the Advanced School of War of Foz do 
Iguaçu and the eSIC-Business & Marketing School,34 the IDeSF initiated a 
postgraduate course in Management of Political Science, Strategy, and Plan-
ning, with an emphasis on borders. This new stance goes together with the tra-
ditional notion of advocating for the products of the companies that support the 
institute, like the main Brazilian tobacco company.
32. However, demands for control can go hand by hand with tightening controls. 
As Peter Andreas has shown in Border games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico divide, the 
growth of control and law enforcement at the border can further the escalation 
of risk and profits, of flows, and of demands for more law enforcement (Andreas 
2009).
33. eGoPe was a partner of IDeSF in that research.
34. eSIC was the first business school of Spain. It now has several international 
programs.
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once inscribed in the political agenda, borders have become a new govern-
mental frontier that guarantee an infinite field of interventions and designs, 
where security and control businesses can flourish without restrictions. The mil-
itarization of the border is one of the outcomes of this transformation, which 
came together with the proliferation of products, technologies, and procedures 
(Andreas 2009; Heyman and Campbell 2012). Brazilian border policy is gradu-
ally moving in that direction.
The recent emphasis on smuggling undertaken by the actors portrayed in 
this chapter, managed to naturalize a view of the border that criminalizes cer-
tain actors and circuits but not others. outside remains other points of entry 
that have an important place in the map of flows of products that came from 
abroad. For example, the luxury circuits of high and middle classes through 
which large quantities of merchandise are introduced by regular airports, and 
the markets of consumption for all these products, are completely absent from 
the portrait of smuggling that has become naturalize in the media.
The possibility of defining the reality of smuggling in so little time, efficient-
ly naturalized, was related to a very particular conjuncture. The manipulation 
of data that captured the attention of the media worked because the scenario 
for its enunciation was already prepared to have the effect that it achieved. The 
gradual presentation of that reality and the repeated proposals for tackling it—
reduction of taxes—underlines the lobbying strategy implemented by those 
actors. If the conditions were conjectural, the consequences are enduring: the 
tightening criminalization of certain practices, the circumscription of problems 
to certain spaces (borders and slums) and the naturalization of corporate claims 
as public interest.
“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences,” wrote 
William Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas (1928: 572). What became one 
of the most quoted sociological statements—at least among sociologists—con-
denses William Thomas’s concept of definition of the situation as central to 
human action: the real is not something given outside a definition and, once 
defined in a certain way, it produces real effects in the world.35 Thomas’s classical 
formulation helps us to advance an agenda on the “real economy”: Who defines 
what? With what means do they do so? For what reasons? Which consequences 
do these definitions produce? The power to define something as real and the 
35. For a discussion of the “Thomas Theorem”—as it was named by Robert Merton—
and the ways it was quoted and used in sociology, see Merton (1995).
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knowledge and techniques used to do so are crucial to understand the world 
that we live in.
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The method of the real
What do we intend with ethnographic 
infrastructure?
Bill Maurer
Yes, words are useless! Gobble-gobble-gobble-gobble-gobble! Too much 
of it, darling, too much! That is why I show you my work! That is why 
you are here!
—Edna E. Mode, The Incredibles
The false use of passions, or of types, or the mere use of conventional 
gestures,—these are all frequent faults in our profession. But you must 
keep away from these unrealities. You must not copy passions or copy 
types. You must live in the passions and in the types. Your acting of them 
must grow out of your living in them.
—Constantin Stanislavski, An actor prepares
When I took my very first anthropology class in college, the professor, Walter 
Fairservis, assigned the bible of method acting, Constantin Stanislavski’s An 
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actor prepares. It was a class called Peoples and Cultures of the Soviet Union. It 
was the weirdest thing I’d ever experienced in a classroom setting at that point 
in my fledgling academic career. The book is written from the point of view of 
an acting student named Kostya who chronicles his lessons with “The Director,” 
Tortsov, who is the fictional embodiment of Stanislavski himself. The reader is 
just thrown right into it. If you miss this at the outset, you will soon be lost. If 
you are not an actor, if you don’t know anything about the theater, and especially 
if you have no experience with Russian theater or much else besides a little 
Shakespeare and Masterpiece Theater on television—my situation in 1986—it 
is rough going.
What kept my interest, however, and pushed me to slog through it, was 
Professor Fairservis’s insistence on what he believed Stanislavski’s mission re-
ally was. I just had to take his word for it, but I was game. That real mission, he 
told us, was to help teach Russians how to act on stage in order to convincingly 
portray Russians. He said, “He’s trying to teach Russians how to act Russian.” 
He said it over and over again, through the several class sessions where we read 
An actor prepares and then Chekhov’s Three sisters. Somehow this was supposed 
to help us get at “the Russian national character.” I still didn’t quite get it, but 
I liked the problem posed and I liked that it was posed as an anthropological 
problem, a problem of the ethnographic method—even if I didn’t really know 
what that was yet, either.
This experience came back to me while reading the papers from the Real 
Economy conference that generated this volume. What could be more “meth-
od” than the instructor’s explanation in the workshop on the case method in 
business instruction quoted by Fabian Muniesa (Chapter 2 this book, p. 30): 
“The more the case is lived, . . . the more it is understood”? The business case is 
not a set of empirical facts from which to test hypotheses and draw conclusions 
but something to be “lived.” In other words, the business case is not supposed to 
be incorporated in a student’s preparation for the business world as a set of facts, 
but rather as a lived experience. This is the essence of method acting or of pre-
paring the actor for the role on the stage. There is resonance with ethnography. 
As Keith Hart said at the conference in Rio de Janeiro where these papers were 
first presented, a difficulty for ethnography is that although it had “sold itself to 
the academy as a science,” it cannot trace its truths to a “source.”
This chapter uses the essays from the Real Economy conference to stage a se-
ries of questions about the sources of ethnographic truths. I am interested in the 
homology between what ethnography does or can do—as I will discuss below, 
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I am particularly interested in how anthropologists can discover new things 
in old ethnographies—and how anthropologists grapple with the relationship 
between plural economic formations and that thing we call “capitalism.” The 
Real Economy project grapples with both the question of ethnographic repre-
sentation and the sources of ethnographic truths, and the question of economic 
plurality. Even the designation of the “real” economy suggests there is some-
thing others are missing when they look at economic relations and forms. An-
thropologists think we have specific insights to offer based on our attachment 
to certain kinds of methods. But I think we often miss possibilities for method 
in the impulse to be more revelatory than experiential, delighting in the reveal 
rather than in the doing. I will specify this “doing” in what follows.
How we understand economic plurality and how we do ethnography are 
intertwined, too, not just homologues. As ethnographers we live both problems: 
we live in plural economic worlds every day (and I do not mean “in the field” 
but “at home”); and we put ourselves in others’ shoes during fieldwork and in the 
reading of others’ ethnographic texts.
I am also interested in the family affinity between the Gens Manifesto (Bear 
et al. 2015) and the Real Economy project conveyed in this book. Both are con-
cerned with multiplicity and plurality, and the need to “challenge the bounded-
ness of the domain of ‘the economic’” (Bear et al. 2015: §2). Both strain against, 
even as they try to analyze, the kinds of standardization and formalization par-
ticular to, or ideologically enforced by, totalizing dreams of the thing we call 
capitalism. Both want to grasp how diverse life forces get enrolled in value pro-
jects. Although I am interested in the relations and conversions that make this 
enrollment (sometimes) possible, if (always) conflicted, I am more concerned 
here in what these twinned efforts illuminate about the ethnographic project. 
If the Gens project draws attention to the bridges or infrastructures between 
noncapitalist and capitalist economic forms that facilitate the conversion and 
appropriation of value from the former to the latter, I use the Real Economy 
essays to put forward the notion of ethnography as a similar kind of bridge. It 
has other intentions, however.
METHoD ETHnoGRAPHY
Method acting tries not to represent or mimic the intention of the character one 
is portraying but to place the actor in a situation where he or she will embody 
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it. At one point in An actor prepares, the Director asks a pupil named Maria to 
enact a simple scene of sitting on a chair. “not knowing where to look, or what 
to do, she began to change, to sit first one way and then another” (1948: 32), 
awkwardly going through a variety of poses before the curtain fell. others re-
peated the experiment; “their helplessness and desire to please were ridiculous” 
(33). Then, he asks Maria to come back up on stage, to the same chair she previ-
ously occupied, while he looks for something. She sits. “Her pose was life-like, 
natural” (33). Then the curtain fell. “‘How do you feel?’” the Director asked. “I? 
Why? Did we act?” “of course” was his reply. “Why, I didn’t act anything,” she 
protested. “That was the best part of it,” he replied. “You sat and waited, and did 
not act anything” (34). Her intention was simply to sit. And she did. And it was 
marvelous.
In Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra’s account of fraudulent orders to buy or sell 
securities, what comes across is the centrality of “intent” to the determination 
of what is or is not a “real” trade. There is nothing that materially differenti-
ates a true trade from a spoof. “like a forgery,” Pardo-Guerra writes, “a spoof 
is physically real” and is “materially identical to the other orders in the system” 
(2016: 13). This is why the discovery of intentionality matters so much to the 
identification of the spoof. Had Maria been intending to act as if sitting, and 
had done as well as she did when she did not realize she was “acting,” then that 
would have been acting indeed.
Conceptions of the “real economy,” as Jane Guyer (2016) outlines, wend 
their way through various Western political economic traditions. Yet “the po-
tential for slippage, or for insistent precision, across the range of terms to which 
‘real’ belongs is profound” (Guyer 2016: 245). Even in the field of economics, the 
real economy is a contested term. Prominent economists across the ideological 
and methodological spectrum appear to agree that the field has largely aban-
doned the real economy: “Economics has become an increasingly arcane branch 
of mathematics rather than dealing with real economic problems,” wrote nobel 
laureate Milton Friedman (1999: 137). Tony lawson, the Cambridge critical 
realist economist, opened his Economics and reality with the headline from an 
edition of the Times Higher Education Supplement: “no reality, please. We’re 
economists!” (1997: xii) before proceeding to launch a sustained case to “bring 
reality (or more of it) back into economics.” Closer to anthropology, Michel 
Callon (2005) and Daniel Miller (2002) have debated whether economic theory 
constitutes economic realities or virtual fantasies of neoliberal ideology. Ka-
ren Ho (2009: 36) argues, based on her ethnography of shareholder value, that 
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economic ideas are performative—but not in a total fashion—as well as being 
“virtual substitutions for real life complexity”—but again, not wholly so.
not acting anything. The Director’s statement implies a first-order reality 
in which resides the true nature of intention or purpose. Aristotle (2013) fa-
mously differentiated the primary and secondary uses of things, the former as-
sociated with their true, intended use, and the latter with second-order purposes 
to which they might be animated:
of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing 
as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the 
improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used 
for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for 
money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but 
this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object 
of barter. (Politics IX)
Such secondary purposes are not necessarily immoral or unjust. It is only when 
the secondary use of a thing is employed in the service of unlimited acquisition 
that it veers from its intended use. Household management, for Aristotle, “has 
a limit,” a natural one, determined by the size of the household and the provi-
sioning of its members. Trade and money-making move beyond the confines of 
what is natural and good when they exceeds this natural limit and when wealth 
acquisition is undertaken as an end in itself. Such an end is unbound by any 
natural constraint or convention. The shoe, to stick with this example, starts act-
ing in a whole new way when it is traded to make money beyond limit. When 
it is a shoe on my foot, however, it is not acting anything other than itself. It is 
simply being what it is, or what it was intended to be.
Anthropologists, for our part, have tended to assume that the real economy 
has those same natural limits that Aristotle postulated. This is perhaps borne 
of our longstanding interest in family, kinship, and household. It is also borne 
of our commitment to telling the reality of others’ lifeways: what is “real” is 
generally understood to be what is “on the ground,” as Jane Guyer has said to 
us in conversations about this workshop. What is on the ground tends to be the 
creation, maintenance, and sundering of familial and other interpersonal rela-
tions. So when we try to counter the “fictions” of finance, say, we seek out those 
“real” relations underneath or behind the fictions. or when we try to sketch 
“real” economies, we find ourselves returning to the oikos or the “human scale”. 
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This tendency is reflected in theoretical statements about the articulation of 
modes of production among the French structural Marxists (Meillassoux 1975), 
feminist anthropologists’ criticisms of the French Marxists’ naturalization of 
the biological generation of new humans, sidelining their social reproduction 
(Yanagisako and Collier 1987), and more recent work that understands capital-
ism and kinship as mutually implicated (Yanagisako 2002).
There is a tension, however, over whether those other social relations are su-
tured into a dominant mode of production, say, capitalism, or whether they exist 
outside, to one side, or sometimes out of phase with it, and when or whether it 
matters. For J. K. Gibson-Graham (2006), noncapitalist relations are all around 
us. Capitalism’s apologists, promoters, and critics alike refuse actually existing 
economic plurality and diversity, and in so doing make out capitalism—and 
any critical response to it—to be singular or monolithic. Anna Tsing (2015a) is 
closer to the articulation of modes of production approach, in that she “look[s] 
for the noncapitalist elements on which capitalism depends” (2015a: 66). What 
she calls “pericapitalist” spaces are both inside and outside capitalism—say, lao 
and Hmong mushroom foragers’ trajectories of and relationships to war, dis-
placement, and migration. In designating these as pericapitalist she foregrounds 
their articulation to or mobilization for “salvage capitalism” (Tsing 2015a: 106) 
in order to show how things “created in these non-capitalist processes are trans-
lated into capitalist value” (Tsing 2015b: ¶2). Indeed, “economic diversity makes 
capitalism possible” and at the same time provides the possibility for “instability 
and refusal of capitalist governance” (Tsing 2015a: 301).
Tsing’s argument, and the analytical perspective on economic plurality pre-
sented by the Gens Manifesto (Bear et al. 2015), restages while challenging 
earlier Marxist accounts of the relationship between noncapitalist and capitalist 
modes and relations of production. Revisiting those debates gets us right into 
the thick of the “real”—and the association in anthropology between the real 
and the household, and how things “count” as real—literally and figuratively. 
There is an accounting problem here, and what Taylor nelms (2015) has called 
a problem of delimitation: How do we understand kinship, gender, and the 
real economy and decide whether, when, and how these forms are alternatively 
opened up or closed off in people’s practices, making bridges or articulations 
possible or not, sometimes or often, durable or periodic (as nelms also argued 
in a paper that was circulated after the Rio conference).
let’s dig into anthropology’s history for the often-overlooked antecedents 
of theories about economic plurality. Claude Meillassoux (1975) argued that 
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there is a twofold dependency of capitalism on non- or precapitalist forms. 
First, capitalism depends on the reproduction of labor power in the household. 
Second, capitalism as a global phenomenon in colonial imperialism depends on 
reserves of cheap labor power and resources outside its core loci in the industri-
alized West. To paraphrase Bridget o’laughlin’s summary (1977: 4), capitalism 
preserves these pre- and noncapitalist forms in order to exploit them more fully; 
primitive accumulation from noncapitalist modes “is a functional requirement 
of the reproduction of capital” (1977: 8).
o’laughlin criticized Meillassoux for naturalizing reproduction. House-
hold, family, and biological generativity are simply assumed as coterminous 
and given. Take, for instance, Meillassoux’s discussion of the supposed transi-
tion from land as a subject of production (among, say, migratory gathering and 
hunting bands) to land as an instrument of production (among quasi-settled 
horticulturalists). The ethnographic record on such quasi-settled communities 
contains examples of people developing systems of accounting between the full 
season and the fallow—they carry over surpluses and take stock of who has lent 
what to whom. Meillassoux describes them as resting on a system of “advances 
and returns”—credits and debts. This is because “production is delayed”—it 
takes time for those crops to grow—which requires ongoing “co-operation be-
tween members of the productive cell” (1975: 41). How is that cooperation 
organized and maintained? In addition to the social relations maintained be-
tween those who labor together, there are the relations over time between “the 
successive workers who, at each season, depend for their survival through the 
non-productive period and for the preparation of the next cycle on the subsist-
ence food produced during the previous productive period” (1975: 41). over 
time, he writes, the work team changes—but this establishes a relationship of 
debt to “those who came before” (Meillassoux 1972: 99–100). Thus elders gain 
authority over juniors, as being closer to as well as being an example of those 
who came before.
The problem o’laughlin and others (see Collier 1988) identified, however, 
is that this account assumes what should be explained: the “contingency of the 
biological reproduction of workers” (o’laughlin 1977: 7). In Meillassoux’s ac-
count, elder men perpetuate their authority over junior men “by controlling 
both the distribution of women and access to the valuables young men must 
present to women’s kin to validate marriages” (Collier 1988: 4)—the stuff of 
“primitive money,” or the accounting or memory-devices that make up so much 
of the early ethnology of money (e.g., Quiggin 1949).
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Jane Collier’s account of marriage and inequality in classless societies further 
advanced o’laughlin’s critique by pointing out the obvious from the evidence 
of the ethnographic record: it’s pretty clear that elder men don’t control women 
at all, at least, Collier writes, “not in any ordinary sense of the word ‘control’” 
(1988: 4). Rather, they are “constantly involved in litigation because unmarried 
girls have affairs and married women leave their husbands to run off with lovers 
or return home to mother” (1988: 4). Rather than controlling women, elder men 
face the accounting problem of “who owes what to whom” (1988: 4) and need 
to settle up with men jilted by their wives. Those primitive moneys, far from 
suggesting the price of a wife or compensation to the wife’s family for her labor 
is better seen as a remedy to a conflict situation rather than a right to a woman’s 
labor, reproductive or otherwise.
Read one way, Meillassoux’s critique sounds like Friedrich Engels’s account 
of the rise of private property—men gaining control over women’s reproductive 
powers once the “discovery” of paternity inaugurates the institution of private 
property through inheritance from those (men) who came before. This, too, is 
the story from louis Henry Morgan’s (1877) reading of numa Denis Fustel 
de Coulanges (1877), which was picked up by both Engels and Karl Marx. The 
defeat of the female line and common property by agnatic descent and private 
property represents the resolution for Marx and Engels of the first great world 
historic class struggle.
The classic Marxist version of the story depends on a “real” of biological re-
production, lineage, and “blood.” As Collier succinctly put it, however, “mating 
and marriage are not the same thing” (Collier 1988: 4). As o’laughlin put it, 
“social reality can never be adequately analyzed in . . . empiricist terms because 
the surface world of appearances provides only a fleeting and necessarily incom-
plete glimpse of the contradictory social relations that underlie it” (o’laughlin 
1977: 23). And now we come to the heart of the thing. How do we get at what’s 
on the ground—to return to Guyer—without falling into the empiricist trap? 
How do we “see,” ethnographically speaking, what we see? And how do we 
analyze relations without being fooled by what we see?
When ethnographers witnessed the exchange of valuables at marriage, it 
appeared to them to be a payment for a wife, the exercise of control over social 
relations of reproduction that effected a transfer of rights of the biological ca-
pacities of the wife from her family to the husband. What they did not always 
see were the ways in which debts were socially organized, and in which the 
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delimitation and durability (à la nelms) of relations among men were main-
tained or restored in the breach of such debts.
Consider, however, Collier’s accomplishment in Marriage and inequality—
and the ethnographic accomplishment that actually preceded it. The book is 
not based on fieldwork, but on rereading some old ethnographies. Collier “saw” 
things in those old ethnographies that others had not. How so? By placing her-
self in the position of the women whose lives and conflicts could be imagined 
through the pages of those ethnographies (and, admittedly, doing so by reading 
across a host of such ethnographies). She admits, this was a just-so exercise, im-
agining one playing the game from her own point of view and perspective. But 
nevertheless, it allowed her to open up the relations structuring social inequality 
and the importance of marital instability (really, women’s agency) in classless 
societies. There was enough in those old ethnographies for Collier to imagine 
herself in the position of the actors portrayed—even if only just off to the side, 
just off stage—to ask herself, what would I have done?
EMPIRICAllY PlURAl
I rehearse the feminist debate over Meillassoux because I think it is restaged 
in contemporary anthropological conversations about the real economy, and 
provides a cautionary tale on the limits of empiricism. It also reminds us that 
the translation of noncapitalist forms into capitalism has a prehistory in the 
annals of anthropological thought. It is easy to see Meillassoux’s first error—
naturalizing biological reproduction, which then prevented subsequent an-
thropologists from questioning the diverse forms of life-forces and their social 
production and organization into other value projects (to borrow some lan-
guage from the Gens Manifesto). It is more of a challenge to grapple with how 
we might still be reproducing his second error—subsuming all noncapitalist 
relations into capitalism. I think this is because revealing the subsumption of 
the noncapitalist into the capitalist feels like the answer. Having found the 
answer, we can then take our attention away from the “doing” on either side of 
that operation of subsumption as well as from the operations or infrastructures 
of conversion facilitating that subsumption. In effect, finding the answer is 
like making those hyperexaggerated expressions of emotion Stanislavski made 
fun of; attending to the doing requires just sitting in the chair, like Maria that 
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second time she was asked to do so, and acted convincingly by not playing at 
anything at all.
“Real” economic diversity, or “real” translation into capitalism: which one 
of these two constructs we as analysts or social actors take up, and when we do 
so, it seems to me, depends on the stakes of whichever game we are playing at 
whichever time or in whichever temporality. This, in turn, requires openness to 
these alternative times and games, or, to put it another way, openness to putting 
oneself in the shoes of those playing those games, much as Collier, but to the 
extent possible without caricature (about which, more below—I realize this is 
a perilous charge, and a place ethnography has been before . . . and not always 
a happy place!).
But we experience people doing this kind of operation themselves, out there 
in the “real” world. Take nelms’s argument (nelms 2015, and in nelms, n.d., 
which circulated among the Rio conference participants afterward): Variously 
positioned Ecuadorians either seek out those economic alternatives as a source 
of refusal of neoliberalism, or simply live them—not acting anything. Some-
times anthropologists (and some of nelms’s interlocutors) foreclose possibility 
in the name of ideological or analytical purity, or a desire to state what is “re-
ally” going on or what is “really” important, consequential, meaningful (such as 
incorporation into capitalist accumulation). I know that in refusing this fore-
closure I am just putting forward another conception of the real; but I am going 
to do it anyway, to see what it might evoke, to muster whatever resources it may 
afford me and my own nature for the new contexts and configurations, indeter-
minate, yet to come.
And, nota bene, I am doing it here, in terms of ongoing conversations the 
Real Economy project has fostered. (In spite of statements about surfacing con-
tingency and refusing totalizing purity in analyzing the things of the world, 
anthropologists remain pretty stingy in granting the same indulgences to each 
other!) I would very likely do otherwise in other venues, on another stage, so to 
speak, or in another time phase of this being that I call myself and my world. 
This, of course, implies a certain kind of being in a certain kind of world—one 
in which something called an individual in something called a society can oc-
cupy different roles, take on different perspectives. Marilyn Strathern (1991) has 
been a signal guide through the questions this sort of being/worlding evokes, 
and I will return to her in my conclusion.
Many of the actors described in the Real Economy chapters are them-
selves simply on a quest to sort out what’s real from what’s not. Whether they 
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are trying to get an accurate count of something (the size of South Africa’s 
economy, for James; smuggling into Brazil, for Rabossi; the numbers in the 
favela, for Motta) or trying to make themselves visible through formality and 
documents (as with migrant laborers at the Zimbabwe–South African border, 
for Bolt), or trying to determine whether a set of representations corresponds 
to a real economic fact (in securities trading, for ortiz; in antitrust cases, 
for onto; or in potentially fraudulent trades, for Pardo-Guerra), these actors’ 
goals are often to establish an incontestable baseline to guide to their own and 
others’ future action. To be successful as fact, that baseline has to be accepted 
by any parties that might consult it. It has to account for the real, and the 
activities that produce it have to be undertaken for real. Those actions cannot 
be an act.
of course, this path to objectivity is littered with failure. It’s hard to count 
certain things, and these chapters detail why, in particular cases, achieving a 
count that can stand as objective is often thwarted—by people’s everyday prac-
tice, their negotiations and conversions of one form of value into another, their 
resistances, or the lack of fit between the counting tool and the reality “on the 
ground” being counted. Still, the belief persists that counting can give access to 
the “real” economy.
What is this real economy? For some of the actors described here, it stands 
in opposition to the fictions of the financialized economy. The real economy 
is the economy of stuff, labor, construction, or manufacturing or mining or 
whatnot, as opposed to paper or digital trading of representations of some sup-
posedly more real assets backing them. These fictions can become so complex, 
however, that deducing the reality behind them is a puzzle for analysts and 
actors on the financial scene alike. There are contested claims, too, as we see 
in Horacio ortiz’s, Deborah James’s, and Gustavo onto’s chapters: it is often 
difficult to differentiate what is economic from what is stately, or what is neo-
liberal from what is redistributive. Multiplicity, ambiguity, and the intertwining 
of relations and institutions that are supposed to be separate keep getting in the 
way. The real economy is also the economy of certain time horizons, which, as 
Caitlin Zaloom shows, involves a great many leaps of faith, not straightforward 
economic calculation.
Stanislavski warned that theater based on “conventions”—stylized gestures 
expressing inner states, like clutching one’s head to convey anguished surprise—
may entertain but will not truly move the audience. Hence, the quotation that I 
have chosen as one of the epigraphs for this essay. Stanislavski challenged such 
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“unrealities” in favor of acting that grows out of living, or, what he elsewhere 
called “the direct co-operation of nature herself ” as opposed to “representation” 
(Stanislavski 1948: 22). The direct cooperation of nature gives you true intent 
and thus real drama. Anything else is just play-acting.
If Muniesa’s interlocutors are using cases to create subjective experiences 
that actors can draw on to guide future actions, some of nelms’s interlocutors 
crave cases, which they can turn into on-the-ground examples of alternative 
economic relationships or arrangements, not to experience but to implement, to 
make what they call a “real change.” If Muniesa’s worry that the real that busi-
ness students seek can never be realized, at least some of nelms’s informants 
commit themselves, given this same condition, to keep on trying, to “hang in” 
and hang on. Their commitment is reminiscent of Slavoj Žižek’s (1989) analysis 
of the ideological fantasy: ideology is not a veil masking the real, because we 
know full well that the real never lives up to its name. Yet we continue to persist 
in its fictions. This is analogous perhaps to drawing on one’s real emotions, in 
cooperation with nature, while nevertheless on the stage. or method ethnog-
raphy, we might say: experiencing in cooperation with others their experiences, 
which are also yours.
It is a phase-shift in time. In method acting, I know I am not this guy 
(whomever it is I am portraying; and let’s keep the masculine terms for now, for 
this is arguably a masculinist fantasy). But I have spent months, maybe years, 
turning myself into this guy—changing not just my physical appearance but my 
actual physical type, to the point possibly of causing health complications; not 
just reading about the lives of those like the one I will portray but partaking of 
their peccadillos or their perversions. So, am I that guy? of course not. And yet 
. . . I have become him. And yet . . . I am not him. And so on. (An aside: I think 
ontology would have a tough time here).
The process is similar to what nelms’s informants describe, as they seek 
or embody economic alternatives. or what James’s interlocutors experience as 
they juggle debts and relationships, here becoming responsible and responsibi-
lized borrowers or creditors, there falling into over-indebtedness and financial 
chaos—complexly intertwined, or again, at the “same” time yet out of phase, 
just as informal and formal or neoliberal and redistributive practices themselves 
intertwine. And it is in play in the multiplicity and plurality of both money and 
houses in Mariana luzzi and Ariel Wilkis’s chapter. In her chapter, Eugênia 
Motta tells an evocative story about a house in a favela whose owner styled hair. 
She reconfigured the main room of her autoconstructed house each time: what 
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is today a living room would become tomorrow a hairdressing salon. So, which 
is it, really? How do we live it, have muscle memory of it as we move through 
it, inhabit it? As luzzi and Wilkis relate, building materials—bricks—can be a 
store of value. But of course they are just bricks. And of course they are a store 
of value. But they’re bricks. You get the idea.
InTEnTIonAl ETHnoGRAPHY
In their exhortation to “live” the business case or to “live” the dramatic passions 
and types, Muniesa’s business instructor and Stanislavski’s Director might be 
describing the orientation in ethnography set out by Stephen Tyler in his con-
tribution to the Writing culture project. Strathern’s reworking of that orientation 
may give purchase on how ethnography can help us grapple with real econo-
mies. The real economy and ethnographic reality have something in common: 
they exceed representation. Tyler wrote that ethnography is “imperfect” (1986: 
122)—one might say partial—because it does not produce a universal metalan-
guage nor truly describe in total another reality. Rather, it evokes “what cannot 
be known discursively or performed perfectly”:
[If ] a discourse can be said to “evoke,” then it need not represent what it evokes, 
though it may be a means to a representation. Since evocation is nonrepresenta-
tional, it is not to be understood as a sign function, for it is not a “symbol of,” nor 
does it “symbolize” what it evokes. (Tyler 1986: 129)
In Tyler’s view, “fragments of discourse” “evoke in the minds of both reader and 
writer” a “possible world of commonsense reality” that produces an integrative, 
even therapeutic effect (1986: 125). Such fragments create an object of joint at-
tention that exceeds those fragments themselves (again, going back to Hart’s in-
sights, that is why for ethnography there are never clear or direct “sources” for 
truth claims). Taking the etymology of intend, they stretch or strain one’s atten-
tion toward something. Why strain, I wonder? Perhaps because the thing is not 
really perceivable as such, not amenable to empirical observation. like a “culture” 
or “society,” much less an “individual.” In any event: how like the method of An 
actor prepares or the case method of business instruction! The result is an “emer-
gent holism” (Stanislavski 1948: 133), a “restorative harmony” (134). Tyler also in-
voked polyphony and temporality in his effort to craft a new realism (1986: 137).
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The limit of evocation, however, is precisely this restorative harmony, this in-
tegrative therapy. As Strathern wrote of the situation of the ethnographer work-
ing “at home” in a generalized “Western” context or an English village, there 
is never any real integration. Rather, there is constant interruption. Whether 
from colleagues from other disciplines—sociology, economics—also working 
on the terrain of home, or our subjects, themselves theorists of their practices, 
there are constant “presences that impinge” (Strathern 1991: 23)—including the 
mundane knock on the door, new email, or administrative crisis that jolts us out 
of our research timespace and into our lives as bureaucrats (I speak for myself 
here). I would add: they impinge first in this time, then in another; here in one 
locus, there, elsewhere. There are different timespaces to these interruptions, 
and different spatiotemporal horizons. The situation is not limited to the eth-
nographer at home, of course. It is characteristic of any analytical or descriptive 
endeavor in which we hold onto the self in society, the concept of the person 
that denies its own partiality and multiplicity, its own distribution or dispersion 
across and within a social field, and its own interconnectedness with other such 
distributed entities. Strathern writes:
Interruptions to the self do not guarantee a therapeutic return to the familiar. 
Rather, there is a sense of holding in one’s grasp what cannot be held—of trying 
to make the body do more than it can do—of making a connection with others 
in a partial manner. (Strathern 1991: 27)
What Strathern and Tyler do for ethnography—as a site of connections and 
conversions—the Gens project (Bear et al. 2015) and Tsing do for capitalism. 
They “look beyond market exchanges and monetary forms to explore these con-
versions to take into account the full range of mediations: for example, between 
state debt and social debt, humanitarian projects and entrepreneurship, and 
non-human forms and commodities or resources” (Bear et al. 2015: §5), radi-
cally empirical without being irreducibly empiricist.
For those of us in Fairservis’s class, to read Stanislavski and then (trying) to 
act Chekhov was a peculiarly effective way to stage the method of ethnogra-
phy—and to stage it as “method” in the acting sense. To borrow one of Federico 
neiburg and Jane Guyer’s terms from their introduction to this volume, it “pro-
voked,” and it strained, pulled us toward a nonperceivable object. Despite our 
having been thrown into the Writing culture and deconstructive moment, words 
did not matter here so much. Showing was more important than saying, as 
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ludwig Wittgenstein had it. We were put in the position of Maria in An actor 
prepares, on the stage without realizing that the acting had begun, by which fact 
we were able to act.
Can the ethnographer bridge scenarios, neiburg and Guyer ask? Can eth-
nography itself be the bridge, the thing that facilitates that stretching-toward, 
that intention in the sense I’ve used above? That is to say, can ethnography of the 
real economy be the kind of conversion device, or infrastructure, that Bear et al. 
discuss in their reflections on capitalism? For the Gens project, conversion de-
vices channel the values and possibilities of plurality and multiplicity into capi-
tal—at least sometimes, and contingently so. Toward what would ethnography 
channel the possibilities of the polychronic (Bear et al. 2015), the polyphonic 
(Tsing 2015a: 24), and the multiple timescapes in which human and nonhuman 
actors coordinate their activities (Bear et al. 2015: §8)? My own struggle has 
been to harness ethnography’s infrastructures rather intentionally when setting 
off from the starting point of Gibson-Graham’s world of economic plurality 
and possibility. I try then to come back again toward that world, but now drop-
ping the “economic” frame altogether—in order to set our interests sometimes 
athwart capitalism as our primary object of concern and practice. This, anyway, 
is what I have intended to show.
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